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SUMMARY: A SYNOPSIS OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF THE THESIS
The aim of this thesis is to undertake an analysis of the expression and 
the concept of 'missionary theology' based on the writings of Emil 
Brunner. Through its analysis there are two main objectives: the first 
is an understanding of Brunner's missionary theology. The second 
objective is a critical evaluation of it. For more than two centuries, 
the issue of apologetics has been a dominating theme in the works of 
theologians and of those who have contributed to the development of the 
study of Christian religion. In fact, it is one of the perennial 
questions in Christian theology whether the Christian message can be 
adapted to be acceptable to modern man without losing its essential and 
unique character. In the history of Christian theology it is in 
reference to argued defences, against the various charges that 
Christianity is untenable, and against the expressions of 
misunderstanding of Christian faith, that the terms 'apology' or 
'apologetics' originated. There is necessarily a defensive element in 
all Christian preaching and teaching. In consequence the term 
'apologetics' implies the defence of Christian truth-claims.
Christian apologists, therefore, attempt to demonstrate that 
Christianity is more reasonable than, or at least as reasonable as, any 
other competing view of life. They may argue philosophically in defence 
of the greater reasonableness of belief in the existence of God; they 
may argue morally in defence of the greater moral force of incarnational 
belief; or they may argue historically in defence of the historicity of 
the gospel narratives; and some apologists attempt to argue for the 
compatibility of Christianity and modern science. Emil Brunner has also 
tackled this apologetic problem in his whole theological enterprise. He
attempts neither to return to orthodoxy nor to seek company with the 
liberals, but he suggests apologetic theology, or 'missionary theology' 
in his terms, in accordance with his theological proposal of truth as 
encounter. As a result, Brunner develops a theological epistemology 
which seems to be both biblical and existentialist or, precisely, 
dialogical-personalist and somewhat adequate to the subject matter with 
which theology has to deal. It seems to overcome the enslavement to the 
object-subject structure of knowing that dominates most of our ordinary 
and scientific thought. So his biblical personalism contributes to the 
discussion of the concept of faith.
Today, however, the apologetic problem and theology in general are 
faced with, in particular, the fundamental question of whether in 
speaking about God the man of faith is making assertions about 'what 
there is' and 'how things are'. This issue presents itself to the 
apologist as a problem concerning religious language. So many 
philosophers of religion wrote a great deal about whether religious 
utterances can be regarded as stating truths or falsehood, or whether 
such utterances should perhaps be thought of as expressing the speaker's 
feelings or directing commands and requests. To put it briefly, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein can remark: These are, of course, not empirical problems;
they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, 
and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in
despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not 
by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language.
Since I am convinced that the task of Christian apologetics in
relation to philosophy is the elucidation of the nature of biblical 
truth-claims by which our experience is to be interpreted as a whole, 
this philosophical analysis of language may provide us with a useful 
tool for working on the contemporary problem of theology. In this 
regard, theology as grammar in Wittgenstein’s terms tells us how to take 
the language of faith. It is an aid to those who would speak and 
understand that language, helping them to avoid mistakes and 
misapprehensions so that they can get along with the language. Theology 
as grammar, in this context, determines what can and cannot be said of 
God. Thus apologetic theology, like philosophy, is an activity of 
elucidation, that is, the activity of clarifying and analysing the 
content of our talk about God and the reflection on the fundamental 
concepts exercised in the church's talk about God.
From the methodological point of view of linguistic analysis our 
provisional conclusion which will clearly emerge from our study is that 
although Emil Brunner affirms its significance, he seems to be reluctant 
to discuss the theological semantics fully. For this semantic problem 
does not play a significant role in his thought. As a result, Brunner's 
use of the term ' truth as encounter1 seems to be ambiguous in asking 
what the real measure of appropriateness of a symbol to the experience 
can be. If the one fundamental task of the apologist is to understand 
the gospel which is an answer to the questions of men of every present 
age, or precisely if the aim of the process of 'missionary theology' in 
his terms is to bring every thought into captivity to the obedience of 
Christ, then missionary theology is no more than an intellectual 
presentation of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which starts from the 
situation of the hearer and is addressed to it. One of the reasons for 
the omission of semantics is that this would bring him dangerously close
to natural theology if theological semantics necessarily had this 
consequence. In other words, although he recognises that philosophy is 
both possible and necessary, Brunner does not essentially appreciate the 
philosophical question enough.
Consequently, faith and the meaningful character of theological 
discourse will not be open to the kinds of analysis to which it is often 
put; and then the language of theology will always remain mysterious, 
or as those lacking the power to be truly critical may put it, it must 
be invalid and nonsensical. For we might take these human words of ours 
in full recognition of the fact that they were in themselves quite 
inadequate to God's own revelation of Himself, and allow that revelation 
to give them a meaning of its own. However, we are convinced that the 
meaning of any language is to be sought in a social context where it has 
a genuine use. Moreover, the language of faith is also a language 
within the community of faith. As this community develops, it affects 
the language because the concepts of this language are related to the 
community. In this respect Christian language is the speech of the 
believer who is rooted in the gospel, who speaks to the present, and who 
waits for the end. Therefore, if Brunner claims that the missionary 
theology aims at interpreting the gospel in such a way that men of today 
can feel themselves addressed thereby in their particular conditions, 
then one is tempted to suggest that the problem of religious language 
should not be neglected completely; perhaps a necessary way of dealing 
with the missionary problem is to try to undertake such an activity of 
elucidation or a linguistic analysis of religious assertions.
To begin with, chapter I deals with Brunner's basic notion of the 
term 'missionary theology', and precisely sketches to indicate our aim
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of investigation. Chapter II examines a theological context for 
Brunner's missionary theology to show the origin and development of it. 
His whole theological thought and work, consequently the term 
'missionary theology', was largely determined by the debate and response 
to his contemporary theological opponents, Karl Barth and Rudolf 
Bultmann. Brunner's insistence that faith is 'the point of contact' for 
divine revelation suggests a relational and Christological understanding 
of man's essential being. But his conceding to the 'formal image' a 
legitimate role in presenting the continuity of personal identity in sin 
and faith leaves open the possibility of an immanent structural concept 
of human being as subjectivity, personality and responsibility. Whereas 
Barth, especially in his early period, emphatically denies that the 
possibility of sin (is) one of the possibilities given in human 
creatureliness, as is implied in Brunner's assertion of neutral 
spiritual capacities. In Brunner's view, Barth identifies, however, the 
object of faith with the Word of God.
Rudolf Bultman proposes demythologisation which revolves around two 
poles: interpretation, that is, the articulation of an ancient message 
in modern terminology, and the question about human existence, its 
potentiality and its meaning. Precisely demythologisation is then the 
interpretation of the New Testament faith in terms of the understanding 
of human existence. However, even though Brunner is in sympathy with 
Bultmann's theological proposal of demythologisation, he raises a 
question of whether this is not to reduce the reality of the historical 
revelation to simply subjective experience.
Chapter III investigates Brunner's alternative proposal of truth as 
encounter, which indicates the paradigm of his missionary theology. In
this theological programme he heavily depends upon the I-Thou philosophy 
of Martin Buber. His dialogical personalism gives Brunner a new insight 
into the unique character of the fundamental phenomenon of the biblical 
message, the unity of truth and fellowship. So Brunner's fundamental 
thesis is that the biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped by 
means of the object-subject antithesis, on the contrary, it is rather 
falsified thereby. Therefore, he substitutes the category of personal 
correspondence or encounter in its place. Chapter IV analyses the 
truth-claims of Brunner's missionary theology, in which he is primarily 
concerned with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This notion 
involves his methodological terminology 1 truth as encounter 
revelation as an objective event in history and the reception of this 
revelation by man through faith. However, through our undertaking an 
analysis of the term 'missionary theology' the argument about the 
concept of truth is that it is ambiguous with respect to its use in 
terms 'history', 'bible', 'faith' and 'philosophy'.
Since Emil Brunner draws knowledge and fellowship into a unity, 
that is, to know God means to be one with him, chapter V discusses these 
theological epistemological concepts derived from the experience of 
actual faith, of faith as a living reality and sees how they function in 
a missionary context. For him, the reality of God is a fundamental 
presupposition of the Christian faith and the church. To some extent 
Brunner's theological thought has always been concerned with the 
question of what the truth is. Furthermore, since faith for him is 
understood in such a personal way, certain conclusions necessarily 
follow for the concept of the church. He is convinced that the ecclesia 
of the New Testament, the community of Jesus Christ, is a pure community 
of persons and has nothing in it of the character of an institution. So
vii
he challenges the institutional church to the much vaunted rediscovery 
of the church and its missionary task.
Chapter VI discusses the basic issues of a missionary theology 
which is to be discovered in the underlying conceptions and principles 
of Brunner's theological enterprise. Here, at vital points, is rooted 
the necessity of the missionary task of Christian faith as historic 
revelation and in the nature of man. In this regard, although we
recognize the importance, for practice, of Brunner's account of the term 
'ecclesia', it is necessary also to discuss the language used within 
those forms of life which are found within the church. Further, it is 
desirable to consider expressions which we used within churchly forms of 
life but which can also come to be understood by those outside, even 
from differing cultures. This would add content to the notion of a 
'point of contact'. With these related issues of the communication of 
the Christian message, I want to bring the language of encounter with 
some of the issues which are beset with difficulties in testing symbols. 
Thus I shall invoke Wittgenstein's notion of 'forms of life' and 
'language-games' in my attempt to tackle our doing missionary theology. 
Finally, Chapter VII deals with a critical evaluation of Brunner's 
theological proposal of truth as encounter.
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I INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the term 'missionary theology1 
based on the writings of Emil Brunner. Through this investigation I 
want, firstly, to attain an understanding of Brunner's missionary 
theology and then attempt to show a critical evaluation of it. His 
entire theology has an missionary character.^ This is expressed even in 
the peculiar thrust of his thinking and speaking. His theology always 
tends to dialogue , encounter, criticism, dynamic decision and 
missionary outreach. Throughout his life Brunner has tackled the 
problem of missionary theology, or apologetics. However, he attempts 
neither to return to orthodoxy nor to seek company with the liberals, 
but to develop a missionary theology in a way of his own theological 
proposal, truth as encounter. Brunner is convinced that this proposal 
reveals errors, misunderstandings, and hiding places in which the modern 
man usually entrenches himself against faith. It is in its whole 
tendency and aim a continuous encounter with the way in which the modern 
man thinks and understands himself. Thus it affects man in his 
reasoning, his responsibility, his personality. For him, this 
missionary encounter with disbelief is a goal of evangelical theology 
which is directly and necessarily connected with the preaching of the 
word.
In Brunner's view, it is not just enough to prove and to 
substantiate Christian faith by means of logical argument, a defence of 
Christianity against its modern enemies and despisers, an apology for 
faith before the forum of human reason, or an annexation of faith to a 
scientific system of thinking by harmonizing oppositions and rational 
contradictions. Rather, Brunner attempts to define the meaning and the
1
task of a missionary theology in a new way. Missionary theology or
apologetics, according to him, is eristics. The word 'eristics' derives
* * y* > /
from the Greek word G  p c £  t is meaning to dispute; or eftcrTrjK.*) TEX,*]
meaning the art of disputation. Or it means Auseinandersetzung,
argument.^ The reason for this is that the word 'apologetics' is too
heavily burdened with onerous connotations; it. calls to mind a faith
that weakly and fearfully seeks to defend itself before the tribunal of
reason. The history of theology through the centuries has shown that
this picture corresponds to reality. Furthermore, the term
'apologetics' connotes a theology in which the church seeks to defend
Christianity before a world that has lost confidence in the church. He
puts it as follows:
Apologetic, or (as I have proposed owing to the unfortunate 
suggestions attached to this word) "eristic" theology, is 
the intellectual discussion of the Christian Faith in the 
light of the ideologies of the present day which are opposed 
to the Christian Message. The name "apologetic" is hampered 
by the suggestion of a defence of Christian at the bar of 
Reason, even if it does not go so far as to claim rational
proof. Actually, however, what matters is not "defence" but
"attack" - the attack, namely, of the Church on the opposing 
positions of unbelief, superstition, or misleading 
ideologies. It is true that part of this attack consists in 
proving that the hostile attacks - not on empirical 
Christianity, for these are as a rule only too fully 
justified, but - on the Biblical Message, as being contrary 
to reason, opposed to culture, scientifically untenable, 
etc., are based upon errors, due either to the confusion of
rationalism with reason, of positivism with science, of a
critical with a sceptical attitude, or out of ignorance of 
the real truth which the Bible contains.^
Thus Brunner prefers to substitute for it the term 'eristics' 
although he retains the term 'apologetics' for traditional reasons. 
This, he believes, is more appropriate to the proper task of missionary 
theology because it indicates emphasis on the dialogical rather than the 
mere defensive attitude in his service of the church. For real 
apologetics means the attack of faith on the strongholds of disbelief;
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the attack on human reason insofar as reason obstructs faith; and this 
latter involves an attack on the idols of modern thinking as these are 
expressed in contemporary '-isms'. For the opposition to faith does not 
stem from reason as such, but from the abuse of reason, from the 
authoritarianism of the reason which regards itself and its creations as 
absolute.^ Moreover, he regards the task of missionary theology as one 
contained in the gospel and necessarily connected with it. In Brunner's 
opinion, revelation is divine self-disclosure, the coming of God to man. 
Thus it becomes human and seeks out man where he is. The word of the 
church is an instrument of the divine message and thus it has to subject 
itself to God's coming to man where he hides from God. This, therefore, 
is the passion of the divine agape itself that forces us to missionary 
concern.
In this regard, every attempt at preaching and theology which is 
not concerned with this missionary task, which does not take man 
seriously, is wrong from the very beginning. For Brunner, the proper 
task of missionary theology is, therefore, inseparable from what he 
calls 'Biblical theology' that reflects upon the Word of God, in as much 
as the Bible is the foremost witness of the revelation of God, and in 
every age the Scriptures must be exegeted anew.^ For this reflection 
does not occur in an empty, but in a historically filled space. The 
Word of God encounters men who have already taken a position prior to 
the confrontation, and have sought to explain the meaning of their 
existence in one way or other. Consequently, the proclamation of the 
Word is a call to rethink; it is a call to repentance |4€r"T,5 V 0 C d. * 
Indeed it is polemical. However, eristics does more than just show the 
unbeliever that he is wrong. If that were all, it would be merely 
negative. Rather, it has assignment to show that man can understand
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himself rightly only in faith; that alone through the Word can man 
become what he natively seeks; that solely in the Christian faith can 
he attain his true goal which he now seeks in a false way.6
Thus it becomes apparent that the problem with which missionary 
theology deals, is that of the relationship of the Christian faith to 
the thought of the unbeliever, with the hope of winning him to the 
Christ. How can the natural man be reached with the gospel? Can the 
natural man be prepared to accept faith? Missionary theology would 
elicit the confession of untruth from the unbeliever, but does this mean 
that he who turns believer must make a complete renunciation of his 
previous life and thought? If every thought must be brought into 
captivity to the obedience of Christ, must every thought also be purged 
of its rational content in order to give the proper primacy to Christ? 
What is the relationship between rational philosophy and revealed truth, 
or between general and special revelation? If a theologian ignores the 
questions of the man of today, then he is ignoring the living man 
himself and failing to capture his attention.
In fact, Brunner is convinced that the mere act of bearing witness 
remains sterile unless it can be integrated with the truth which the 
listener already possesses. To deny this is to deny an obvious fact; 
it really means shutting one's eyes to the truth for the sake of a 
mistaken theory.^ The one fundamental task of the theologian is so to 
understand the gospel that it answers the questions of men of every 
'present age'. Indeed he cannot ignore the questions of the modern man 
who is formed by the Zeitgeist, the spirit of the times. So a true 
theology must be a struggle by that Zeitgeist. In this regard, eristic 
theology is really missionary theology. "The aim of this process (of
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eristics) is to bring 'every thought into captivity to the obedience of
Christ1 - that is the programme of what we may call 'missionary
theology'".® For Brunner, this theology is, then, no more than an
intellectual presentation of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which starts
from the spiritual situation of the hearer, and is addressed to it.^ He
puts it as follows:
It is the task of "missionary theology" to accomplish in the 
sphere of intellectual reflection what every missionary 
does, as it were, by instinct. In so doing something is 
achieved which the dogmatic theologian, as such, ought not 
to do, and cannot do. His task is strictly confined to the 
subject with which he is dealing; the person who is 
listening to what he has to say does not directly concern 
him. He has enough to do to make clear the content of the 
message in its own proper context. The spiritual situation 
of the non-Christian hearer does not come directly within 
his line of vision. This spiritual situation, however, is 
also a concrete problem. The non-believing hearer - above 
all the presumptive hearer - is already affected by a 
definite "spirit of the age"; that is to say, his views of 
life and its problems, and of his own nature, are all 
coloured by a definite outlook which claims to rival the 
Christian view of life.
It is not enough, however, simply to define Christian faith or to 
show what does, or what does not, make sense within it. If Brunner 
suggests that missionary theology is the intellectual discussion of the 
Christian faith in the light of the ideologies of the present day which 
are opposed to the Christian message, then the second main question 
arises: does Brunner's missionary theology make sense in that its basic 
concepts and process of its thought are intelligible to man of the 
Zeitgeist? In other words, he is also concerned with the question of 
how the gospel can be communicated in any way. With this question I 
shall try to deal a perspective of personal encounter informed by 
Brunner's work in order to confront the problems by taking a proper form 
of a conversation between a Christian believer and an unbeliever. The 
main difficulty of the dialogue between them, Brunner assumes, lies in 
the question of whether the communication of the gospel is to employ two
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dichotomies which are between the personal I-Thou relation and the 
objective I-It relation to meet those who reject the gospel on the 
ground of reason. Instead I will suggest that the difficulty lies in 
the character of the language of faith which is today a matter of debate 
and controversy among philosophers and theologians. Thus I am 
convinced, in accordance with my Wittgensteinian views, that linguistic 
analysis may provide us with a useful tool for working on this sort of 
problem of missionary theology.
I begin, in chapter 1, with Emil Brunner’s basic notion of the term 
’missionary theology' to undertake an analysis in this study. Then I 
examine, in chapter II, a theological context to show the origin and 
development of his missionary theology. Brunner's whole theological 
thought and work, consequently the term, was in the main determined by 
the debate and response to his contemporary theological opponents, Karl 
Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. The former identifies the objectum fidei 
(the object of faith) with the term 'the word of God1 whereas the latter 
proposes demythologisation in which he attempts to interpret this faith 
in Christ as the self-understanding.
I will investigate, in chapter III, Emil Brunner's theological 
proposal of truth as encounter. In this theological programme he 
heavily depends upon the I-Thou philosophy of Martin Buber and develops 
his methodological discussions. Then I try, in chapter IV, to analyse 
the truth-claims of Brunner's missionary theology, in which he is 
primarily concerned with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This 
notion revolves about his methodological terminology truth as encounter: 
revelation as an objective event in history and the reception of this 
revelation by the man through faith. This will be thus treated in terms
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'history', 'bible', 'faith' and 'philosophy'. For him, as the 
revelation in Christ is made possible by the fact of an original divine 
self-communication, so also it is given meaning because it has a 
reference to that ultimate goal of history, which exists beyond history. 
This eschatological revelation is, as it were, the nail on which 
everything hangs.^
Since Emil Brunner draws knowledge and fellowship into a unity, 
namely that to know God means to be one with him, we will examine, in 
chapter V, these theological epistemological concepts derived from the 
experience of actual faith, of faith as a living reality, and see how 
they function in a Christian life. For Brunner, the reality of God is a 
fundamental presupposition of the Christian faith and the church. 
Moreover, since faith for Brunner is understood in such a personal way, 
certain conclusions necessarily follow for the concept of the church. 
He is convinced that the ecclesia of the New Testament, the community of 
Jesus Christ, is a pure community of persons and has nothing in it of 
the character of an institution. So he challenges the institutional 
church to the much-vaunted rediscovery of the church and its missionary 
task. In Chapter VI, I want to bring the language of encounter with 
some of the issues which are beset with difficulties in testing symbols. 
With regard to the problem of language I shall invoke Wittgenstein's 
notion of 'forms of life' and 'language-games' in my attempt to tackle 
our doing missionary theology. Finally, in Chapter VII, I shall try to 
enter critically into the problem as to whether Brunner has 
successfully achieved his missionary task in the theological proposal of 
truth as encounter.
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II A THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT FOR BRUNNER'S MISSIONARY THEOLOGY
1 The debate about natural theology with Karl Barth
1.1 The new task of theology: the Word of God
The great turning point in the Protestant theology of the twentieth 
century has often been noted in relation to the age of crisis and 
catastrophe because of two World Wars and their consequences.^ It 
seemed that the German theological establishment, liberal and 
conservative alike, was committed to the war effort with all that this 
entailed. For many, the 'manifesto of the intellectuals' represented 
the simultaneous collapse and discrediting of the bourgeois idealism of 
the nineteenth century and the theological programme it had engendered.^ 
Since then theology Could no longer go on speaking of God as it had done 
in the past. The attempt had to be made to do so in a new and different 
way, if what theology said about God was to remain, or was once again to 
become, responsible and worthy of acceptance. The question in fact 
arose whether and to what extent it was still permissible at all for 
theologians to speak of God. So confronted with this question Barth and 
his colleagues such as Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf 
Bultmann and Edward Thurneysen were convinced that nineteenth-century 
anthropological, immanentist, optimistic theology had shown itself to be 
dangerously unhealthy.^
Although there was no unanimity among them, there were large common 
themes with which these theologians have been preoccupied:^ (1) There is 
the emphasis upon the word of God, the interpretation of the Christian 
faith in the sense of what God says to man rather than on what from his 
own 'religious resources' man finds himself able to say to himself about
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God. This emphasis has brought about a theology of revelation, that is, 
an interest in the knowledge of God, which is guided by the 
acknowledgement of God's disclosure of himself in Christ and not by a 
preoccupation with the epistemological resources of the human mind - all 
this is in radical opposition to the line of thought of modern 
Protestant theology since Schleiermacher. (2) In contrast to the
traditionalist and the modernist view of the Bible, a 'new' biblicism 
was emphasised. It is a view of the Bible which is different from that 
which can be obtained by the use of the historical method for the 
interpretation of historical text and documents, because it takes the 
books of the Bible as the bearers of a kerygma, a message of salvation 
that must be believed. On the other hand, it has nothing in common with 
the view of the fundamentalists, who stress the literal inerrancy of the 
Bible as if this were the foremost article of the Christian faith. The 
new biblicism is oriented to the message of the Bible, the gospel of 
Christ, insofar as it is to be conveyed to the men of today. (3) The 
research into the Reformation was revived, under the sway of Luther and 
Calvin. But the remarkably influential revival of the teaching of the 
Reformers has been brought about chiefly not by their denominational 
followers, that is, those who would cultivate a study of their thought 
because of denominational loyalties and interests, but by a historical- 
scientific investigation and interpretation of the teachings of the 
Reformers undertaken in connection with work on the critical edition of 
their writings.
The result appeared firstly in Karl Barth's The Epistle to the 
Romans which was published in 1919. In this work Barth was primarily 
concerned with what Paul veritably speaks to all men of every age though 
he, as a child of his age, addressed his contemporaries. Accordingly,
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he seeks to know 'the Word in the words'. He desires to advance his 
understanding to the point where the enigma of the historical documents 
virtually disappears, and only the enigma of the theological matter 
remains: "My whole energy of interpreting has been expended in an
endeavour to see through and beyond history into the spirit of the 
Bible, which is the Eternal Spirit."5 As a result, what he knows in 
this investigation is the fact that 'Paul knows of God what most of us 
do not know; and his Epistles enable us to know what he knew1, or more 
precisely 'God is God'5 And the Word which God speaks to us through 
Paul can be appropriated by us as judgement upon ourselves, culture and 
religion. Thus we must take it seriously as the self-disclosure of God 
in Jesus Christ.
In this investigation he does not however disregard the historical- 
critical method of biblical study that has its legitimacy so far as it 
is concerned with the preparation of the intelligence, because there is 
a human element in Scripture like any other book.^ So what he wants to 
say in it is that the Bible is the Word of God in that God addresses His 
own Word of judgement, promise and grace, so there is no way from man to 
God, but, God has come to man and has spoken his word simply because He 
is 'God': "If I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what
Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time 
and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as 
positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth.' The 
relation between such a God and such a man, and the relation between 
such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the 
essence of philosophy. Philosophers name this CRISIS of human 
perception - the Prime Cause: the Bible beholds at the same cross-roads 
- the figure of Jesus Christ".®
Soon after Barth finished writing his The Epistle to the Romans, 
Emil Brunner strongly supported Barth’s main thesis of it and felt some 
affinity to this emphasis on the Word of God as the subject-matter of 
Christian theology: "I hailed his Romerbrief {The Epistle to the Romans) 
as a forceful confirmation of my own thoughts. If I am not mistaken, I 
was the first one, who in reviewing this book, emphatically pointed to 
its epoch-making c h a r a c t e r . Brunner joined the group of the 
dialectical theologians who had closer links with the periodical 
Zwischen den Z e i t e n and then he became one of the most eminent 
representatives of the 'new theology', especially to the English- 
speaking world.11 Since he analysed critically the theology of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher in his Die Mystik und das Wort,1^ Brunner 
attempted to contribute by approaching first the doctrine of Christ in 
terms of the dialectical theology in his Der Mittler which was published 
in 1927.1  ^ in the latter he claims that Christian revelation differs 
from what the philosophy of religion, religious speculation, or 
mysticism claims. For it is historical and personal revelation of Jesus 
Christ: "It is based wholly upon something which has actually happened,
within this world of time and space, and indeed, to put it still more 
plainly, it is based upon something which has taken place once for 
all."14 Also Christian revelation differs from 'popular' religion such 
as historical and social religion because it is not based upon a series 
of events, but upon one single event and its uniqueness 
(Einmaligkeit).1 ^
So the Christian revelation, namely the Word of God comes, 
according to Brunner, to us from beyond the borderline which separates 
God and man; and it is God's own Word about Himself based on the fact 
that He alone is God. Thus, the Word of God as revelation means the
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issuing forth of this hidden One from His concealment through God's 
incomprehensible self-communication.1® This Word which comes to us from 
the realm which lies beyond all human and historical possibilities, is 
here as a person; Jesus Christ is the Word from the other side; He 
Himself is the One who has come 'down to us from above'; and this 
Incarnation of the Word is in its very essence a unique event.1  ^ Like 
Barth, Brunner was also concerned with the Word of God as the subject- 
matter of Christian theology;1® and at the same time he was led to his 
dialectical method. For Brunner, this method aims at both defending the 
paradoxical character of the Christian revelation which belongs to 
faith-knowledge from the non-paradoxical speculation of reason, and 
seeks to declare the Word of the Bible to the world.1^
1.2 The point of contact
In the year of 1929 Emil Brunner wrote two important articles, "On the
Orders of God"^® and "The Other Task of Theology".^1 in the former he
grounded Christian ethics in the orders of creation, i.e. the natural
orders, and then presented the problem of natural theology along with
the general consciousness of man; and in the latter he argued further
that the first task of theology is surely to make the message of the
Word known. However, since the Word of God is not preached in a vacuum;
rather, it is preached to the self-conscious human being, it demands,
"an entrance of house which is already occupied".^2 For the
/
proclamation of the Word is a call to repentance /i>C &  T4. 2/0 ( A  and it 
is a call to rethink and to be p o l e m i c a l . So Brunner claims that the 
other task of theology is the 'eristic one' which has the assignment to 
show that man can understand himself rightly only in faith, and that he 
receives it only through the Word of God that he seeks inwardly.^4
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Once again Brunner dealt with the question of the relation of the 
Word of God to the mind of natural man in his article in 1932, "Die 
Frage nach dem 1Anknupfungspunkt' als Problem der Theologie".25 He 
argues that theological anthropology, as it is necessary for a complete 
understanding of man, does not exclude man's natural knowledge of 
himself in a philosophical anthropology; and similarly, the special 
revelation that descends into the consciousness of man, with his 
language and culture, finds a point of contact (Anknupfungspunkt).26 
For the Word of God is, Brunner argues, given to us in no other way than 
through human witness. For instance, this is often presented in the 
popular Greek koine. The New Testament, like effective preaching, 
speaks the most easily understood language; and its content is a true 
compendium not only of the natural experience of life and of the world, 
but also the ethical and religious understanding of the self, of the 
world, and of God. The apostle did not create the vocabulary of the New 
Testament, but used everyday words and presupposed a knowledge of their 
content.27 Accordingly, there must be the relation of the Gospel to 
man.
However, if it is the case that the Word and man must be related, 
one may raise a question of how it is possible. The answer to this 
question may be given, according to Brunner, by distinguishing between 
the formal imago dei and the material imago dei.28 in Brunner's 
opinion, in the Old Testament the term 'imago dei' is always used to 
describe man as he now is, and never a mode of being lost through the 
fall. This sense of the term is, however, not confined to the Old 
Testament; it is also found in the New Testament. But there are some 
passages of decisive significance which give to the concept of the image 
an entirely new meaning. There it is brought into relation to the
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characteristic New Testament ideas of sonship of God, and likeness to 
Him, and particularly into relationship with the doctrine of Christ as 
express image of God. Thus it is a necessary presupposition that the 
formal imago■ dei is the capacity for perception and the point of 
contact. In other words, there is some content to the knowledge of God 
before the revelation of God in Christ although this knowledge of God is 
that of a God of wrath.
In this claim, Barth perceived however the anthropological 
underpinning of theology alongside the word of God, and then he argued 
in his two articles, "Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie" and "Die 
Theologie und die Mission in der Gegenwart", that all polarity between 
philosophy and theology must be rejected; all such contact is a
dialectical tension between giveness and non-giveness; thus any attempt 
of the modern missionary to find a point of contact for the proclamation 
of the Word of God should be abrogated.2  ^ instead, he confined theology 
to be one task because the revelation itself will be its own proof, 
otherwise it is permissible to speak of the 'point of contact' for the 
saving action of God.21 So, he charged in his article of "Die erste 
Gebot als theologisches Axiom" in 1933 that Brunner had lapsed into 
Thomistic natural theology and neo-protestantism.22
In his essay, "Natur und Gnade: zum Gesprach mit Karl Barth",22
Emil Brunner defended himself in arguing that God does speak to us 
through nature but, through man's sin, the Word of God is not heard in 
the orders of creation. He developed his conception of the point of 
contact in that man is responsible to the Word of God. He was convinced 
that in every man there is a will and a knowledge at the side of which 
the proclaimer can place himself, where he can find his 'point of
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contact'.34 in this counter-thesis what Brunner claims first of all is 
that the formal image of God in man, which not even the sinner has lost, 
signifies his humanity and his special relation to God.^5 So the formal 
image of God in man is, according to Brunner, his humanity by which man 
is not only distinguished from the other creatures but also as rational 
creature he has an immeasurable advantage over them. And this humanity 
is based on his special relation to God, for God has created him for a 
special purpose - to bear his image; he is not only man in virtue of 
the claim made on him by God but also by the fact that man is -one with 
whom God can speak. ^ 6 in consequence, man retains capacity for words 
(Wortmachtigkeit) which is limited to his receptivity to be reached by 
the revelation and to hear the Word when it is uttered.^7 At the same 
time he is responsible to the Word of God as well as to his fellow man 
since man has existence as man through the Word of God which addresses 
him and calls him into existence.
Accordingly, since man is, in his view, humanity with a capacity 
for words and responsibility, Brunner claims that the formal image of 
God in man is the 'point of contact1 for the divine grace of 
redemption;39 and yet it means only the 'receptivity of the Word of 
God': "But this 'receptivity' must not be understood in the material
sense. This receptivity says nothing as to his acceptance or rejection 
of God. It is the purely formal possibility of his being addressed.
At the same time the formal image of God in man is, for Brunner, 
identical with responsibility because the possibility of man's being 
addressed is also the presupposition of man's responsibility.41 Without 
knowlede of God there can be no sin: sin is always 'in the sight of
God'. In sin there can be no knowledge of God, for the true knowledge 
is the abolition of sin. This dialectic must be insisted upon. For
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only in this dialectic does the responsibility of faith become clear. 
He who does not believe is himself guilty. He who believes knows that 
it is pure grace.^2
In contrast to the formal image of God, the material image of God
in man, in Brunner's view, is the concrete self that we have built upon
through the use of our freedom.^3 it would reflect its Creator only if
man had used his freedom as he was meant to use it, and this use is
really made only when one can say with the apostle, 'not I, but Christ
who liveth in me 1. And he puts it as follows:
Materially the imago is completely lost, man is a sinner 
through and through and there is nothing in him which is not 
defiled by sin. To formulate it differently: as before,
man is a person, i.e. he is in a derived sense that which 
God is originally. Yet he is not a personal person but an 
anti-personal person; for the truly personal is experience 
in love, the submission of the self to the will of God and 
therefore an entering into communion with one's fellow- 
creature because one enjoys communion with God. This quid 
of personality is negatived through sin, whereas the quod of 
personality constitutes the humanum of every man, also that
of the sinner.^4
Here man remains a responsible person, in spite of the fact that through 
sin the true personality, the state of freedom in dependence, has been 
destroyed, so that his freedom has become alienation and his connexion 
bondage. He cannot help his wickedness, but he is none the less 
responsible, guilty, and condemned because of it.45
As P.G. Schrotenboer points out, whether one looks at the image as 
a material something or as merely formal, in either case it is 
relational. Man is a responsible being, a relation, not a substance. 
It is difficult for us to unify structure and relation, but it is a 
peculiarity of humanity that its structure is precisely a relation.46 
The Bible knows no other man than the one who stands before God; even
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he who turns his back on God is still before God. Also the one who 
misuses his freedom and denies his responsibility is nevertheless 
responsible. The loss of the image in the material sense presupposes 
the image in the formal sense. The difference between the two does not 
lie in the fact that the one does not and the other does involve 
knowledge of God, but it lies rather in the kind of knowledge. Since 
man is an echo of God, it is one and the same thing to know Him as the 
holy loving God and to understand my true creaturely essence. ^
In short, Brunner's claim about the term 'the point of contact' is
that the capacity of man ' for understanding discourse is a necessary
presupposition for his belief in the Word of God, but it is not at all a
capacity for revelation, or for the Word, and no contribution is made by
man to his own salvation. It is a gift of God still left, even in sin,
from the gifts of creation with which God endowed man, and it is the
presupposition of his moral responsibility and his guilt before God.^®
So he claims as follows:
It is impossible to deny this point of contact of divine 
grace, i.e. it is possible to do so only by a 
misunderstanding. The misunderstanding always arises out of 
the lack of a distinction between the formal and the 
material definitions. We said above that materially there is 
no more imago Dei, whereas formally it is intact. Similarly
we must say that materially there is no point of contact,
whereas formally it is a necessary presupposition. The Word 
of God does not have to create man's capacity for words. He 
has never lost it, it is the presupposition of his ability 
to hear the Word of God. But the Word of God itself creates 
man's ability to believe the Word of God, i.e. the ability 
to hear it in such a way as is only possible in faith. It
is evident that the doctrine of sola gratia is not in the
least endangered by such a doctrine of the point of 
contact.
1.3 Natural theology
Emil Brunner follows the Bible and the Reformers in teaching a 
revelation of God in nature through creation, which precedes his
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revelation in Jesus Christ through atonement. As in every creation the
spirit of its creator is 'in some way1 recognisable, so also in the
creation of God: "Wherever God does anything, he leaves the imprint of
his nature upon what he does." Consequently, the creation of the world
is at the same time his revelation. Brunner explicitly affirms that
this proposition is not pagan but fundamentally Christian.50 Though man
immediately proceeds to distort God's revelation in creation into idols
of his own, he could not do this if God had not in some way revealed
himself in his creation. But precisely because God has revealed
himself, and enabled man to know about him, man's disobedience is
without excuse. Brunner puts it as follows:
The term "nature" can be applied to such permanent capacity
for revelation as God has bestowed upon his works, to the
traces of his own nature which he has expressed and shown in 
them.
But the term "nature" can also be applied to what sinful
man makes of this in his ignorant knowledge, just as it can
be applied to that which God has implanted in human nature 
as an image of himself, indestructible, yet always obscured 
by sin.5*1
Furthermore, Emil Brunner attempts to distinguish between the 
objective and the subjective sense of-a term 'natural theology'. By the 
former he means such a knowledge of God in his creation as can come only 
to those who are already enlightened by the Christian revelation of him; 
whereas by the latter he means such a knowledge of God as might be 
supposed to be accessible to the heathen or to independent rational 
argumentation.52 God reveals himself in an objective manner in the 
order of creation, but "sin darkens the sight of man in such a manner 
that in the place of God he knows and fancies gods". 53 Thus the 
revelation in creation is not sufficient for the sinful man in order to 
know God in such a way that the revelation in Jesus Christ brings 
salvation. Man as a sinner is unable to know God, who in Jesus Christ
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reveals Himself to man anew according to His true nature, which even in 
creation is partially h i d d e n . B u t  only in faith, that is, taking our 
stand upon the revelation in Jesus Christ, such a knowledge of God in 
His creation can be recognised in all its magnitude by those whose eyes 
have been opened by Christ.55
The problem of natural theology Brunner sees as fundamental for all 
theology. One's position on natural theology determines the character 
of one's ethics, and it is significant just as well for one's dogmatics. 
Further, this matter is important from a methodological point of view.55 
He has in mind the Church's teaching mission, particularly the dialogue 
with non-believers, with intellectuals and with modern youth. If this 
is to be pursued intelligibly, there is need of a natural theology. In 
this regard, Brunner appeals to the natural theology of the Reformers, 
especially that of Calvin on his side by the same pattern of distinction 
between the objective and the subjective sense of the word naturalis or 
n a t u r a l  In the objective sense Calvin uses, according to Brunner, the 
term, 'nature' to designate the original creation in so far as it is 
still recognizable as such, i.e. the God-given form of all created 
being; and thus he understands that nature presents no contrast to 
spirit or culture, but rather to what is not in accordance with 
creation:
Therefore nature is for Calvin both a concept of being and a 
concept of a norm, and over and over again we meet with the 
expression: natura docetf natura dictat, which for him
means almost the same as: God teaches - i.e. the will of
God, which has been implanted in the world, teaches. It is 
therefore quite natural for Calvin to use the concept of the 
lex naturae and also that of the order of creation in the 
same sense. Both are used very frequently, but if I am not 
mistaken lex naturae is used more frequently. The will of 
God, imprinted upon all existence, implanted in it from 
creation, can therefore be recognised as such5**
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On the other hand, Calvin understands, in Brunner's view, that the 
divine order of nature is affected by sin not only subjectively but also 
objectively. But it is not affected so much as to render the will of 
God, the 'rule' of nature invisible. On the contrary, where Calvin 
speaks of nature in the objective sense, he says but little of a 
disturbance by sin. In this view, God can be thus known even though the 
knowledge of God to be gained from nature is only partial. And this is 
not a confused knowledge, which can hardly be of interest for the 
Christian, who knows the Word of God. Rather, it is something highly 
important and necessary for the Christian as well. For God demands of 
us that we should know and honour him in his works.^9
In contrast to Brunner's claim about natural theology, Karl Barth 
denounced it with his emphatic 'No'. With regard to 'natural theology' 
Barth claims that he is 'ultimately uninterested. ' In his view, it is 
not an independent theme and problem at all, but merely the great danger 
to the evangelical Church and her theology which must emerge from the 
present suffering and strife purer, more united and more determined than 
when she entered it. And he says: "My opinion concerning the task of
our theological generation has been this: we must learn again to
understand revelation as grace and grace as revelation and therefore 
turn away from all 'true' or 'false' theologia naturalis by ever making 
new decisions and being ever controverted anew. When... Brunner 
suddenly began to proclaim openly ' the other task of theology', the 
'point of contact', etc., I made it known that whatever might happen I 
could and would not agree with this".^
In Barth's opinion, what Brunner claims about natural theology 
should be completely rejected, because the image of God in man is
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totally destroyed by sin. There is for Barth neither any grace of 
creation and of preservation, nor recognizable ordinances of 
preservation; and therefore there is no point of contact for the 
redeeming action of God.61 Moreover, if natural theology would be done, 
it can be only becoming to the theology and Church of Antichrist. 
Therefore, except in His Word, God is never for us in the world, i.e. in 
our space and time. For the early Barth, there is no road from science 
to faith because God is and must remain the unknowable 'wholly other'. 
So Barth argues that 'natural theology' does not exist as an entity 
capable of becoming a separate subject within what he considers to be 
real theology, because it cannot properly deal with the subject matter 
of the real theology which concerns the revelation in Jesus Christ 
"By 'natural theology' I mean every (positive or negative) formulation 
of a system which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine 
revelation, whose subject, however, differs fundamentally from the 
revelation in Jesus Christ and whose method therefore differs equally 
from the exposition of Holy Scripture".63
In Barth's view, only through His revelation in Jesus Christ we may 
come to know God; and enter into relationship and even communion with 
God; and therefore Jesus Christ, the Word of God, is the revelation, 
because in His existence He is the reconciliation. Only as he beholds 
the reconciliation that has taken place between God and man, can man 
know G o d . 64 Thus if Brunner accepts unconditionally the Reformer's 
principle of sola scriptura and sola gratia by saying that "we are 
concerned with the message of the sovereign, freely electing grace of 
God," then he has been, Barth argues, unable to adhere to the Reformer's 
principle. For Brunner claims that man's undestroyed formal imago Dei 
is the objective possibility of the revelation of God.66 That is to
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say, if a point of contact is for the divine grace, the formal sense of 
the original image of God in man, so Barth argues, is then 
controvertible to sola fide-sola gratia; and it must be denied, 
therefore, to recognize any attempt of natural theology by which Brunner 
attempts to hold such a 'capacity for revelation', or 'capacity for 
words' or 'receptivity for word', or 'possibility of being addressed' as 
man possesses even apart from revelation.^6
Furthermore, what Brunner argues about natural theology in his
counter-theses, in Barth's view, lies not only in contradiction to the 
principle of Reformers, but also in his misunderstanding of Calvin's 
doctrine of the knowledge of God. According to Barth, Brunner attempts 
to prove his own doctrine of the formal side of the imago dei with the 
teaching of Calvin; so he thinks that it adheres to the teaching of the 
Reformation and that it is quite near Calvin's doctrine. However, 
Brunner distorts what Calvin comprehends in it.^7 Barth argues that 
Calvin speaks of a Duplex cognitio Domini from creation and in Christ 
and he also says about a natural knowledge of God through creation, 
which is said in Romans (1 : 19f, 2 : 14f) and Acts (14 : 15f, 17 :
24f). But he does not regard it as a capacity which man has retained 
and which has to be reconstituted by faith, as a point of contact for
revelation and for the new life in C h r i s t . S o ,  if there is any
possibility of a real knowledge of the true God as derived from creation 
by natural man, it is the possibility, according to Calvin, to know and 
worship the gods of his own heart. For what Calvin says is that the 
knowledge of God which now remains to man is nothing other than the 
terrible source of all idolatry and superstition.69
Therefore, Barth concludes that the knowledge of God in Christ
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includes, according to Calvin, a real knowledge of the true God in 
creation; thus in order to understand Calvin's contention the word 
'includes' must be emphasized, because it does not, as Brunner seems to 
think, bring forth a second relatively independent kind of knowledge.7® 
Calvin does not mean that room should be made after all for a Christian 
philosophy of nature and history, or a Christian anthropology and
psychology, and he says: "Christ is the imago in which God makes
manifest to us not only his heart but also his hands and his feet.
...As soon as we depart from Christ there is no matter great or small in 
which we would not give way to our own imaginations." In Barth's view, 
what Calvin says about God in nature and history is meant to be anything 
but (materially) the proclamation of Christ and (formally) exegesis of 
Scripture.71
However, Emil Brunner is not willing to limit our knowledge of God 
to special revelation. The cleavage between Brunner and Barth goes even 
deeper: as Dale Moody points out, where Barth rejects the idea of the
image as a formal potentially for God, Brunner retains it; where Barth 
speaks of special revelation alone, Brunner affirms a general revelation
in nature and man; Barth knows of saving grace, but Brunner finds
sustaining grace (Erhaltungsgnade) also; Brunner finds natural 
ordinances while Barth does not; Barth believes in faith alone, but
Brunner finds a point of contact between faith and reason; with Brunner 
the new creation is a consummation of the old, but with Barth the new 
creation is a miracle.7^
In fact, this controversy over natural theology between Brunner and 
Barth leads us to the early stage of the new movement of the dialectical 
theology against the liberal theology when it attempted to restore 'the
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subject-matter of Christian theology1 as the Word of God. In contrast
to the immanence of God in liberal theology, they emphasized the
’otherness of God’ in a Kierkegaardian term ’infinite qualitative
distinction'.73 At the same time they needed to face the relation of
the Word of God to man in a dialectical way. For theology involves
necessarily the correlation of the two factors: God and man.74 But it
can be thrown off its balance by the exaggeration of either to the
depreciation of the other. Thus through the controversy Barth is
primarily concerned with the subject-matter of theology, namely the Word
of God and he expresses as follows:
There exists no difference between Brunner and myself in 
that in our activity, both as a whole and in detail, we are 
constantly faced with the double question: what has to be
done? and: how is it to be done? It is the question
concerning content and that concerning language, the 
question concerning revelation and the question what I and 
my audience and readers ought to ’’make of it." But we are 
not at one as soon as Brunner maintains that the two 
questions are one level; that they are therefore 
comparable; that they can therefore be raised and answered 
while confortably separated; and when he wishes to treat 
the question of method, of language, of form, separately.75
Here Barth claims that he rejects natural theology upon which Brunner
attempts to presuppose any possibility of a point of contact between the
Word of God and the natural man.
On the other hand, Emil Brunner sees a dilemma between his 
acceptance of Barth's presupposition and his suggestion of the ’another 
task of theology’ by saying: ”1 agree with Barth in teaching that the
original image of God in man has been destroyed, that the justitia 
originalis has been lost and with it the possibility of doing or even of 
willing to do that which is good in the sight of God, and that therefore 
the free will has been lost".76 Nevertheless, he is convinced that 
Barth himself does not deny that even sinful and unredeemed man is 
capable of doing and thinking what is reasonable, and that inspite of
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their questionable nature humanity and culture are not simply to be
dismissed as of no value from the point of view of revelation.'77
Therefore, there is, in Brunner’s view, another task of theology which
is at the same time a missionary task for providing the Christian
message to natural man and heathen religion. For Brunner theology
cannot ignore the fact that they are besides us:
The knowledge of this fact is of decisive importance for 
this missionary to the heathen who has set the standard for 
all ages; and it ought to be of decisive importance, now as 
then, for all who proclaim the Gospel. • It concerns the 
responsibility, which has a double, grounding in the 
revelation in creation, of the man who is to be reached by
the Gospel. This knowledge becomes practically effective in
the 'contact1, indispensable for every missionary, between 
his proclamation of Christ and the revelation of God (which 
leaves men inexcusable) in the works of creation and in the 
law written in the heart.7®
As Reinhold Niebuhr points out, in this debate Brunner seems to him 
to be right and Barth wrong; but Barth seems to be insistent in the 
debate because Brunner accepts too many of Barth’s presuppositions in 
his fundamental premises to be able to present his own position with 
plausibility and consistency.7® Brunner’s controversy with Barth may 
perhaps be not unfairly extended to Brunner's thought as a whole. John 
Macguarrie, in respect to the language of theology, suggests that when 
we are confronted with such questions, we are nowadays likely to react 
in a different way from that in which men reacted when the questions 
were first debated. We are more likely to wonder whether there are any 
correct answers at all, and our first step today would be to take a 
harder look at the questions themselves.®® So, we note that for Barth 
the primary datum for all theological discourse is the Word of God. To
this alone, he tells us, the theologian is responsible. This seems to
imply that any genuine discourse about God must come from the side of 
God himself. Thus, there is no 'natural theology1, no path that leads
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from our everyday knowledge of things and persons in the world to the 
knowledge of God.®^
However, there is also, according to Macquarrie, another question - 
how does our human language ever come to express a truth about God? 
Barth’s answer to this question is quite simple, and cuts straight 
through the knot. God graciously- confers upon our human language the 
capacity to speak about himself. Just as God has condescended to become 
flesh in Jesus Christ, so. he permits his divine speech to be expressed 
in human speech. This analogy is an analogia gratiae; and it depends 
not on the characteristics of our human language but rather on what God 
does with that language.®^ In Barth's view, God makes our language 
about him veridical. However, we are still inquiring about what meaning 
can be given to such sentences as ’God gives us his revelation' or 'God 
makes this language veridical, although the very expressions which 
trouble us are of the type 'God gives....1 and 'God makes....1 It may 
indeed be true that God is ontologically prior to everything else, that 
everything gets its meaning from him, that language too is his creation. 
According to Macquarrie, these points are not to be ignored, but they do 
not answer the kind of question that has been engaging our attention. 
Barth's proffered solution of the problem of how we talk about God has 
been described by Frederick Ferre as the 'logic of obedience',®® and 
perhaps it is the only solution open to Barth, once his presuppositions 
have been accepted. But Barth's solution is only one of several that 
are offered by contemporary theologians.®^
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2 The critical response to Rudolf Bultmann's demythologisation
2.1 The theological proposal of demythologisation
Perhaps no work which appeared in the field of the New Testament during 
the years of the War has caused so much lively discussion as Bultmann's 
book, Neues Testament und M y t h o l o g i e and since then his theological 
programme of 'demythologisation1 has been problematic among the 
exponents of both New Testament exgesis and systematic (or dogmatic) 
theology. Schubert M. Ogden who is one of the post-Bultmannians 
expressively says: "The 'demythologising debate's' most striking
characteristic is the substantial agreement among its various 
participants that Bultmann's proposal is intrinsically problematic".®® 
What Ogden himself concludes about Bultmann's demythologisation and
existential interpretation is that his solution is inherently 
inadequate. The claim has come from responsible voices on practically
every side that Bultmann's theology is structurally inconsistent and
therefore open to the most serious criticism.®^
In this 'demythologising debate' Emil Brunner (who belongs to the 
same generation as Bultmann) shares Bultmann's suggestion that "in the 
New Testament there are present conceptions which are determined not by 
the kerygma of Jesus Christ but by the world-picture of antiquity and 
which on account of their mythical character are no longer intelligible 
to men of the twentieth century". Also he recognises Bultmann's
theological proposal as 'the counter-attack on Barth's objectivism'. 
However, on his own part Brunner criticises Bultmann's proposal as 
"subjectivism which dissolved the work and Person of Jesus into a 
kerygma about Christ and a subjective faith", if his 'demythologisation' 
and 'existential interpretation' is that which seeks to explain
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statements of faith as being primarily expression of man's self- 
understanding.®®
As Brunner's own expression, 'theology beyond Barth and Bultmann', 
has shown to us, he does not try to identify himself 'with one or the 
other of these extreme systems';®9 and this is precisely because the 
use of the objective-subjective antithesis in understanding the truth of 
faith and furthermore in the Church is, so Brunner argues, "a disastrous 
misunderstanding which affects the entire content of Christian doctrine 
and also operates fatally in the practice of the Church, most severely 
impairing the proclamation of the Word and faith among the 
fellowship".9® Brunner then develops his own way (see chapter III) and 
he stands in the middle between them, which makes it appear that his 
theology is an attempt at mediation.91 In this regard, he confronts 
what Bultmann suggests in his proposal of demythologisation for his 
counterpart of the theological dialogue and so we must take the question 
of what Bultmann claims in his theology.
(a) Modern man and the mythological world-picture. What Bultmann 
means by demythologisation of the New Testament message is the 
interpretation of the New Testament in terms that contemporary man can 
comprehend. And precisely the term, 'demythologisation', indicates a 
method of interpreting the mythological understanding of man held by the 
New Testament so that it becomes understandable to its contemporary 
hearer and compels him to make a decision for himself with regard to 
it.92 According to Bultmann, the New Testament is, in more than one 
respect, of a mythological character; and so this mythical character 
must be removed if the New Testament proclamation is to be made 
intelligible for modern man.
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In particular this is true of the New Testament view of the world 
and of the history of redemption. This mythological view of the world 
includes not only everything that the New Testament presupposes as 
consisting of three levels of world view: heaven, earth and hell, but
also that the earth is the work-place of supernatural powers: God and
his angels, satan and his demons. All this is mythical language which 
modern man cannot employ and cannot speak, since science has given him 
another world picture. So, the basic problem of the understanding of 
the New Testament for Bultmann is that modern man can no longer accept 
the mythological world-picture in which the New Testament message is 
clothed. Thus it is not a question of faith but of a legitimately
acquired insight, and to require of the faithful that such be abandoned
would demand that the believer sacrifice his intellect.^3
According to Ogden's analysis of Bultmann's proposal of 
demythologisation, as Paul van Buren sums up: "'A mythological world-
picture' is one in which (1) the nonobjective reality that man 
experiences as the ground and limit of himself and his world is 
'objectified' and thus presented as but another part of the objective 
world; (2) the origin and goal of the world as a whole, as well as 
certain happenings within it, are referred to nonnatural, yet
'objective' causes; (3) the resulting complex of ideas comprising the 
picture takes the form of a double history".^4 The New Testament 
pictures the world as having three storeys. This three-storied world- 
picture is in fact only a bit of primitive science. What makes this 
primitive science mythological in the New Testament is the belief that 
the upper and lower realms are transcendent. So, Bultmann intends,
according to Ogden, to project the idea of objectification of 'the non-
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objective reality that man experiences as the ground and limits of 
himself and his world1.95 For Bultmann this is true because he sees 
that the biblical myths did not arise in order to paint a certain 
picture of the world, but to express "how man understands himself in his 
world". Behind the mythology lay an understanding of man. Myth is
therefore not simply to be eliminated; it must be interpreted as an
expression of man's existential self-understanding.96 Thus, he is 
convinced that the New Testament not only allows but demands this
interpretation.
Bultmann stands against both 'literalism' and 'liberalism1. In
response to the former he contends that the proclamation of the New 
Testament does not involve the proclamation of the New Testament's 
world-view; and thus faith must not be confused with a 'Weltanschauung' 
that is, for Bultmann "a theory about the world and life, and about the 
unity of the world, its origin, purpose or worth - or again, its 
worthlessness - about the meaning of it all - or again, about its 
meaninglessness."9^ To make faith understandable the mythical world­
view of the New Testament in which angels, demons, miracles, and so 
forth play such a significant role in the mythical world-view of the New 
Testament, must not be interpreted in a fundamentalist way that 
maintains the Bible, being from God, cannot be wrong; it cannot be in 
error and cannot lead into error; and so its understanding cannot be 
established by the means and methods of historical (or empirical) 
science.98 The myth of the New Testament must not be interpreted in a 
way of liberalism that seeks to eliminate the mythology, thereby 
throwing out the kerygma itself; and of liberalism he complains:
The liberal theologians of the last century were working on 
the wrong lines. They threw away not only the mythology but
also the kerygma itself........The last twenty years have
witnessed a movement away from criticism and a return to a
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naive acceptance of the kerygma. The danger both for 
theological scholarship and for the Church is that this 
uncritical resuscitation of the New Testament mythology may 
make the Gospel message unintelligible to the modern world. 
We cannot dismiss the critical labours of earlier 
generations without further ado. We must take them up and 
put them to constructive use. Failure to do so will mean 
that the old battles between orthodoxy and liberalism will 
have to be fought out all over again, that is assuming that 
there will be any Church or any 'theologians to fight them 
at all.' Perhaps we may put it schematically like this: 
whereas the older liberals used criticism to eliminate the 
mythology of the New Testament, our task today is to use 
criticism to interpret it.^9
Finally, what Bultmann argues in his proposal of demythologisation 
is that the New Testament itself invites this kind of criticism; not 
only are there rough edges in its mythology, but some of its features 
are actually contradictory. Then the principal demand for the criticism 
of mythology comes from a curious contradiction which runs right through 
the New Testament; and attempts at demythologisation are sometimes made 
even within the New Testament itself. ^ 0  so, the New Testament for 
Bultmann not only allows but demands this interpretation. He believes 
there are basically two kinds of statements: those which give
information, and those which demand a decision of the listener or 
reader. Those of the proclamation of the New Testament belongs to the 
second type; and so they demand that the reader decide how he shall 
understand himself. For Bultmann the very nature of the New
Testament witness and of faith, therefore, demand an existential 
interpretation.
(b) The demythologisation process. According to Edwin M. Good, 
what demythologisation involves is that it revolves around two poles: 
interpretation, that is the articulation of an ancient message in modern 
terminology, and the question about human existence, its potentiality 
and its meaning. Demythologisation is the interpretation of the New
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Testament faith in terms of the understanding of human existence. It 
rests on exegesis, and therefore on the principles of hermeneutics that 
drive Bultmann to the existential interpretation. For Bultmann the 
gospels of the New Testament are fundamentally the message, "Tua res 
agitur" (this concerns you). So, precisely he approaches the New 
Testament myths 1existentially', that is, not as objective reports of 
extraordinary phenomena, but as vehicles of a world that speaks out of 
existence and to existence, and then a tenable solution to the 
theological problem begins to a p p e a r . A t  this point 
demythologisation for Bultmann is a "demand of faith itself on the 
historical foundation enshrined within the mythological imagery it 
uses",1^  because it requires to be freed from every world-picture 
sketched by objectifying thinking, whether it be that of myth or that of 
science. The conflict between science and myth indicates that faith has 
not yet found its really adequate form of expression.
For Bultmann, in the New Testament as it has been interpreted
through the centuries, mythology has been used as if it were
descriptive; and so it has ceased to be existential; and then has
become dogma; and its originally fresh articulation of human existence
has degenerated into statements of it. Thus the Church has tended to
lose sight of the mythological dynamics of the New Testament and has
treated it as the source book of theological systematization. So, the
mythical thought objectifies the divine activity and projects it on to
the plane of worldly h a p p e n i n g s . 1 ^  But that is trouble; and then the
miracle demands a rational explanation, for it must conform to history
in the positivistic sense; and he states:
"Mythological thought regards the divine activity, whether 
in nature or in history, as an interference with the course 
of nature, history, or the life of the soul, a tearing of it
33
asunder - a miracle, in fact. Thus it objectifies the 
divine activity and projects it on to the plane of worldly 
happenings. A miracle - i.e. an act of God - is not visible 
or ascertainable like worldly events. The only way to 
preserve the unworldly, transcendental character of the 
divine activity is to regard it not as an interference in 
worldly happenings, but something accomplished in them in 
such a way that the closed weft of history as it presents 
itself to objective observation is left undisturbed. To 
every other eye than the eye of faith the action of God is 
hidden. Only the "natural11 happening is generally visible 
and ascertainable. In it is accomplished the hidden act of 
God.106
So, according to Bultmann, if we are to avoid the mistakes of 
liberal theology and yet as the same time deal with the problem 
presented by the New Testament world-picture, we must, as Schubert M. 
Ogden points out, devote ourselves to interpreting the biblical myths 
critically in terms of the estistentiell understanding of existence they 
basically seek to e x p r e s s . T h e r e f o r e ,  what Bultmann projects (to 
take away the 'myth' in the New Testament) is the demythologisation of 
the existential interpretation, in which Christ is present to our 
existence, for example, "I have been crucified with Christ" (Gal. 
2:20).10® Here the 'eschatological1 event of God's saving act in Christ 
has become actualized in one's own l i f e ; 109 ancj he is in the 'new age'. 
The Christ event has been taken out of the purely historic realm, where 
it can never be more than the tragic death of a great man; and at the 
same time it has been taken out of the mythological realm, where we must 
imagine a cosmic transaction between God and Christ or between God and 
satan. It has become the encounter of the self with God himself, in 
which one's own past and security give place to the past of the Christ 
event and to faith. And this bring us to Bultmann's existential 
understanding of God and of faith.
2.2 The Christ-event and self-understanding
On the way of realising the demythologisation, or rather the existential
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interpretation of the New Testament, Bultmannn does not take his
starting-point from the Christ-event, describing it as an objectively 
verifiable part of the story of redemption, and going on to draw from it 
specific consequences for the destiny of man and of the world. Instead, 
he takes as his point of departure the understanding of existence in the 
New Testament. Since the Bible is an historical document, he approaches 
it, as he would any historical text, with the question of how man's 
existence is understood in the Bible. And to this question the New
Testament requires, according to Bultmann, two modes of human existence, 
that is, unbelieving (or unredeemed) existence, and believing (or
redeemed) e x i s t e n c e . B o t h  modes of existence are determined by the 
fact that man is focussed upon the future, and that he seeks to attain 
to what he really is.
(a) The understanding of existence in the New Testament. The 
unbelieving man whose life is 'apart from faith' is based on what is 
immediately at hand, visible and tangible. He seeks to attain to the 
future and to his essentiality by his own means and therefore having it 
under his own control. He is not prepared to understand himself as 
God's creation; so he would like to secure his life himself, either by 
acquisition of this world's goods or through great moral achievements. 
But this brings him into a fatal error. For in truth man is not secure. 
He clings to what is transitory, and so his life is subject to 
transitoriness and to death. It is, therefore, this attempt at self- 
sufficiency on the part of man which the Bible calls sin. In this 
regard, Bultmann follows St. Paul in characterising it as the 'glorying' 
of him; and it is man seeking to assert himself as man, and thereby 
making himself God.^^
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But the believing man whose life is that of faith (or authentic 
life) abandons all security created by himself, and bases his life on 
what is 'unseen and intangible1. He understands himself as God's 
creature, and receives his life as a gift in this "radical self-
commitment to God, which looks for everything from God, and nothing from
oneself," man is set free from himself. An authentic (or genuine) life 
in freedom only becomes possible through faith in God's grace, that is, 
by trusting that what is invisible, unknown and intangible will 
encounter man as love and open up to him a future which is not one of 
death, but of life. Thus to exist means for Bultmann 'eschatological 
existence', and it means being 'a new creature'. By 'eschatology' 
Bultmann intends not the catastrophic destruction of the world at the 
end of time, but the end of the world which in faith is an event taking 
place even now:
This (the life of faith) is eschatological existence; it
means being a "new creature" (2 Cor. 5:17). The eschatology
of Jewish apocalyptic and of Gnosticism has been emancipated 
from its accompanying mythology, in so far as the age of 
salvation has already dawned for the believer and the life 
of the future has become a present reality. The fourth 
gospel carries this process to a logical conclusion by 
completely eliminating every trace of apocalyptic 
eschatology. The last judgement is no longer' an imminent 
cosmic event, for it is already taking place in the coming 
of Jesus and in his summons to believe (John 3:19; 9:39;
12:31). The believer has life here and now, and has passed 
already from death into life ■'( 5 : 24 , etc . ) . Outwardly 
everything remains as before, but inwardly his relation to 
the world has been radically changed. The world has no 
further claim on him, for faith is the victory which 
overcometh the world (1 John 5:4).^  2
The believer stands, therefore, back from the world and looks at it
critically. Having committed himself to God, he is free and liberated
from all that is tangible in the world.
But the question is that of how the transition, from one kind of 
existence to the other, takes place. The message of the New Testament
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states, for Bultmann, that faith in God's grace is faith in Christ, and 
that the new understanding of existence is only possible as the 
consequence of a particular event in history, the Christ-event.113 
Indeed Bultmann recognizes that both theology and philosophy are 
concerned with the true 'nature' of man, that is, that man neither can 
nor ought ever to be anything but what he already is.114 In this regard 
even Christian faith is not a 'mysterious supernatural quality' but 'the 
disposition of genuine humanity', and Christian love is not a 
'mysterious supernatural power', but 'the natural disposition of 
m a n ' . ^ 5  However, both theology and philosophy reply differently to the 
question of how this natural and authentic existence of man is to be 
realised. The latter believes that no divine revelation, but only human 
reflection, is necessary to bring to light the 'natural' attitude of 
man; and it holds the view that the awareness of his own essentiality 
is sufficient to bring it into man's power, on the principle "You can, 
therefore you ought". The former asserts, however, that man's true 
nature is no longer at his own disposal, even if he is aware of it. 
Every movement on the part of man is a movement made within his fallen 
condition, because it is determined by his attempt at self- 
sufficiency. 11 6
(b) The Christ-event as the saving act of God. Thus the 
understanding of the true situation of man leads directly to the 
question how man can be set free from himself. The message of the New 
Testament says that there is no other practicable way for him to come to 
true life. Such a liberation cannot take place through man's own power, 
but only from outside himself. Only the love of God is able to free man 
from himself and to bring him to a life in faith and love. But the love 
of God must not be a human product of his own wishful thinking. Instead
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it must be revealed as an act of God in Jesus Christ:
The event of Jesus Christ is therefore the revelation of the 
love of God. It makes a man free from himself and free to 
be himself, free to live a life of self-commitment in faith 
and love. But faith in this sense of the word is possible 
only where it takes the form of faith in the love of God. 
Yet such a faith is still a subtle form of self-assertion so 
long as the love of God is merely a piece of wishful 
thinking. It is only an abstract idea so long as God has 
not revealed his love. That is why faith for the Christian 
means faith in Christ, for it is faith in the love of God 
revealed in Christ. Only those who are loved are capable of 
loving.117
The saving event of God in Jesus Christ is, according to Bultmann,
wholly and completely concentrated upon the cross and resurrection of
Christ.118 The cross of Christ is a past historical event which can be
dated like any other. But even this past historical event which took
place at a particular date ‘acquires cosmic dimensions'11^ through the
use of mythological language, and so its significance as a saving event
is revealed. It becomes an 'eschatological' event, which brings the old
world to an end, and transforms its destiny once for all. But as an
eschatological event it is no longer a past historical event, but is
constantly present for us. Bultmann puts it as follows:
To believe in the cross of Christ does not mean to concern 
ourselves with a mythical process wrought outside of us and 
our world, with an objective event turned by God to our
advantage, but rather to make the cross of Christ our own, 
to undergo crucifixion with him. The cross in its
redemptive aspect is not an isolated incident which befell a 
mythical personage, but an event whose meaning has "cosmic" 
importance. Its decisive, revolutionary significance is 
brought out by the eschatological framework in which it is 
set. In other words, the cross is not just an event of the 
past which can be contemplated, but is (understood in its 
significance, that is for faith) an ever-present reality.1^8
In this regard, the resurrection of Christ for Bultmann is 
inextricably bound up with the cross. What the New Testament says about 
the resurrection of Christ is simply "an attempt to convey the meaning
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of the cross11.121 It signifies that the death of Jesus on the cross is
to be regarded as "not just an ordinary human death", but as "the
judgement and salvation of the world", through which he has brought the
world salvation and created the possibility of true life. But Bultmann
readily grants that the resurrection is not a historical event which,
like the crucifixion, is to be understood in its existential
significance.122 Therefore, what does seem to him to be so is that the
New Testament's statements about the resurrection are its attempt to
express the decisive meaning of the cross for human existence. Then,
the cross and the resurrection form a unity, and are the origin and
object of the same faith:
Cross and resurrection form a single, indivisible cosmic 
event which brings judgement to the world and opens up for 
men the possibility of authentic life. But if that be so, 
the resurrection cannot be a miraculous proof capable of 
demonstration and sufficient to convince the sceptic that 
the cross really has the cosmic and eschatological 
significance ascribed to it. ...The resurrection is not a 
mythological event adduced in order to prove the saving 
efficacy of the cross, but an article of faith just as much 
as the meaning of the cross itself. Indeed, faith in the 
resurrection is really the same thing as faith in the saving 
efficacy of the cross, faith in the cross as the cross of 
Christ.122
But Bultmann clearly distinguishes, as Schubert M. Ogden points 
out, between (1) the reality of the resurrection itself, which still is 
(while not an objective event at all) independently real as the gracious 
action of God whereby we are presented with the factual possibility of 
authentic existence, and (2) the first occurrence of faith in the 
resurrection, which is an objective event open to the historian's 
scrutiny.12  ^ Thus he can allow for the affirmation by faith of the 
independent reality of the resurrection as the ground of the Easter 
message and also maintain that what the historian can see is simply that 
this message in fact arose within the circle of Jesus' disciples and
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that the occasion (or occasions) for its arising probably took the form 
of some kind of visionary experience in which Jesus was apprehended as
the exalted M e s s i a h . 125
However, a question still remains of how one comes to apprehend the 
'significance' of the Christ-event, in other words, how it is 'made 
present'. To that question Bultmann's constantly repeated answer is 
that Christ crucified and risen encounters us 'in the word of 
proclamation and nowhere else'. "There is only one answer. This is the 
way in which the cross is proclaimed. It is always proclaimed together 
with the resurrection. Christ meets us in the preaching as one
crucified and risen. He meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere 
else. The faith of Easter is just this - faith in the word of
preaching". When the word of preaching confronts us as the word of God, 
it is not for us to question its credential, but it is we who are
questioned whether we will believe the word or reject it. "But in 
answering this question, in accepting the word of preaching as the word 
of God and the death and resurrection of Christ as the eschatological 
event, we are given an opportunity of understanding ourselves".126
(c) Kerygma and self-understanding. Bultmann considers therefore 
Christ to be risen in the faith and preaching of his disciples, that is 
in the Kerygma; and further he argues that Jesus is really present in 
the Kerygma, that it is 'his' word which comes to the hearer in the
Kerygma. He is not exhausted to continuously say: "In the word of
preaching and there alone we meet the risen Lord. So belief cometh of
hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rom. 10:17) . "127 In this
regard the concept, 'kerygma', becomes for Bultmann the essence of his
theological thought.128 The word, 'kerygma', means 'the cry of a
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herald1, 'the message1, 'proclamation1, 'testimony', 'preaching' - the 
word expresses the idea that through the preaching taking place today 
the New Testament proclamation becomes a personal word of God addressed 
to me. Consequently, the content and the carrying out of the kerygma 
are identical, for the content of the Kerygma is the Christ-event, and 
it is this Christ-event which takes place here and now in preaching.1^9
Therefore, revelation for Bultmann occurs in an 'encounter' with 
the Word of preaching; and then preaching, by mediating an encounter in 
which God addresses man and man answers God, is itself revelation. "The 
preaching is itself revelation and does not merely speak about it, so 
that it mediates a content that one can understand or to which he can 
relate himself through knowledge and thereby 'have' the revelation. If 
preaching communicates a content, it at the same time addresses us; it 
speaks to our consciences, and whoever refuses to let himself be 
addressed likewise does not understand what is c o m m u n i c a t e d " . ^^0 This 
interpretation in terms of an encounter with the Word of preaching, i.e. 
the kerygma, explains the precise meaning that Bultmann attaches to his 
constantly repeated view that revelation, so far from being a system of 
dogma, is 'an act'. But it is not 'any' kind of act; rather it is 
specifically God acting here and now in addressing to man his decisive 
eschatological Word of salvation.
However, Bultmann claims that God's act of self-disclosure in the 
proclamation of the gospel would not be complete, or could not indeed 
occur, unless it met with self-understanding in the hearer. "Revelation 
encounters man in the word - in the word that sounds forth in his 
present; and it thereby actually happens to him whether he understands 
that it does or not. Faithful and unfaithful alike are qualified by the
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revelatory occurrence; for them the decision has been made, either to
live or to d i e . 3 2  j f  a  m a n  i s  to receive and then to obey God's Word,
he must see it in relation to his own existence. Thus revelation does
not unveil the speaker only; it also unveils the hearer by showing what
he is and what he can become. So Bultmann states as follows:
What, then, has been revealed? Nothing at all, so far as 
the question concerning revelation asks for doctrines - 
doctrines, say, that no man could have discovered for 
himself - or for mysteries that become known once and for 
all as soon as they are communicated. On the other hand, 
however, everything has been revealed, insofar as man's eyes 
are opened concerning his own existence and he is once again 
able to understand himself. ...Man learns to understand 
himself in the light of the revelation of redemption not a 
bit differently than he always already should understand 
himself in face of the revelation in creation and the law- 
namely, as God's creature who is limited by God and stands 
under God’s claim, which opens up to him the way to death or 
to life. If revelation in Jesus means salvation as an 
understanding of oneself in him, then the revelation in 
creation meant nothing over than this understanding of 
oneself in God in the knowledge of one's own 
creatureliness.  ^33
Here the concept of 'self-understanding' forms a parallel in 
Bultmann to the concept of the ' k e r y g m a ' . ^34 God's act of revelation 
which we encounter in the kerygma bestows upon us a new understanding of 
ourselves. "If it is also not permitted to understand God's act as a 
phenomenon in the world that can be perceived apart from an existentiell 
encounter with it, then his act can be spoken of only if at the same 
time I myself as the one who is encountered by it am also spoken of. To 
speak of God's act means to speak at the same time of my own existence. 
Since human life is a life in space and time, man's encounter with God 
must be an event that takes place concretely here and now. Accordingly, 
what is meant by speaking of God's act is this event of being addressed, 
questioned, judged, and blessed here and now by God."135 For Bultmann 
this does not mean that preaching effects a marginal transformation of
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our life, or that our relationship to God is added on to our existence 
in other spheres of life, as an extension. It means that preaching as 
such opens our eyes to ourselves, and that we understand ourselves anew 
in the concrete existential circumstances of our lives, in the light of 
the divine act of revelation. Therefore Bultmann speaks of faith as a 
new 'understanding of existence1 or 'understanding of oneself'.136
2.3 Some criticism of demythologisation
(a) The problem of 'demythologisation'. Bultmann's position that is 
his proposal of 'demythologisation' and 'existential interpretation' 
maintains, Brunner argues, 'the confusion of the world-view with the 
question of myth' in saying that "the presentation of God's saving act 
corresponds to the mythical world-view"; and therefore "all the related 
ideas of God's saving act such as the sending of the Son of God in the
fullness of time, the pre-existence of the Son of God, His atoning death
on the Cross, the despoiling of the 'powers', the exaltation of Jesus, 
the coming Judgment, the Holy Spirit who works in the hearts of the 
faithful and guarantee their resurrection, etc., are reckoned as part of 
the mythical world-view".^7 He criticizes that Bultmann eliminated the 
myth from which "the Christian kerygma cannot be separated" and which 
"is related to the historicity of the divine revelation and to the 
history of s a l v a t i o n " . ^38 For Brunner the two terms, 'the world-view' 
and 'myth' signifies two different spheres: the former is "the question
of natural science", and the latter is that of "the interpretation of 
history, the idea of the nature and the action of G o d . "^39
As the previous discussion has shown to us, what Bultmann intends 
to eliminate is the fact that "myth talks about the unworldly as
worldly, the gods as human", ^ 0  ancj he claims as follows:
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What is expressed in myth is the faith that the familiar and 
disposable world in which we live does not have its ground 
and aim in itself but that its ground and limit lie beyond 
all that is familiar and disposable and that this is all 
constantly threatened and controlled by the uncanny powers 
that are its ground and limit. In unity with this myth also 
gives expression to the knowledge that we are not lords of 
ourselves, that we are not only dependent within the 
familiar world but that we are especially dependent on the 
powers that hold sway beyond all that is familiar, and that 
it is precisely in dependence on them that we can become 
free from the familiar powers.
Here the term, 'myth1, for Bultmann deals with the life of man sub
specie Dei; and understands man's existence in terms of his
relationship with the divine, and presents the divine power in action
within the human sphere. It is, therefore, a mode of expression for
man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. The
problem is to penetrate the myth in order to discover the understanding
of human existence enshrined there, and then to discover the
contemporary terms in which that understanding may be interpreted. And
thus myth must not be critically eliminated (as the liberal theology
does), but interpreted existentially. However, Bultmann's use of the
term 'myth' is ambiguous when he says "there certainly are for those who
regard all language about an act of God or of a decisive, eschatological
event as mythological. But this is not mythology in the traditional
sense, not the kind of mythology which has become antiquated with the
decay of the mythical w o r l d - v i e w " . That is to say, Bultmann does
not, as Heinz Zahrnt points out, seek to eliminate the mythological
conception of the New Testament out of hand, in order to retain a
'Christian residue'. Instead, he seeks in those conceptions the
understanding of existence which is expressed within t h e m .  ^ 3
(b) The charge of subjectivism. Bultmann's identification of
kerygma with the self-understanding of man raises another problem. 
According to Brunner, it is noticeable that Bultmann's two postulates,
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'demythologisation' and 'existential interpretation', often pass over 
the one into the other, and that they are identified with each other. 
The former is then made repeatedly to serve the purpose of confronting 
the self-understanding of 'modern' man, for which Bultmann projects 
demythologisation by the existential philosophy of Martin H e i d e g g e r .  ^ 4  
In Bultmann's view, what the philosophy of Heidegger does is to provide 
him with the conceptual framework that is necessary to understand 
kerygma. When we seek to understand anything, no matter what it may be, 
there is a general rule that we can only approach it on the assumption 
that we already have some understanding of what it is about. "In order 
to understand anything, we must already have some pre-understanding 
(Vorverstandnis) of the subject matter".^ 5  In this regard, we have the 
concept of pre-understanding which is fundamental to Bultmann's 
theology: "Basically pre-understanding is the understanding of one's own 
existence which can be clarified conceptually through philosophy. To 
this end, I use the concept of authentic and inauthentic existence and 
of history and historicity developed by Heidegger in his Being and 
Time".1^6 This explains why Bultmann has committed himself to the 
existentialist philosophy.
Bultmann is anxious to insist that this in no way determines the 
content of kerygma. "The philosophical analysis of existence has for me 
only propaedeutic significance, and prejudges nothing concerning the 
existential life of the individual. Philosophy for Bultmann only 
provides us with the concepts of authentic and inauthentic existence, 
only furnishes the formal scheme into which kerygma must be introduced 
if its specific character is to be understood. Philosophy "offers the 
possibility of speaking of Christian existence in a language which is 
comprehensible t o d a y " .  ^ 7  Hence even theology cannot put forth any
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statement it pleases, but must show that their truth would be 
meaningful. But it cannot do this like the natural sciences, by
subjecting its truth to objective experiment, but only by demonstrating 
their relevance to reality and their significance for external life.
So, theology must show, for Bultmann, how far man in reality obtains
through faith a new understanding of his own self in the world.
But this has important consequences for theological language. The
object of theology is God. So, we cannot speak 'directly1 of God, that
is, in general propositions and verities, which do not take into account
the concrete existential situation of the speaker or the person
addressed. We can only speak of God 'indirectly', that is, in
propositions and verities which have a relevance to the concrete
existential situation of the person addressed. In this regard, Bultmann
argues that all theological propositions are true and valid only as
existential statement and all pronouncements concerning God and his
revelation require to be 'expressed in terms of existential life' when
he says as follows:
If the action of God is not to be conceived as a worldly 
phenomenon capable of being apprehended apart from its 
existential reference, it can only be spoken of by speaking 
simultaneously of myself as the person who is existentially 
concerned. To speak of the act of God means to speak at the 
same time of my existence. Since human life is lived out in
time and space, man's encounter with God can only be a
specific event here and now. This event, our being
addressed by God here and now, our being questioned, judged,
and blessed by him, is what we mean when we speak of an act 
of God.148
Consequently, Bultmann is never exhausted to emphasise that we can 
only speak of God and his action if we speak at the same time of man and 
his existential life. He is ready to accept the assertion of a critics 
that he is transforming theology into anthropology; and indeed his
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proposal of demythologisation is, as Anders Nygren points out, an 
analysis of existence that "intended to provide the anthropological pre­
understanding which is supposed to open the way for the gospel to modern 
man" Bultmann heartily agrees: "I am trying to substitute
anthropology for theology, for I am interpreting theological 
affirmations as assertions about human life. What I mean is that the 
God of the Christian revelation is the answer to the vital questions,
the existential q u e s t i o n s " . ^ 0
So at this point a question arises whether this is not to deprive 
the action of God of all objective reality and reduce it to subjective 
experience, or God and faith in him are not made simply an inward 
experience, a psychological p r o c e s s . T h i s  is the usual theological 
objection raised against Bultmann's existential interpretation. Helmut 
Thielicke expresses the view thus: "the event in the process of
revelation is not an objective reality, it is simply a change in the 
subjective consciousness of man. ...The historical narratives of the 
New Testament are, to put it bluntly, not events in their own right, but 
only the prelude to an event. The real event is the change which takes 
place in human s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "^^2 Or Anders Nygren criticises that 
Bultmann's existential interpretation of the last resort "replaces the 
religious message of kerygma. Anthropology takes the place of 
t h e o l o g y " .  ^ 3  Therefore, this threat that the kerygma may be made 
completely unhistorical leads to a further conseqence. Because all the 
historical and concrete, living and bodily, visible and tangible 
elements are taken away from the Christ-event in Bultmann's theology, 
there is a danger of its losing its character as a gift and as gospel. 
All that remains is, as Heniz Zahrnt points out, "a single and naked 
saving act, characterised only by its mere existence as a fact. It is
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the empty paradox, that God acted in this man Jesus. What he actually 
did, and how he did it, is not stated.1'15^
In this regard, even though Brunner shares partly Bultmann's 
'theological' proposal of 'demythologisation', he believes that 
Bultmann's 'subjectivism' fails to do justice to the reality of the 
historical revelation, as the Jesus of history disappears behind the 
believer's witness to Christ and the Old Testament sacred history has no 
longer any part to play. The reason for this is that Bultmann "rejects 
the question whether a historical event, a personality called Jesus, 
stands behind the Christian witness of the believing community, and 
whether the picture of this Jesus drawn by the gospels corresponds to 
historical reality as irrelevant and theologically u n j u s t i f i e d " . ^ 5  gut 
the kerygma itself permits an inquiry concerning the historical Jesus. 
Indeed, not only does it permit such a inquiry, it demands it as an 
obligation. The kerygma explicitly states that its criterion is Jesus 
himself, and speaks of this criterion as of an historical phenomenon. 
This requires that the name of Jesus of which the kerygma speaks should 
not remain a mere word, a fortuitous and meaningless symbol, but should 
appear as that of an historical p e r s o n . ^^6 Therefore, instead of the 
term 'demythologisation', Brunner suggests the term 'truth as encounter' 
that points to the God who speaks to us in the Bible, above all, in the 
history of Jesus Christ. ^ 7  por him, this alternative proposal may 
indicate an appropriate meaning of the term 'missionary theology'. This 
we will discuss in the next chapter.
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Ill THE PARADIGM OF MISSIONARY THEOLOGY
1. An alternative proposal
1.1 The question about truth
Throughout his literary career, Emil Brunner is concerned with an 
interest in the problem of truth.1 He believes that the possibility of 
a knowledge of truth lies in the juxtaposition of revelation and reason, 
and then he proposes as a solution to the problem the conception of 
'truth as encounter1 (Wahrheit als Begegnung) that points to one of the 
most basic concepts in his theology. So, a consideration of the meaning 
of this important term is imperative if we want to acquire a clear 
understanding of his missionary theology. It should be pointed out, 
however, that this precise expression does not appear until a relatively 
late period of Brunner's theological development (see 111.3.1)2 The 
term 'truth as encounter' is a basic category in his investigating the 
problem of truth.3 especially pronounced in the following works: Truth
as Encounter, Revelation and Reason and three volumes of his Dogmatics A
As Paul Tillich points out, Brunner develops a theological theory 
of knowledge which he describes as adequate to the subject matter with 
which theology has to deal: "In perhaps his most suggestive book, The
Divine-Human Encounter, Brunner develops a theological epistemology 
which seems to be both Biblical and existentialist and, most important, 
adequate to the subject matter with which theology has to deal. The 
concept of 'encounter' is highly useful in a situation where the word 
'experience' has lost any definite meaning. It helps greatly to 
overcome the enslavement to the subject - object structure of knowing 
that dominates most of our ordinary and scientific thought. In a
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genuine encounter, subject and object are taken into something third in 
which they cease to be mere subject or mere object."® in addition, 
Tillich criticises, however, that this epistemology is, however, 
deficient in certain respects, particularly with regard to a semantic 
problem, the concern of- natural theology, and the proper view of non- 
Christian religions.^
In his reply to the question of Tillich Emil Brunner claims that he 
does not categorically develop any epistemology in the sense of 
philosophy,^ considering that it is a problem for Christian philosophy 
and not one for theology.® With that assertion he moves on to the fact 
that there is a fundamental difference between his understanding of 
truth and that which is based on objective knowledge; and he goes on as 
follows:
My thinking is oriented differently from that of Tillich. I 
do not ask philosophically if in this concept, "Encounter", 
there are still other relationships contained than the I - 
Thou, but I content myself with selecting this one as the 
only one meant in the Biblical witness. In contrast to
Tillich, I understand encounter only as the truth which
comes to us in faith in the self-communication of God. This 
truth creates a knowledge which rises above the subject - 
object distinction. We cannot make it an object of 
epistemological discussion, except by referring it back to 
its own source, God's self-communication.^
Here Brunner claims that a theologian may in no case incorporate faith
into (or subordinate it to) a philosophical epistemology since the
latter stems from an it-world and not as does faith, from a Thou-
world.^ 0
This leads to the problem of what Brunner understands in the terms 
of 'the truth of revelation' and 'the truth of reason', for what each of 
them claims on its own basis is truth: "Revelation and reason possess
one common element: they both claim truth. The genuine scientist
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wills, not that his opinion should prevail, but that truth should 
prevail; unbelievers have frequently surpassed Christians in their love 
of truth, and in their willingness to sacrifice their own interests to 
the truth they have put many a Christian to shame. But the Christian 
faith also is concerned with truth. It is the will of God that we 
should 'worship Him in spirit and in truth'; even the Apostle who 
proclaims most decisively the message of the Cross proclaims: 'We can
do nothing against the truth, but for the truth': He who says of
Himself that He is the Life says also, 'I am the Truth'. Faith can only
will the truth that saves, and not an illusion that gives a passing
happiness. 'The truth shall make you free"'.^
So there appear to be two fundamentally opposing views of truth. 
On the one hand, modern scientific minded man is preoccupied with the 
things of this world and with an ' immanental' philosophy.^ For him 
whatever cannot be fitted into the categories of scientific objectivity 
is, for that reason, suspect and whatever cannot be proved 
scientifically is either not quite true or not quite certain. All that 
lies beyond the perception of the senses and the conclusions of logic, 
all that cannot be proved and verified experimentally, is 'subjective', 
'hypothetical', or improbable and incredible.^ There persists an 
unyielding demand for scientific proof; then, science plays a far
greater part in human thought than it has ever done before. On the 
other hand, Christian theology and the church presume to speak of a
revelation which is truth. Here is a claim to absolute truth, but one
which "can be neither proved by the intellect nor verified by 
experience".^ For modern man, moreover, this Christian claim to truth 
seems to have been seriously damaged by two negative facts. In the 
first place, some of what the church has long proclaimed as 'revealed
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truth1 has been conclusively demonstrated to have been in error by the 
process of scientific knowledge. In second place, under the support of 
the state for some fifteen hundred years the church forbade all counter 
opinions as heresy and attempted to keep its authority with severe 
penalties.^ But the claims of the church could not be supported in 
this way.
So, just as important as this external stimulus is that which is 
the result of history and of the inner situation within the church. The 
question of the nature of revelation arose late within the church and 
theology. And such discussion as was given to this subject usually 
centered in the relation between 'natural' and 'revealed' theology until 
post-Reformation thought^ But when attention was focused upon the 
meaning of revelation, it usually led to ecclesiastical theories of 
inspiration. For Brunner this leads almost inevitably to the notion 
that divine revelation is the equivalent of a revealed doctrine or a 
book of divinely revealed doctrine: "Theological reflection, once it
had got entangled, in the early centuries of its history, with this 
fatal equation of revelation with the inspiration of the Scriptures, was 
never able to shake itself free. The result was that reflection on 
revelation simply meant a theory of verbal inspiration as the basis of 
the divine authority of the Bible; in principle this meant that it did 
not matter how much or how little emphasis was laid on a 'general' or 
'natural' revelation. The ecclesiastical doctrine of revelation was and 
remained identical with her doctrine of the Scriptures".^7
Accordingly, what Brunner contends against this view of revelation 
is that the revelation is rather "God Himself in His self-manifestation 
within h i s t o r y " ; i n  other words, it means the whole of the divine
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activity for the salvation of the world.1® This fundamental biblical
view for Brunner was briefly rediscovered during the period of the
Reformation, but was soon lost in an inordinate desire to establish an
authoritative safeguard for the renewed understanding of faith. An
infallible Scripture was substituted for an infallible church. He
argues as follows:
So they returned to the Catholic idea of revelation, 
according to which the revelation guaranteed the infallible 
doctrine contained in Scripture, and the Scripture 
guaranteed the divine revelation, which is therefore the 
infallible source of this doctrine; they did not notice 
that in so doing they had destroyed the real gains of the 
new discovery of the Reformation. Now the way led, not to 
the freedom of the Church, but to the "paper-Pope." Once 
the concept of revelation had thus been falsified, the 
concept of faith, even though to some extent preserved by 
the teaching of the Reformers, followed suit. A "believer" 
is now a person who accepts the doctrine revealed in the 
Bible. The absolute authority of the Church had been 
replaced by the absolute authority of the Book.2®
The subsequent breakdown of the notion of infallible Scripture under the
impact of modern scientific and historical knowledge led, however, to a
collapse of the imposing structure of orthodox doctrine and to the
enthronment of the 'truth of reason', namely in the place of the
biblical revelation was the truth of reason.21
1.2 The imprisonment of theological thought
Reflecting upon these developments, Brunner undertakes to reassess the 
whole concept of truth in the light of the presuppositions of reason and 
of the biblical message. His investigations leads him to the conclusion 
that the intellectualist misunderstanding of revelation and of faith 
began very early, as early as the first centuries of the primitive 
Church. The cause of this was the intrusion of Greek philosophical 
thought into the Church.22 Under its influence Christian theology 
applied the general rationalist concept of truth to biblical revelation,
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and consequently moved it into 'the object - subject antithesis' that
prevails in the whole of Western philosophy and science.23 But the real
calamity, in Brunner's views, was not the attempt to approach
understanding of revelation either objectively or subjectively, but to
force it into a category of thought which is alien to it.
The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped 
through the object-subject antithesis: on the contrary, it
is falsified through it. This does not mean, to be sure, 
that we should avoid using this conception, since it is 
indispensable for natural-rational knowing, or that we can 
do without it in every respect; indeed we should have to 
stop thinking altogether if we entirely gave up using it.
This thesis does not mean, however, that where the heart of 
faith is concerned - the relation between God's Word and 
faith, between Christ and faith - the objective - subjective 
correlation must be replaced by one of an entirely different
kind.24
According to Brunner, the Bible describes the history of the 
revelation of God entirely in verbs of movement: "Divine revelation is
not a book or doctrine; the Revelation is God Himself in His self­
manifestation within history. Revelation is something that happens, the 
living history of God in His dealings with the human race: the history
of revelation is the history of salvation, and the history of salvation 
is the history of revelation. Both are the same, seen from two angles. 
This is the understanding of revelation which the Bible itself gives 
us".25 But theology now was full of speculation about the Trinity and 
about the person of Christ purely in categories of being and nature. 
Thus divine revelation became the supernatural imparting of doctrinal 
truths inaccessible to limited human reason, and faith accordingly 
became the unquestioning acceptance of these supernaturally revealed 
doctrinal truths as such.26
Faith was then turned into 'a matter of believing' with no 
distinction between dogma or the Bible as the object of belief. In this
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regard, "Bible-orthodoxy is precisely the same as dogma-orthodoxy, 
involving the application of the general concept of truth to revelation, 
instead of surmounting this understanding of truth by means of 
revelation";27 and thus in both cases there is a 'revealed truth' that 
must be believed. This obligation for Brunner destroys, however, the 
nature of faith (or the genuine meaning of faith) at its very root. The 
reason for this is that it turns faith into a duty which man has to 
perform, and on the performance of which his eternal salvation depends; 
and thus instead of the 'genuine faith' of the New Testament, 
'orthodoxy' becomes the standard by which every Christian attitude is 
measured: "If only your support of doctrine is clear and unequivocal,
you are a Christian."28
In consequence, that 'faith' means to live for Christ as you trust
Christ, so Brunner argues, is forgotten: "one now allows himself to
relativize in such a measure the attainment of the new life in Christ
that even the dead 'letter-faith' is considered valid as faith".29 For
Brunner, this misunderstanding of faith lies in 'the objective-
subjective antithesis' in the history of the church: "the use of the
object-subject antithesis in understanding the truth of faith and
furthermore in the church generally is by no means self-evident; on the
contrary, it is a disastrous misunderstanding which affects the entire
content of Christian doctrine and also operates fatally in the practice
of the church, most severely imparing the proclamation of the Word and
faith among the f e l l o w s h i p " . 2 0  Because of the intrusion of the object-
subject antithesis into theology and the church the misunderstanding of
faith is for Brunner noticeable, and he claims thus:
This misunderstanding of faith is noticeable in the fact 
that what in the Bible is meant as expression and 
description of the nature of faith has come to be understood
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as the object of faith. The Bible means that he who stands 
in faith is a new creature; the misunderstanding is, that 
we must believe that one becomes a new creature through 
faith. The Scriptures say that he who stands in genuine 
faith has the Holy Spirit and experiences the Spirit's 
living, renewing action; the misunderstanding is that one 
must believe that through faith he receives the Holy Spirit 
and that the Spirit is an animating, renewing power. The 
apostles speak of the ecclesia as the community and 
fellowship of believers, a community that can be experienced 
and that realizes itself in the exchange of gifts; the
misunderstanding considers the church as the object of faith 
and even emphasizes that the communio sanctorum is not a 
fact of experience. The Bible speaks about faith being the 
same as being in reality allied to Christ; the
misunderstanding replaces the real alliance by the alliance
with Christ as object faith, as a truth, to be believed. 
This confusion, this replacing of personal understanding of 
faith by the intellectual, is probably the most fatal
occurrence within the entire history of the church.^
Here Brunner seeks, therefore, to overcome this imprisonment of 
theological thought in the object-subject dichotomy. The biblical 
revelation for Brunner cannot be understood either from the point of 
view of the object as merely an outward event, or from the point of view 
of the subject as merely an inner process. Rather, it lies 'beyond 
objectivism and subjectivism.'^2 yor this reason Brunner never ceases 
to claim an argument about 'the extreme objectivism' of Barth's 
theological proposal and 'the extreme subjectivism' of Bultmann's 
theological proposal.^3 instead, Brunner finds numerous parallels in 
modern thought to the overcoming of the traditional object-subject 
dichotomy, both in philosophy and in natural science. Examples in 
philosophy are provided by Dilthey, Husserl, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, 
who all have in common that they no longer make a sharp distinction 
between the subject which knows and the object which is known;34 the 
outstanding example in natural science in Einstein's theory of 
relativity, which makes the point of view of the perceiving subject part 
of the description of the world of objects.^5
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1.3 A theological epistemology^G
By suggesting his position in relation to the attempts at 'truth as
encounter1 undertaken in the overcoming of subject-object dichotomy in
thought, Emil Brunner sees the problem of truth as primarily theological
rather than philosophical and he claims as follows:
Whenever an individual, a people, or an epoch ceases to take 
existence merely for granted, two questions at once arise:
"What is truth?" and "How can we become possessed of the 
truth which thus is?" The problem-how thinking or knowing 
is related to being - which more than any other has engaged 
Western philosophy from its first beginnings down to the 
present time, is not based upon a misunderstanding as has 
recently been maintained; it springs necessarily from our 
very existence. The familiar experience that there may be 
conflicting opinions concerning the same matter of fact is 
enough to force upon us the distinction between an 
objective being and a subjective knowing of that being. 
Especially in the sphere of science, though by no means only 
there, the striving for "objectivity", for the greatest 
possible correspondence between "thinking" and "being", is 
rightly regarded as the one true ideal of the search after 
knowledge.
We are not concerned here with this general 
philosophical problem, but only with the relation between 
the "objective" and the "subjective" in Christian faith.
The question is theological rather than philosophical, not 
only in regard to its subject matter but also, and equally, 
with reference to its presuppositions. We ask not as those 
who are primarily interested to know if and in what sense 
there is truth in the Christian faith, but rather as those 
who, being believing members of the church, have knowledge 
of divine truth through the revelation in Jesus Christ. Our 
question arises, as we are accustomed to say to-day, from 
within the church, not from without, and is intended as a 
backward-looking inquiry on the part of believers into the 
source, the foundation, and the norm, of their faith - which 
can be no other than the Word of God become flesh in Jesus 
Christ.37
With this assertion he begins with the premiss that the Bible is 
the source and norm of all Christian theology and comes to the 
conclusion that there is a fundamental disparity between its 
understanding of truth and that which is determined by the object- 
subject antithesis. "The source and norm of all Christian theology is 
the Bible. Its subject matter is the secret and, at the same time,
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manifest meaning of the Bible: the God who inclines himself toward man
and makes himself present to man: Jesus Christ and his Kingdom. This
is the presupposition (never to be lost from sight) for my attempt to 
work out the opposition between the Biblical understanding of truth and 
the general rational understanding of truth as determined by the object- 
subject antithesis. This understanding of truth is nowhere explained in 
the Bible".3® However, in the object-subject antithesis the more 
precise and formal a concept becomes, the more fully is it apprehended 
and possessed; and hence in the history of Christianity there has been, 
Brunner contends, an inordinate disposition to objectify all aspect of 
the faith, including the understanding of truth.
The Bible contains, according to him, no formal doctrine of God, or
of the Word of God, or of man in the sense of that which is determined
by the object-subject antithesis; and thus the more formal a
theological concept becomes in its structure, then the less can it be
directly discovered in, or validated by the Bible. Therefore, what
Brunner argues is that the Bible does not speak of God as he is in
himself nor of man as he is in himself, but rather it speaks always of
the two in relation one to the other; it speaks of the God who comes to
man and of man who has his being from God. He claims thus:
The Biblical revelation in the Old and New Testaments deals 
with the relation of God to men and of men to God. It 
contains no doctrine of God as he is in himself (Gott-an- 
sich), none of man as he is in himself (Menschen-an-sich) .
It always speaks of God as the God who approaches man (Gott- 
zum-Menschen-hin) and of man as the man who comes from God 
(Menschen-von-Gott-her). That God - even in his "i-am-ness" 
(An-sich-sein) - wishes from the first to be understood as 
the God who approaches man is precisely the meaning of the 
doctrine of the Truine God; that man, even in his natural 
being, is always the man who comes from God is the meaning 
of the doctrine of the image of God and of original sin.
And both are known in their fullness only in Jesus Christ, 
in whom as the incarnate Son of God both the God who 
approaches man and the man who comes from God are
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revealed.^9
So, what the Bible indicates here is the fact that the truth 
contained in it is not set forth in 'abstract doctrinal form1; rather 
because that it is the relation of event (or of happening), it can 
therefore be expressed (or described) in 'narrative form' : . that in the 
Bible this two-sided relation between God and man is not developed as 
doctrine but, rather, is set forth as happening in a story. The 
relation between God and man and between man and God is not of such a 
kind that doctrine can adequately expressed it in abstract formulas, 
...It is not a timeless or static relation, arising from the world of 
ideas - and only for such is doctrine an adequate form. Rather, the 
relation is an event, and hence narration is the proper form to describe 
it. The decisive word form in the language of the Bible is not the 
substantive, as in Greek, but the verb, the word of action. The thought 
of the Bible is not substantival, neuter and abstract, but verbal, 
historical and personal.^
Consequently, this leads us to a question of how Brunner defines 
the place of dogmatics (or doctrinal form) in the sphere of 
'theological' enterprise. His answer to this question is that dogmatics 
is 'the re-thinking of the faith' that has been given with the Word of 
God; and hence this engagement of the intellect "presupposes the 
Christian Faith and the Christian Church not only as a fact but as the 
possibility of its own existence".^  Stating these presuppositions, 
Brunner proceeds to the further explication that "Dogmatics... is the 
Science of Christian teaching or doctrine. But the subject always 
exists before the 'science' of the subject can be studied...Dogmatics is 
a function of the teaching Church".^2 Thus he sums up as follows:
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Dogmatics is not the Word of God. God can make His Word 
prevail in the world without theology. But at a time when 
human thought is so often confused and perverted by 
fantastic ideas and theories, spun out of men's own minds, 
it is evident that it is almost impossible to preserve the 
Divine Word without the most passionate intellectual effort 
to re-think its meaning and its content. The simple 
Christian may, it is true, understand and preserve God's 
Word without theology: but for those Christians who are
involved in the thinking of their own day, and who, as 
children of their own day, are deeply influenced by these 
currents of thought, an all-inclusive and thorough effort to 
re-think what has been "given" to faith is absolutely 
indispensable. This is particularly true for those whose 
calling it is to proclaim this faith to others.43
This indicates to us the fact that Brunner does not deny that
dogmatics (in a sense of 'doctrinal form') has its proper place and
function in the sphere of theological enterprise; rather, what he argues
about the 'truth' of the Bible primarily is that it is not a doctrine 
which is the object of faith as Orthodoxy believes, but Jesus Christ 
Himself in whom God reveals his nature and his will and in whom the 
preceding revelation gains its meaning and its fulfilment;44 hence the 
doctrine is only a means which serves to lead us to Him: "Doctrine is
only a pointer, though it may be clear and useful pointer. Therefore, 
faith is not directed to it, but it skims past it, as it were, like a 
ball from the barrel of a gun, toward a goal". So, the truth
contained in the Bible is, for Brunner, the fact that God is known in 
his relation to man, and likewise man comes to know himself in his 
relation with God. As a matter of fact, it is precisely in God's giving 
himself to be known and in this knowledge of God that the essence of the 
relation between God and man lies.46
Thus the event of revelation as God's self-communication that 
corresponds to the theological character of knowledge is what Brunner 
calls 'truth as encounter.' As truth of revelation it stands, for
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Brunner, basically in opposition to man's autonomy as the self- 
justified truth of reason. Accordingly, 'truth as encounter' does not 
mean that there is the steadfast truth that man objectifies, but it 
means that it itself happens and disposes of man. The event that is the 
relation between God and man is always an act of revelation: likewise,
the event that is the relation between man and God is always a relation 
based on knowing. ^  "Here revelation is 'truth as encounter', and faith 
is knowledge as encounter."^® In this regard, as J. Edward Humphrey 
points out, he brings together in one succinct expression 'truth as 
encounter' the two centres of his theology, namely, the self- 
communication of God, and responsive man whom God has posited in freedom 
over against himself.^9 God who comes as the sovereign Lord gives 
himself in love to man, and man responds in trustful obedience.
Consequently, the relationship which exists between God and man is, 
for Brunner, understood in two terms, 'lordship' and 'fellowship'50 that 
is to say, the former means that God wills to be known and acknowledged 
by man or that he is known and acknowledged by man as the One to whom 
man unconditionally belongs; and the latter means that God wills to 
express unconditionally his self-communication to man in l o v e . 51 
Therefore, the decisive elements in the relation between God and man are 
'self-revelation' and 'knowing': God is never other than the God of
man, and man is never other than the man of G o d . 52 This means both 
revelation and faith are for Brunner inseparable. What Brunner says 
about revelation in turn determines, as Reidar Hauge points out, his 
understanding of faith and vice-versa.53 Thus, Brunner makes use of the 
notion of truth as encounter to refer to these two basic concepts of 
revelation and of faith. Now we will try to investigate the meaning of 
'truth as encounter1 which Brunner implies in his understanding of
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biblical (or theological) truth. Before we begin to do this, we need 
some information about the I-Thou philosophy of Martin Buber which 
provides a conceptual device for Brunner's term, 'truth as encounter.'
2. The conceptual device and Buber's I-Thou philosophy
2.1 Two primary words 'I-Thou' and 'I-It'
Emil Brunner expresses his indebtedness to the dialogical personalism of 
Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber that influences his own interpretation 
of Christian faith:54 "Here I saw the rationalistic thought-scheme of 
object and subject overcome by understanding the human person as 
basically related to the divine Thou and by the distinction between the 
I-Thou world and the I-It world. Through this I came to see what was 
the heart of the biblical concept of m a n " T h i s  dialogical 
personalism provides for him the central category of his theological 
project in that it seems not only to overcome the object-subject 
dichotomy but also to illuminate such themes as creation, redemption, 
revelation, faith and sin; and thus it is of a seminal significance in 
the development of Brunner's later theological thought.56
Soon after his dialectical period^ Brunner is confronted with the 
concept of dialogical personalism which both Ebner and Buber attempt to 
develop for a critique of contemporary idealism, and particularly the 
concept of the isolation of the self, in terms of the analysis of all 
human existential life in dialogical terms.58 He then realizes the fact 
that this insight provides for him a via media by which the church could 
be preserved from rigid doctrinal formulations, and also a way to 
preserve the results of biblical criticism for the church. Thus he 
acknowledges that the I-Thou concept of the philosophy is decisive in
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placing him between the theological camps of Karl Barth and of Rudolf 
Bultmann. The theology of Barth, Brunner contendes, deals with "true 
doctrine" and then the "object of faith"; whereas Bultmann's theology 
is concerned with the "act of faith itself" (or faith's understanding of 
its own nature) and in consequence the "fundamental questions of 
interpretation" (and self-understanding) as such. In preference to 
either of these options Brunner adopts the concept of dialogical 
personalism that gives him "a new insight into the unique character of 
the fundamental phenomenon of the Biblical message, the unity of truth 
and f e l l o w s h i p " . ^  In this regard, we shall investigate mainly one of 
Buber's major works, Ich und D u ,60 in which he expounds on his 
philosophy of dialogue or I-Thou relation.
The first part of the book, J and Thou, consists of an extended 
definition of man's two primary attitudes and relations, 'I-Thou' and 
'I-It.' According to Martin Buber, the two primary words 'I-Thou' and 
'I-It' do not signify things, but 'relations' which he calls: "Primary
words do not signify things, but they intimate relations. Primary words 
do not describe something that might exist independently of them, but 
being spoken they bring about existence".61 Each of these expresses one 
aspect of man's twofold attitude to the world. In accordance with this 
twofold attitude, the world is a twofold world to him. When we say 
these two primary words, they cannot be said in separation. If 'Thou' 
is said the 'I' is said along with it; the ordinary sense this would 
mean that we cannot think of others as persons without being aware of 
being persons ourselves. Likewise, if we say 'It' we must also say 'I'. 
We cannot think of the world or of things without being conscious of 
ourselves in contrast to them;62 thus Buber says: "There is no I taken
in itself, but only the I of the primary word I-Thou and the I of the
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primary word I - I t ."63
What Buber claims about man's attitude to his world is to recognize
two relations with all that they involve, namely, those of I-Thou and I-
It, set alongside each other. The word 'I-Thou' means the attitude of
'real living' or of 'meeting ' an 'other' personally; whereas the word
'I-It' means the attitude of 'knowing'. And he puts it as follows:
To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold 
attitude.
The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the 
twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.
The primary words are not isolated words, but combined 
words.
The one primary word is the combination I-Thou.
The other primary word is the combination I-It; wherein, 
without a change in the primary word, one of the words He 
and She can replace It.
Hence the I of man is also twofold.
For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from 
that of the primary word I-It.64
Here, as Maurice S. Friedman points out, the I of man comes into being
in the act of speaking one or the other of these primary words; but the
two I's are not the same: "The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken
with the whole being. The primary word I-It can never be spoken with
the whole b e i n g " . 65 So, the real determinant of the primary word in
which a man takes his stand is not the object which is over against him
but the way in which he relates himself to that object. Hence the word
'I-Thou' comes before the word 'I-It'.66
Accordingly, it is necessary, according to James Brown, to 
recognize two relations, with all that they involve, those namely of I- 
It and I-Thou, set alongside each other; the former essentially an
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epistemological relation, the latter an existential relation, and the
latter the more basic, primary, inclusive, expressive of the fullness of
being adequate to real life. In Buber's opinion, man's attitude
alternates between the fully existential and the merely epistemological
with regard to the same elements in his world. Here a man takes his
stand in relation. So the term 'relation' that is a key word in Buber's
terminology is not an epistemological generality but bears a
characteristic and specific sense in his use of it. 'Relation', it
turns out, is properly applicable only in the case of the primary word
'I-Thou'. I-It is the relation of subject-object in the realm of
knowledge, and not properly relation in the full s e n s e . I n  the
primary word 'I-Thou' Buber sees the genuine relation as follows.
In the beginning is the relation. Consider the language of 
"primitive" peoples, meaning those who have remained poor in
objects and whose life develops in a small sphere of acts
that have a strong presence. The nuclei of this language, 
their sentence - words - primal pre-grammatical forms that 
eventually split into the multiplicity of different kinds of 
words - generally designate the wholeness of a relation. We 
say, "far away"; the Zulu has a sentence-word instead that 
means: "Where one cries, 'mother, I am lost'." And the
Fuegian surpasses our analytical wisdom with a sentence - 
word of seven syllables that literally means: "they look at
each other, each waiting for the other to offer to do that
which both desire but neither wishes to do". In this
wholeness persons are still embedded like reliefs without 
achieving the fully rounded independence of nouns or 
pronouns. What counts is not these products of analysis and 
reflection but the genuine original unity, the lived
relationship.68
For Buber, the I-It relation defines the world of experience, which 
may be regarded as the interaction of subject and object. The I-Thou 
relation, however, establishes the world of encounter, which must be 
regarded as the mutual interaction of two subjects. Thus. I-Thou and I- 
It cut across the lines of our ordinary distinctions to focus our 
attention not upon individual objects and their causal connections but
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upon the relations between things, the dazwischen (literally, 'there in-
between1). In this regard, what at one moment was the Thou of an I-Thou
relation can become the next moment an It and indeed must continually do
so. The It may again become a Thou, but it will not be able to remain
one, and it need not become a Thou at all. Likewise man can live
continuously and securely in the world of It. If he only lives in this
world, however, he is not truly a man, for 'all real living is
meeting.69 Thus Buber says as follows:
The human being who was even now single and unconditioned, 
not something lying to hand, only present, not able to be 
experienced, only able to be fulfilled, has now become again 
a He or a She, a sum of qualities, a given quality with a 
certain shape. Now I may take out from him again the colour 
of his hair or of his speech or of his goodness. But so 
long as I can do this he is no more my Thou and cannot yet 
be my Thou again.
Every Thou in the world is by its nature fated to become 
a thing, or continually to re-enter into the condition of 
things. In objective speech it would be said that 
everything in the world, either before or after becoming a 
thing, is able to appear to an I as its Thou. But objective 
speech snatches only at a fringe of real life.^O
Here Buber indicates that in this mutual relation one is no longer 
an object among objects, a nature which can be experienced and 
described, or a specific point of space and time, when one faces a human 
being as one's Thou. In the meeting with the Thou, man is no longer 
subject to causality and fate, for both of these are instruments of the 
ordered world of continuity and take their meaning from it. It does not 
even matter if the person to whom the Thou is said is the It for other 
I's or is himself unaware of the relation. So the I-Thou relation 
interpenetrates the world of It without being determined by it. This I- 
Thou for Buber exists during the moment of meeting as direct and 
directly present, even though it continually becomes I-It. It exists 
only in so far as meeting and relation exist.^
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Thus, the two primary words 'I-Thou' and I-It1 that Buber uses here 
mean that they have their own spheres of 'relation' that the two terms 
indicate. According to Maurice S. Friedman, in the silent or spoken 
dialogue between the I and the Thou both personality and knowledge come 
into being. Unlike the subject-object knowledge of the I-It relation, 
the knowing of the I-Thou relation for Buber takes place neither in the 
'subjective' nor the 'objective' the emotional nor the rational, but in 
the 'between'-the reciprocal relationship of whole and active beings. 
Likewise, personality is neither simply an individual matter nor simply 
a social product, but a function of relationship. Hence though we are 
born 'individuals' in the sense of being different from others, we are 
not born persons. Rather our personalities are called into being by 
those who enter into 'relation with us'. But this does not mean either 
that a person is merely a cell in a social-organism. To become a person 
means, for Buber, to become someone who responds to what happens from a 
centre of inwardness; that is to say, to be fully real the I-Thou 
relation must be mutual; otherwise, such a relation is really I-It.
2.2 The objective I-It relation
In the second part of J and Thou, it is suggested that the basic 
relation of man to the world of It may be illustrated in terms of the 
two primary words 'I-Thou' and 'I-It'. As Maurice S. Friedman points 
out, Buber claims that the proper alternation between I-It and I-Thou is 
disturbed by a progressive augmentation of the world of It in the 
history of both the individual and the human r a c e . 73 Each culture takes 
over its predecessors or contemporaries; and then it enlarges its world 
of It not merely through its own experience, but also through the 
absorption of foreign experience. So, the primary relation of man to 
the world of It for Buber is comprised in experiencing which continually
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reconstitutes the world, and using, which leads the world to its
manifold aim, the sustaining, relieving, and equipping of human life. 
As a result, there is a progressive development from generation to
generation of the individual's ability to use and experience. For the
most part this development, however, is an obstacle to life lived in the
spirit, for it comes about in the main through the decrease of man's 
power to enter into relation.7^
Spirit, that is a response of man to his Thou, is not in the I but 
between I and Thou. To respond to the Thou, man must enter into the 
relation with his whole being: "Man lives in the spirit, if he is able
to respond to his Thou. He is able to, if he enters into relation with 
his whole being. Only in virtue of his power to enter into relation is 
he able to live in the spirit".7  ^ But man's greatness lies in the 
response which binds Thou into the world of It, for it is through this 
response that knowledge, work, image, and symbol are produced. All of 
these Thous which have been changed into Its have it in their nature to 
change back again into presentness. But this fulfilment of their nature 
is thwarted by the man who has come to terms with the world of It. 
Instead of freeing, he suppresses it; instead of looking, he observes 
it; and instead of accepting, he turns it to account.7^ Appearance of 
these obstacles prevails, so Buber claims, in the realms of knowledge, 
art, and action: in knowledge the thing which is seen is exclusively
present and exists in itself; in art, form is disclosed to the artist 
as he looks at what is over against him but he banishes it to be a 
"structure"; and in action with arbitrary self-will, man may decline 
the meeting and instead pin the life down with information as an It, an 
object among objects.77
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Furthermore, Buber claims that this abdication before the world of
It makes impossible a life in the spirit since spirit is a response of
man to his Thou. The evil which results takes the form of individual
life in which institutions and feelings are separate provinces and of
community life in which the state and economy are cut off from the
spirit, the will to enter relation. Here "the development of the
function of experiencing and using comes about mostly through decrease
of man's power to enter into relation."'7® According to Buber, the man
who has come to terms with It has divided his life into two separated
provinces: one is 'institution' that knows only the specimen; and the
other is feelings that know, only the object.7® The former is outside,
where all sorts of aims are pursued; and the latter is 'within', where
life is lived and man recovers from institutions.®® However, neither
institutions nor feelings know man or have access to real life. For
institutions know only the specimen; feelings know only the 'object'.
The solution to this lack of real public and personal life is not
freedom of feeling; but true community for Buber arises through people
taking their stand in living mutual relation with "a living Centre" and
only then through being in living mutual relation with each other.
Hence community cannot be set up as a goal and directly attained, but
can only result from a group of people being united around a common
goal, that is, their relation to the Eternal Thou.®^
The true community does not arise through peoples having 
feelings for one another (though indeed not without it), but 
through, first, their taking their stand in living mutual 
relation with a living Centre, and, second, their being in 
living mutual relation with one another. The second has its 
source in the first, but is not given when the first alone 
is given. Living mutual relation includes feelings, but 
does not originate with them. The community is built up out 
of living mutual relationship, but the builder is the living
effective Centre.......
True public and true personal life are two forms of 
connexion. In that they come into being and endure, 
feelings (the changing content) and institutions (the
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constant form) are necessary; but put together they do not 
create human life: this is done by the third, the central
presence of the Thou, or rather, more truly stated, by the 
central Thou that has been received in the present.
Therefore, what really matters is not that the organization of the 
state be freer and economics more equitable, though these things are 
desirable, but that the spirit which says Thou remain in life and 
reality.83 t o parcel out community life into separate realms one of 
which is spiritual life "would mean to give up once and for all to 
tyranny the provinces that are sunk in the world of It, and to rob the 
spirit completely of reality. For the spirit is never independently 
effective in life in itself alone, but in relation to the world".®4 So, 
Buber claims the true communal life must be fulfilled by being capable 
of decision of man who can continually leave the world of It for the 
world of relation, or whose life swings between Thou and It. For the 
reason is that it is in relation that true decision take place. Thus 
man's very freedom to do evil enables him to redeem evil. What is more, 
it enables him to serve the good not as a cog in a machine but as a free 
and creative being. Man's creativity is the energy which is given to 
him to form and direct, and thus the real product of this creativity is 
not a novel or a work of art, but a life lived in relation, a life in 
which It is increasingly interpenetrated by Thou.
Therefore, the freeman who wills without arbitrary self-will knows 
he must go out to meet his destiny with his whole being, and he 
sacrifices his unfree will that is controlled by things and instincts. 
"Then he intervenes no more, but at the same time he does not let things 
merely happen. He listens to what is emerging from himself, to the 
course of being in the world; not in order to be supported by it, but 
in order to bring it to reality as it desires, in its need of him, to be
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brought-with human spirit and deed, human life and death".®® But the 
self-willed man, according to Buber, neither believes nor meets. He 
does not know the solidarity of connection but only the outside world 
and his desire to use it. He has no destiny, for he is defined by 
things and instincts which he fulfils with arbitrary self-will. 
Incapable of sacrifice, he continually intervenes to 'let things happen' 
His life never attains to a meaning, for it is composed of means which 
are without significance in themselves.®® Only I-Thou gives meaning to 
the world of It, for I-Thou is an end which is not reached in time but 
is there from the start, originating and carrying-through. The 
freeman's will and the attainment of his goal need not be united by a
means, for in I-Thou the means and the end are one.
In this regard, Buber claims 'individuality1, that is, the I of I-
It, becomes conscious of itself as the subject of experiencing and
using. It makes its appearance through being differentiated from other
individualities and is conscious of itself as a particular kind of
being. It is concerned with its My-my kind, my race, my creation, my
genius. It has no reality because it has no sharing and because it
appropriates unto itself. 'Person', on the other hand, the I of I-Thou,
makes its appearance by entering into relation with other persons.
Through relation the person shares in a reality which neither belongs to
him nor merely lies outside him, a reality which cannot be appropriated
but only shared.®7 The more direct his contact with the Thou, the
fuller his sharing; the fuller his sharing, the more real his I.®® But
the I that steps out of the relational event into consciousness of
separation retains reality as a seed within it.
This is the province of subjectivity in which the I is aware
with a single awareness of its solidarity of connexion and 
of its separation. Genuine subjectivity can only be
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dynamically understood, as the swinging of the I in its 
lonely truth. Here, too, is the place where the desire is 
formed and heightened for ever higher, more unconditioned 
relation, for the full sharing in being. in subjectivity 
the spiritual substance of the person matures.
So, there are not two kinds of man, but two poles of humanity; for
no man is pure 'person' and no man pure 'individuality'. But some men
are so defined by person that they may be called persons, and some are
so defined by individuality that they may be called individuals.
However, true personality for Buber is neither simply individual matter
nor simply social product, but a function of relationship. If man has
surrendered to the world of outer and inner division, then he directs
the best part of his spirituality to averting or at least to veiling his
thoughts, for thinking would only lead him to a realization of his own
inner emptiness. Through losing the subjective self in the objective
whole or through absorbing the objective whole into the subjective self,
he tries to escape the confrontation with the Thou.
Thus confrontation of what is over against him takes place 
within himself, and this cannot be relation, or presence, or 
streaming interaction, but only self-contradiction. The man 
may seek to explain it as a relation, perhaps as a religious 
relation, in order to wrench himself from the horror of the
inner double-ganger; but he is bound to discover again and
again the deception in the explanation. Here is the verge 
of life, flight of an unfulfilled life to the senseless 
semblance of fulfilment, and its groping in a maze and 
losing itself ever more profoundly.^
Here man hopes to make the world so ordered and comprehensible that
there is no longer a possibility of the dread meeting which he wishes to
avoid. However, he must go to confront the eternal Thou through the way
at last that he builds for himself a cataclysmic reversal, or a way of
dread and despair.
2.3 The personal I-Thou relation
Buber attempts to analyze 'the eternal Thou' in terms of I-Thou
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relation. According to him, the inborn Thou is expressed and realized 
in each relation, but it is consummated only in the direct relation with 
the eternal Thou: "Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the
eternal Thou: by means of every particular Thou the primary word
addresses the eternal Thou.. .....The inborn Thou is realised in each 
relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct 
relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become It.11^  And this 
Thou is met by every man who addresses God by whatever name and even by 
that man who does not believe in God yet addresses 'the Thou of his 
life, as a Thou that cannot be limited by another'.92
So, our speaking to God, or our meeting Him, in Buber's view, is
not mere waiting and openness for the advent of grace from God; rather
man must go forth to the meeting with God, for here too the relation
means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one. Hence we
must be concerned not about God's side-grace-but about our side-will.
To go out to the meeting with the eternal Thou, a man must have become a
whole being, one who does not intervene in the world and one in whom no
separate and partial action stirs. For the eternal Thou for Buber does
not become It when the others do - not because it is some universal
essence of Thou, but because it is the present reality, the ever-renewed
presentness of meeting, eternally T h o u . 93
Men do not find God if they stay in the world. They do not 
find Him if they leave the world. He who goes out with his 
whole being to meet his Thou and carries to it all being 
that is in the world, find Him who cannot be sought.
Of course God is the "wholly Other"; but He is also 
the wholly Same, the wholly Present. Of course He is the 
Mysterium Tremendum that appears and overthrows; but He is 
also the mystery of the self-evident, hearer to me than my
I.
If you explore the life of things and of conditioned 
being you come to the unfathomable, if you deny the life of 
things and of conditioned being you stand before 
nothingness, if you hallow this life you meet the living
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God.94
The meeting with God is a finding; a discovery of what is the
primal and the origin. The finding 'is not the end, but only the
eternal middle, of the way'.9® If someone attempts to make the relation
To God into a feeling, then what he attempts is to relativize and
psychologize it. True relation to God, however, is a coincidentia
oppositorum, an absolute which gathers up the poles of feeling into
itself.9® Though one has at times felt oneself simply dependent on God,
one has also in this dependence felt oneself really free. It is in
one's freedom that one acts not only as a creature but as co-creator
with God, one able to alter the fate of the world through one's actions
and life. So, if God did not need man, or if man were simply dependent
and nothing else, there would be no meaning to man's life or to the
world.9  ^ So, the world for Buber is not simply 'divine sport', it is
'divine destiny':
You know always in your heart that you need God more than 
eveything; but do you not know too that God needs you - in
the fulness of His eternity needs you? How would man be,
how would you be, if God did not need him, did not need you?
You need God, in order to be - and God needs you, for the 
very meaning of your life.9®
Therefore, in contrast to Kierkegaard, there is for Buber no such 
thing as an I-Thou relationship with God which comes when man turns away 
from his fellowmen and the world. Buber describes God in deliberate 
paradox as the absolute Person, i.e. the Person who cannot be limited. 
What is more, it is not some personal manifestation of the Absolute but 
the Absolute itself that we encounter-as Thou, and the 'personhood' of 
this Absolute is not its 'nature' about which we know nothing, but the 
act of meeting itself; so, it is as the absolute Person that God enters 
into direct relation with us. This Person for Buber is 'the person' as
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the sharing of I-Thou relationship; but it is not a person in any 
finite, person-alongside-other-persons sense of the term. It is because 
of this paradox that the relationship with the eternal Thou is at once 
exclusive and inclusive.99
It is therefore the unbroken world of Thou which assures us that 
relation can never fall apart into complete duality, that evil can never 
become radically real and absolute. For Buber, without this limit to 
the reality of evil we would have no assurance that I-It can become I- 
Thou, that men and cultures can turn back to God in the fundamental act 
of 'reversal* (Umkehr), the teshuvah. Without this limit the world of 
It would be evil in itself and incapable of being redeemed.1^  And 
Buber puts it as follows:
The world of It is set in the context of space and time.
The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of
these.
Its context is in the Centre, where the extended lines
of relations meet - in the eternal Thou.
In the great privilege of pure relation the privileges 
of the world of It are abolished. By virtue of this 
privilege there exists the unbroken world of Thou: the
isolated moments of relations are bound up in a life of 
world solidarity. By virtue of this privilege formative 
power belongs to the world of Thou: spirit can penetrate
and transform the world of It. By virtue of this privilege 
we are not given up to alienation from the world and the 
loss of reality by the I - to domination by the ghostly. 
Reversal is the recognition of the Centre and the act of 
turning again to it. In this act of the being and buried 
relational power of man rises again, the wave that carries 
all the spheres of relation swells in living strams to give 
new life to our world.
According to Buber, there are three spheres in which the world of 
relation is built: First, our life with nature: the relation is said
to cling to the threshold of speech. Second, our life with men: our
relation takes on the form of speech. Here we can give and accept the 
Thou. Thirdly, our life with spiritual beings, where the relation, is
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without speech, yet begets it.^^ Like the life of the creative artist,
a man is faced by a form which claims to be made through him into a work
of a r t .  ^ 3  Each of these spheres leads into the presence of the Word,
but when the full meeting takes place they are united in one gateway of
real life. Of the three spheres, our life with man 'is the main portal
into whose opening the two side-gates lead, and in which they are
included1. It is here alone that the moments of relation are bound
together by speech, and here alone 'as reality that cannot be lost are
'knowing and be known, loving and being loved.1 Hence the relation with
man is thus 'the real simile of the relation with God, for in it true
address receives true response. But in God's response all the universe
is made manifest as language:
Of the three spheres, one, our life with men, is marked out.
Here language is consummated as a sequence, in speech and 
counter-speech. Here alone does the word that is formed in 
language meet its response. Only here does the primary word 
go backwards and forwards in the same form, the word of 
address and the word of response live in the one language, I
and Thou take their stand not merely in relation, but also
in the solid give-and-take of talk.......
The relation with man is the real simile of the relation 
with God; in it true address receives true response; 
except that in God's response everything, the universe, is 
made manifest as language.
Here as Maurice F. Friedman points out, the 'eternal Thou1 for 
Buber is not just another up-to-date way of reintroducing the God of the 
philosophers and theologians - the God whose existence could be proved 
and whose nature and attributes could be described as he is in himself 
apart from our relation to him. In this regard, it is the reality of 
the "between", of the meeting itself, and there and nowhere else does 
Buber find the unconditional which no fathoming of the self or soaring 
into metaphysical heights could reveal.'*®^ Hence the fundamental 
beliefs of Buber's I-Thou philosophy are the reality of the I-Thou 
relation into which no deception can penetrate, the reality of the
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meeting between God and man which transforms man's being, and the 
reality of the turning which puts a limit to man's movement away from 
God. On the basis of these beliefs Buber has defined evil as the 
predominance of the world of It to the exclusion of relation, and he has 
conceived of the redemption of evil as taking place in the primal 
movement of the turning which brings man back to God and back to 
solidarity of revelation with man and the world.
As Alister E. McGrath points out, Buber's main argument of I - Thou 
philosophy may be found in Brunner's 1938 work on truth as 'encounter', 
Die Wahrheit als Begegnung, and he goes on to sum it up: For Buber, the
I-It relationship defines the world of experience (Erfahrung), which may 
be regarded as the interaction of a subject and object. The I-You 
relationship, however, establishes the world of encounter (Begegnung), 
which must be regarded as the mutual interaction of two subjects. 
Whereas in the world of experience the subject is active and the object 
passive, the world of encounter opens up the possibility of both 
activity and passivity on the part of the subject as he engages in a 
dynamic relationship with another subject. It is this concept of the 
mutual interaction of two subjects which Buber attempts to encapsulate 
in the untranslatable formula Ich-wirkend-Du und Du-wirkend-Ich.106 
Buber thus emphasizes the importance of the relationship (das Zwischen) 
between the 'I' and the 'You', which prevents the improper reification 
or hypostatization of either. 'Actuality' (Wirklichkeit) cannot be 
objectified. While Buber locates the world of encounter primarily in 
human relationships, he is clearly aware of its potential application of 
the relationship between God and man.^^
The development of Buber's dialogical critique of the subject-
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object dichotomy was a major theme of the theology of the second quarter 
of the twentieth century. Buber uses the term, 'Begegnung1, a German 
word which means 'encounter' or 'meeting' as such, and the term 
'encounter' is significantly applied to Brunner's theological 
projection. Brunner uses the term 'encounter,' with conscious 
indebtedness to Buber, as a means of pointing out Christian themes which 
form the personal or relational perspective. Brunner, however, does not 
take the I-Thou philosophy in its precise formulation over into 
Christian thought, but rather uses the concept of the personal I-Thou 
relation by which to amplify Christian teaching.^® Brunner says as
follows:
Here....our concern is not to try to combine the "I-Thou" 
philosophy with Christian theology, but to emphasize the 
importance of this truth, which is wholly derived from the 
Bible, for Christian thought.^09
So, within the dialogical framework Brunner develops many different
views which make up Christian teaching. Further he claims the 'truth as
encounter' must permeate the Christian themes of creation and
redemption, sin and salvation, the doctrine of God and Christology.
In his I-Thou philosophy Buber employs the I-Thou concept to break 
the objectivization of the 'other1, where the 'other' is merely an 'It', 
not a 'Thou'. Similarly, Brunner uses it to break down an object- 
subject antithesis of faith; and then he insists that truth must be 
personalized - truth must 'happen' in an encounter with a person. For 
Brunner, this person is Jesus of history; and at this very point Buber 
contends, as Maurice S. Friedman points out, that Jesus the man, Jesus 
the Jew, who stood in unique and unmediated relationship with God, was 
not identical with the Christ of Christian faith whom men worshipped as 
the S a v i o r . Again, Buber is concerned with the person-to-person 
encounter in an existential setting that the primary word I-It and I-
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Thou may be used with respect to our life with nature, with other 
persons, or with intelligible forms, and in that the world of relations 
arises. Brunner is treating Christian "truth", however, within an
existential context in that he equates I-It with man's sinful nature and 
I-Thou with the grace and divine love which are in Christ, and then he 
emphasizes the limitations that man's sinfulness places upon his ability 
to enter this relationship.111 Nevertheless, the I-Thou philosophy of 
Buber represents the final significant qualification in the development 
of Brunner's eristic theology from his early Kierkegaardian dialectical 
theology.
3. Truth as encounter
3.1 A transitional period
We have already noted that a transition from Brunner's early 
'dialectical' period to his later 'historical-dialogical' period 
involves a shift in his theological proposal.11^ As Alister E. McGrath 
points out, when Brunner says 'God encounters man' the term 'encounter' 
for the later Brunner does not take place in a vacuum (as he appears to 
suggest in Der Mittler), but in history itself, the.sphere in which man 
is active; and this means for him that the term 'encounter' presupposes 
that man possesses a capability to respond to the historical and 
personal revelation of God in Christ.11  ^ So, Brunner envisages a direct 
correlation between the man who responds to the word of God and the 
appearance of the word of God in Christ: "Only the meeting between the
divine 'Thou' and the human * I ' is personal, the meeting where the Word 
of revelation is spoken, and is met by the answer of faith".114 And 
then he insists upon the mutual activity of God and man within the 
sphere of history, in order that the insights of 'dialogical
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personalism' may be exploited theologically.
Thus, in his methodological work Truth as Encounter, Brunner claims 
that faith is primarily a 'personal encounter' with the God who meets us 
personally in Jesus Christ. And this claim reflects his conviction that 
the early church misunderstood revelation as the divine impartation of 
doctrinal truth about God, rather than the self-revelation of God. For 
Brunner, the biblical revelation lies 'beyond objectivism and 
subjectivism', in that revelation is understood to be an event in 
history (see III.3.2). This should not be interpreted to mean that 
history reveals God, but that God reveals himself within the historical 
process, and supremely in the work and person of Jesus Christ.115 For 
revelation in Jesus Christ, in Brunner's view, is not merely the apex of 
potential human knowledge, but the personal self-communication of God. 
By this identification of revelation with a person, the idea of 
communication becomes categorically precise.115
3.2 Beyond objectivism and subjectivism.^1^
Emil Brunner's fundamental thesis in Wahrheit als Begegnung is: "The
Biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped through the object- 
subject antithesis; on the contrary, it is falsified through it."11® 
Therefore, one must rise above the object-subject correlation in order 
to grasp such truth. And then Brunner substitutes the category of 
personal correspondence or encounter in its place. Thus his objection 
to intellectualism, as Reidar Hauge points out, is essentially following 
two points:11^ (1) Revelation is not doctrine but act; so, it consists 
of the act of God for our salvation and above all His act in Jesus 
Christ. And especially this same emphasis comes to expression in later 
writings when he speaks to understand the significance of Christ, not
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first of all in his nature (or person) but in his work, in God's act in 
him. So, Brunner repeatedly calls attention to the fact that the 
characteristic form of speech used in the New Testament witness to 
Christ is not the substantive, but the verb. Brunner's purpose here is 
to show that when revelation is understood as doctrine it cannot also be 
a historical event. "Where doctrine is emphasized at the expense of the 
Biblical narrative, there the intellectualistic misunderstanding of 
orthodoxy has already b e g u n " . ^ 0
(2) Brunner's reason for breaking with intellectualism is rooted in 
his conception of revelation as an encounter. According to Brunner, 
revelation is a 'personal encounter' between God and man; and he states 
as follows:
The distinction between world-knowledge and God-Knowledge - 
leaving to scientific investigation the world of facts and 
reserving for divine revelation the disclosure of the 
mystery of God's being, will and purpose - is not the only 
revolution which the Christian faith produces within the 
realm of the concept of truth. There is a second, just as 
important. What kind of a truth is it, then, which is
revealed to faith? It is not truth in the sense of knowing
something, but in the sense of a divine-human, personal 
encounter. God does not reveal this and that: He does not
reveal a number of truths. He reveals Himself by 
communicating Himself, it is the secret of His person which
He reveals, and the secret of His person is just this, that
He is self-communicating will; that God is Love.^1
Man, then, no longer has a monologue existence, for he is now confronted
by another who says, "I am the Lord, thy God." He is addressed
personally, and he gives a personal answer in the form of confession and
prayer. In this personal exchange, the Word of God is not a mere
formula to be believed, but it is directed address. Likewise, the
response of faith is not a formulated credo, but it takes the form: "My
Lord and my God." Here the object-subject antithesis for Brunner can be
replaced by personal encounter; and thus he claims as follows: "Here
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... the third person is replaced by the second person. 'I am the Lord, 
thy God1 bespeaks the answer, 'Yes, I am thy obedient servant and thy 
child.1 The true form of faith is hence not the so-called declaration 
of faith, the formulated Credo that has been learned, but prayer, even 
as the Word of God is not a formula to be believed but challenging, 
freely given address. The antithesis between object and subject, 
between 'something true' and 'knowledge of this truth' has disappeared 
and has been replaced by the purely personal meeting between the God who 
speaks and the man who answers."122
The opposite of this Word of God - faith encounter is what Brunner 
calls Credo-credo (Belief-belief) faith, which is belief in a formal 
confessional statement or creed. There is here no Thou-form of 
occurrence, but only an It-form of reflection, a belief in Belief: "It
is only reflection about faith that explains this personal occurrence in 
the second person as an impersonal twofold set of facts in the third 
person: A Belief signifying something to be believed, and belief
signifying assent to this thing which is to be believed."123 This 
Belief-belief faith may indeed be present, however without any 
resemblance to agape. Therefore, there is for Brunner an 'abysmal' 
difference between this nonpersonal relation (or in Buber's term 'I-It' 
relation) and that which is central in the biblical category of personal 
correspondence (or in Buber's term 'I-Thou' relation).^ 4  Yet, in 
giving himself (rather than doctrine) to us, God also says something to 
us, so that in some sense doctrine is contained even in the Word of God. 
His address in its direct and simplest form, "I am the Lord, thy God", 
is not comprehended apart from conceptualization. Likewise, the 
response of faith in prayer is expressive of a form of knowledge. In 
its most direct, simple and personal form "Our Father who art in
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heaven”, there is a conceptual content.^ 5
Consequently, this means for Brunner that the personal encounter 
which is truth is also firmly linked with truth as doctrine: ”We can
never separate the abstract framework from the personal Presence 
contained in it, although certainly we must differentiate them. We know 
that we can never have one without the other, and we know at the same 
time that the whole point is to have the personal contained within the 
abstract framework. Doctrine is certainly related instrumentally to the 
Word of God as token and framework serving in relation to the reality - 
actual personal fellowship with God; but doctrine is indissolubly 
connected with the reality it represents". ^ 6  ^he more doctrine enables 
one to hear the address of God, however, the more does it actually point 
away from itself (i.e. from 'something') to God himself. A principle of 
proximity^27 is, therefore, operative which enables one to distinguish 
in some measure true doctrine from that which is heretical and at the 
same time to avoid a legalistic understanding of doctrine. At this 
point Brunner draws two principles connected with the primary concern of 
the Holy Scriptures.^2® and the Holy Spirit when he says: "How did this
'understanding' arise? The Apostles themselves give us the answer: the
Spirit of God testified in their hearts that Jesus is the Christ".12  ^
The presence of the Holy Spirit lends personal directness to doctrinal 
indirectness. However, the connection between 'truth as encounter' and 
'truth as doctrine' must be clarified in order to avoid deviating toward 
either a false objectivism or a false subjectivism.^
3.3 The contrast between rationalism and personalism.
In accordance with this content of the term 'encounter', Emil Brunner 
develops the category of personalism as a contrast to rationalism. In
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this context personalism for Brunner is defined as the other-than-I,
which I can know only in so far as it reveals itself to me. In other
words, it is I and Thou relationship in the sense of Buber's primary
word, 'I-Thou' dimensional relation (see III.2.2). Brunner's remark on
'personality' is as follows:
What is personality as distinguished from anything else? A 
person is a being of such a kind that we cannot ourselves 
think it, but it reveals itself to us in an act of 
revelation. What I myself think is the object of my 
thought. Even when I think God as a personal being this God 
is the object of ray thought and therefore not truly 
personal. He can be something different from an object of 
thought only if it is not myself who think him, but himself 
who reveals himself by an act of self-disclosure. 
Everything which I think myself, or the reality which is 
disclosed by my own mental activity, is therefore not a 
person. A person is that unique being which discloses 
itself and therefore enters into my thought-world, so to 
say, as a stranger, affirming itself as an I in its own 
right. In my own thought-world I am the unchallenged 
centre, I am the subject of all objects of my thought, and 
by that, so to say, the master of them all. When, however, 
a person encounters me, a rival world-centre faces me, a 
kind of being which refuses to be a part of my thought 
system.^ 31
As Paul King Jewett points out, Emil Brunner makes much of the 
difference between the way in which we know an object and the way in 
which we know a person. ^ 2  Qur knowlede of objects involves only our 
own cognitive processes. But our knowledge of a subject, a person, is 
wholly contingent upon an act of self-disclosure on the part of the 
person known. A subject which I think is not truly a subject. What I 
can discover by virtue of my own thought processes is, to the degree 
that that is posssible, not a person, but an object. A personal 
subject, a real 'thou', is all one with that mystery which only the 
subject himself can disclose. Not only is my knowledge of a subject 
dependent on the latter's self-disclosure, but it is not knowledge in 
the ordinary sense of the word at all. It is, for Brunner, encounter. 
We rationally, then, analyse things; but we meet persons:
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We can ourselves find the clue to things; they are 
objects, which confront us not in their own self-activity- 
making themselves known - but as entities which, by 
processes of research and thought, we can learn to 
understand. But persons are not enigmas of this kind; a 
person is a mystery which can be disclosed only through 
self-manifestation. In this self-disclosure alone do we 
meet this person as person; previously he or she is an
"object11, a "something". ^ 3
Therefore, this contrast between the way of personalism and that of
rationalism involves several antithesis by which Brunner seeks to
characterize the term 'encounter'. According to Brunner, rationalism is
not only autonomous, but possesive; whereas personalism is exposed to a
direct challenge to my self-sufficiency: "All that I think ... can, as
something that I think, only confirm my autonomy. I am the master of my
thoughts. So long as I am alone with my thoughts I am unchallenged and
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undisturbed in my autonomy. In the same measure I am out of touch with 
reality. Reality begins where I am 'disturbed' in my thinking and 
dreaming solitude by what is outside of me, what is not me, where my 
thoughts encounter resistance. But nature, which is impersonal, cannot
disturb this solitude, for I cannot include it in my thought and become
its master through thought. On the contrary, it is what lies beyond me 
as the source of independent speech and will - the Thou, which really 
'disturbs' me and thus calls in question my autonomy."134
The self-autonomy of rationalism belongs, according to Brunner, to 
the sphere of proof; whereas personalism belongs to that of decision. 
"You cannot prove personal truth, you can only believe it; and
similarly you cannot believe impersonal truth, you can only prove 
it."135 proof excludes decision. For where the proof rules there is 
nothing to decide. Hence rationalism lies with my initiative and
intellect; whereas personalism sets me in a secondary position of
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response:
The God of philosophy is, by definition, an idea acquired by 
man's own thinking. This does not mean to say that the idea 
does not claim objective reality. All philosophers would 
endeavour to show that their idea of God, which imposes 
itself by necessity, has objective reality. But it is also 
clear that this God is not a living God in the sense of the 
biblical testimony, that is, in the sense of a personal 
reality intervening in the course of human history. It is 
not a Thou addressing man: 'I am the Lord Thy God'. It is
the movement of man's own thought, which, so to say, in its 
end reaches God. The initiative, the movement leading 
towards knowledge, lies entirely on the side of the human 
mind, not on the side of God. It is a God whom to reach 
lies within the possibilities of human thinking. it is not 
a God who, from outside human capacities, enters by his own 
movement and by his own initiative into the thought-world of 
men and, so to say, bursts open the closed globe of human 
thought.^36
Thus the knowledge of rationalism is for Brunner essentially 
solitary and ahistorical; whereas that of personalism is responsible 
and historical: "It is no accident that in the Bible, the witness to
this truth, God is always spoken of in the I-Thou or Thou-I form. In 
this a double antithesis to abstraction is manifest, the antithesis to 
the ahistorical abstractness of the idea, which has neither beginning 
nor end, and the antithesis to impersonal knowledge of things, to the 
truths of thought that require no communication to a Thou, but are the 
product of the solitary self. The thinking of reason in the traditional 
sense is ahistorical. It deals with substantives and not with verbs. 
In philosophy the substantive dominates, but in the verb, the word 
expressing activity. The word of God is always word and deed, history. 
Conversely, in philosophy, history is an alien and an embarrassment.'1^ 7 
Therefore, in so far as rational truth is concerned, rationalism for 
Brunner leaves man isolated in principle; and then even God here is 
part of one's rational world, in which he is the centre of it; so, God 
is the mere object of man's thinking so that He is introduced into the
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world of his thought; as a result, "nothing happens that breaks through 
the circle of my self-isolation. I am alone with my truth, even with my 
idea of God. The God whom I think, is not the one who really confronts
m e . 38
In making the contrast between rationalism and personalism Brunner 
may regard a contrast between a subject-object antithesis and a subject- 
subject framework in the understanding of man's relation with respect to 
God; then, he suggests that a subject-subject framework can more 
adequately express the Biblical truth than any alternatives.^39 sQf 
what he argues is that the conflict between objectivism and subjectivism 
can never be resolved simply by finding the proper balance between these 
two elements but only by abandoning this whole scheme and replacing it 
with an entirely different concept of truth centering in the 'personal
correspondence' between God and man. In the Bible God and man for
Brunner are never spoken of in terms of an object set over against a 
receiving subject but always in terms of a reciprocally free, personal 
relationship between them. God is the Subject who seeks man. Man is 
the creature made for God. So, God who is the sovereign Creator-Lord, 
calls man into being a personal counterpart with whom He wills to have 
fellowship and by whom He wills to be freely acknowledged as Lord. This 
relationship is consummated, Brunner believes, in an event in which God 
and man personally meet each other. This Divine-human encounter is
based on the self-communication of God through his Word, Jesus
Christ.14®
3.4 Personal correspondence
The later Brunner claims that revelation is precisely the act of God in 
Christ or personal correspondence; and this personal revelation is also
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the truth. Therefore, the biblical truth is not rationalistic truth if 
rationalism regards it as a mere doctrinal system (or a set of 
propositions).^ The reason for this is that the truth which is spoken 
of in the Bible is not static and timeless truth, for it "came into 
being". Therefore it cannot be the object of doctrine because it occurs 
in history and because it is a person. So, Brunner argues that the 
biblical truth deals with the relation of God to persons and of persons 
to God. There is no doctrine of God as isolated from the personal 
revelation of God. The Bible, so Brunner claims, speaks of a 'two-side 
relation' in which God approaches us and we meet God. This relation
defies precise doctrinal f o r m u l a t i o n . 142
When Brunner explicates the Christian understanding of truth, he 
aims, as Ronald W. Hepburn points out, to return to 'Reformation 
principles' by rejecting both what he calls 'objectivist' and 
'subjectivist' standpoints with regard to our knowledge of God. Knowing 
God for Brunner is not receiving revealed information about him (the 
objective view): but it is no truer to say that God is known through
the devout feelings of worshippers (the subjective v i e w ) . 143 In the 
case of objectivism the truth of God becomes a 'thing', something within 
our grasp which we can manipulate and therefore it is no longer possible 
to speak of personal c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ; 144 whereas in the case of 
subjectivism the truth comes from within man, and hence it is to be 
identified with the human subject. And in it one also cannot really 
speak of the encounter of God with m a n . 1 4 5
Therefore, denying both alternatives, Brunner says God is known
only through encountering him in faith. The knowledge of God is not the
communicating of information, but an 'event', or an 'act'. Faith thus
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is no simple 'believing that', but is the single 'answering' acceptance 
of the Word of God:
Here truth happens, here we are in the truth, which is not 
in us but comes to us, which makes us free by restoring to 
us our true being, our being in the Thou, and our being for 
the Thou. In this truth as encounter, in which we 
understand our personal being as being in the love of the 
Creator and Redeemer - and not only understand it but have 
it as a new bestowal of our original being - to have and to 
be are one.^^
Here Brunner attempts to show that biblical truth must be understood in 
personal terms. To take his primary example, he interprets 
justification by faith as the transformation of a personal encounter in 
which God and man become reconciled and not simply a legal, forensic 
transaction which takes place objectively and which is intellectually 
accepted by the believer. In this regard, Paul Tillich points out .that 
the personalistic categories are conspicicuously predominant in all 
Brunner's writings and can be partly explained in terms of his 
nominalistic - Reformed t r a d i t i o n . ^ ^7
When Brunner claims truth as encounter, it is necessary, then, that 
God not only address man but also that man answer. This implies first 
of all that the relationship between revelation and faith is very close. 
It is a false antithesis, however, when revelation is considered 
objective and faith its subjective counter-part. Revelation always 
means for Brunner that something is revealed to me. It is thus 'a 
transitive event'.148 jn a similar way the Word of God, Brunner states, 
is not only a past but also a present reality: "The Word in Scripture,
Christ, becomes the same as the Word in the heart, the Holy Spirit".^^ 
Not only is the truth revealed to man, but also man is obligated to 
respond in a responsible and active manner. In fact Brunner lays, as 
Raidar Hauge rightly points out, great emphasis on man's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ^ 0  For the later Brunner, i t  is then evidential that
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the chief concern of the concluding volume of his Dogmatics is to 
vindicate the biblical concept of faith with discussion of the ecclesia 
(see V.1.1). Since the ecclesia and the life of faith are for him 
inseparable, the witness of the ecclesia in Word and life is seen as the 
presupposition of faith, while faith is spoken of as personal existence 
in fellowship. Accordingly Brunner argues men come to faith only 
through the ecclesia; yet it is just as true to say that men come to
the ecclesia only through faith.**51
Obviously, Brunner does not deny that there is any relation of 
faith (person-truth) to reason (it-truth) when he asserts that man’s 
being is essentially responsible being: "Man is, and remains,
responsible, whatever his personal attitude to his Creator may be. He 
may deny his responsibility, and he may misuse his freedom, but he 
cannot get rid of his responsibility. Responsibility is part of the 
unchangeable structure of man's being. That is: the actual existence
of man - of every man, not only the man who believes in Christ - 
consists in the positive fact that he has been made to respond to 
God". ^ 2  At this point as Paul K. Jewett points out, it must be said 
that Brunner is never the uncritical irrationalist. He knows that a 
rejection of the axioms of reason would lead to religious relativism. 
There can be no bridging of the gap between A and non-A. We cannot 
think unless we employ such universals as truth, goodness, and beauty. 
In fact, the very proposition "All is relative" is either true or false, 
if true, then all is not xelative, and therewith the proposition defeats 
itself. Reason, then, is the law of thought which God has implanted 
with us, (and in this sense he recognizes there is a revelation in 
creation; and it is indeed the Creator's highest and most glorious 
gift).153
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For this reason, Brunner regards a theologian as 'a wanderer 
between two worlds'. As a believer, he transcends the object-subject 
antithesis; as a thinker, he remains between the tongs (so to say) of 
the object-subject antithesis, even though his '"theme sui generis (and 
that with which he deals when he speaks about the Word of God and faith 
is precisely not thinking but a discerning of truth of an entirely 
singular nature) lies thus beyond what can be comprehended by means of 
the object-subject correlation".154 Yet the theologian is essentially a 
thinker, for it is not faith, but thought, which distinguishes him as a 
theologian. "The great theologian does not differ from the rest of the 
members of the Church by his greater faith, but by his greater powers of 
thought in the service of faith."155 Thus we should expect that the 
object-antithesis will play a major role in the work of the theologian.
Therefore, there are for Brunner certain fields where both reason
and faith can legitimately claim a competence. So we cannot just draw a
clear line of demarcation. Only a proportional proposition will do
justice to the facts. This proposition is the "law of closeness of
relation".155 And Brunner puts it as follows:
The nearer anything lies to that center of existence where 
we are concerned with the whole, that is, with man's 
relation to God and the being of the person, the greater is 
the disturbance of rational knowledge by sin; the farther 
away anything lies from this center, the less is the 
disturbance felt, and the less difference is there between 
knowing as believer or as an unbeliever. This disturbance 
reaches its maximum in theology and its minimum in the exact 
science, and zero in the sphere of the formal. Hence it is 
meaningless to speak of "Christian mathematics"; on the 
other hand, it is significant and necessary to distinguish 
the Christian conceptions of freedom, the good, community, 
and still more the Christian idea of God, from all other 
conceptions.15,7
Here not reason, then, but rationalism is what Brunner decries - that
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proud, autonomous reason which will not curb its tendency to system, 
which seeks to discover God at the end of a syllogism, and which thus 
reduces Him to a mere theory or a sets of propositions.
So, what Brunner has said about the biblical understanding of truth 
should indicate that the biblical truth is not a mere formal concept. 
Brunner emphasizes that in the New Testament is an expression of rich 
content. Truth and grace, truth and life belong together. He will make 
no simple distinction between a 'formal' and a 'material' principle: 
"The 'formal principle', the Word of God, and the 'material principle1, 
redemption through Jesus Christ or justification by faith alone, are 
two, but one and same principle seen in two aspects".15® When theology 
makes the formal principle the object of special investigation, it has 
the task of making clear "how this structural 'form' is determined by 
the 'matter' and the 'matter' by the 'form', in so far as it has 
"primarily no interest in being called a 'science' and its primary 
tendency is certainly not in the direction of intellectual research, but 
in the direction of the fellowship of faith and the preaching of the 
Church".15^ Thus when the biblical truth is understood as truth as 
encounter, it is not mere something formal; rather, it is the personal 
relationship between God and man in faith with Jesus Christ, and its 
only purpose is to realize God's lordship and his fellowship with Him.
The term 'truth as encounter' for Brunner, therefore, heralds the 
overcoming of the object-subject dichotomy in thought; and it 
reproduces adequately the two decisive elements which are contained in 
the biblical understanding of truth: that it is historical and that it
is personal. 1®0 According to Brunner, the biblical truth is not, as we 
have seen in the previous discussion, something which is inherently
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present in man or the world, and which man needs only to become aware
of, but the divine truth comes to men from outside the world and happens
among men in space and time. As a characteristic expression of this
biblical understanding of truth, Brunner often quotes a verse from the
y 'prologue to the Gospel of John: Grace and truth became ( € ' 7 € V 6 ' T O  )
through Jesus Christ" (1:17). That truth 'became', that it is not 
eternal and timeless, and that it is involved in history and subject to 
historical change, is a self-contradiction to Greek ears. Yet for the 
Bible the whole question of truth hinges upon the fact that it is not 
something timeless, but something which comes into being, the act of God 
in space and time.^1
As the revelation in Christ is made possible by the fact of an 
original divine disclosure, so also it is given meaning because it has a 
reference to that ultimate goal of history, which is beyond history, 
when the tabernacle of God will be with m e n .  ^ 2  This eschatological 
revelation is, as it were, the point on which everything hangs: "All
that is meaningful is teleological, that is, directed toward an end. 
Everything that is to have sense depends on a Telos; evry meaning is
determined as a partial-meaning, by the ultimate meaning  If the
end is nothing, then everything leading up to it is meaning-less; if 
the total sense is nonsense, then every partial sense is likewise 
nonsense. If everything ends up in the oblivion of nothingness, then 
existence is without meaning."163 jn fact, Brunner's references to this 
eschatological revelation occur primarily in conjunction with his 
rejection of the liberal idea of human progress of which, he claims, 
there is not a word in the New Testament, and which constitutes one of 
the most fatal errors in the history of theology.
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So, God's revelation of his truth in an historical event in space 
and time does not signify that he originates an idea which is then taken 
up by human thought, or that he creates a series of facts which man has 
to take into account. Rather, as Heinz Zahrnt points out, it means for 
Brunner the fact that he himself, his person, is the content of this 
event, the act of God in space and t i m e .^64 T h e  revelation of God is 
thus 'the imparting of himself', what he speaks is 'addressed' to 
someone, and his word is 'a communicating word'. "In his Word, God does 
not deliver to me a course of lectures in dogmatic theology, he does not 
submit to me or interpret for me the content of a confession of faith, 
but he makes himself accessible to me. ... he does not communicate 
'something' to me, but 'h i m s e l f ^ 65 Consequently the act of 
revelation and its content are identical. The fact that God has 
revealed himself to man includes what he has revealed: that he loves
man and desires fellowship with him. Thus in the Bible the truth of God 
is always identical with the love of G o d . ^ 66 jn the biblical 
understanding of truth the fact that truth is historical and the fact 
that it is personal are linked; together they define the nature of 
revelation as the self-imparting of God to man.^67
As the revelation in creation, though man has fallen from this 
original revelation, the knowledge of God, Brunner claims, is not wholly 
obliterated; and hence there is a point of contact for the revelation 
in Christ. This indicates Brunner's argument about the point that the 
distinction between the revelation of creation and that of salvation was 
made, according to him, not only by the Reformers but also by Augustine 
and all other teachers of the Church, including Paul (Romans 1 :3 ).^68 
So Brunner claims as follows:
It is impossible to believe in a Christian way in the unique
revelation, in the Mediator, without believing also in a
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universal revelation of God in creation, in history, and 
especially in the human conscience. But, on the other hand, 
a believer in the universal revelation who is a Christian 
and believes in the Mediator, can no longer be an idealist 
or a mystic. This twofold point of view is based on the 
fact that the Christian believer regards "general" 
revelation as an indirect (gebrochen) revelation and think 
that in it they have an authentic knowledge of God they are 
not in the truth. The recognition of the indirect general 
revelation is the presupposition of the Christian religion 
of revelation, with its unique character.^69
However, as Wolfhart Pannenberg points out, this sort of claim, 
that there is a multiplicity of revelation, implies a discrediting of 
any particular revelation. The form of the divine manifestation is no 
longer the singularly adequate expression of the revealer. We can 
classify, according to him, the possibility of revelation into two 
following cases: (1) the direct transparence of divine power through a
medium that is distinct from God; and (2) the indirect self­
authentication of God on the basis of his activity. What Brunner makes 
between revelation in creation and revelation of salvation (on the basis 
of the economy of salvation) can be classified into both cases in which 
he attempts to make the two in practice amounting to the same thing. 
Although his claim about God frequently moves between them, Brunner 
stands on the opinion that the revelation of God is primarily the direct 
engagement of a person to a Thou.170 Here every activity and act of God 
can indirectly express something about God. If this is so, then it can 
be said, Pannenberg argues, that God is the one who does this or that: 
"The event in question does not have the same aspect as it would if one 
merely stood under the impact of its content. Not only is the content 
perceived for its own value; it is also seen that the event defined in 
this way has God as its originator. Here lies the change of
perspective........As acts of God, these acts cast light back on God
himself, communicating something indirectly about God himself. That
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does not of course mean that they reveal God or that God reveals himself 
in them as their originator, for every individual event which is taken 
to be God's activity illuminates the being of God only in a partial 
way."171
Thus, Brunner is aware of this problem, and he claims that as the
original and final forms of divine revelation may be important, the crux
of the problem of revelation is the incarnation; that revelation of God 
in the middle, between the beginning and the end, around which all else 
revolves and from the perspective of which 'beginning' and end must be 
interpreted:
It has pleased God to reveal Himself in a different way in 
each of the following forms: in His work in the Creation;
in the Prophets and Seers; in the One in whom all is
fulfilled; again, His revelation in the earlier stages 
differs from that in which He has promised to reveal Himself 
at the end of all things. But when we admit this we do not 
question either the unity of the Revealer or the unity of 
that which has been revealed. It is only in the 
characteristic variety of the divine methods of revelation 
that the genuine characteristically Biblical unity of that 
which has been revealed, and the true nature of the Revealer 
Himself, can be understood. For the Biblical revelation it 
is essential to begin with the central revelation and from 
that standpoint to look back to the primal revelation and 
forward to the revelation of the last days. If this variety 
of revelation is either ignored or explained away in the 
interest of a theological monism, the main point has been 
missed. None of these different forms of revelation 
resembles the others; none can be mistaken for another; 
none makes the rest superflous; each has its own place, and 
its own special significance; and only in their combination 
in the knowledge of faith which both looks back to the 
beginning and forward to the end can we understand what the 
Bible means by revelation and faith.17^
Here Brunner underlines the personal nature of the biblical revelation
as event, the act of God in space and time, and the impossibility of
expressing its full meaning in an abstract definition independently of
its manifold and concrete forms.
Yet revelation and knowledge of faith for Brunner belong "in
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essence", as we are shown in the previous discussion, to the relation 
between God and man: "God as Lord lays claim to the obedience of man;
and by giving himself to be known as the loving God, he gives this love 
of his to man, that man may love him in return. He does both through 
his Word. " ^ 3  So, what is true of revelation from God's side is also 
true of its acceptance on man's part. Revelation as the sovereign self- 
imparting of God finds its counterpart in faith as the free self-giving 
of man. Thus, faith is seen to be not an object of knowledge, but an 
act of trust: man is now ready to receive his life from the hand of God
and to exercise his responsibility in such a way that he responds to the
word of God. Thus Brunner describes the personal being of man as 'a 
responding a c t u a l i t y ^ ^  That is to say, the truth of God is not an 
object, which lies before me and which I grasp, so that I then possess 
it, but that it is a movement, which comes to me, and by which I am 
possessed, so that I then am in it.
In brief, what we can say about God is the fact that the
relationship which prevails between God and man is that of a personal 
correspondence - this concept sums up everything which Brunner has to 
say about truth as encounter, and indeed is a most pregnant
representation of his fundamental missionary concern. So Brunner sees 
in it the 'fundamental category', the 'basic ordinance', the 'original 
formal relationship', etc within which everything that the Bible says 
about God and man must be understood. The relationship of personal 
correspondence is a 'twofold but unambiguous relationship'. It is 
twofold, because it is concerned primarily with the relationship of God 
to man, and secondarily with the relationship of man to God. In this 
regard, Brunner's claim about the God of revelation may be labelled as 
'the God of dialogical personalism'. Thus Christian revelation for
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Brunner is never an abstract system, and yet it is also a communication 
of truth in and through the personal self-communication of God in the 
incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. Both levels are legitimate and necessary, 
for God's revelation to man is given on both levels. Each conception is 
true at its proper epistemological level. Consequently, an adequate 
explanation for Brunner must consider both levels in their proper order 
of importance and in their relation to one another. We shall discuss 
the question of what the truth-claims of Brunner's missionary theology 
are in the next chapter.
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IV THE TRUTH-CLAIMS OF MISSIONARY THEOLOGY
1. Historical truth
1.1 The truth of revelation^
The great theme of Christian thought is, according to Emil Brunner, the 
defining and establishing of the Christian truth of revelation.^ The 
Church knows that she lives on the divine revelation, that is, the Truth 
which she has received. For him, the divine revelation is then both the 
ground and norm of the proclamation of the Church and theology as well 
as the content of the message of the Church. If theology is reflection 
upon the message, which has been given and entrusted to the Church, then 
its most urgent task is to reflect upon revelation; and it is the duty 
of the Church, both to herself and to the world, to make a clear 
theological statement about the fundamental truth on which the life of 
the Church depends.^
But the biblical understanding of revelation is, Brunner argues, 
deformed by both the liberal theology and the orthodox theology of 
Protestantism and Catholicism in that the former compromises the 
uniqueness and transcendence of revelation with mysticism and immanence 
and the latter transforms revelation from an encounter with the living 
Christ into an object, either the Bible or a deposit of propositional 
truths.  ^ Against the first deformation Brunner insists that the 
biblical understanding of revelation is unique and differs from that of 
non-biblical religions; against the second, he underlines the ’personal1 
revelation as event and the impossibility of expressing its full meaning 
in an abstract definition of its manifold and concrete forms.^
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Then, revelation for Brunner is not merely an objective event
without depending on the subjective reception of it by man for whom it
is intended; but revelation in its full and proper sense includes a
subjective illumination which makes possible a personal reception of the
objective communication. Brunner puts it as follows:
Revelation is indeed that which becomes manifest to us 
through a definite action of God; it means that we, whose 
eyes were formerly closed, have now opened them to a certain 
light; that upon us, who were in darkness, the light has 
shone. Thus revelation only reaches its goal in the
subject, man. Revelation is not a fact in itself, but it is 
this fact, plus an illumination, a disclosure, which makes 
the 'fact' known. The fact of illumination is therefore an 
integral part of the process of revelation; without this an 
event is no more a revelation than light is light without 
the seeing, illuminated, eye. Revelation is a transitive 
event which proceeds from God and ends in man, a light ray 
with these two poles. There is therefore no point in 
setting the objective fact of revelation over against the 
subjective act of receiving the revelation, because the 
revelation actually consists in the meeting of two subjects, 
the divine and the human, the self-communication of God to 
man .6
Therefore, to understand what the revelation in Jesus Christ is means 
also to understand what faith is. In this regard, we shall be concerned 
with Brunner's analysis of the revelation of God in Christ. This 
analysis revolves about two main problems: revelation as an objective
event in history and the reception of this revelation by the individual 
through faith.
1.2 Revelation and history
Christianity rests on, according to Brunner, a historical revelation, 
became flesh'. This indicates revelation as the historical event, that 
is the unity of revelation as promise in the Old Testament and 
revelation as fulfilment in Jesus Christ.^ So Brunner claims this
revelation is the 'absolute event'; it has always the character of a 
sudden event; and it stands out from all ordinary happenings from the
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normal course of development. Hence it is a kind of ’incursion from an 
other dimension1. This sudden event, however, is understood in the 
Bible alone as the absolute and unique event that can never be repeated 
in the sense of the Incarnation. It is the Jesus event in history. 
Here it takes place that which 'happens once-for-all, and is therefore 
unconditioned1. ® From this perspective is to be understood the polemic 
which runs through the entire corpus of Brunner's writings against what 
he calls general religion.
(a) Immanence. Brunner's understanding of the historical 
revelation differs from that of historicism (in both the idealism of 
Hegel and historical positivism). Hegel attempts, according to Brunner, 
to preserve the absolute character of Christianity by making it the 
highest stage in the evolutionary development of the religious 
consciousness of the race; and his system of philosophy of history aims 
at being the intellectual presentation of the historical process, in 
which the absolute Spirit is manifested in the finite.^ So the idea 
expressed in history is, for Hegel, really everything, and the element 
of concrete realization was mere matter of fact^®; hence the defect of 
Hegelianism lies in its immanence that regards man and God as 
metaphysically, epistemologically and ethically continuous, so that man 
may arrive at the true knowledge of God within the framework of his own 
innate possibilities.^  According to Hegel, history itself is the self­
manifestation of God, that is to say, it is revelation. In history, or 
rather, through history, through the historical process as such, very 
gradually there takes place the overcoming of the relative opposition 
between existence and the divine; and therefore history is itself the 
Mediator.^
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Brunner claims that Schleiermacher takes the place of Hegel as the 
great teacher of immanence; and that he tries to combine a historical 
element with his subjectivism by representing that the form supplied by 
the mere fact become a content which determines the religious 
consciousness. In consequence Christian religion for Schleiermacher is, 
according to Brunner, not only a concrete historical phenomenon, like 
every other living thing, but also a conscious reference to a historical 
factor (in this case the factor is its historical origin in the 
historical personality of Jesus), is essential to it; and this reference 
to a historical factor ends by being regarded as the essential 
characteristic of Christian piety; but both conceptions of religion are
incompatible.^
That religion consists in a feeling of union with the 
Infinite that is void of any idea, and that Christian 
religion is a conscious relation to the historical 
personality of Jesus of Nazareth, and accordingly it is 
knowledge of him, including the knowledge that he is the 
originator of the Christian religion. These two lines of 
thought are held together, but only seemingly so, by a third 
conception - that this significance belongs to Jesus, 
because in him the religious consciousness (understood in 
the sense of the first definition) finds expression in 
exemplary perfection, and hence he can redeem other men by 
arousing in them that same consciousness.^
(b) Transcendence. Against the immanence of Hegelianism, Brunner 
agrees with Kierkegaard who passionately stresses the absolute 
qualitative difference between the finite and the infinite, the man and 
the Divine^; and criticizes Hegel's 'the absolute whole' which 
contains everything; and in consequence destroys individuality.^ At 
first Barth seizes upon Kierkegaard's disjunction between time and 
eternity as the way out of the either-or of liberalism and Orthodoxy; 
and Barth himself says: "If I have a 'system', it consists in this,
that I always keep in mind with the utmost rigour what Kierkegaard has 
called the 'infinite qualitative difference' between time and eternity,
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and that in both its positive and negative implications 'God is in 
heaven and thou upon earth".^7 Brunner also shares with Kierkegaard 
and Barth an unshakable conviction in the absolute otherness of God, 
that is, the infinite qualitative difference between the Creator and the 
creature. He asserts that God stands on the ground of divine 
transcendence; and therefore our knowledge of God rests on 'a self-
manifestation of God, penetrating and contradicting the world and human 
experience'.  ^®
Accordingly, Emil Brunner distinguishes between the transcendent
God of the Bible and the God-idea of the religion of immanence
epistemologically. ^  He claims that by the latter man finds 'God' in
nature or in his soul; hence the name 'God' is for man merely another
name for the essence of existence or the substance of the empirical
world; and he says:
Man finds God in existing things. He is merely another name 
for the essence of existence. A religion based on such a 
conception of God is monistic and optimistic. It asserts an 
unbroken unity and continuity of God and the natural 
existence of man. God and world-experience are not 
contradictory; nor are the experience of the world and the 
Ego different from God. There is a way of passing from one 
to the other. The world in its being is divine and the 
essence of the Ego is God-like.^
So he radically reacted against the doctrine of immanence; for if God is
really identical with the world or the soul, then He is neither the
sovreign of the world nor of man; and such a God is not really the
personal God who 'meets us in revelation as Absolute Lord' So, the
God of immanence 'whom I shall have to know through an interpretation of
world or of myself', as Brunner claims, 'is less than I am because I
give utterance to him who himself is dumb, as it w e r e ' .^2 Therefore this
religion of immanence is not really based upon faith, that is, 'an
answer to a call, or a response to a challenge'; and an immanent God
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neither calls me nor demand my decision. Rather such a God excludes 
decision because the Divine (in this case of immanence) is supposed to 
be identical with 'the deepest self of man'; and therefore man himself 
is already in God and God in him; he is already on the safe side before 
he makes a decision to a call from God of the otherness, whom man knows 
only through His revelation of Jesus Christ.^3
(c) The uniqueness of revelation in history. Since Brunner
rejects immanence, that is, the Hegelian idealistic negation of history 
as we have seen in the previous discussion. Instead, he conceives of 
transcendence, that is, in Kierkegaardian terms, 'the absolute otherness 
of God' or 'the infinite qualitative difference between the Creator and 
the creature'. But one may raisesra question of how it is possible to 
build the knowledge of God, or to express the relation of God to the 
world. Brunner's answer to this question is that the genuine 
theological expression must be dialectical.^ Even though they are 
antithetical in themselves, yet they are tangent at the point of divine 
revelation, a point where Eternity becomes time^; the Absolute,
finite; the Divine, human; God, man. Because the Christian negation 
of history is, according to Brunner, at the same time its affirmation, 
because the Word became flesh, we would expect him to have a Christian 
understanding of history.26
It is also important for us to note that as time went on, Brunner 
began to feel the need for a more balanced emphasis from 
'transcendence', and then took controversy with Karl Barth (see 1.1.2); 
so the fundamental structure of Brunner's thinking more profoundly was 
an awakened appreciation for the dimension of the personal, as mediated 
to him especially by Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber.27 Brunner,
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working out the implications of the Ebner and Buberian axiom, 'no I 
without a thou1, as it bears on the question of God's self-disclosure to 
man, has tended to counterpoise the otherness of God, with the idea of 
man's likeness to God in that God has created man in His own image and 
all men in a sense know God.^® So we must keep constantly before us 
Brunner's concern to solve the problem of revelation and history without 
falling into 'historical positivism' on the one hand, and 'non- 
historical idealism' on the other; therefore Brunner conceives of the 
biblical (or Christian) revelation in such a way that it is neither idea 
nor historical facts (in a sense of historical science); rather, it is 
'unique event' in history. By this event he seeks to understand history 
from the perspective of revelation, rather than to subordinate 
revelation under the general category of history29; and on this Brunner 
remarks:
It is of the very essence of the Christian faith that its 
relation to history should be entirely different from that 
of any other religion or philosophy. In the ordinary sense 
of the word it is not concerned with history at all. It is 
what it is through its relation to that unique event, which,
although it is a fact of history, does not gain its unique
character from its historical connection. It is this which 
determines the peculiar relation of the Christian faith to 
history in general. To the Christian faith revelation does 
not mean a reverent process of tracing the ways of God in
history. Indeed, history as such is not a divine
revelation; it merely represents humanity as a whole in its 
need of redemption. But precisely because something super- 
historical, unique, absolutely decisive has entered into 
human history, to faith history means something entirely 
different from its meaning for all other forms of thought.
Our relation to history is determined by our relation to 
Jesus Christ, not vice versa.30
Therefore, no religion knows the concept of revelation as 
Christianity holds it; and no religion ever dared to affirm seriously 
that God became m a n . s o  the one word of Christian confession of 
faith-crucified under Pontius Pilate - together with the apostles'
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( GcP <k TTdt ^ ), ’once for all1 - fixes the fundamental difference
between Christianity's claim of revelation and the claims made by other
religions. Hence the revelation of the Christian faith, Brunner claims,
differs wholly from revelation and its meaning of other religions by
reason of its ’uniqueness’ (Einmaligkeit).32 in this regard,
Christianity takes the word, ’revelation’, with absolute seriousness:
and this very concept of uniqueness, however, is unknown outside
Christianity because uniqueness in a genuine sense can only mean one
fact that there can be only one individual example;33
The peculiar fact about Christianity - and one which gives 
great offence - is this: it is absolutely concerned with an
external historical fact. It is not the external fact 
itself with which it is concerned so deeply, but with the 
fact of the actuality of that upon which it depends; this 
too is intended in the absolutely literal sense of the word 
- in the sense of a fact which has actually taken place.
All depends upon the fact that the Word did become flesh, 
and this means that the Eternal has entered into the sphere 
of external historical fact. To be 'made flesh' means among 
other things an actual state of presence, sensible, 
external, non-spiritualized. Incarnation means entering 
into the realm of visible fact, ... It is a state in which 
an individual can be touched, handled, or photographed; it 
is an isolated fact within time and space, the filling of a 
certain point within time and space which apart from this 
fact would have remained empty, and which can be filled in 
this fact alone: all this belongs to the actuality of the
Incarnation of the Word.34
Accordingly, history for Brunner is not mere causal sequence, nor 
the unfolding of the Absolute; rather it is 'the field of personal 
decision on the basis of a divine act of revelation'35; in other words, 
history is decisive as the Jesus-event in history is unique in that its 
meaning is grasped by the act of faith. Brunner does not mean, however, 
the term ’history’ by the expression 'uniqueness1, when applied to the 
incarnation, simply as the idea of singleness of kind. It is precisely 
the fact that the Incarnation of the Word of God is an absolutely 
decisive event that constitutes its uniqueness, in contrast to all other
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events in history which have only relative s i g n i f i c a n c e . 36 He puts it 
as follows:
Revelation is absolutely unique, therefore it is absolutely 
decisive. This is so true that we could reverse the 
statement and say: the one absolutely unique and decisive 
fact is revelation. It is only since Christ came and
through Him, that both uniqueness and absolute decision have 
been in existence.... The key to the understanding of this 
very significant fact lies in the conception of uniqueness, 
which is identical with that of absolute decision.37
There is, of course, time for plants and animals only in the sense
of the natural time of physics, or a series of moments in ordered 
sequence, but nothing really decisive happens, for the organic life
which has the character of a cycle which loses significance by turning 
in on itself; and therefore there is history, properly speaking, only 
in the realm of human activity. History as such has only a tendency to 
uniqueness. It is distinguished from nature by this tendency, and yet, 
as nature has its historical side, so history has its natural side. In 
this regard history, understood in the usual sense, is 'characterized by 
a relative uniqueness'; and within the sphere of empirical happenings 
there are, according to Brunner, no final decisions. So what are 
usually called 'historical decisions' are relatively irreversible, 
relatively unique, relatively decisive events.
However, the Christian faith alone, as Brunner claims, "can speak 
of one decision, namely, the reversal of the world order in Jesus 
Christ, in whom not only earthly history but also all that happens, from 
its beginning derived from eternity and its end in eternity, eternally 
receives its centre, and in this centre its qualification - the event 
which the witnesses in the New Testament expressly testify has taken 
place 'once for a l l '."39 Hence temporal events with the quality of a 
'time of decision' only exist where eternity itself has entered into
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time4 ;^ and therefore the Jesus event is, for Brunner, the end of 
history, in the sense that it is that toward which all history because 
of its tendency to the uniqueness, strives; that is to say, it is
history par excellence, 'the truly historical'. The goal of history is
not 'nothing' (das Nichts), but the fellowship of the faithful, the 
Kingdom of God. The Kingdom has broken into history in the person of
Jesus, who is 'the Eternal in time'41; and yet it is wholly
eschatological. With the coming of Christ history has become 
eschatological history.4^
1.3 The Jesus-event
Here we discuss Brunner's concept of revelation on the object side, and 
what Brunner speaks thus about revelation is an event in history, i.e. 
the Jesus-event in which 'the Eternal had to meet historical 
humanity'.43 This does not mean that history itself reveals God. 
Rather, God reveals Himself in definite moments of history and above all 
in Jesus Christ - in His person, life, death, and resurrection. 
Therefore, even if the revelation-event in Jesus Christ touches history, 
so Brunner lays great stress on its factuality (Aktualitat), but history 
itself never become the 'object of faith'; rather, it is the locus of 
revelation. Brunner sees that the problem of revelation and history 
finds its sharpest focus in the person of Jesus.
So, this problem raises the question of how the Jesus-event is to 
be conceived so that the historical person of Jesus may be secured from 
what Biblical criticism has done to the Gospel tradition because Jesus 
for Brunner is not simply a religious symbol.44 Brunner's answer to 
this question is intelligible only on the background of his 
Kierkegaardian structure of revelation as the point of tangent between
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time and eternity; hence he understands that the Jesus event is the 
category of the incognito to history (of science) because it is the 
incarnation of the son of God, His historical personality; in other 
words, 'the historical, tangible side' of revelation.4® In this regard, 
Brunner claims that the eternal in history, the revelation as the 
absolutely unique, cannot be perceived in terms of historical extension. 
Revelation is not the actual fact that which is made known through 
history: the life of Jesus and the historical personality of Jesus -
but the invisible secret of the Person of Jesus, hidden behind the veils 
of history and of human life, not the Christ after the flesh but the 
Christ after the Spirit, the 'Word made flesh'.4® Thus God is really in 
Christ, but only for the eye of faith, not yet for sight.
Therefore, dependence of revelation on scientific history means 
uncertainty because the eternal as an event in history has as such 'no 
historical extension'. That is to say, the unique event in history, 
revelation, achieved in history in such a way that it constitutes a 
complete breaking through of all historical continuity. In this regard, 
it is not the extended fact in history; rather, it is 'an isolated fact 
within time and space'.47 Thus it is not perceptible to the eye of 
scientific historian because the historian mainly aims at two things: 
first, the aim of history is to create, as far as possible, a complete 
'film picture of the past' and secondly, it is to interpret the pictures 
of reality which have thus been completely recaptured in the light of 
previous happenings, and of that which is intelligible to humanity as a 
whole.4®
Here Brunner recognizes with historical criticism the distinction 
between the two terms, 'the Christ in flesh' and 'the Christ after the
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flesh1. But distinction between the two terms is only intelligible from
the standpoint of the Christian faith; and outside it such an idea
could not even be entertained. The reason for this is that this
distinction is only another way of expressing the unique fact in
history, the Jesus event, while it is really and truly historical, yet
transcends all historical barriers. It is precisely because of this
that the historical actuality of the eternal, the Jesus event in
history, is in Brunner's view the way (or form) in which the eternal
divine Word, as the Eternal Son, touches the historical world.^9
Hence the possibility of making the distinction between the 
'Christ in flesh' and the 'Christ after the flesh'. The 
'Christ in the flesh' offers a common point of interest both 
to the chronicler and to the believer. The believer 
believes in Christ of whom the Chronicler also must have 
something to report. But the Christ who is set forth by the 
Chronicler, by the author of a report, or by the historian 
who is most profoundly prepared by all his previous training 
to understand the great and truly human in history, or by 
the man who in all reverence watches and listens for the 
voice of God within history, is the 'Christ after the 
flesh'. The believer alone sees more than the 'Christ after 
the flesh' in the 'Christ in the flesh'.50
Accordingly, the picture of Jesus given in all four of the Gospels 
is, for Brunner, is not an historical one but one already permeated with 
kerygma.5”1 The gospel of John, for instance, was never intended to be 
history; it will not report what happened as such, but rather instruct 
us as to who Jesus was and what His life meant. We have testimony to 
Christ on the part of the believing community which shows us the truly 
historical Jesus; and the nexus between the preaching of Jesus and the 
preaching of the Christian community about Him is the event of the 
resurrection.52 The disciples were witnesses of the resurrected Christ 
and it is their witness which we have recorded in the Gospels. 
Therefore, they were not concerned, as is the historical critic, to 
reconstruct an historical picture of Jesus; but rather "they testify
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with more or less historical fidelity the Jesus Christ, whom they first 
came to know aright after Easter; and then they relate the story of the 
Christ-in-the flesh, from which the historian abstracts the history of 
Jesus, the history of the Christ-after-the-flesh".53
Therefore, the question whether we need historical revelation or 
not is, for Brunner, "a question which is decided by faith alone; a 
question, then, which is not decided by intellectual pros and cons, but 
only in that ultimate decision which claims the totality of man, namely, 
whether our honour and justification lies in ourselves, or whether we 
have to receive them from outside ourselves".^4 The apostles had 
actually experienced the resurrection of Jesus and the whole living 
reality of Jesus. No instance of this kind has ever been known; 
indeed, the truth of faith make it possible. It is of the very essence 
of revelation and of faith that we should become Christians not through 
the historical picture of Jesus, but through the picture traced by the 
Gospels in the light of resurrection faith which has grown out of the 
testimony of the apostles, and has become the witness to Christ of the 
Christian church; and thus faith justifies this attitude by pointing 
out that the revelation of Christ does not cease with the process which 
the historian can verify - even when he has every possible kind of 
material at his disposal. Therefore the adequate basis of the Christian 
faith for Brunner is the witness of the Scriptures to Christ.^5
2. Biblical truth
2.1 Revelation and the word of G o d ^
As we have seen in previous discussion, revelation for Brunner is the 
Jesus-event, that is to say, God's breaking into history in the person
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of Jesus Christ. Therefore the revelation is, he claims, Jesus Christ 
himself, not a doctrine about Jesus Christ: "The doctrine of the Church 
is always the Confession, the expression, but not the object of faith. 
The Object of faith is the revelation, Jesus Christ Himself, not the 
Credo of the Church. But if this Creed of the Church is wrongly equated 
with absolute Truth, then it is almost impossible to avoid setting it up 
as the actual object of faith. Faith becomes faith in dogma, belief in 
an authoritative human doctrine, it then ceases to be what it is 
according to the teaching of the Bible: faith in the truth of
revelation, which can never be equated with any human doctrine at all. 
The revelation is Jesus Christ Himself, not a doctrine about Jesus 
Christ".57
However, if it is the case that revelation is Jesus Christ Himself, 
Brunner is, then, faced with the problem posed by Biblical criticism,55 
how does one get from the Word, which is Christ, to words about Him and 
how are these words related to the Word; or precisely how does one 
conceive of any discrepancy between the Jesus of history and the Jesus 
which the early Church preached that constitutes the very nature of the 
situation of crisis - a major challenge to Christian faith.5  ^ Brunner's 
solution to this problem is, as Paul K. Jewett points out, that it was 
the task of Jesus to be the Christ, while it was left to the apostles to 
preach Him.55 Thus, he presumes, we can adequately account for the 
difference between the way in which Jesus himself speaks and the way in 
which the disciples speak about him. Brunner is not concerned in the 
main, however, with the solution of critical questions in concreto; 
rather, his interest lies in another direction. He is concerned with a 
tracing of the course of the process as such, and then he claims that 
every genuine testimony about Christ must be grounded in and stem from
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such personal encounter of Him. The primal form of all witness to
Christ is the faith-confession of the thou-answer to the addressing 
thou-word of God.  ^^
Since Emil Brunner objects to orthodox Protestantism's simple
identification of the word of Scripture with the Word of God on the one
hand and to liberal theologian's compromise of the uniqueness and
transcendence of revelation on the other, he suggests a different view
of the argument for the problem of the apparent difference between the
'Jesus of history' and the 'Christ of faith'; and Brunner's argument
for this is as follows:
If ... we go back to the origin of both, to the point at 
which 'it pleased God to reveal His Son in me'; that is, 
where the revelation becomes the Word of God, then we 
perceive that an important change has taken place between 
this point and the witness. Peter, who was the first to 
confess Jesus as the Christ, because this 'was not revealed 
unto him by flesh and blood, but by the Father in heaven' , 
does not tell the story of Jesus, nor does he teach about 
Christ. His confession, the primitive form of his witness, 
is still accomplished in the dimension of personal 
encounter: 'Truly Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living 
God! ' The original form of all genuine witness is the 
confession of faith in the form of the answering 'Thou 
evoked by the 'Thou' - word of God addressed to the soul.
This is true not only of the confession of the Apostle, but
also of the confession of every true believer, of that 
'Abba, Father', which the Holy Spirit utters, evoking the 
response of faith in the same inspired words. The act of 
faith is a confession in the form of prayer, in the
dimension 'Thou-I'; it is not a doctrinal statement in the 
third person: 'He-you'.
Thus the first step in the development of the doctrinal 
testimony is to move away from the 'Thou-relation' to God; 
this signifies a change of front: from God towards the
world. In doctrine man speaks no longer in the 'Thou'-form 
to God - as in the original confession of faith - but he now 
speaks about God as 'He'. Doctrine is no longer a 
spontaneous, personal response, in the form of prayer, to 
the Word of God, but already, even in its simplest form, it 
is reflective speech about God. The process of leaving the 
sphere of personal encounter in order to enter into the 
impersonal sphere of reflection is the presupposition of all
doctrine.^
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Here Brunner claims that we must be primarily concerned with the 
thou-form word in the dimension of personal encounter. He suggests two 
reasons for this: (1) the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is not
itself a doctrine but a person with his story63; and (2) the 
development of doctrine from the thou-form word is, according to him, to 
move away from the thou-relation to God.64 This means for Brunner that 
we have to recognize primarily the revelation in Christ as a Person: "It 
is therefore he, this Person, who is really the Word. He himself is the 
communication, the self-communication of God; it is he himself in whom 
God proclaims and realises his will to Lordship and his will to 
fellowship".66 Therefore the apostles’ witness is not revelation in 
the genuine sense of the word; rather it is a compliment of the ’mute1 
act-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. And yet it is also true, 
according to him, that God's act-word in Christ must be interpreted to 
us in the witness of the believing apostles.66 "The word of Jesus, in 
point of fact, has a share in the absolute authority of the Son of God. 
But this implies that it is not itself the Word of God as a whole. He, 
Himself, His person and His work, is not an object, but, as it were, the 
silent presupposition for a right understanding of His teaching; this 
underlying truth only becomes explicit in the words of His Apolstes".67
The question, therefore, naturally arises, what is the relation 
between doctrine and personal revelation in the revelation in Jesus 
Christ? Brunner expresses this relationship in a way of ’encounter’66:
(1) The Incarnation of the Word, the entrance of God into the sphere of 
our life, the self-manifestation of God in his Son - this is the real 
revelation, the establishment of Lordship and creation of fellowship. 
Words, therefore, are not of ultimate consequence, not even divine 
words, but the Word, which he himself, Jesus Christ is. Thus because he
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himself is the Word of God, all words have only an instrumental value. 
Neither the spoken words nor their conceptual content are the Word 
itself, but only its 'frame1, the means of conveying it. As God in his 
Word wills to direct not only our thinking but 'ourselves1, so in his 
Word he wills to give 'himself' - that is, Jesus Christ.^9
(2) We cannot possess Jesus Christ, the content, the thing itself, 
the personal revelation except in this 'container'. The frame is 
necessarily bound up with its content. Without the doctrine, the thing 
itself is not present for us. "God indubitably says 'something' to us 
in order to be present as Lord and as Father in the Son through the 
Spi r i t . "^0 Even the most personal encounter with the personal 
revelation, Jesus Christ, which Peter experienced at the Sea of Galilee, 
involved doctrine which had to be grasped conceptually: 'Thou art the
Christ, the Son of the Living God'. Though it is true that God does not 
hold a dogma class with us, nor propose to us a confession of faith, 
still 'he tells us authentically who he is and what he wills for us and 
from us'. So Brunner concludes that we can never separate the 
conceptual framework from the personal presence contained in it. "We 
know that we can never have the one without the other, and we know at 
the same time that the whole point is to have the personal contained 
within the abstract framework. Doctrine is certainly related 
instrumentally to the Word of God as token and framework, serving in 
relation to the reality - actual personal fellowship with God; but 
doctrine is indissoluably connected with the reality it represents".71
This leads us to re-emphasize for Brunner the truth of the word of 
God in human language: "The word of the Apostles itself forms part of 
the revelation of God through Jesus Christ. The act of the historical
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divine revelation is completed only where, in the spoken word of the 
Apostle, it becomes the knowledge of faith, the confession of faith, and 
the witness which creates faith".7^ The Bible is then the fixation of 
this faith-confessing, faith-creating, and interpretative testimony of 
the apostles. This viva vox of the apostles stands in much closer 
relationship to the Word of God than the Bible, but the Scriptural 
fixation of this living testimony (and that was necessary to preserve it 
from being completely altered and thereby lost in the moving stream of 
historical tradition) participates in the authority of that 
revelation.7  ^ It is, therefore, the border of that particular 
revelational event of which it bears record: "In principle, therefore,
an Apostle is one to whom the primary knowledge of Christ is entrusted, 
not mediated by the intrusion of any other human being, apart from which 
Jesus Christ would not have been the revelation to humanity. As the 
Apostle belongs to the unique event of revelation, so all knowledge 
mediated through the Apostolic word stands on this side of the unique 
historical events. This 'frontier' is the basis of the idea of the 
canon, the basis of the fact of the Bible".7^
2.2 The witness of the apostles to the revelation in Christ.
Emil Brunner also suggests that we, who are not the contemporaries of 
Jesus Christ, reach to the Jesus-event in history, and we can only have 
access to this particular and personal revelation of God through the 
witness of the apostles. We only possess him in their witness to him. 
This should not be surprising for Brunner because the revelation in 
Christ is a historical revelation. It is of the very nature of an 
historical revelation that it can only reach later generations through 
the testimony of eyewitnesses. So Brunner calls the apostle as the 
original witness on the two respects: the first is the fact that he is
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an eyewitness, and the second is that he possesses a fund of detailed, 
original knowledge of Christ, which is of particular i m p o r t a n c e . A s  
Brunner points out, it is the 'share in the uniqueness of the event of 
revelation' as historical event that gives the written documents 
superiority over the subsequent (or later) oral tradition and grounds 
the idea of a canon, in which it had to be fixed in writing in order to 
preserve the original witness of the apostles in all its purity.
Consequently, the Scripture alone, Brunner claims, could preserve
the original witnesses of the apostles from distortion and contamination
in the living stream of historical tradition. Hence all later oral
tradition and witness of the church must have its source and norm in
this written-original tradition of the New Testament canon precisely in
order to preserve the genuineness of the tradition itself.^6 The
Scripture, however, is not the absolute norm, nor are they to be simply
identified with the Word of God. Insofar as we are concerned with its
truth of the Christ, the normative authority of Scripture is, in
Brunner's view, conditional and relative. The reason is that its real
norm and authority is the revelation itself, that is, Jesus Christ
himself, who reveals himself to us by means of and in the witness of
Scripture. In this regard, we are unconditionally bound to Scripture as
the medium of revelation for us. So Brunner claims as follows:
Actually, this is the point at issue: that the real norm is 
the revelation, Jesus Christ Himself, who Himself witnesses 
to us through the Holy Spirit, who, however, in addition to 
this His self-revelation makes use of the witness of the 
Apostles. While we are bound in an absolute sense to the 
medium, to the menas of revelation of the Apostolic witness, 
we are only bound in a relative sense to the authority of 
this witness. The absolute authority in Jesus Christ 
Himself, whom we only possess through the record and the 
teaching of the Apostles; but He, whom we only have through 
them, stands above them. Their witness is valid, absolutely 
binding, insofar as it really witnesses to Him Himself.^7
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Here Brunner affirms that the apostolic witness to Christ in the 
Scripture does possess a divine foundation in inspiration, ’but it 
nowhere claims, eo ipso, to be inspired, either because it is apostolic 
testimony, or in the whole range and detail of its formulated 
d o c t r i n e A l l  the varied witnesses of the apostles are repeated
attempts to express ever more adequately that which can never be fully 
expressed in human words: the revelation which God has given in the 
person of Jesus Christ. All their witnesses stand in a circle about
Christ and point to him. Like a 'funnel' every point on whose surface 
is oriented toward the centre; and this centre for Brunner indicates 
Christ. So the closer a statement of the Bible is to this centre, the 
closer it is to him who is the real meaning of the Bible, and therefore 
the more important it is for the personal encounter in faith.^9 At this 
point what Brunner argues about the view of the Bible is that the
Scriptures therefore are not to be identified directly with the Word of 
God, for they are at the same time a human word; and therefore they are 
afflicted with all the infirmity and imperfection of all that is human. 
In this regard, Brunner does not hesitate to accept many conclusions of 
higher criticism (with which orthodoxy has never made its peace) 
involving the admission of error in the Bible-error, that is, which is 
not due to transmission of the text but which is lodged in the original
writings.
Thus Emil Brunner claims with Luther's saying of 'the crib in which 
Christ (the Word of God) lies' that although the connection between the 
testimony of Christ and Jesus Christ himself is very close, they are not
i d e n t i c a l . T h i s  does not mean, however, that Brunner's view of the
Bible that the Scripture is the witness of the apostle to the revelation 
in Christ is that the Scriptures are mere records of a revelation that
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has taken place. They themselves are, so Brunner argues, a particular
form of revelation. For in them God Himself, through the illumination
of the apostles by His Spirit, provides us with the meaning of His
unique and historical revelation in the life, suffering, death and
resurrection of his Son. He puts it as follows:
The Bible is the word of God because in it, so far as He 
chooses, God makes known the mystery of His will, of His 
saving purpose in Jesus Christ. The Bible is a special form 
of the divine revelation; it is not merely a document which 
records a historical revelation, because in it God Himself 
reveals to us the meaning of that which He wills to say to 
us, and to give us in the historical revelation, especially 
in the life, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. The 
mission of the Son is one thing; the illumination of the 
Apostles to perceive the meaning of the mystery of the Son 
is another thing. God has finally revealed Himself in the 
Son; but this revelation would not reach us apart from the 
sending and illumination of the Apostles who bear witness to 
Him. Without the witness of the Apostles we should not know 
Jesus as the Christ.
Furthermore, Brunner insists that the Bible only becomes the word
of God for me through the present action of the Holy Spirit; and yet it
is the word of the Bible which becomes God's word for me, and it can
only do that because it already is God's word in some sense; and then
what he argues is as follows:
It is here that revelation in the ultimate, fullest sense 
can only be an act, God speaking to me here and now. But 
that is only one side of the biblical concept of revelation.
The other side is its very opposite. It is the fact that 
God speaks to me here and now because he has spoken. Above 
all, that he speaks to me through the Holy Spirit because he 
has spoken in Jesus Christ. The "has" is maintained in the 
concept of the Canon. The Bible is the 'fact of the
revelation' of God. It is true that the Scriptures become 
the Word of God for me only through the Holy Spirit. But 
they become the Word of God for me and they become it 
because they already are it. They become it through that, 
which is written, the solid body of words, sentences and 
books, something objective and available for every one.®^
Here Brunner seems to be closer than Barth to the 'traditional'
reformation conviction according to which the forms and means in which
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and through which God chose to reveal himself, and to which he freely 
but expressly bound the revelation, retain their character as 
revelation, even when they are not recognized as s u c h . 84
However, it must be noted that the later Brunner has again placed
the emphasis on God's Word as a present event for the believer in a
manner similar to Barth®5 when he says: "Only God's self-communication 
to me is God's Word.... God does not inform us about this and that. He 
opens His heart to me and in so doing He also opens my own heart. That 
is the meaning of 'God's Word' as it encounters me in the Bible. It is 
an 'I-Thou' word; it cannot be generalized, materialized or 
objectified. God's word is not a 'something', an objective thing in 
itself, rather is it a transitive transaction, an assurance and 
claim".®5 And by this claim Emil Brunner has to contend with, in fact, 
the orthodoxy's belief in a verbally inspired (or infallible) Bible
which equates the word of God with the words of Scripture; and thereby 
it believes everything in the Bible because it is in the Bible. He 
would prefer therefore to insist more on the other aspect of his 
doctrine: that the scripture does not become the Word of God for me in
the full sense, except when God himself by the Holy Spirit makes me 
certain of his immediate presence and permits me to hear his 'Thou- 
word', so that it meets me here and now in a personal relationship of 
God's Word and faith.®^
2.3 The witness of the preaching church to the revelation in Christ.
The revelation in Christ and the Scriptures is, according to Emil
Brunner, transmitted to men of all ages through the living witness of 
the Church. For this reason, Jesus Christ is 'a living and present 
event, which takes place in and through the Church'.®® The preaching of
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the church in its essence is making the word of the Bible to be a 
present reality: "The Church is the bridge which carries the message of 
the Bible over the stream of the centuries into the present. The word, 
the preaching of the Church, consists essentially in making the word of 
the Bible present and a v a i l a b l e " . Through this preaching of the
church Jesus Christ is not imprisoned within the pages of the Bible; 
and He is the living, present Lord of the Church; hence His revelation 
is a living and present event. For Brunner, preaching is then 'a form 
of revelation'; and it is itself an element in the coming of God to us: 
"Thus the message of the Church - which is in living union with Christ - 
is also a form of revelation. The teaching of the Church about 
revelation is itself the bearer of the revelation".90 in other words, 
the proclamation of the revelation in Christ by the community of the 
faithful living in union with Christ through the Spirit (Brunner's term 
'the ecclesia', that we discuss later) is itself a form of. the
revelation. This preaching of the Church becomes living revelation 
whenever God wills to vitalize it with his Spirit.^
So the mutual relation between the Church and the Word is 
indispensable: "The Church is founded upon the witness of the Apostles 
and Prophets, as a house is built upon its foundation. Without the 
Apostles' 'word' there would be no Church. That is the first thing we 
have to say about the mutual relation between the Church and the Word. 
But we must immediately add a second point: there is no Apostolic word,
and no Holy Scripture, without the Church".92 jn this regard, Brunner
claims that even the first disciples were not individuals because the 
moment at which they recognized Jesus as the Christ was also the moment 
at which the ecclesia was founded. So they proclaimed the deeds and 
words of the Lord as the common ( ITO^pcX.d'c (TtS ) (tradition); and they
133
undertake their missionary journeys under the commission that has been 
entrusted in the name of the Christian community. At the same time the 
Christian community is founded through the preaching of missionaries; 
and it is maintained, strengthened, and nourished through the preaching 
at public worship of the Church.93 Therefore, what Brunner argues here 
is that without the Church there would be no Bible and vice versa.
If Brunner’s argument about the mutual relation between the Word 
and the Church is true, then we have to recognize with Brunner the fact 
that it is the essential function of the ecclesia to bear witness to the 
revelation in Christ in which God manifested his own nature to be 
communicating love. The Church exists for the sake of this witness; 
and it is primarily nothing else than the organ and bearer of the Word 
by its preaching or proclamation: "Everything that serves this
proclamation is the Church, and it is this function and nothing else
which makes the Church the Church: a 'proclaiming existence1 as the
historical continuum of the revelation".95 Thus Brunner's use of the 
word 'preaching' (Verkiindigung) does not restrict its meaning to verbal 
preaching. It is for this reason that he employed the term 'proclaiming 
existence' or 'preaching existence'^6 (see V.1.1). There is a question 
here not merely of proclaiming words, but of carrying to future ages the 
life in which God communicated himself. For this reason, the Church is 
'every form of historical life which has its origin in Jesus Christ and 
in which God's self-communication is continuously active'.^
Consequently, the Church bears witness to Christ in two ways: 
through its word and through its life. It is only in the unity of
witness by its word and witness by its life that the Church can
perfectly fulfil its function of historically mediating God's revelation
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in Christ to men. Genuine tradition, as the continuum that binds the 
unique, historical revelation in Christ with the present, is the
preaching existence of the brotherhood of the faithful which mirrors the 
preaching of the apostles and the life of the primitive communities as 
recorded in the biblical canon. Thus this preaching existence of the 
Church makes known the revelation that occurred in Christ; and it
announces the revelation to come in glory; and it, while doing so, 
becomes itself faith creating revelation.^® In this regard, even 
though we recognize the fact that the individual passes on his witness 
to another, or he receives it from another living Christian witness is 
possible only within a community, in the fellowship of a community. For 
there is no community of this sort apart from the Bible. The individual 
witness perhaps would be possible wihout taking the form of the
exposition of the Bible or even without the opening of a Bible at all,
but it cannot take place apart, Brunner claims, from the fact that "the 
one who gives his testimony lives in the Bible, and in a Christian 
community, which is spiritually nourished by the whole expositary 
tradition of the Church".^9
For Brunner, preaching is then a more primary thou-form word than
doctrine or theology. The original word of apostolic witness was a word
of preaching. It was, according to Brunner, the influence of Greek
intellectualism with its tendency to reduce 'thou-truth' to ’it-truth',
with its lack of appreciation for the dimension of the personal, which
caused the Church to forget this fact and to understand 'preaching from
the perspective of doctrine, instead of doctrine from the perspective of
preaching1. So Brunner claims as follows;
Unfortunately, the Greek intellectualism which so early 
dominated the ecclesiastical view of revelation obscured 
this truth almost from the very outset. The Church regarded 
preaching from the point of view of doctrine, instead of
135
vice versa. Hence the proclamation of the Gospel - as was 
the case also with the revelation - was regarded as the 
communication of doctrine, and thus as 'applied doctrine1, 
in which the personal address and the 'Thou-form' were 
merely a matter of form. Thus the Church did not understand 
the personal character of the revelation; hence it did not 
understand that the transition from the 'Thou-form' to the 
'It-form', from personal address to doctrine, was the 
transition from one dimension to another, namely, the 
transition from the 'truth as encounter to that of the 
'truth as idea'.100
Thus preaching for Bunner stands between the original apostolic 
witness as fixed in Scripture, and the doctrine of the Church as 
expressed in dogma, catechism, and theology.101 This does not mean, 
however, that Brunner denies the necessity of 'the scientific character 
of dogmatics' (in his own terms) that he finds in three factors: (1)
the requirements of the Church in its struggle against false doctrine;
(2) the demands of exegesis; and (3) the need for making the bridge 
between 'secular and natural knowledge and the knowledge of faith 
(extended Baptismal instruction)'.102 what he then argues is that the 
preaching expresses "the personal character of revealed truth; the fact 
that the truth of God is one which demands obedience, and creates 
fellowship. Its form and attitude are that of address and, indeed, when 
it takes place with authority, it is an address on behalf of Christ: 'We 
are ambassadors, therefore, on behalf of Christ, as though God were 
intreating by us: We beseech you on behalf of Christ, be ye reconciled
to God' (II Cor. 5:20)".103 in this regard, preaching for Brunner has 
to point away from itself to Christ and to move toward man.104
Thus the Scriptures themselves are not, Brunner argues, the ground
of Christian faith but its means. It is, in a strict sense, a record of 
the apostolic witness to the Word, which participates in the authority
of that witness. Jesus Christ is thus Himself the Word of God: "Not
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because I believe in the Scriptures do I believe in Christ, but because 
I believe in Christ I believe in the Scriptures. The Scriptures are 
indeed the first of the means which God uses, but they are not the first 
object of faith, nor are they the ground of my faith. The ground, the 
authority, which moves me to faith is no other than Jesus Christ 
Himself, as He speaks to me from the pages of the Scriptures through the 
Holy Spirit, as my Lord and my Redeemer".1^5 The Bible for Brunner 
bears witness to Jesus Christ; it points to Him. And if so, how does 
one know, then, that Christ to whom the Scripture or the preaching of 
the Church testifies is ineed the Word of God? Brunner's answer is that 
there is no revelation in itself. Revelation for him is incomplete 
apart from its subject side.^®^ Therefore revelation is, he claims, 
address and response, i.e. personal correspondence. I believe in Christ 
for the same reason Peter did, whose eyes were opened to the truth by a 
special act of God's Spirit. ^ 7 This testimony of the Spirit is only by 
means of the apostolic witness as preserved in Scripture. Thus the only 
sufficient ground of faith is the authority of God Himself as He 
addresses me in His Word; and that ground of authority, however, needs 
its completion in the encounter of faith with the Christ of the
Scripture.
3. Personal truth
3.1 Revelation and faith
What Brunner claims in the term 'truth as encounter' is that the 
revelation in Christ is not complete with the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus; and therefore it attains at the same time its
goal only in that a man recognizes Jesus as Christ. For revelation is
not a mere objective entity in itself, but it is a transitive event in
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that God reveals Himself to someone. So he claims as follows:
Revelation is indeed that which becomes manifest to us 
through a definite action of God; it means that we, whose 
eyes were formerly closed, have now opened them to a certain 
light; that upon us, who were in darkness, the light has 
shone. Thus revelation only reaches its goal in the
subject, man. Revelation is not a fact in itself, but it is 
this, fact plus an illumination, a disclosure, which makes 
the "fact" known. The fact of the illumination is therefore 
an integral part of the process of revelation; without this 
an event is no more a revelation than light is light without 
the seeing, illuminated, eye. Revelation is a transitive 
event which proceeds from God and ends in man, a light ray 
with these two poles. There is therefore no point in 
setting the objective fact of revelation over against the 
subjective act of receiving the revelation, because the 
revelation actually consists in the meeting of two subjects, 
the divine and the human, the self-communication of god to 
man.^0®
So Brunner argues that the revelational act of God is a double 
condescension to man: a historically objective one in the incarnation of 
the Son, and an inwardly subjective one in the testimony of the Son 
through the Spirit in the heart of man. There is therefore no point in 
setting the objective fact of revelation over against the subjective act 
of receiving the revelation, because the revelation actually consists 
for Brunner in the meeting of two subjects, the divine and the human, 
the self-communication of God to man.1®^ In this regard, Jesus Christ, 
Brunner claims, "Is not ’revelation’ when He is not recognized by anyone 
as the Christ, just as He is not the Redeemer if He does not redeem 
anyone. The Biblical doctrine of revelation means this transition from 
the divine to the human subject. is the Bible, according to
Brunner, that draws a definite subjective process into the sphere of 
revelation, and describes it simply as 'revelation'. Faith is, then, 
the act in which the revelation or self-communication of God is received 
and in which this is realized in the subject, man; and therefore it is 
the 'reception of revelation'; and in this sense it is the aim of 
revelation.^^
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3.2 Decision
We turn now to an analysis of the concept of faith itself by which that 
revelation is appropriated on the part of the subject, man. At this 
point it is instructive to note that the early Brunner heavily depends 
on the existential philosophy of S<f>ren Kierkegaard that provides him the 
conceptual framework of faith.11^ As Zuidema points out, Kierkegaard's 
view of man and of the divine revelation in Christ are brought together 
in his view of the real nature of the faith of a Christian. For in 
faith in the sense of 'our believing1 neither human existence nor divine 
revelation can be absent. Man cannot believe without human existence, 
nor can he believe without divine revelation. Both are necessary for 
faith. Thus, both basic ideas are united in Kierkegaard's theory of 
faith: they need each other, are based upon each other, and serve each 
other.
These ideas lead him to the question of how one can become a 
Christian. The question for Kierkegaard contains two basic themes11^; 
(1) The concept of personal existence is presupposed in the idea of 
self-conscious personal possession. (2) The concept of the absolute 
paradox, Kierkegaard's idea of revelation, is presupposed in the idea of 
salvation given in Christ. The believer is as a believer reconciled to 
himself and to God. He is made right with himself through his self- 
consciousness of his own personal possession of salvation. He is made 
right with God through his acceptance of God's salvation in Christ. So 
Kierkegaard describes the faith as that which "by relating itself to its 
own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently 
in the Power (that is, in God) which constituted it..."114 This means 
that he considers faith to be closely related to being one's self, i.e., 
human existence. It is equally obvious that he cannot speak of this
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faith unless he directs our attention to the work of God, namely, the 
salvation in Christ. Thus human existence and absolute paradox are both 
implicit in this conception of faith.
For Kierkegaard, the truth of man is not truth about man; rather it 
is the true-being of man. Truth consists of passionately being one's 
self. So what can be discursively distinguished in man, the eternal and 
the objective, is not the authentic man. It is not what is truly human. 
But man is a mystery and a hiddeness; he is innerness. In this regard, 
there are three essential characteristics of subjective knowledge:1^  
(1) It cannot be passed on from one person to the next, nor added to by 
different researchers. (2) What is known subjectively always has the 
nature of a paradox. Therefore subjective knowledge is identical with 
faith. For faith alone, and not reason, can induce us to accept 
paradox. So Kierkegaard says: "Christianity wishes to intensify passion 
to the highest pitch; but passion is subjectivity, and does not exist 
objectively".^ ^  (3) Subjective knowledge is concrete, not abstract.
This is because it must necessarily be related to the actual concrete 
existence of a living individual. And this subjective truth, in 
contrast to that of a philosophical system which may be indifferently 
contemplated, is truth that changes my existence.
So it is to be understood that the early Brunner has effectually 
employed many of the concepts, and in fact many of the actual phrases 
that Kierkegaard uses in his philosophical formulation. And Brunner 
enriches his concept of faith as decision. Of more immediate concern 
for our purposes is his employment of the Kierkegaardian concept of the 
individual. The renunciation of speculation involves a basic alteration 
in the attitude of life, the change from spectator to participant. The
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man who sees himself as a participant, one who takes life with 
earnestness, one who stands ’before God’ is the individual. As an 
individual man is absolutely responsible.^^ As a spectator man, 
however, withdraws himself from the stage of life where decisions are 
rendered, into the realm of observation, theory, enjoyment and 
contemplation, into that realm of theoretical thought, which does not 
involve me in the crisis of personal decision, as I am confronted with 
the revealing address of God. Whether a spectatorship be that of the 
metaphysician, attempting to construct an integrated system of reality, 
or that of a scientist probing the facts of nature, it ever moves 
Brunner claims "in a cool atmosphere of objectivity and serenity. Man, 
in both instances, is a spectator who views the world from afar. Truth, 
therefore, to metaphysician is an aesthetic object, a 
Weltanschauung" The spectator who ambles along through life has an
opinion, but not he who wrestles with life.
In Kierkegaard's opinion man is a synthesis of soul, body, and 
spirit; and a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. As a synthesis 
of the eternal and the temporal, the existential man exists in an inner 
relation to the moment. For the moment does not belong to the temporal 
anymore than it belongs to the eternal. The moment thus synthesizes the 
temporal and eternal in man. It constitutes the point in which time and 
eternity meet each other. Through the meeting of time and eternity 
arises the moment of temporalization or of real temporality. Time 
breaks into eternity and penetrates into time. The finite and the 
infinite selves of man are synthesized in the moment. They meet each 
other in it in an ever new present. Human existence is based upon this 
meeting of time and eternity in man.^9
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Similarly, when the eternal in the form of the divine Word in the 
person of Jesus Christ confronts man, that historical moment is thereby 
raised, so Brunner claims, to the moment of decision. The man knows 
then he must decide in that moment. The instant in which man, 
confronted with the word of God, decides, is the moment (Augenblick), 
'an atom of eternity in time' or in Brunner's own words: "The moment is
the place where the bolt from eternity pierces time."120 However, 
Brunner is convinced that in that moment of decision, man has not simply 
made an affirmative choice; rather he hears of crisis, that is, he 
learns that his whole existence stands under the judgement of God. Man 
before God is existence-in-crisis. Hence the crisis is no mere illusion 
of which man's mind is to be disabused as in the optimism of classic 
liberalism; and indeed, it is not only the threat to Christian theology 
which sets in with the liberal dissolution of the truth of faith, but 
also that collapse of the life of the Western world, which Oswald 
Spengler envisioned in his book The Decline of the West, a threat which 
Brunner diagnoses as stemming ultimately from the contemporary religious 
situation.121
The subjective aspect of crisis of human existence is dread 
(Angst), or the feeling of not being at home in the u n i v e r s e .  1 2 2  A s  
Paul K. Jewett points out, this dread for Brunner stems from the revolt 
against God which conditions all human existence and in its more 
personal forms goes beyond anxiety to doubt. When doubt becomes 
intensely personal and seizes the individual in the very core of his 
being, when the great question mark in the depth of the soul is 
potentiated into a sense of desperation, we have despair, whose strength 
and sting is an evil conscience. 123 Thus at the very heart of our 
existence the sense of homelessness crystalizes into a sense of guilt,
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or, in Brunner's own term, 'the negative point of contact' that is a 
consciousness of g u i l t .  ^ 4  Actually man is too much a sinner to go this 
far, to recognize himself a sinner and confess the same: "Man can only 
genuinely despair about himself when he no longer needs to despair, 
because a different ground has been placed under his feet, because there 
has already been offered to him a new healthful possibility of life, 
which is the antidote to despair". This is, Brunner calls, 'the 
dialectic of repentance and faith, faith and repentance': "that faith
comes only when we stretch out in despair for the only help available; 
and yet that we are only properly despairing in our search for help when 
it is already in sight; that is, when we already dare to admit our 
desperate s i t u a t i o n " . ^ 5  Hence Brunner can say that the knowledge of 
sin is the crisis, the turning point, where immanental knowledge and 
faith are tangent. The true perception of our need and saving faith are 
mutually conditions. ^ 6
So if the term 'faith' is the description of a right relationship 
between man and God, and if it is a way of life or a manner of 
existence, then man, Brunner claims, 'exists either in faith or in 
unbelief'.1^7 For man's present existence is an existence-in-decision. 
Each moment places us before an 'either-or'. "The life of the Christian 
is never a possession but remains, as it begins, a decision. One never 
is a Christian. To be Christian upon earth means to know that we are 
called through Christ, i.e., that, God has accepted u s " . ^ 8  By defining 
faith as decision, Brunner insists that we see how different it is from 
that knowledge accessible to all men by reason or experience. The truth 
of sense perception is directly communicated to the mind. Most people 
do not debate the existence of the material objects; so it is with the 
truths of reason. I do not need to make a decision about the steps in a
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mathematical demonstration. When the mind grasps the truth, there is 
nothing to decide. However, revelation for Brunner is truth that is 
indirectly communicated, and therefore it can be grasped only by faith 
as an act of decision. When God became a Man. He not only veiled 
himself from sight, but He also broke through the limits of reason.
3.3 Indirect communication
The early Brunner frequently employs the Kierkegaardian distinction 
between objective and subjective truth in unfolding the meaning of 
faith. For Kierkegaard object truth is abstract-rational truth that can 
be directly communicated to the human mind, and subject truth, however, 
can only be indirectly communicated: "When the question of truth is
raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the 
truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not 
focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether 
it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to 
which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the
truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively,
reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's 
relationship: if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the 
individual is in the truth, even if he should happen to be thus related 
to what is not truth". ^ 9  jn this regard Hegel's failure is for
Kierkegaard its avoidance of the subjective viewpoint, or the existence 
of the individual, for his way of objective reflection makes the subject 
accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, 
that is individual existence is reducible to a system of 'Absolute
Knowledge' . ^ 0
For Kierkegaard, the term 'the individual' is however a category
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that is his method of thought. As Michael Wyschogrod points out, the 
individual for Kierkegaard maintains his own self identity and makes his 
decisions out of himself. His view of the world is truly his because he 
is not ready to transform his inwardness into objectivity, which to him 
would mean giving himself up as an individual, and yet it is essential, 
for a proper understanding of Kierkegaard's category of the individual, 
to distinguish it from a generally egocentric orientation. 
Kierkegaard's 'individual' makes no sense if he is conceived of as being 
alone. The individual who is alone can establish a relation of
ownership towards the world. For such an individual there is no real 
possibility of tension because nothing and nobody can have any claim on 
him and his world. However, only by placing the individual before God 
is the typically Kierkegaardian concept of the individual reached. Or 
to put it more precisely, it is not an individual who first establishes 
himself as an individual and then enters into a relationship with God, 
but it is the relationship with God that makes one an individual.**31
From such an understanding of human existence his method of
communication proceeds as indirect communication. Inherent in this 
understanding was the assumption that though individuality is achieved 
not by egocentricity but by being 'and individual before God', it is
nevertheless only before God that such a fruitful relationship can be
established, not before anyone else. It is, therefore, necessary for 
the communicator to withdraw himself from the situation and make sure 
that the relationship that is established is not between the listener 
and himself but between the listener and God. This involves a means of 
communication that is not direct because direct communication 
establishes an essential relationship with the one who communicates the 
knowledge. The nature of the communication must be such as to call for
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some action on the part of the listener. For it is essential for
communication to be of such a nature as to make it necessary for the
listener to relate himself to it in some way. The best way to
accomplish this is to make the communication a 'sign of contradiction1
which inevitably arouses such a reaction.^32 g0 Kierkegaard says:
A communication which is the unity of jest and earnest is 
such a sign of contradiction. It is not by any means a 
direct communication, it is impossible for him who receives 
it to tell directly which is which, because the
communication does not directly communicate either jest or 
earnest. The earnestness of such communication lies in 
another place, or is a second instance, in the intent of 
making the receiver independently active - which, 
dialectically understood, is the highest earnestness in the
case of communication.^33
Here the indirect communication has, therefore, a role in Kierkegaard's 
thought only because there is need for the existing individual to relate 
himself to something that is itself not existential but gives to time 
the tension that makes it existence.
Turning to Brunner's account of the distinction between degrees of 
direct and indirect communication, he insists that faith is possible 
only when the truth is indirectly communicated. That is why God 
revealed Himself in the incognito of a human personality. If the 
'unveiling' were not at the same time a 'veiling', if God had 
overwhelmed man with the display of His power and great glory, as He 
will in the last day, there could be no exercise of decision, for we 
would have the direct communication of sense perception: "The
indirectness of the divine self-communication means that God does not 
force Himself upon man, that He does not overwhelm him with His creative 
power, but that He summons him to make his own decision. This is why 
God comes in the Word, and, it is true, in the completion of the Word, 
in the Personal Word. The Word is always an indirect communication, a
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communication which demands our own activity as well. Direct 
communication would mean the passive transference from the one to the 
other, like the relation between two pipes which communicate with each 
other. All sensible communication is of this k i n d " . ^34
According to Brunner, faith knows then nothing of the assurance of
sense perception. Faith does not rest upon the foundation of
mathematical proof and logical consistency. Rather, faith embraces the
paradox that the infinite God became a finite mgn, that is a thinkable
self-disclosure of God in a historic personality, is incomprehensible to
reason. And hence there is reasoned solution to our d i l e m m a . ^35 If we
may speak of the evidence of faith, then we do only figuratively, for we
could just as well say that faith is the opposition of such an evidence.
So Brunner argues as follows:
According to the testimony of the apostles, what took place 
in Christ took place once for all. There was no historical 
continuity of revelation but only a paradoxical unity
between that unique event and the present time, the
contemporaneity of faith with revelation which is immediate 
and independent of intermediary criteria. Between Christ as 
the mediator and the believer there is no intermediation, 
because this could come about only by means of a continually 
renewed incarnation of the logos, thus contradicting the 
apostolic dictum "once for all". Only God, as the Holy 
Spirit, can speak again the word which was spoken at that 
time once for all, and speak it in the heart of the believer 
at any later moment in history. God as identical with 
Himself in His historically unique revelation, and in the 
"subjective" knowledge that appropriates it, God as the 
ground, object, and subject of knowledge, the truine God, is 
the content of Christian faith, a content incomprehensible
to reason.^36
For Brunner, faith is therefore the subjective event conceivable; and it 
is existential, not theoretical or rational thinking. Faith is then
subjective truth that changes my existence, in contrast to that of a
philosophical system that may be indifferently contemplated. "Faith 
is", so Brunner claims, "the personal decision of myself for God, in 
which all objectivation or proof is excluded. It is the answer of the
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Ego to the call of the divine 'Thou1. In faith there is no truth 
separable from myself; it is the act in which I myself come into truth -
I myself, not my thought, not my w o r l d - v i e w " . ^ 7  And yet faith is the
objective attitude, since it has as its object the Word of God, Jesus 
Christ: "Faith, however, declares: truth is in God's own word alone; and 
what is in me is not truth. And this is why faith is transcendental; 
that is, in faith the Ego is independent of its own conditions and rests 
solely in that which is not here, but there - in God's W o r d " . ^38
Accordingly, the revelational significance of the Jesus-event is 
especially evident in its consummation which is the Cross, since it is 
at the Cross that for the first time it becomes unmistakably evident 
what lies between us and God, what the real issue is, so far as sin is
concerned. Also at the Cross is first revealed to us what the love of
God means. God loves me with the kind of love that I see in Christ who 
died for me. For Brunner, faith is then the very opposite of mysticism 
for it rests on a historical event that occurred nearly two thousand 
years ago, the knowledge of which is conveyed to us in a historical
document, the B i b l e .  ^ 9  If so, how does the objective fact of
revelation, then, bind with its subjective realization in the crisis 
experience of the individual? Brunner's answer is that he who
recognizes the revelation of God in the Jesus-event with the eye of
faith is 'contemporary with that event'.140 That is to say, the passage 
from the object form of the revelation to the complete revelation in and 
for the subject is effected by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. By 
means of this illumination of the Spirit, the historical distance and 
exteriority of the revelation in Christ, Scripture and the Church are 
overcome.
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So the revelation is no longer outside of me, but now speaks 
interiorly to me through the Spirit: "Only God, as the Holy Spirit, can 
speak again the word which was spoken at that time once for all, and 
speak it in the heart of the believer at any later moment in
history."141 this regard, the idea of contemporaneity with Christ
merges in Brunner's thinking with the word of Scripture becoming the 
word of God to me, because the knowledge of the historical event of the 
incarnation is secured to me only in the once-for-all written word of 
the Bible, which, like the event itself is outside of me, non - I, 
belonging to a past, separated from me by centuries. Hence Brunner 
frequently speaks of the work of the Spirit in our hearts whereby we are 
convinced of the truth of the Holy Scripture as the Testimonium Spiritus 
sancti internum. This testimony of the Spirit is analogous to what the 
older theologians called effectual calling, that illumination of the
mind in the knowledge of the Lord through which we are made partakers of 
the redemption purchased by Christ.
3.4 The dimension of the personal
We have already noted that the later Brunner develops his theological 
proposal of truth as encounter in Buber's dialogical terms (see III, 
3.1). He attempts to complement the dialogical personalism of Martin 
Buber (and of Ferdinand Ebner) to his early implication of the
Kierkegaardian existentialism. The reason for this is that Brunner has 
never considered his increased concern with the dimension of the
personal as opposing to the Kierkegaardian formulation of his early 
thought in the time and eternity dialectic terms. 142 There is, however, 
a significant contrariety between the stress of Kierkegaard on the term 
'the individual' and Buberian emphasis on the category of the communal- 
fellowship (Gemeinschaft). Perhaps it is certainly true that
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Kierkegaard was passionately concerned with the individual in his 
concrete here-and-now existence. For the existentialist, the objective 
thinker has the whole world, but loses himself. The truly existential 
thinker, therefore, does not forget along with his other thoughts to 
think of himself as one who exists. ^ 3  This individual is, however, 
anything but an epistemologically autonomous and metaphysically 
independent.^^ The individual, who stands at the crossroad of time and 
eternity, is addressed by God in the moment.
At this point Brunner attempts to formulate this Kierkegaardian 
individual with Buberian person that confronts with the divine Thou. 
According to him, man's existence is not a mere individual; rather it is 
a responsible being, for an 'I' can only be developed in the relation 
with a 'Thou' . But the 'Thou' is not a simple fact any more than the 
'I'; and the other must be given to me in a definite way in order that I 
may recognize him as this 'Thou' to whom I owe my being. So I must 
listen to the claim that proceeds from him to me and that makes me a 
responsible b e i n g .  ^ 5  "The isolated individual is an abstraction, 
conceived by the reason which has been severed from the World of God. 
'The other' is not added to my nature after my nature, after I myself, 
as this particular individual, have been finished. But the other, the 
others, are interwoven with my nature. I am not man at all apart from 
others. I am not 'I' apart from the 'Thou'. As I cannot be a human 
being without a relation to God, without the divine 'Thou', so also I 
cannot be man without the human ' T h o u ' " . 1 4 6  Therefore we must be so 
made for one another (and the 'Thou' must be given to me in such a way) 
that in him I perceive both these facts: firstly, Brunner claims, that I 
am responsible to him; secondly, that my life consists in the fact that 
the power which alone can make the 'I ' responsible to the 'Thou' is God.
150
This means that being responsible to the 'Thou' is being bound up in the 
bundle of life with the 'Thou' by God Himself. This responsibility, 
then, constitutes the human life itself.
Now Brunner stresses the point that a person cannot be thought, 
rather he can only be encountered. The biblical concept of truth, 
Brunner then argues, is truth as encounter, that is encounter between 
God and man as such, (see III, 3.4). Thus faith is not a matter of ’it- 
truth', truth about objects in the world (science) or ideas in mind 
(philosophy). In science and philosophy, I who think and the object or 
idea that is thought exhaust the knowledge situation. For Brunner there 
is the evidence of personal encounter, if faith is to actually occur. 
"Where personal truth is concerned, proof is neither possible nor 
fitting. For this truth is both trust and decision: we must decide 
either for proof or for trust, either for rational evidence or for the 
evidence of personal encounter, which is accomplished in God's gracious 
condescension and in the trustful obedience of man. The fact that this 
inner movement arises in the heart of man, a movement which is the very 
opposite of the sinful striving for autonomy or independence: this is 
the work of the Holy Spirit".^® So just to the degree that there is no
objective certitude, to the same degree the encounter between God and
man gives subjective certitude. The experience itself is its own best
and only proof; and it is credible in itself even though it is not
capable of rational analysis.
Our knowledge of objects involves, according to Brunner, only our 
cognitive process. However, our knowledge of a subject, a person, is 
wholly contingent upon an act of self-disclosure on the part of the 
person known. A subject which I think as such is not truly a subject.
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The reason for this is that what I can discover by virtue of my own 
thought process is, to the degree that is possible, not a person, but an 
object. A personal subject or a real 'thou' is, however, all one with 
that mystery which only the subject himself can disclose. That is to 
say, my knowledge of a subject is not only dependent on the latter's 
self-disclosure, but it is not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the 
word at all:
We can ourselves find the clue to things; they are objects, 
which confront us not in their own self-activity-making 
themselves known - but as entities which, by process of 
research and thought, we can learn to understand. But 
persons are not enigmas of this kind; a person is a mystery 
which can be disclosed only through self-manifestation. In
this self-disclosure alone do we meet this person as person; 
previously he or she is an "object", a "something". But God 
is not a Person, but Person, absolutely; not a Subject but 
absolute subject, "I Yahweh, and none else". He can be 
known as absolute Subject only through the fact that He 
Himself makes Himself known through His own action: He is
not at our disposal as an object of knowledge.
Here what Brunner argues is that God's revelation and man's
response to it are essentially personal in nature and therefore God is
not discovered by human reason alone. Indeed, we do not and cannot
'discover' God at all, for human thinking is inadequate to this end.
Brunner is aware, however, that human beings are not only persons, but
also objects in the physical world. Hence we can acquire much useful
knowledge about man through the science of physiology and phychology.
But God is not an object of the world in any sense. All of our thinking
is, according to him, in bondage to what he calls 'the categories of the
objective-subjective antithesis. So our relation to God is best
understood as personal encounter. In revelation God does not give
information about himself. Rather He gives himself to the believer:
God is Person: He is not an "It"; He is our primary "Thou".
That which we can think and know by our own efforts is 
always an object of thought and knowledge, some thing which
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has been thought, some thing which has been known, therefore 
it is never "person” . Even the human person is never truly 
"person" to us so long as we merely "think" it; the human 
being only becomes "person" to us when he speaks to us 
himself, when he manifests the mystery of this being as a 
"thou", in the very act of addressing us.
The "Thou" is something other than the "Not-I"; the "Not-I" 
is the world, the sum-total of objects. But the "Thou" is 
that "Not-I" which is an "I" (or a Self) as I am myself, of 
which I only become aware when it is not thought by my own 
efforts, or perceived as an object, but when it makes itself 
known to me as self-active, self-speaking, as "1-over- 
against me".^0
We can know, therefore, nothing of God except as He communicates to 
us the secret of His person in a free act of self-disclosure.151 God 
reveals himself personally to the man, who in faith receives then this 
revelation. The truth of revelation, unlike 'it-truth', does not merely 
inform me; rather it changes me. For this reason Brunner emphasizes the 
fact that God is no God-in-Himself (Gott-an-sich), but a God-who- 
approaches-man (Gott-zum-Menschen-hin).^52 In other words, he is 
convinced that the history of revelation is the history of salvation and 
vice-versa. "Since God gives Himself to be known, He gives communion 
with Himself; and since He gives communion with Himself He gives us a 
share in His own eternal Life. Revelation is not concerned with 
"something", but with me myself, and with God Himself, namely, with my 
salvation and with His dominion over me and His communion with me. God 
Himself in His love gives Himself to me, and in so doing He does away 
with the darkness, the godlessness and lovelessness, the bondage and 
misery, which constitute the 'lost state1 of mankind without G o d " .  ^ 3  
And then faith for Brunner is not to be regarded as intellectual assent 
to propositions about God; rather it is a personal decision, a turning 
toward one who is personally present. In short, the man of faith does 
not believe something but someone.
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Thus what Brunner argues here is that if the personal self- 
communication of God is itself a person and more precisely if Jesus 
Christ, in His person, reveals the name, the personal mystery of God 
fully and finally, then revelation is not mere it-truth, information 
about something, nor it is a matter of the increase of one's knowledge, 
but rather 'a life-giving and a life-renewing communion1.154 God's 
self-disclosure is his claim of Lordship over me; and thereby He wills 
to have fellowship with me.155 One cannot contemplate God Almighty, as 
he does the ideas, He can only obey or disobey Him. So Brunner always 
maintains, like Barth, that revelation is reconciliation. However, 
while Barth drives this thought to the extreme that there is no 
revelation outside of Christ and thus the reception of revelation is an 
essential ingredient of revelation, Brunner makes however the point very 
clear that although there is revelation in the creation, this does not 
lead to a natural or a rational theology, for this revelation is 
according to him rejected and corrupted by the natural m a n . 156
Hence Brunner insists both that there is a revelation in Christ 
that leads to reconciliation and that there is a revelation in creation, 
which apart from Christ is never correctly interpreted and received by 
the natural man. Thus revelation is an offence to man, for it denies 
that there is a continuity between divine truth and human t h o u g h t . 157 
This, says Brunner, is why the Bible represents the final revelation of 
God as a personal meeting, a "seeing face to face". 15® According to 
Brunner, autonomous reason does not therefore perceive the wisdom of the 
foolishness that God sets Himself as subject. Being estranged from the 
living God by the fall, man goes about constructing by his reason an 
idea of the transcendental, the Absolute, which moves ever in the 
dimension of the abstract, the impersonal. So Brunner contends that
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reason operates with a self-constructed God-idea, and then it is 
imprisoned within itself.16^ This matter of man's self-confidence of 
autonomous reason to the address of God brings us to the question of the 
truth of reason since Brunner is convinced that the aim of missionary 
theology is to bring 'every thought into captivity to the obedience of 
Christ'.160
4. Philosophical truth
4.1 Revelation and reason
In seeking to complete the picture of how Brunner develops his
missionary theology, we must investigate the concept of human reason and 
its relation to revelation. This question is for Brunner most
important to both theologians and the church: "it is of paramount
importance for the theologian, above all others, to be clear in his own 
mind on this question of the relation between revelation and reason, and 
to be able to make it clear to the Church; for every statement, if it 
is a genuinely theological statement, interlocks with every other such 
statement, and thus forms a unity in the sense intended by the 
theological statement",161 In Brunner's view those whose business is 
theology should not allow themselves in principle to ignore the reason 
which in practice they use to so great an extent. Also one who is of
the opinion that theology is a necessary function of the believing
community cannot deny (without falling into the most absurd self- 
contradiction) that there are not merely negative, but also positive, 
relations between revelation and reason.16^ However, if there is any 
relation between revelation and reason, the question is then how these 
two forms of knowledge are related. Brunner's answer to this question 
is that each has its own sphere, and so long as it keeps in that sphere,
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it is consistent with the other and supplement it, but unfortunately 
each has sought to invade the sphere of the other. He puts it as 
follows:
"Revealed knowledge is poles apart from rational knowledge.
These two forms of knowledge are as far from each other as 
heaven is from earth. And yet, in the very act of
expressing this sentence, writing it down, and printing it, 
we have already put in use the whole apparatus of the human 
reason and of human culture. Whoever forms sentences, even 
if they are sentences full of heavenly wisdom, does so, not 
only and not primarily, but still in the strength which 
comes from the fact that he possesses reason; for apart 
from reason there is only 'speaking with tongues' - and 
perhaps not even this. Jesus Christ is not the enemy of 
reason, but only of the irrational arrogance of those who 
pride themselves on their intellect, and of the irrational 
self-sufficiency of reason".163
For Brunner, human reason is primarily a matter of law; and in 
consequence rational knowledge is necessary knowledge according to law: 
"With the law as the norm of the will the heart of reason has been laid 
bare. Our rational thought is necessarily legalistic. Its legalistic 
character is its strictness, that which distinguishes thought from mere 
imagination and fantasy. Only that which has been thought in 
accordance with law, with a norm, has been actually thought. Behind 
the moral law of reason there stands logic. Without a logical law 
there is also no moral reason. Even theological thought is logical 
thought, or it would not be thought but mere babble. Indeed, even 
prayer comes under this rule of law. It too is rational speech with 
God, just as faith is a rational answer to the Word of G o d " . 1 64 jn 
this regard, Brunner claims that reason extends as far as the law 
extends. Where the law ceases there also rational knowledge ceases, in 
the sphere of the moral as well as in that of the knowledge of the 
w o r l d . 1 65 As the law represents the natural self-knowledge of man, so 
reason also is that knowledge that man can have from himself, without 
the need of revelation of faith. So law and reason for Brunner are co­
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extensive.
The province of reason, then, is the world, or in Brunner's term 
'the realm of the non-personal', or 'the realm of objects'. It is the 
truth which has to do with things: "there is nothing wrong in the
insistence on autonomy in the sphere of knowledge; indeed, this should 
be recognized as the proper goal of knowledge. In everything which 
concerns this world, it is part of our destiny and our duty to seek, as 
far as possible, to reach our 'own' knowledge by the use of our reason. 
It is our duty to strive, as far as possible, to arrive at the evidence 
gained by rational knowledge, to see all we can for o u r s e l v e s " . ^^6 That 
is to say, as distinguished from God, it is the domain of the world,
that reason without any help is able to know adequately. Within this
realm reason is autonomous, or at least should strive for autonomy. 
This power to rationally know the world has been given to man by God 
according to His command. "Have dominion over the earth". God thus 
made this world, and fashioned human beings with the ability by rational 
knowledge to understand the World.
Since the creator gives man such a capacity, by the will of God 
there is, so Brunner argues, "a natural knowlege, which really knows, 
that is, finds the real truth, even if this truth is never the final and 
complete truth, but one which is ever being discovered afresh, and the 
knowlege thus gained is never final and complete, but is always growing, 
and ever purifying itself with its own criticism, and transforming 
it". 167 gG truth, even that not directly revealed by God, is
grounded in God and comes from Him. In this regard, the autonomy of 
reason is then only a relative a u t o n o m y .  168 The self-understood task
of rational thought for Brunner is to remove contradiction. It is the
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force of coherence that gives thought its power. For without such 
coherence thought become mere f a n c y  . ^ 9  Brunner defines reason as that 
which is "abstract and solid thinking which is concerned with argument, 
in so far as it refers to idea, law, value and norm"; in other words, 
reason means for Brunner what Kant called 'das Vermogen der Idee1, 'the 
power to grasp ideas and to express t h e m ' .  170 The ideas of goodness, 
truth, and right belong to every man and are immanent in the human 
spirit; this does not mean that they are inborn, but that they belong 
to man's humanity. As man's spirit develops these ideas function as 
the driving force of man's thinking and willing; so thereby man is able 
to create culture and civilization; this is his humanitas.171 
However, these ideas are not independent of God; rather they come to 
man through general revelation.172
Furthermore, since Brunner recognizes that reason is required for 
the possibility of faith and as a primary instrument for theology, he 
acknowledges that reason is the organ of man whereby man receives the 
word: "The understanding of the Word - in so far as it is the
grammatical and logical understanding of something that has been said; 
also in so far as it is the grammatical and logical understanding of the 
preaching of the Gospel - is an act of mental and rational self-activity 
on the part of man. Without this rational self-activity or 
appropriation no faith arises. We do not say that faith is this 
rational self-activity of man, but that it is the logical grammatical 
understanding of that which is said, even if said by an Apostle or a 
Prophet; without this mental, rational self-activity the Word of God 
cannot be understood; without it no faith arises. Reason is the 
conditio sine qua non of faith. So long as we are talking about 
language in general terms the matter is simple, and no one will
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contradict us. Here we are only dealing with the formal element, with 
the mere fact of capacity for speech, with the mere fact that the reason 
is present as the organ of reception". ^ 3  In this respect reason is
Vernehmen konnen, and therefore it is not a thing in itself, but a 
relation. "Reason comes from perception. The core of reason is, in 
philosophical terms, transcendental; in Biblical terms, the relation 
with God. The Christian understanding of reason is the perception of 
the Word of God".17  ^ If the word which reason is said to receive is 
personal, then reason as reception of the word is for Brunner much the 
same as faith. Reason is then not only the organ to receive the word as 
the bare faculty of man, but also the function of the organ in the sense 
of the actual reception of the word.
Accordingly true reason, which is determined by the Word of God, is 
nothing else than faith.^7  ^ When Brunner suggests that reason is 
compatible to revelation as such, he frequently uses the term 'formal 
reason' or the V O  U  $ that indicates the organ which receives the 
divine word.^7^ "Revelation itself, however, tells us that God has 
already revealed Himself always, and to all men, and, therefore, that 
there is a revelation in the creation that is independent of, and 
precedes, the historical, revelation; hence the peculiar quality of man 
as man and the rational nature of man, in particular, are both derived 
from this revelation. Man would be unable to know the world as it is
had he not been created in the image of God, did he not possess in his
reason a reflection of the divine light of the Logos. Man, so the 
Scriptures tell us, has been created not only in order that he may know 
the world, but also that he may know God Himself, as He reveals Himself
to him in the works of the Creation, and as He gives Himself to the
V O 0 S to be known". ^ 77 Reason is then the law of thought or
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Kant's term 'the power of the idea' which God has implanted with man; 
and it is the Creator's highest gift.^®
However, this is not the case that Brunner calls 'the autonomous 
reason'. According to him since man is fallen and corrupt, the 
autonomous reason of man will not curb its tendency to system, which 
seeks to discover God at the end of a syllogism, and which thus reduces 
Him to a mere t h e o r y .  ^ 9  The human reason that is emancipated from its 
Creator and Lord strives to bridge the gap between himself and God by an 
activity of his own mind.^®® But such a philosophic 'Absolute', such 
an 'Unmoved Mover', is not God. It is but an idea, not a person. It 
is not the Creator of my reason, but rather its creation. I cannot 
commune with an Absolute, I can only contemplate it. So Brunner claims 
as follows:
The question is only whether we wish to understand God from 
the point of view Of the reason, or the reason from the 
point of view of God. But as this question has already 
been answered, this means that it is our task to keep the 
reason within its own bounds, yet to give it its full rights 
within these bounds. It is not the reason as such which is 
in opposition to faith, but only the self-sufficient reason; 
and this means, the reason which sets itself up in the place 
of God, the reason which wills to understand God in itself 
instead of itself in God, the arrogant self-willed reason.
There is war to the knife between faith and rationalism, but 
there is no war between faith and reason; by 'rationalism' 
we mean, not merely the superficial 'rationalism' of the 
eighteenth century, which usually bears this time, but also 
that titanic system of rational thought which is known as 
German Idealism, and that rationalism which we have 
inherited from Greek philosophy. The reason is right
wherever it listens to the Word of God, and does not think 
that it is able to proclaim the divine truth to itself.^®^
This refusal of fallen autonomous reason is especially apparent in 
the dimension of the ethical.^®^ Philosophy's task is to find the law of 
all laws, that final, ultimate Reason behind all reasons. In this 
regard, Kant's fundamental interest was, according to Brunner, a
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religious one; namely, man in his relation to the Transcendent.1®®
And yet Kant was too sober a thinker, having escaped the Scylla of 
Realism, to allow his ship of thought to be dashed against the Charybdis 
of speculative Idealism. That is to say, Kant has respect for the
critical postulate of experience.1®^ So he not only realized that 
sense perception without concepts is blind, but also that concepts 
without sense perception are empty.1®5 He did not allow himself to be 
deceived into supposing that in this knowledge of the limit of knowledge 
he had arrived at final truth, 'the knowledge of the Absolute': "It is
no accident that Kant held fast to the thing-in-itself, inspite of the 
dubiousness of the concept. This concept denoted for him the 
insuperable barrier between us and the truth itself. If this dualism
is set aside by the evolution of thought, we are forced, without
realizing it, into Hegelian Monism".1®5 However, Brunner argues that 
man by reason alone can never overcome this epistemological dualism. 
There is no theoretical, objective solution to the idealistic-realistic 
antinomy:
The time-honoured opposition between idealism and realism is 
insoluble on the ground of reason or philosophy. For 
idealism, while it has the claim to superior truth because 
starting from the possibility of Knowledge as such, always 
comes to grief on the concrete character of what is actually 
given, because this last can never be resolved into 
concepts, i.e. into universal ideas. Realism on the other 
hand, which constantly derives from this fact its power to 
withstand its superior opponent, also constantly comes to 
grief over the impossible task of finding a self-subsistent 
entity out of connection with the unity of thought, when 
such "finding" always means adoption into the unity of 
consciousness. The realist is not aware how much of 
"idealism" lurks in the mere search for knowledge. 
Critical idealism can indeed ultimately point out this 
dualism in knowledge, but not overcome it".1®^
These limits of reason for Brunner are imposed by creation and it 
is the refusal on the part of fallen autonomous reason to recognise
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these limits, not limits themselves, that is blameworthy. The fall
expresses itself in the sinful way in which man uses his rational 
powers. He refuses to recognise that he is a creature with a finite, 
not an absolute reason. Hence, he attempts to reduce all reality to his 
system, including God Almighty and, above all, rationalizes away his
sin; and indeed he is the 'master of his fate and the captain of his 
soul'.^®® This pride of reason, which is for Brunner the heart of sin, 
is its claim to be the last court of appeal, the supreme judge of truth.
By this claim man asserts his will to be like God and he refuses to
acknowledge the majesty and sovereignty of God.1®^ So, the autonomous 
reason is the denial of the relation to God, which Hamann called the 
"misunderstanding of reason with itself". It is not the gift of 
reason, but the misuse of reason that causes the conflict. ”*9° since it 
is by reason that man is able to rule and investigate the world, it is 
by reason also that he detaches the world from God. "Through reason 
the modern man is God to himself, for every law of truth and good he 
possesses in himself, that is in his reason. Autonomy is self-
deification".^'! in this regard, what Brunner suggests occasionally to 
label is 'the material reason' ^ 2  or 'rationality' with which man 
expresses his revolt against God on the intellectual side by denying 
that there is any truth which cannot be reduced to a rational system in 
which the continuity of thought is u n b r o k e n . ^ 93
4.2 Paradox
Brunner's therapy for this disease, this 'fall of reason into sin', is 
r e v e l a t i o n . ^94 However, this revelation is, according to him the
absolute manifestation of something that had been concealed. Hence it 
is a way of acquiring knowledge that is essentially opposite to the 
usual human method of acquiring knowledge, by means of observation,
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research, and thought. In Brunner's view, revelation is then "a 
supernatural kind of knowledge - given in a marvellous way - of 
something that man, of himself, could never know. Thus revelation 
issues from a region which, as such is not accessible to man. The 
absolutely Mysterious is not only partially hidden from the natural 
knowledge of man; it is wholly inaccessible to man's natural faculties 
for research and d i s c o v e r y " . ^95 Here it is truth that breaks the 
fundamental categories of our rational thought; and it is adequately 
expressed only in paradoxes, which are inadequate to reason, however. 
It is because in theology, preaching, even in the Bible itself, we have 
the Word in the words of man, subject to the grammatical rules and 
logical categories of all human speech, it is because this revelation in 
the garb of human speech illumines the mind only through a human act of 
understanding and will, that "genuine theology must be d i a l e c t i c a l " . ^ 9 6  
So the object of faith is something which is absurd to reason, i.e. 
paradox; the hall-mark of logical inconsistency clings to all genuine 
pronouncements of f a i t h . -* 9 7
As Paul K. Jewett points out, the paradox is for Brunner expressed 
in the sense of both intensive and e x t e n s i v e . ^98 The 'intensive' 
paradox consists in a real contradiction, not just an apparent one. 
The paradoxes of faith are not accidental, but Brunner claims "necessary 
contradictions in themselves and therefore also contradictions against 
the fundamental law of all knowledge, the law of contradiction, then, 
not k n o w l e d g e " . ^ 99 The necessity of the paradoxes of faith is
grounded, as we have already indicated, in the ontological basis as 
s u c h . 200 In revelation eternity really becomes time; God becomes man; 
and the Infinite becomes finite. It is the chief paradox of true faith 
and the central message of the whole Bible that "the Omnipresent and
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Almighty comes".^^ In this regard, Brunner's argument of term
'paradox', especially in his early dialectical period, is a resemblance 
to Kierkegaard's term 'paradox'. Kierkagaard locates the Absolute 
Paradox in Jesus Christ as a single man who happens to be God-incarnate. 
This is bringing together the polar opposites and therefore constitutes 
the maximum stunning of the intellect.2®2 He writes: "that God has
existed in human form, has been born, grown up, and so forth, is surely 
the paradox sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox".2®3
For Kierkegaard, God's revelation in Christ is a 'fact' that 
refutes itself and it is a fact that cannot be a fact, and as an 
impossible fact, it is yet a fact. This fundamental datum of the 
Christian faith is constituted by the fact that God became man and 
becomes man, that the man Jesus is the Son of God, and is God himself. 
It is mainly the absurd fact that God becomes man, that the eternal 
became temporal, the infinite became finite, the absolute became 
relative, the transcendent became immanent, being-in-itself became 
history.2®^ These paradoxes are, in Kierkegaard's view, unresolvable 
by reason and they are absolute paradoxes. So one can choose either 
one or the other, but not have the best of both. These choices are 
beyond the scope of reason, for the mediating powers of reason have no 
use in an absolute paradox. Choice is here not guided by rational 
principle but by a leap of faith. Reason plays the part of disclosing 
these choices for us and showing us that they are uncompromisingly 
opposed; in other words, reason shows us that we have a choice, but not 
what to choose.2®^
Thus this paradox does not permit of any mediation; we cannot 
penetrate it intrinsically in any manner whatsoever. We can only
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declare and make comprehensible that we cannot understand, that it is 
incomprehensible. And yet what is peculiar is that we can say 
something about this absurdity because it is a 'fact', that is, 1800 
years ago it happened, when God’s son became man, and it is still 
happening in him today. Faith, then, grasps the inner act of realizing 
one possibility out of the many infinite possibilities; and it 
penetrates existentially deeper than objective reason. For faith is, in 
his view, not concerned with what has become, with what has happened, 
but with what is becoming.^06 Similarly, Brunner believes that faith 
answers that the recognition of this contradiction is the condition sine 
qua non for knowing the true and living God. The only way we can 
comprehend the truth is then in the incomprehensible of a moving and 
coming Deity.^07
The term 'paradox' is also 'extensive' to theological expressions. 
According to Brunner, the Bible is full of paradoxes. It tells about 
unity in plurality (the trinity), foolish wisdom (the cross), the 
freedom of divine servitude, determinism and responsibility, the 
holiness and the love of God. When the Bible would speak to us of the 
renewal of our existence, it uses the figure of a new birth, denoting 
utter passivity, on the one hand and that of conversion, which bespeaks 
the highest activity on the other.^08 So when reasosn attempts to grasp 
these paradoxes, the teaching of Scripture is lost in a system. This is 
the trouble with orthodoxy because it seeks to reduce the truths of 
revelation to the criterion of rational coherence: "where the rational 
element alone is at work, there arises a rational, speculative theology, 
which leads away from the truth of revelation". ^ 09 But faith is not
offended in these paradoxes which transcend reason; rather, it grasps
the truth through and beyond them.
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Brunner, therefore, will have nothing to do with theistic proofs of 
God's existence. He readily admits that the doctrines of Nicea on the 
Trinity, those of Chalcedon on the two natures of Christ, and other 
"holy of holies of Christian faith" are logical contradictions.210 As 
for the language of paradox, Brunner also appeals to the Reformation, 
especially with Luther, although he is occasionally concerned with the 
logic of Zwinggli and Calvin; and he claims that the Reformation came 
along with the paradox of faith. "In the case of the Reformers, faith 
was the paradoxical unity of authority and freedom, submission to 
something given while at the same time it was self-evident knowledge. 
It could and must be so defined, because revelation and faith were 
understood concretely as phenomena of human life.11^ ^  For this same 
reason, Christian doctrine for Brunner adequately expressed only in 
paradoxes.^12
However, we find that Brunner's use of the term 'paradox' is the 
slippery ambiguity in that he attempts to designate with the term two
sorts of objects, i.e. language about God and God Himself. As a result,
Brunner believes, as shown in the previous discussion, that the 
'paradox' represents the inevitable clash of reason with faith so that 
the 'paradox' is that which offends rationality. In this confusion, 
Tillich concedes that 'paradoxical language should be used 
discriminatingly. The mystery of reality is not a licence to engage in 
mystification and flagrant contradiction. Paradox then, is not 
synonymous with irrationality and the absurd. Rather, paradox means 
that God transcends human expectations. "Paradoxical means 'against the
opinion' namely, the opinion of finite reason. Paradox points to the
fact that in God's acting finite reason is superseded but not 
annihiliated; it expresses this fact in terms which are not logically
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contradictory but which are supposed to point beyond the realm in which
finite reason is applicable  (therefore) The acceptance of this
paradox is not the acceptance of the absurd, but it is the state of 
being grasped by the power of that which breaks into our experience from 
above it. Paradox in religion and theology does not conflict with the 
principle of logical rationality. Paradox has its logical place."213
Perhaps more critically Ronald W Hepburn, in this respect to the 
language of paradox, shows the "vital analogy ... is that between 
meeting people and meeting God". If it were not for this analogy, it is 
clear, there would be no linguistic ground for affirming the 
'personality' of the God encountered or for using term like 'Father', or 
'Son' with reference to him. But, Hepburn asks, "have the theologians 
established this analogy firmly enough to bear the weighty 
superstructure that they have reared upon it?"^^ As Frederick Ferre 
sums up, Hepburn's answer to this question must be in the negative. If 
the language of paradox or precisely the logic of encounter wishes to 
claim that all that Christians mean by 'God' can be exhausted by 
reference to certain human experience, if statements about 'God' thus 
would be equivalent to statements about human experience, then it would 
be, Hepburn argues, nonsense (by definition) to speak about 'God's 
experience' prior to the existence of human beings possessing such 
experiences. The definition of 'God' may well be held essentially to 
include reference to human experiences, but traditional theism will 
always insist on more than this in any complete definition. And yet the 
moment that a 'more' is required, we are confronted with a metaphysical 
issue concerning a being who is the independent cause or source of the 
so-called 'encounter-experience'. In this way the logic of encounter 
subtly slips from an overt attempt at explicating the meaning of
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theological terms to a covert argument to the existence of God from 
religious experience.21 ^
4.3 Contiguity
Since Brunner found Buber's dialogical critique of the subject-object 
dichotomy, he substituted the category of personal correspondence in its 
place (see III.3.4). In this, he is denying that anything true for 
revelation can be false for reason, and vice versa. Rather, he begins 
with points of identity between the two realms: reason ruling in its
terrestrial empire, faith operative in the celestial realm; reason 
analysing objects, faith embracing the self-disclosure of the divine 
T h o u . 2 1 6 it is precisely for this reason that the two can converse with 
each other, be mutually relevant, and disagree. Since Brunner 
recognizes that there is only one truth, even though it may be 
apprehended and conveyed in radically different ways, the relationship 
between rationally attested truth and revealed truth is especially 
acute. If there is only one truth and if both reason and faith are at 
least relatively independent modes of apprehending truth, the 
possibility that they may conflict is by no means precluded.
So we may ask, since the realms of faith and reason overlap and 
since there is interpenetration, how do we define the limits of reason 
in those areas of mutual concern? To this question Brunner replies that 
an exact solution is not possible. We can have only a proportional one; 
it is the principle of contiguity (das Prinzip der Beziehungnahe): "The 
nearer anything lies to that center of existence where we are concerned 
with the whole, that is, with man's relation to God and the being of the 
person, the greater is the disturbance of rational knowledge by sin; 
the farther away anything lies from this center, the less is the
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disturbance felt, and the less difference is there between knowing as a 
believer or as an b e l i e v e r " . ^17 Thus no one will maintain that there is 
a Christian logic, mathematics, or physics, but the irrelevance of 
Christian belief to psychology can be maintained only by restricting the 
latter discipline to a study of elementary processes and sensations. We 
cannot speak of a Christian science of law as we can of Christian 
theology, but there is an important, though indirect, relevance of 
Christian belief to our doctrine of law, since our view of justice will 
be influenced by our view of divine justice.218
4.4 The criterion of truth
Emil Brunner, however, is not a philosopher, but a theologian. He does 
not, therefore, give much consideration to the problem of philosophy. 
"As theologian I have recognized it as my duty to look at the standpoint 
of philosophy from the standpoint of faith. Thereby it proves 
unavoidable that the theologian himself philosophizes, that is, that he 
thinks as much as possible without presuppositions. That he still 
remains dilettante in this, however, is just as clear to me as that the 
same applies to the philosopher who writes about faith. Epistemology, 
perhaps also metaphysics, is secondary from the perspective of faith, no 
matter how primary they may appear to the philosopher. It may well be 
that in an uncritical way I have up to now drawn the limits too narrowly 
around philosophy. But there is one point- I now would make 
emphatically: the God grasped by faith is not the same as the one who 
can be grasped by man with his r e a s o n . "219 go, when reflecting oh these 
matters, Brunner generally speaks of the disturbance of rational 
knowledge by sin and the corrective of faith. Since man is fallen, he 
uses his reason in a sinful way, by which Brunner means, as we have 
seen, he refuses to recognize any sphere in which reason is not wholly
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competent. Hence 'sinful' reason will not recognize its incompetency in 
the dimension of the personal and then reduces the personal to the
a b s t r a c t . 2 2 0
In this regard, even the theologians of the church, according to
Brunner, have not escaped this fatal tendency to depersonalize the truth
of faith and thus obscured the fact that God, in His revelation, does
not give us something, but Himself. So what Brunner argues is that the
Greek philosophical tendency of the object-subject antithesis attempts
to identify reality with the most abstract and impersonal. The fact
that the New Testament is written in Greek tempts us to Hellenize its
content, as did Fichte, who tried to transform 'the Son of God' into an
eternal idea, for e x a m p l e . 221 He concedes that theology cannot operate
without certain finished Christian concepts of a basic sort, and yet it
must always recognize that they are not really such.
We have already made it clear that any Confession which 
becomes a 'doctrine' is the fruit of a transition from the 
dimension of the "person" into that of a "thing", and indeed 
that it consists in this change. God, instead of being 
addressed, is spoken about; He is the object of doctrine.
The further this process of refraction of immediacy goes the 
more impersonal does the truth become, the more does the 
knowledge of faith approximate to other forms of "secular" 
knowledge, the more impersonally objective and remote does 
it become. A further sign of theological reflection points 
in the same direction: the more that theological ideas
become intellectual concepts, the more abstract do they 
become, the less do they resemble the vital concreteness of 
the Biblical way of teaching, especially that of Jesus
H i m s e l f . 2 2 2
Hence Emil Brunner has no sympathy with orthodoxy's attempt to 
discover a 'system' of truth in the Bible. The unity of revelation is 
not that of the timeless uniformity of abstract truth, but that of the 
self-disclosure of God to man in the event of personal encounter. "The 
reason is that we must recognise the God who is active in history, who
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makes Himself known, not in a doctrine, but in historical action; the 
God who 'makes' history with His People, the God who strides forward,
the One who ' comes' . As the whole message of the New Testament has an
eschatological reference, since it looks forward to the final goal of 
all history, so also it is a 'recapitulation'; it represents the whole
of saving history as a unity, not of doctrine, but of the mighty act of
God."223 go it is hardly controvertible that in the New Testament, 
faith for Brunner is, then, not belief in a doctrine or truth about 
God, but faith is in God Himself as He makes known His will to us in 
Jesus Christ and offers us true communion. Faith, therefore, must never 
be understood as primarily belief in doctrine but trust in Jesus Christ, 
in whom a new way of salvation apart from law is opened up. But as 
Christ is always proclaimed as the Lord, so faith is always at the same 
time obedience.^24
In his argument against a doctrinal objectivism, Brunner attempts 
to replace its concept of truth with an entirely different one. The 
truth which is witnessed to in the New Testament is not 'truth-in- 
itself', but 'truth as encounter'. It is no 'It-truth' but a 'Thou- 
truth' and is not therefore a truth which can be affirmed through 
doctrinal belief but obedience and trust. Nevertheless, one cannot 
refrain from a question, whether belief in doctrines is not also an 
aspect of faith. As Frederick Ferre argues, if only in this view of 
faith can man's language convey meaning and truth about God, he suspects 
its account as in any way a justification for theological language, 
despite the intensity of conviction and the most striking affirmation 
that Jesus Christ is the Word of God, between the logical character, of 
human theological discourse and the 'meaning' and 'truth' which is 
allegedly breathed into it miraculously and independent of its nature.
171
Thus what Ferre charges is that "the value of the human is 
minimized, denied and deplored ostensibly to glorify the miraculous 
inspiration of the divine; but such a policy can never lead to a 
genuine theory of incarnation, only to a violation of the debased human 
by the divine which, instead of ’inspiring1 the human, assaults and 
replaces it. In making the logical structure of theological language 
thus irrelevant to the content it supposedly bears, obedience not only 
has violated its own governing Christocentric analogy but also has 
called into question the nature of theological meaning and truth".22  ^
This charge is not unfair if we recognize the fact that what Ferre calls 
'the logic of obedience' cannot be compatible to the philosophical 
reason as does Barth who claims as this: "Theology guides the language 
of the Church, so far as it concretely reminds her that in all 
circumstances it is fallible human work, which in the matter of 
relevance or irrelevance lies in the balance, and must be obedience to 
grace, if it is to be well done. (Thus) the criterion of Christian 
language, in past and future as well as at the present time, is thus the 
essence of the Church, which is Jesus Christ, God in His gracious 
approach to man in revelation and reconciliation."22^
However, even though both Brunner and Barth maintain that 
revelation is reconciliation227, Brunner recognizes, unlike Barth, the 
fact that there is a revelation in the creation as well as there is a 
revelation in Christ. That is to say, what is true of revelation from 
God's side is also true of its acceptance on man's part. Brunner's 
faith and knowledge are also a personal event throughout. Revelation as 
the sovereign self-communication of God finds its counterpart in faith 
as the free self-giving of man. He puts it as follows:
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If revelation is really counter, then we cannot understand 
it without knowing something of him to whom it is made. If 
revelation is God's self-communication to man, then it is of 
decisive importance to know the man to whom God communicates 
Himself. Were man only an object to whom God "does" 
something, a receptacle into which He pours something, then 
it would be possible to speak of His revelation without
knowing the man who is exposed to this divine action.
Since, however, this revelation is a personal encounter, it 
is necessary to learn to know both the person whom God meets 
in His revelation and the way in which this person
experiences this divine encounter. This confronts us with 
the problem of reason and revelation. To anticipate only 
one of the particularly important aspects of revelation:
The fact that God reveals Himself through His Word 
presupposes that man is a being who has been created for 
this kind of communication, for communication through
speech.228
Thus the relationship which prevails between God and man is that of 
a personal correspondence; and this concept sums up everything which 
Brunner has to say about truth as encounter; indeed it is a most 
pregnant representation of his primary missionary concern. He sees, 
therefore, in it 'the fundamental category' or 'the original formal 
relationship', within which everything that the Bible says about God and 
man must be understood.229 False doctrine, then, rises from a pressing 
of any point of doctrine in a one-sided way to its abstract logical 
conclusion. Christian theology can be achieved only by a constant 
suspension of the tangential tendencies of logic through securely 
holding to the revelational centre, which is, as we have seen, the 
person of Jesus C h r i s t .  230 <j>0 sure, Brunner insists upon the
necessity of doctrine, in fact, of correct doctrine. Though Jesus is 
more than all words about Him, and yet He is not present to us, other 
than through definite concepts of thought. "Only when a person is 
taught rightly about God is his heart rightly turned toward Him; 
incorrect doctrine points man in the wrong direction, where we cannot 
find Him and He cannot find us. The correctness of 'Christian doctrine'
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has both its norm and the basis of its possibility in the fact that the 
incarnation of Christ is fulfilled by being 'incarnate' in the Apostolic
testimony."231
Accordingly, when all is said and done, this doctrine is not 
revelation. It too, according to Emil Brunner, only points to 
revelation. It might seem as though this were sufficient, since we have
in doctrine, at least, an objective pointer to the truth. Thus the
truth of faith for Brunner is then Christ: "We must say quite clearly:
Christ is the Truth. He is the content; He is the 'point' of all the 
preaching of the Church, but He is also really its content. The human 
word must point definitely to Him, and to Him alone. The doctrine is 
not concerned with itself; nor is the divine revelation concerned with 
itself; but it is the indispensable means through which the human heart 
must be turned toward Him Himself. Jesus Christ, the Truth, is not a 
doctrine; but it is only through teaching that we can witness to Him, 
and it is only as we are taught that we can believe in H i m " . 232 Here 
the theological language, or 'the human word' does two things: "it
points away from itself to Christ, and it moves toward man".233
Thus the notion of truth for Brunner may be stated precisely as 
personal truth. This notion indicates to the communication of the
incommunicable (or simply indirect communication). The personal stands 
in contradistinction to the idea. Revelation is not the communication 
of this or that. The revelation of God is truly His self-communication. 
We know nothing about Him, except what He Himself has revealed to us. 
All that we can know is the world. God is not the world. Therefore He 
is exalted above all our knowledge. He is Mystery. The biblical
revelation is the absolute manifestation of something that had been
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absolutely concealed. Hence it is a way of acquiring knowledge that is 
absolutely and essentially opposite to the usual human method of 
acquiring knowledge by means of observation and thought. Revelation 
means a supernatural kind of knowledge of something that man of himself 
could never k n o w . in the Bible, however, God and revelation are so 
intimately connected that there is no other revelation than that which 
comes to us from God, and there is no other knowledge of God than that 
which is given to us through revelation. God does not cease in His 
revelation to be the mysterious o n e . 235 This is not to say that 
revelation is not a communication of truth; on the contrary revelation 
communicates the truth which is personal truth. God alone is true 
person and absolute subject in the unconditional and unlimited sense; 
whereas man is person only as an image of God and he is a subject which 
is also an o b j e c t . 236 go personal faith and knowledge of a personal God 
who is Lord of the world can be gained only when God reveals Himself 
personally.
For Emil Brunner, revelation comes to its fullest expression in the 
person of Jesus Christ. Christ is the principle of all revelation and 
of all knowledge of revelation, and He is the ’Mediator1 because of His 
relation to revelation. If there is a real revelation of God, it is 
that the self-presence of God with us. Only in a human person can God 
be perfectly revealed, for only man is made after the image of God. In 
this light we must view the Incarnation. The revelation of the person 
of God in the God-man is at the same time the revelation of the 
original, the truly personal m a n . 237 j j - ^he Christ that the
thought of the hiddenness of revelation comes to its clearest 
expression, for there God becomes man. In fact, Brunner attempts to 
always maintain two distinctive terms 'revelation' and 'reconciliation'
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within his theological framework of personal correspondence, or truth as 
encounter. Therefore the term 'personal correspondence' is a twofold
but unambiguous relationship: it is twofold, because it is concerned
primarily with the relationship of God to man, and secondarily with the
relationship of man to God; and it is, according to him unambiguous,
because whether it is that of God to man or of man to God, its meaning
is always identical - it is that of the love with which God first loved 
man and with which man, as it were echoing this love, loves God in 
r e t u r n . 238 Therefore Brunner draws knowledge and fellowship into a
unity: to know God means to be one with him. If when faith is
understood in such a personal way as in Brunner, then certain 
conclusions necessarily follow for the concept of the Church. Brunner
is quite ready to draw these conclusions. Thus he insists that the
Church and the life of faith are inseparable. To speak of one is to 
speak of the other. The witness of the Church in Word and life is seen 
as the presupposition of faith, while faith is spoken of as personal 
existence in fellowship. Men come to faith only through the Church; 
yet it is just as true to say that men come to the Church only through
f a i t h . 239 For Brunner, concern for the missionary and pastoral tasks of
the church is, therefore, a necessity of his missionary theology.
176
Notes
1. Revelation is a partner-theme with faith in Brunner's first two 
works against the liberal theology of the nineteenth century: 
Erlebnis, Erkentnis und Glaube, 1921, and Die Mystik und das Wort, 
1924. Since then Philosophie und Offenbarung in 1925 and Der 
Mittler in 1927 deals with revelation to show that the Person of 
Christ is the unique revelation. And Religionsphilosophie, 
evangelischer Theologie in 1927 is a confrontation of the Christian 
concept of revelation with rationalism, subjectivism, historicism, 
and orthodoxy. The works, 'Gesetz und Offenbarung' in Theologische 
Blatter 4 (1925), 'Die andere Aufgabe der Theologie' in Zwischen 
den Zeiten 7 (1929). Gott und Mensch in 1930, 'Die Frage nach dem 
"Anknupf-ungspunkt" als Problem der Theologie' in Zwischen den 
Zeiten 10 (1932), and Der Mensch im Widerspruch in 1937, are all, 
in whole or in part, attempts to expose and develop a Christian 
anthropology, and thus be able to define the relationship between 
the natural man and the revelation in the Word of God. And also 
Natur und Gnade in 1934 is a clarification of Brunner's view on a 
general revelation in creation, and Von Werk des heiligen Geistes 
in 1935 indicates how the 'once-and-for-all' historical revelation 
in Jesus Christ is made present to all generations. Warheit als 
Begegnung in 1938 is Brunner's important work that attempts to 
illustrate, in the personalistic categories of Ebner and Buber, the 
significance for Christian Theology of the 'biblical' truth as the 
event that occurs when man in faith meets God in His revelation; 
and then Offenbarung und Vernunft in 1941 develops the biblical 
concept of revelation. Finally his three volumes of the Dogmatik 
in 1946, 1950, 1960 expands and applies his view of the 'biblical' 
revelation. Cf Emil Brunner, "Intellectual Autobiography", in 
ThoEB pp.3-20. Cf. also Joseph J. Smith, "Emil Brunner's Theology 
of Revelation" in the Heythrop Journal. vol. VI, No.1, Jan 1965. 
p.5.
2. Emil Brunner, PhuOff, p.15.
3. Emil Brunner, RaR, pp.3f.
4. Joseph J. Smith, op.cit. p.5.
5. Brunner maintains that the biblical understanding of revelation 
cannot be adequately expressed in an abstract definition. It can 
only be comprehended by studying its concrete forms. Accordingly 
we can fully know the nature and unity of revelation only by 
viewing the characteristic diversity of these many forms in their 
relation to one another: "We have therefore to bear in mind both 
the variety of ways in which the revelation is given, and the unity 
of its content". RaR, p.58.
6. Emil Brunner, RaR, p.33.
7. Emil Brunner, Ibid., p.81: ScoCh, p.15.
8. Emil Brunner, Ibid., pp.30-32.
9. E. Brunner, Ibid., p.43. Hegel attempts to reconcile Spirit with
the history of the world: "Philosophy concerns itself only with
the glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the History of the 
World. . . . That the History of the World, with all the changing 
scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and 
the realization of Spirit - this is the true Theodicae, the
justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile 
Spirit with the History of the World - viz., that what has
happened, and is happening every day, is not only not "without 
God", but is essentially His Work. Hegel, The Philosophy of 
History, trans.by J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
177
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
1 2 .
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. 
19.
20. 
21 . 
2 2 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
1956), p.457.
Brunner, PhoRe, p .4 5.
Paul K. Jewett, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p.12.
Brunner, Med, p.116. And further this idea implies two things: 
"First, the relative character of each individual moment in 
history, and second, that history as a whole is made absolute. 
Both statements give each other mutual support. Historical 
relativisim is not possible without reference to the Absolute, nor 
is it possible to make the whole absolute without rendering the 
individual factors relative. But both are only possible for a 
third reason, that is, by the knowledge of the absolute Idea, by 
the absolute divine truth as terminus a quo and terminus ad quern of 
the whole moment. Again this comes out most clearly in Hegel. His 
philosophy of history is not the whole of his philosophy, but his 
system of Absolute "Idealism into which history itself is 
absorbed." Brunner, see Med, p.117.
Brunner, PhoRe, p.45.
Brunner, Ibid., p.46.
Brunner affirms that Kierkegaard alone, among the great thinkers of 
modern times, clearly saw that every system, no matter what its 
content, is gua system, pantheistic like a immanence of Hegelianism 
and therefore irreconcilable with the Christian concept of God: 
and admires him as 'a truly great Christian thinker1. Cf. Gott und 
Mensch (Tubingen, 1930), p.3. Cf. also RaR, p.377.
Robert Bretall (ed), A. Kierkegaard Anthology, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1946 1st ed. 1973), p.190.
K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1933). p.14.
Brunner, ThoCr, p.28.
In his earlier book, "The Theology of Crisis" (1928), Brunner 
emphasizes that point: "It is important to note that we are
teaching an epistemological but not a cosmological transcendence. 
We hold, i.e. that God cannot be known by his active presence in 
the world. His presence in nature and history is not denied, but 
it is regarded as hidden, so that what God is, is not revealed. 
See ThoCr, p.28.
Brunner, Ibid, p.29.
Brunner, DI, p.141.
Brunner, ThoCr, p.30.
Brunner, Ibid, p.32.
Brunner, Ibid., pp.15f. "In revelation the unconditioned and the 
conditioned subjects, the Absolute, the Infinite, and the 
creaturely spirit, meet. Therefore revelation always passes 
through a process of understanding by man. Even if revelation 
creates a new understanding, it does not create this without laying 
claim upon the natural understanding. Indeed, does not this 
revelation use human speech, human words, grammar, the images of 
man's life and of man's world? It comes as a divine illumination 
of the mind only through the human mental acts of understanding and 
will. That is the reason why genuine theology must be dialectical. 
It is always a conversation between God and man, in which the human 
partner in the conversation is not ignored, but, even though he is 
entirely receptive, he is apprehended with his whole nature." 
Brunner, EtHo, p.54: "To speak of eternity means to speak of God.
God alone has eternity, God who is the Lord of time, the Lord of 
the world."
Brunner affirms that there is no such thing as Christian philosophy 
of history. He chooses to call it a Christian 'undersanding' of
178
history. Cf. MaiRe, p.452.
27. Brunner's own sketchy survey on this point, see TasE, p.60. note 
41. Cf. also Paul K. Jewett, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, 
p.17: Leon 0. Hynson, "Theological Encounter: Brunner and Buber,"
in Journal of Ecumenical Studies, vol. 12, No 1, winter 1975, 
pp.349-365.
28. On Brunner's controversy on the natural theology with Karl Barth 
see II.2. Cf. also Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.17.
29. On this point Karl Barth also takes the primacy of revelation that 
"revelation is not a predicate of history, but history is a 
predicate of revelation". Church Dogmatics 1/2 (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1963), p.58.
30. Brunner, Med, p.153.
31. Brunner, ThoCr, p.39.
32. Einmaligkeit (literally onceness) is the word used by Brunner to 
express the exclusiveness of the Christian faith as special 
revelation. "Uniqueness" is the nearest word in English, but it 
does not fully express his meaning. "Eigmal-igkeit" means occupying 
a unique moment in time. "Unrepeatableness" is the real meaning. 
Cf. Emil Brunner, Med, p.25, note 1.
33. Brunner, ThoCr, p.39
34. Brunner, Med, pp.153f.
35. Brunner, MaiRe, p.442, Cf. also RaR, pp.32-33.
36. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.20.
37. Brunner, Med, p.303.
38. Brunner, MaiRe, p.442.
39. Brunner, Ibid.
40. Brunner, DI, p.305
41. Brunner, RaR, pp.403f.
42. Brunner, Ibid, p.405. Cf. also Dili, vol.3, p.438. : "God's coming
to us is an event which above all concerns man and his history. As 
such it is called eternal life and the Kingdom of God. What is at 
stake is God's self-communication and glorification in that
creature which answers Him in faith. What is at stake is the
realization of the sonship which in Jesus Christ is already a
certainty for faith, but which still awaits its consummation".
43. Brunner RaR, p.407.
44. Cf. Van A. Harvey (ed), A Hand book of Theological terms (New York: 
Macmillan Co. 1971) pp.42-44.
45. The primary source is Kierkegaard's Einubiing im Christentum. Cf.
Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.27.
46. Brunner, Med, p.305
47. Brunner, Ibid, p.154.
48. Brunner, Ibid, pp.160f.
49. Brunner, Ibid, pp.156f.
50. Brunner, Ibid, p.157.
51. Brunner, Ibid, p.159.
52. Brunner, DII, pp.290-292.
53. Brunner, Med, pp.390f.
54. Brunner, ScoCh, p.28.
55. Brunner, Med, p.159.
56. Brunner expresses that he aims to be a biblical theologian. And
his understanding of revelation cannot be understood properly apart
from his point of view of the Bible. Cf. DI, pp.95f.; Cf. also
Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p.117.
57. Brunner, DI, p.53. (Italic is Brunner's).
58. On matters of biblical criticism the early Brunner aligns himself 
with a rather liberal school of thought; however, the later
179
Brunner is considerably more conservative in the sense that he 
accepts fewer critical hypotheses of the biblical criticism of the 
liberal school. See PhoRe, pp.150-151; ThoCr, pp.23-44; DI, 
pp.107-113; and also Dili, pp.244-250, 401-407.
59. For an excellent historical survey of this problem, see Thomas
Sheehan, The First Coming (Wellingborough: Crucible. 1988), pp.5-
27.
60. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.120.
61. Brunner, DI, pp.37f.
62. Brunner, Ibid, p.38. (Italic is mine).
63. Brunner, Ibid, p.35.
64. Brunner, Ibid, p.38.
65. Brunner, TasE, p.132.
66. On this point Emil Brunner appeals to Reformers: "The Reformers
constantly maintained that the mere "story" of Jesus was of no use 
to faith; up to a point, of course, they were right, for in actual 
fact the mere story is as powerless to awaken faith as mere
doctrine. It is essential to the witness to the Incarnate Son of 
God that the story of Jesus and the teaching about Jesus should be 
indissoluably united". Cf. DI, p.36.
67. Brunner, RaR, p.121.
68. Brunner, DI, p.26 : "Revelation and faith now mean a personal
encounter, personal communion. He has come, in order that He may 
be with us, and that we may be with Him; He has given Himself for
us, that we may have a share in Him." (Italic is mine).
69. Brunner, TasE, p.132.
70. Brunner, TasE, pp.132f.
71. Brunner, Ibid, p.133.
72. Brunner, RaR, p.122.
73. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.123.
74. Brunner, RaR, p.123.
75. On this point Emil Brunner attempts to give a more vague definition 
to the term 'apostle' when he says as this: "The Apostles are 
first of all eyewitnesses - not merely eyewitnesses in the simple 
historical sense, but eyewitnesses of the Risen Christ. This fact 
of their position as eyewitnesses gives them, in contrast to all 
who followed them, a share in the uniqueness of the event of 
revelation. They are the witnesses of His resurrection, and thus 
they are also witnesses of the glory of Christ. It is true that 
the New Testament, or more correctly the Church, which defined the 
cannon of the New Testament, did not understand this idea of the 
status of eyewitness in the narrowest and most literal sense." Cf . 
RaR, p.124.
76. Brunner, Dili, p.51.
77. Brunner, DI, p.47.
78. Brunner, Ibid, p.31.
79. Brunner, TasE, pp.136f.
80. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner (Chicago : Inter-Varsity press, 1961). 
p.33.
81. Brunner, DI, p.28
82. Brunner, RaR, p.135.
83. Brunner, NaTh, p.49.
84. W. Van de Pol, Das ref ormatorische Christentum in 
phanomenologischer Betrachtung (Einsiedeln, 1956). p.165; See 
Joseph J. Smith, op. cit., p.16.
85. Barth expresses the term 'the Word of God'. The term indicates a 
threefold form. The primary form of the Word of God is Jesus 
Christ himself, the revealed Word. The secondary form is the
180
written scripture, the written Word; and the third form was the 
word of the church's proclamation, the preached Word. All of these 
are linked. The Word in the primary sense, Jesus Christ, speaks 
only as he is witnessed to by the scripture and proclaimed in faith 
by the church. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics vol.I, part I, 
chap.1, 6 4. The Word of God in its Threefold Form, pp.98-140. ; 
Cf. also James Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM
press Ltd., 1973). p.19.
86. Brunner, Dili, pp.246f.
87. Brunner, Ibid, p.247.
88. Brunner, RaR, p.137.
89. Brunner, Ibid, p.141.
90. Brunner, DI, p.19.
91. Joseph J. Smith, op.cit., p.17.
92. Brunner, RaR, p.139.
93. Brunner, Ibid, p.141.
94. Brunner, Ibid, p.140.
95. Brunner, Dili, p.4.
96. Brunner tends to give Verkiindigung the broad connotation of
proclamation. It includes not only the official word of preaching 
(das Predigtwort), but the sacraments, radio addresses, pastoral 
care, charities, even the novels of Gotthelf and Dostoevski; in 
short, "everything which serves the end of subduing the hearts of 
men to the obedience of Christ and placing men in fellowship with 
Him and with each other". Cf. Emil Brunner, "Der Zweck der 
Verkiindigung", Sinn und Wesen der Verkiindigung (Zurich, 1941),
p. 52. Quoted in Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of 
Revelation, p.124.
97. Brunner, Dili, p.5.
98. Joseph J. Smith, Brunner's Concept of Revelation (London: James
Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1954), p. 18.
99. Brunner, RaR, p.143.
100. Brunner, Ibid, p.149.
101. Brunner, Ibid, p.150.
102. Brunner, DI, p. 64.
103. Brunner, RaR, p.150.
104. Brunner, Ibid.
105. Brunner, Ibid, p.170.
106. Brunner, PhoRe, p.32. : "There is no such thing as revelation-in-
itself, because revelation consists always of the fact that 
something is revealed to me. Revelation is not a thing, but act of 
God, an event involving two parties; it is a personal address. 
Hence the word of Scripture is not in itself the word of God but of 
man, just as the historical appearance of the God-man is in itself 
that of man."
107. Brunner, RaR, p.170.
108. Brunner, Ibid, p.33. (Italic is mine).
109. Brunner, Ibid.
110. Brunner, Ibid.
111. Brunner, Ibid, p.34.
112. Cf. Emil Brunner, "Intellectual Autobiography", in ThoEB, p .11; "A 
Spiritual Autobiography", in Japan Christian Quarterly, July.1955 
p.240; Cf . also "Continental European Theology", in The church 
Through Half a Century, ed. Van Dusen et. al., p.141.
113. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, (Nutley: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing 
Co. 1977), p.11.
114. S<J>ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p.216, Quoted in
181
Robert Bretall edit, A. Kierkegaard Anthology, p.341.
115. Mary Warnock, Existentialism (Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.9f.
116. Kierkegaard, op.cit., p.117.
117. Brunner, Med, p.144.
118. Brunner, ThoCr, pp.24f.
119. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, pp.23.
120. Brunner, Med, p.290. Cf. also Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.50.
121. Cf. Brunner's early lectures in 1928, a year before the Wall Street 
crash, introduced to the English-speaking world the theology of 
crisis, ThoCr, p.1.
122. Robert L. Reymond, Brunner's Dialectical Encounter (Philadelphia: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1967), p.19.
123. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.52.
124. Brunner, PhoRe, p.20.
125. Brunner, RaR, p.424.
126. Brunner, PhuOff, p.22. "Die Erkenntnis der Siinde ist die Krisis, 
die Wende, wo immanentes Erkennen und Glauben sich beriihren. Das 
ist der tiefe, fundamentale Gegensatz der christlichen und 
humanistisch-idealistisch-mystischen Religion : daS diese 
Beriihrung nur in diesem Negativen, in der ganzlichen 
Selbstpreisgabe stattfindet".
127. Brunner, Dili, p.140.
128. Brunner, ThoCr, p.64.
129. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript pp.68f, Quoted in 
Robert Bretall, op.cit., pp.21 Of.
130. Robert C. Solomon. From Rationalism to Existentialism. (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1970). pp.78f.
131. Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954) pp.90f.
132. Michael Wyschogrod, Ibid, p.93.
133. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege 
and Oxford University Press, 1946) p.125.
134. Brunner, Med, pp.334f.
135. Brunner, PhoRe, p.28. "This paradoxical, unthinkable unity 
constitutes the Reformers' doctrine of Scripture. It is
paradoxical in its content: the eternal logos as personal life in
time, personal righteousness as a free gift, the revelation of
God's glory in the darkest place of history. It is also 
paradoxical in form: what is most inward is outward, eternal truth
is nothing else than a given and actual word to be accepted on 
authority, a letter, "brute fact", to use Hegel's terminology. 
Moreover, these two contradictory pronouncements must not only hold 
good side by side, but be recognized as one and the same in faith. 
This cannot be brought to pass in the forms of human thought."
136. Brunner, Ibid, p.23.
137. Brunner, WaW, p. 75.
138. Brunner, Ibid, pp.75f.
139. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p.61.
140. Brunner, PhoRe, p.148.
141. Brunner, Ibid, p.23.
142. On this point Brunner regards fundamentally the philosophy of
Martin Buber (and Ferdinand Ebner) as that whose most important 
insight is owed to the Bible and the philosophy of S4>ren 
Kierkegaard, see Emil Brunner, "intellectual Autobiography", in
ThoEB, p .11.
143. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.69.
144. On this point, as Michael Wyschogrod points out, Kierkegaard's
basic existential interest does not permit him to assume an
182
objective interest in ontological problems. And yet it is possible 
to discern a very marked ontological basis from which his 
existential thinking proceeds. This ontological basis is rarely 
made the chief object of analysis. Kierkegaard's interest is 
always existentially Christian and everything other than that can 
have only secondary interest. There is, however, a definite 
ontological contribution. See Kierkegaard and Heidegger, p.24.
145. Brunner, Dilm, p.295.
146. Brunner, MaiRe, p.140.
147. Brunner, Dilm, p.295.
148. Brunner RaR, p.179.
149. Brunner, Ibid, p.24.
150. Brunner, DI, pp.121f.
151. Cf. Emil Brunner, Ibid, pp.117-119.
152. Brunner, TasE, p.87.
153. Brunner, RaR, p.28.
154. Brunner, DI, p.20.
155. Brunner, TasE, p.95.
156. Cf. P.G. Schrotenboer, A New Apologetics, p.39.
157. Emil Brunner, Med, p.108 : "Thus the stumbling-block of revelation 
is this: it denies that divine truth is a continuation of human 
thought, in line with existence as we can conceive it, and as it 
seems real to us. But our whole culture is built up upon this 
continuity, upon it is based our confidence in science, and - this 
is the root of the whole matter - upon it is based the confidence 
of man in himself." (Italic is Brunner's).
158. Brunner, RaR, p.191.
159. Emil Brunner, DI, p . 122 : "Therefore I cannot myself
unconditionally think of God as this unconditioned "Thou", but I 
can only know Him in so far as He Himself, by His own action, makes 
Himself known to me. It is, of course, true that man can think out 
a God for himself - the history of philosophy makes this quite 
plain. In extreme cases a man can "think" a personal God: 
theistic philosophy is a genuine, even if an extreme possibility. 
But this personal God who has been conceived by man remains some - 
thing which has been thought, the object of our thought-world."
160. E. Brunner, DI, p.101.
161. Brunner, RaR, p.17.
162. Brunner, Ibid, p. 16.
163. Brunner, Ibid, pp.16f. (Italic is mine).
164. Brunner, MaiRe, p.246.
165. Brunner, RaR, p.325.
166. Brunner, Ibid, p.177.
167. Brunner, DII, pp.30f.
168. Emil Brunner contends that the idealistic philosophy of religion 
conceives at its starting-point the idea of autonomy as the centre 
of moral idealism. "Thus the ideal will is the real will; this 
ideal will, the autonomous will of reason, is the centre of our 
personality, the deepest ground of the self. This ideal will, 
however, is identical with the divine willing and being. The 
intelligible ego, the subject of the ideal will, is the divine ego; 
only for this reason is it legislative, this alone is why we are 
autonomous." See Emil Brunner, Med, p.112.
169. Emil Brunner, PhuOff, p.34. "Es ist ja die Notwendigkeit, welche 
dem Denken Kraft gibt. Ohne diese Notwendigkeit wird das Denken 
Zur bloBen Phantasietatigkeit."
170. Emil Brunner, MaiRe, pp.42. 244; Cf. also P.G. Schrotenboer. A 
New Apologetics, p.56.
183
171. Brunner, MaiRe, p.42
172. Brunner, RaR, p.314. "In and through these ideas God works in 
every human being. This forms part of the universal revelation, 
which at the same time determines the essential structure of human 
existence. Without these ideas man is not man, and these ideas 
come from God."
173. Brunner, Ibid, p.418.
174. Brunner, Ibid, p.56.
175. Emil Brunner, "Die Frage nach dem,, Ankmipfungs-punkt" als Problem 
der Theologie", Zwischen den Zeiten, 1932, p.527; Cf. also MaiRe, 
p.247. "Faith is the reason which is opened to that which lies 
beyond reason."
176. Emil Brunner, MaiRe, pp.240,245. He also uses the term 'the logos 
of reason1. See RaR, p.315.
177. Brunner, RaR, p.382.
178. Brunner, MaiRe, p.244.
179. Emil Brunner, RaR, pp.212, 213: "The autonomous reason believes
that this impossibility shows the untruth of the claim of
revelation; faith, however, sees in every such demand for proof 
the consequence of an original perversion in the actual process of 
knowing, of the claim of our human reason to a false autonomy."
180. Emil Brunner, MaiRe, p.242; Cf. also PhoRe, pp.92, 97. "Reason 
which was created to be a mirror of God is spoilt and split."
181. Brunner, MaiRe, p.244.
182. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner, (Chicago: Inter-Varsity press, 
1961), p.29.
183. Emil Brunner, Das Grund problem der Philosophie, p.33. Cf. also
Emil L. Fackenheim, "Immanuel Kant", in Nineteenth Century
Religious Thought in the West, vol. I, edit by Ninian Smart et.al. 
pp.17, 18. According to Fackenheim, Kant wrote extensively on the 
subject of religion. His three Critiques all end with religious 
questions, and in a celebrated passage in the Critique of Pure 
Reasons Kant writes: "All the interests of my reason, speculative
as well as practical, combine in the following three questions: I.
What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? The 
third question is answered by religion.
184. On this point, as Ninian Smart points out, Kant had been brought up 
in the rationalist tradition. All knowledge, he held, could become 
(or already was) 'scientific1, i.e. complete, systematic, a priori 
and certain - and thus the capacity of the understanding to 
apprehend the nature of things as they really are, whether or not 
they could be experienced, was not questioned. This philosophical 
position was dogmatic (as opposed to Kant's later 'critical' 
philosophy) in the sense that it involved speculation without a 
previous inquiry into the scope and limits of knowledge. Kant, on 
his own testimony, was roused from his 'dogmatic slumber' by Hume. 
The latter's empiricism offered a serious challenge to the a priori 
approach of the rationalist, but at the same time his analysis of 
causation appeared to cut away the basis of science. Another 
reason for Kant's rejection of dogmatic metaphysics was his 
discovery of the Antinomies-namely, that certain pairs of 
contradictory propositions (e.g. 'The world has, as to space and 
time, a beginning or limit' and 'The world is, as to space and 
time, 'infinite' - see Prolegomena, 6 50, 52) can equally
rigorously be proved true, on the supposition that our intellectual 
concepts genuinely apply to reality. See Ninian Smart edit., 
Historical Selections in the Philosophy of Religion, chapter 14. 
Kant, especially his philosophical note, pp.248-250.
184
185. Brunner, PhoRe, p.62.
186. Brunner, Das Grundproblem der Philosophie, p.36, Quoted in Paul K. 
Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation. (London: James Clark 
& Co. Ltd., 1954), p.91.
187. Brunner, PhoRe, pp.79f.
188. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.93.
189. Brunner, ThoCr, p.43.
190. Brunner, RaR, p.56.
191. Emil Brunner, "Secularism as a Problem for the Church", in The 
International Review of Missions, vol.XIX, No. 76, Oct., p.498.
192. Cf. Roman Roessler, Person und Glaube, (Miinchen : Chr. Kaiser 
Verlag 1965), pp.53f.
193. Emil Brunner, MaiRe, p.241. "Rational thought necessarily produces 
an abstract idea of God, but for that very reason it never reaches 
the living personal God. For this thought remains confined within 
itself; it is a monologue".
194. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner, p.30.
195. Brunner, RaR, p.23.
196. Emil Brunner, Ibid, p. 15. And in this context, dialectic and 
paradox are interchangeable terms. Brunner tends to use the word 
'dialectic' when stressing that two antithetical statements are 
both true and the word 'paradox' when reflecting on the offence of 
such a procedure to reason. There is no rigidity of usage, 
especially for the early Brunner. Cf. Paul K. Jewett, Emil 
Brunner's Concept of Revelation (London: James Clark & Co. Ltd., 
1954), p.105, note 83.
197. Brunner, PhoRe, p.55.
198. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.106.
199. Brunner, PhuOff, p.34.
200. Cf. Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, chapter II, 
pp.24ff.
201. Brunner, Med, p.286.
202. Bernard Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology (Grand Rapids : 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1977), p.95.
203. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.194.
204. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, p.34.
205. Robert C. Solomon. From Rationalism to Existentialism, pp.91, 92. 
"For Hegel, as for Aristotle, man is essentially rational; for 
Kierkegaard, man is essentially the chooser of his own values. For 
Hegel, everything lies in being rational, objective, and 
reflectively understanding; for Kierkegaard, everything lies in 
the act of choosing, in being subjective (passionate and 
committed). This freedom of choice is itself the most basic of 
values, what makes a man a human being or an existent individual, 
and the recognition and use of this freedom is far more important 
than the object of choice."
206. Zuidema, op.cit., p.35.
207. Cf. Emil Brunner, Med, pp.285f, 290.
208. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, pp.106f.
209. Brunner, DI, p.76.
210. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner, p.31.
211. Brunner, PhoRe, pp.31f.
212. For this reason Brunner's theology is sometimes called a "theology 
of paradox" or a "dialectical theology". Cf. Paul K. Jewett, Emil 
Brunner's concept of Revelation, p.105.
213. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.I., p.57, Cf. also Paul 
Avis, The Methods of Modern Theology (Hant: Marshall Pickering, 
1986), pp.190f. See also a similar account of the term 'paradox'
185
by D.M. Baillie, God was in Christ (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 
1948), pp.106-132, especially chapter V. The Paradox of the 
Incarnation.
214. Ronald W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox (London: Watts, 1958),
p.30.
215. Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and God, (London: Eyre and 
Spottishwoode Ltd., 1962), pp.102f.; Cf. also Ronald W. Hepburn, 
op.cit., pp.29-39.
216. Paul K. Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p.98.
217. Emil Brunner, RaR, p.383. According to Brunner, this idea is used 
for the first time in his book on ethic, Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen, in order to solve the problem of the relation between 
the invisible and the visible Church; since then it has become his 
guiding principle for all problems that concern the relation 
between the Christian and the world.
218. David Cairns, "Brunner's Conception of Man as Responsive, 
Responsible Being", in ThoEB, pp.76f.
219. Emil Brunner, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism", in ThoEB, 
p.337.
220. Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.101.
221 . Emil Brunner, "The Significance of the Old Testament for our 
Faith", in the Lutheran Church Quarterly, 1934, p.334.
222. Brunner, DI, p.62.
223. Brunner, RaR, p.196.
224. Brunner, Dili, p.41.
225. Frederick Ferre, op.cit., pp.82, 89f.
226. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1, pp.2, 3.
227. Brunner, PhuOff, p.22.
228. Brunner, RaR, p.48.
229. Two expressions of Brunner's term 'personal correspondence and 
truth as encounter' are used without any shifting of accent. by 
the former (1personale Korrespondenz' and occasionally personhafte 
Korrespondenz'), Brunner seeks to indicate the formal relationship 
between God and man and more particularly the correlation between 
the Word of God and Faith. Cf. Reidar Hauge, "Truth as Encounter", 
in ThoEB, p.136, note 9.
230. Emil Brunner, RaR, p.148. Cf. also Paul K. Jewett, op.cit., p.104.
231. Brunner, RaR, p.152.
232. Brunner, Ibid, p.151.
233. Brunner, Ibid, p.150.
234. Brunner, Ibid, p.23.
235. Brunner, Ibid, p.47.
236. Brunner, DI, p.140.
237. Brunner, MaiRe, p.416.
238. Emil Brunner, TasE, pp.89f, 94, 97. Cf. also Heinz Zahrnt, The 
Question of God, (London: Collins, 1969), p.76.
239. Emil Brunner, WaW, p. 106. "There is no such thing as Christian 
faith without the Christian church." Cf. also Dili, pp.134f.
186
V THE CHURCH IN MISSIONARY THEOLOGY
1. Faith and the ecclesia
1.1 Togetherness of faith and the ecclesia
To some extent Emil Brunner's theological thought has always been, as 
shown in the previous discussion, concerned with the question of what 
the church is. According to him, if faith is first and foremost a 
relationship to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as God's saving 
act in history, and if this saving event is transmitted to men of all 
ages through the proclamation of the church, then the church is not only 
the bearer of the Word of Christ, but also the bearer of His Spirit and 
life and indeed His self-representation: "The Church is in the first
place merely the instrument, the bearer, of the proclamation. 
Everything that serves this proclamation is Church, and it is this 
function and nothing else which makes the Church the Church: a
'proclaiming existence' as the historical continuum of the revelation. 
We must indeed bear in mind that this proclamation cannot be confined to 
words. This was why we said 'proclaiming existence'. It is not a mere 
matter of uttering words, but of passing on the life in which God has 
communicated Himself.
So Brunner's argument about the existence of the Church is that 
since the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is God's self-communication 
to mankind, and since in this revelation God has made known His own 
nature as self-bestowing love (agape), the Church exists to bear witness 
to this love. Therefore the witness of the love of God is the basis of 
the life of the Church. "Christ has communicated Himself in such a way 
that He did not give the Ecclesia the Word alone, but His life also, and
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made it His Body through His Spirit. This life of His cannot but 
manifest itself as life-creating power. The Spirit who is at work in 
the Ecclesia expresses Himself in active love and in the creation of 
fellowship. Christ has not only revealed the love of God; He has at 
the same time bestowed it.1’2 Because of his love, God wills to give 
himself, to impart himself in communion and fellowship. God’s love is 
the motivation for his will to create the ecclesia. Then the ecclesia 
owes its life to the election of God. God was the one who called his 
people out of the world into the ecclesia, and therefore fellowship with 
himself. As God's creation, the ecclesia shares God's holiness and 
love. Hence the ecclesia not only knows that God is love but also it 
lives from and in the love of God, even though it lives only in an 
imperfect way.2
Accordingly, the word 'Christ' for Brunner is only really effective
and credible when it is accompanied by the witness of the ecclesia
through its life. The existence of the ecclesia is then the
presupposition of faith. The ecclesia is, therefore, both the mater
fidelium (mother of faith) and the communio (fellowship):
But it is possible to look at this same Church from the 
front instead of from behind, not as the community of those 
who have been reborn through faith, but as the body which 
has produced faith, and which receives into its ranks those 
who believe. It is not only communio, but also mater 
fidelium. The word of God is not only given to the
community of believers as gift; it is also a commission. 
Christians are not only called to be disciples, but to make 
disciples. They have not only to preserve the Word of God 
among themselves, but they have also to hand on the Word of 
God to others; they have to share a gift with others, and 
to offer it to the whole world. Thus the Church is not only 
a community of the "saved", but it is at the same time a 
divine means, a divine institution, by means of which the 
same salvation is given to others. Thus God reveals Himself 
not only in and to the Church, but through the Church. The 
Christian community to which the Word of God has been 
entrusted becomes itself the bearer of the word, for "God is 
in the midst of her"; Christ the Head of the Church is 
indeed the Living Lord. ^
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Thus the ecclesia has to bear a double witness to Christ, through 
the Word that tells of what He has bestowed upon it, and through the 
witness of its life, through its being, which points to Him as its vital' 
source. According to Brunner, these two testimonies of the ecclesia 
through Word and life corroborate each other, and neither is fully 
effective without the other.5 The Word of God is truly apprehensible 
and demonstrable only where it is accompanied by the life-witness of the 
ecclesia. The life-witness of the ecclesia is possible only where 
Christ's word dwells actively in it. In practical terms, if we ask, 
"how can a man come to belive?", then the answer must be, so Brunner 
claims, through the proclamation of the Word of the love of God in Jesus 
Christ; and yet this Word can awaken true faith only when it is 
proclaimed by the ecclesia, the brotherhood, in which alone it is 
vitally present. Then only through the Word of Christ which the 
ecclesia has received, can faith come into being: "The gospel of Christ
is a Word 'from faith to faith' - more precisely, a Word from the 
fellowship of faith leading to the fellowship of faith, and for this 
reason it is credible only where it is accompanied by the life witness 
of the Ecclesia. Without this it is unintelligible, unworthy of belief. 
When it is not backed by the love of those who speak it, it is a self- 
contradiction. Only that word of the love of God in Christ, which has 
as a commentary the love, the fellowship, the brotherliness of the 
Church that proclaims it, can have the power of a real witness. The 
Word of the witness presupposes his trustworthiness".5
So in his using the term 'proclaiming existence' (verkiindigende 
Existenz), Emil Brunner attempts to indicate the Church as 'every form 
of historical life which has its origin in Jesus Christ and acknowledges 
in Him its foundation and supreme norm'.*7 It is this proclaiming
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existence of the Church which makes known the revelation that occurred
in Christ, that announces the revelation to come in glory, and that,
while doing so, becomes itself faith creating revelation (see IV.2.3);
and at the same time it implies that the primary commission of the
Church is not mere doctrine but proclamation that, Brunner claims, 'must
always have a doctrinal content, but it is itself something other than
doctrine; it is faith-awakening, faith-furthering, faith-wooing
address'. Genuine proclamation, in Brunner's view, means then an event
entirely personal in the nature of personal meeting, which is far
different from the catechetical homiletical traffic in dogma that is
determined by the Greek concept of truth.®
The notion that the completest catechetical instruction, be 
it for adults or youth, is the best way to faith is the 
product of an undue stress upon logic - even though 
supernatural - which has very little to do with what the 
Bible itself calls "proclaiming the Word of God". It is 
much rather a consequence of that confusion between the two 
concepts of truth of which we have been speaking. The 
practice of the ancient church as well as that of modern 
foreign missions and of evangelization seems to us to point 
another way: that the actual function of doctrine - the
doctrine sermon as well as instruction - normally belongs 
where there is already a confessional congregation, where 
the concern is no longer with establishing a believing 
congregation, but rather with strengthening faith and 
deepening knowledge of faith. But the proclamation that 
seeks to initiate faith is a form of the Word in human 
speech that is vastly different from the doctrinal 
presentation. This the church must learn from those who 
have achieved results worthy of emulation in the missionary 
and evangelistic fields. But the church will first be able 
to learn it when it has discerned as error the false 
identification of doctrine and Word of God. This is one 
consequence of our theological reflection, perhaps the 
weightiest and most practical.^
There exists, then, for Brunner another task of theology. In 
addition to 'dogmatic theology' or 'kerygmatic theology',^® there is 
another one which is turned toward the world and which Brunner calls as 
'missionary theology'. He insists that theology should be in a constant 
state of communication with the actual present world, with its thoughts,
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its needs, and its temptations. A theology degenerates if it retreats
to the area of 'right1 interpretation and conceptualization. Hence
there is a demand for a missionary theology.^ Brunner is convinced
that in every man there is a will and a knowledge at the side of which
the proclaimer can place himself, where he can find his 'point of
contact'. If, indeed, man has not yet heard the Word of God, and if in
him there is no knowledge about it, then of course discussion with him
would be useless; and perhaps there is no point in discussing anything
with him. Brunner maintains, however, that the church should enter into
a genuine discussion with man. It should take seriously the fact that
every man already has something which may contribute to true insight,
that he is capable of responding to the address of God so that the
continuing discussion may lead to increasing insight.
Thus the structure of the being of man is always 
presupposed, which indeed, as we now know, is an actual, not 
a substantial responsible being, being in decision. In the 
Bible this structure is never regard as lost - indeed how 
could this be so, since even the sinner is still a human 
being? - rather even in the act of faith it is presupposed 
as operative, and as such it is shown parabolically 
('coming', 'selling', 'drawing'), as well as in purely 
logical conceptions. This personal structure as actual 
being is that which is always proper to man, and this, in 
the general sense, is the 'point of contact'. To put it 
more exactly, that which makes this personal structure 
personal is responsibility - that which in the passage above 
quoted from Luther is called 'conscience' - the point of 
contact in the narrower sense of the word, and therefore the 
act of 'making contact' of the preacher or pastor consists 
in seeking for the point at which the hearer is to be 'met' 
in the sense of responsibility, or in accordance with his
conscience.^^
To return to the term 'proclaiming existence' or the 'proclaiming 
church', what Brunner argues is that the misunderstanding of the church 
as an ecclesiastical or sacred institution corresponds to the mis­
understanding of faith through which faith was regarded as a mere 
affirmation of doctrinal system. This doctrinal system, according to
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him, became the object of faith, and through this displacement the unity 
of faith and love was dispersed. At the same time as the priestly 
sacramental institution there came into being 'orthodoxy1, the belief in 
true, and the guarantee of this belief by Church cred or d o g m a . S o  in 
this manner the apostolic aspects of the ecclesia raise the problems of 
succession and tradition. For instance, the process of 
institutionalization began even in the New Testament times. It is seen 
in the Pastoral Epistles, where frequent reference is made to regular 
ministry and sound doctrine. Thereafter came the Catholicizing process, 
the development of new doctrines about the sacraments, and, worst of 
all, the patronizing adoption of the church by the Roman Empire under 
Constantine and Theodosius and so o n . ^  What Brunner sees in the 
problems of the development of the church is that the misunderstanding 
does not consist in the establishment by the church of a creed, a norm 
of doctrine and faith, but in the replacement of witness by this 
regulated doctrine and assent thereto, which is described by the same 
word 'faith1, and which takes the place of trusting obedience to the
Christ who meets us and is present in the Word that bears witness to
Him.
Accordingly, Brunner sees the New Testament ecclesia as a free
fellowship of faithful persons, united in common life and worship by
their faith in Jesus Christ and lead in their service and witness by the
Holy Spirit. In this respect of the ecclesia one who receives the Word
of witness through faith is at the same time united with the ecclesia
and incorporated into it. So Brunner claims as follows:
Since both the Word that bears witness to Christ and the 
love created by it have the same source, the second way, 
which leads through fellowship, through reception of the 
Spirit of love, to Christ as the source of this Spirit, is
just as much to be reckoned with as a possibility, although
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true faith comes into being only through the unity of Word 
and Spirit, of truth and fellowship, of knowledge of Christ 
and the heart-felt experience of love. The "unclassical" 
way from the brotherhood in Christ to Christ as its 
originator is indicated in the story of Pentecost. It was
not only the Word of Peter which led the bystanders to 
penitence and to faith; they were made ready to hear it by 
their astonishment at the astounding existence of the 
disciple band. In the accounts given in Acts it seems 
always to be the Word of the Apostle that creates faith. 
But in the letters of the Apostle himself we learn how it 
was only in conjunction with his loving presence that his 
Word opened men's hearts.^
So, Brunner can speak of the ecclesia as something which 'happens' 
of necessity wherever the Word of Christ is received in trust and 
obedience: "The witness to Christ in the Word creates the faith that 
binds the individual to the ecclesia as the fellowship of believers. 
The Word of Christ takes the isolated man out of his solitariness and 
binds him, when he becomes a believer, to the congregation of believers, 
ek pisteos eis pistin, from faith to faith. It is therefore in fact 
impossible to speak of faith without at the same time speaking of the 
Ekklesia from which alone faith comes and in which alone it finds its 
realization. For only that faith accounts which shows itself effectual 
in love. The isolation of the believer, Christian individualism, is a 
contradiction in t e r m s . H e r e  the ecclesia for Brunner is understood 
as a life in which the call to Christ is shared; and it is the implicit 
consequence of faith in Christ and as such the necessary consequence of 
his concept of faith and his conception of Christ.^
Significantly, faith is then related directly to being in the 
ecclesia. True faith means, in his view, 'to become a new creature; in 
other words, to be taken up, incorporated into the life of Christ'.1  ^
And therefore Brunner freely admits that both propositions are true: " 
'Only through the Ekklesia do men come to faith', and 'Only through
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faith do men come to the Ekklesia'. If we say the first, then the Word 
of Christ is already implicit in the Ekklesia-fellowship, for it was 
created by the Word and is sustained by it. If we say the second, then 
the Ekklesia is already implicit in the Word of witness which creates 
faith, since it is indeed the Word of the love of God."2® In this 
regard, he claims that in the ecclesia the self-communication of God in 
Jesus Christ has become reality, inasmuch as it is received in faith.2^
1.2 The life of new humanity in Christ
Since the revelation in Christ and faith are, according to Brunner, so
inseparably bound together as to be given the same dignity, faith is
often spoken of as the one condition upon which the work of Christ may
come to fulfillment. The trust of faith which corresponds to the eu
angelion (good news) contains in itself new security and new humanity.
For it consists precisely in thinking not oneself but God's self-
communication in Jesus Christ alone. It is nothing other than the
knowledge that God thinks us men to be of the utmost importance. This
'humanism' is implied in God's incarnation in Jesus Christ, and to
reject this humanism would be nothing less than to reject Christ.22 So
the one may not be realized apart from the other. Indeed the word
'faith' may be inseparably bound together with the word 'Christ'.
Brunner puts it as follows:
While Paul... is speaking of the new revelation or of the 
new way of salvation, which God has opened up in Christ. He 
speaks just as often of faith as of Christ. There is indeed 
no Christ outside of faith - since only for faith is Jesus 
the Christ, and only in faith does the work of Christ come 
to fulfilment. Therefore Paul alternates between speaking 
of 'justification by faith alone' and 'through Christ 
alone'. One might actually say, faith and Christ are 
synonymous, at any rate in the sense that 'to have Christ' 
and 'to believe' are one and the same thing.2^
Here Brunner sees the coming of Christ and the coming of faith as two
different modes of speaking of the same event.
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So when one hears the message of Christ, one believes. One can 
hear this message only through the witnessing Word of the witnesses, 
however. Thus the Word which creates faith is at the same time, 
according to Brunner, God's Word and man's word, i.e. Word of the 
Spirit and paradosis (tradition). This double character refers back to 
the Incarnation of the Word; that is to say, only the Jesus of history 
can be, so Brunner claims, the Christ in that faith grasps the double 
character of the Word about Christ as a unity^: "the revelation of God
in Jesus Christ is a historical event, and faith is therefore in the 
first place a relationship to this event which happened at that place 
and time. It is dependent on this perfect tense, the reconciliation of 
the world in the Cross of Jesus Christ is the content of faith in 
Christ". if so, one can however raise a question of how the
revelation of that time can become revelation for us today. The answer 
to this question is that this event comes to us, in Brunner's view, 
through the historical mediation of the Church and at the same time the 
intra-personal character of faith in Christ through the witness of the 
Holy Spirit.^6 indeed the Church and faith for Brunner are inseparable, 
since he believes that one comes to faith only through the Church or the 
ecclesia in Brunner's terminology; and yet it is just as true to say 
that one comes to the ecclesia only through faith (see V.1.1). That is 
to say, faith was related directly to being in the ecclesia.^7
Consequently, Emil Brunner is convinced that the term 'ecclesia', 
or the fellowship with Christ, may be properly understood with relation 
to the term faith' : "The fellowship is not something which comes
subsequently as a goal to which the religious experience leads, it is 
rather given immediately with faith, something indeed which, rightly 
understood, is identical with faith. To believe and to become a member
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of the body of Christ are one and the same thing" .^8 Thus Brunner 
claims that as the nature of faith is only fully to be understood in its 
relation to term 'justification' that is expressed as God's verdict 
which faith hears and accepts, so the nature and the reality of the
ecclesia is to be understood only in the same context. For only the
ecclesia which as the work of the Holy Spirit is the Body of Christ is 
the "we" that corresponds to justifying faith.^9 So he claims as 
follows:
It is quite impossible to speak of the Ecclesia without at 
the same time speaking of faith. The Ecclesia is the
communion of the faithful (Communio fidelium). It is the 
brotherhood of those who experience their new life as at the 
same time a life with their brothers in Christ. It may
indeed be said that justifying faith is the origin of the
Ecclesia, although this concept was first created by Paul.
The thing was there before the concept. The grace of God in 
Jesus Christ, the inconceivable self-bestowing love of God, 
which can be apprehended only in faith and which reaches its 
goal in man, is the same event through which man, the 
autonomous, the self-sufficient, the self-supported, man in 
his self-created solitude, becomes a member of the 
fellowship - of that fellowship which acknowledges in Christ 
the source of its life and has its reality in the Holy
Spirit.3°
Here the term 'justification' with which Brunner appeals to Paul 
and Reformers, does not indicate in the first instance doctrine at all, 
but rather the assurance of a forgiving, reconciling Word addressed 
directly to the convicted sinner by a gracious God. In this experience, 
according to him, the objective element in revelation i.e. the personal 
self-communication of God and the subjective, existential character of 
faith meets, and here happens what Calvin speaks of in the first 
paragraph of the first chapter of the Institutes, namely the perfect co­
ordination of knowledge of God, and knowledge of self, and therefore 
also the unity of God's act of revelation and human self-understanding 
in existential experience.31 in other words, only by identifying myself 
with the crucified Christ can I understand what the word 'justification'
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means. Therefore, what Brunner suggests is that two essential elements 
of justification must be considered: First, judgement concerning one's
own sin is spoken from the cross. Here only, is one reduced to 
nothing in himself as he encounters God in the one truly righteous man 
who is crucified. But the sinful man who knows himself thus judged and 
who lets himself be identified with the cursed One dying on that cross 
hears yet another Word.32
Accordingly, when a man as a sinner identifies himself with the man 
who was crucified as a blasphemer against God, there also take place an 
identification with the crucified Christ in that God bestows upon man 
righteousness. This is a Word through which the condemned sinner is 
also identified with the righteous one who is acceptable to God. So the 
meaning of justification is then, in Brunner's words, the authentic
message of the Cross in that God declares the sinner righteous; and thus 
once more this man finds his original, authentic being in the Word of 
the Creator.33
Here, in what happened on the Cross, the charater of the 
whole Biblical revelation finds its perfect expression: that 
God reveals Himself and deals with us in history, that He 
communicates Himself in actions that speak and words that 
are acts. The self-communication of God as revelation, as 
the possibility of knowing Him is one thing: His self­
communications as self-surrender and gift of participation 
in Himself, the reconciliation, is the other. But both are 
one in the death on the Cross, as it is proclaimed to us as 
an imminent event through the Word of Jesus, and as an 
accomplished fact through the Word of the Apostles. The God 
who speaks to us and deals with us not only proclaims in 
Jesus' obedience unto death that He loves us, but He Himself 
also removes out of the way the barrier that lies between
Him and us, our sin, and gives us Himself, His love.3^
In addition to the term 'justification' that has its expression in 
a strictly Pauline figure taken from the context of jurisprudence, 
Brunner uses another New Testament term 'regeneration' which is employed
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to describe the same experience. So his treatment of the term is not as 
an independent theme, but as a second aspect and a second linguistic 
expression to deal with 'the new birth'. When rightly understood as a 
figure and not a natural process,35 the term 'regeneration' contributes 
to a richer understanding of the meaning of justifying in Christ as 
life:
Because in the New Testament the expression "regeneration" 
means the same fact, the creation of the person through 
God's historical self-communication, it stands in strict 
relation to the historical fact in Jesus Christ. But if the 
figure of birth of begetting is understood in the sense of a 
natural process - and this danger lies near at hand - then 
both the historical character of God's self-communication in 
Jesus Christ and faith are lost. The thing that it 
emphasizes (if rightly understood) in a specially impressive 
way in the totality of the new creation of the person. This 
cannot indeed be more trenchantly expressed than by the 
figure of birth or begetting. One other thing could be said 
in favour of this expression as over against that of 
justifying faith, namely that it gives stronger expression 
to the character of the new being of the person as life.
Jesus Christ is not only "the Word" but also "the Life", and 
conjunction with Him is not merely a self-understanding, but 
life in His l o v e . 36
Here Brunner uses the term 'regeneration' to indicate the reality 
and effectiveness of the Creator-Spirit of God through both Word and 
f a i t h . 37 "Man cannot himself extricate himself from this revolt. For 
everything that he undertakes is infected with it. Only the Creator can 
overcome the revolt. He does it in the fact of reconciliation in 
Christ, when he cancels the revolt through His assurance which is 
accepted in faith. The self is restored to soundness through 
justification by faith. The revolt is removed by the forgiveness of 
sin, and man's original, integrated, undivided self is bestowed upon him 
once more, when he is declared to be the child of God, the son of God, 
and this declaration becomes an inner reality as a result of the 
identification of the self with the self of Christ".38 Thus a new self­
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identity takes place, so that one may say with Paul, "I live, yet not I, 
but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. 2:20). And assurance of this fact is 
wrought through the inner testimony of the Spirit who himself "beareth 
witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God" (Rom. 8:16). 
In consequence the term ’regeneration1 is best understood as a version 
of ' justification1 in the sense of the death of the old man and the 
formation of Christ in the new man of faith, which means in effect the 
integration of personality at its very core.39
However, the term 'regeneration' most of all means for Brunner the
incorperation and inclusion into the life of the ecclesia. It is indeed
the indication of the agent who creates the fellowship on the part of
those who are thus renewed through the Word of Christ. Thus the
miserable solitude of sinful separation from one's fellowman is thereby
overcome through incorporation in a new humanity. In this regard, one
cannot isolate the new humanity, the ecclesia, which is created in the
Word of God. So Brunner claims as follows:
This integration which ends the disintegration does not 
happen without at the same time necessarily taking the form, 
not merely of an integration of the person, but of an 
integration into the fellowship, or an integration of 
fellowship. Through the Word of Christ which is proclaimed 
to him - in whatever way this may happen - the solitary man, 
who is most profoundly isolated by sin from his fellow man, 
is incorporated into the fellowship of faith of the Ecclesia 
and thus becomes a member of the new humanity. This also 
happens in a corresponding personal event, in a two-sided 
act. In the New Testament this act is Baptism, and just for 
this reason it is so intimately bound up in the New 
Testament witness with rebirth. In early Christian times, 
when a man was apprehended by the witness to Christ, when 
Christ apprehended him and made him turn towards Himself in 
faith, he became a member of the Ecclesia through Baptism, 
through the double act of entry and incorporation. The act 
of submitting to Baptism and causing oneself to be baptized, 
of being submerged and of sub-merging oneself, is the 
appropriate symbol of admission to the Ecclesia, since in 
fact it occurs through the death, the annihilation and the 
repentance of the old man. Through Baptism the spiritual 
and personal event becomes at the same time a spiritual and 
social event.^
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Accordingly, what Brunner argues here is that the new creation of 
the person is at the same time creation and icorporation into the true 
fellowship, the ecclesia. For ’sin’ as personal self-isolation from God 
is, according to him, at the same time self-isolation from one's fellow 
man. So when through faith in Christ sin is moved, and thus man's heart 
is opened to God, then it is also opened to his responsibility to the 
neighbour in that he is really concerned with 'life for one another' the 
will to fellowship and the capacity for it'. Thus regeneration for 
Brunner means two things: that we become our 'real' selves, and that we 
become capable of 'real' fellowship in Christ: "the faith through which 
we are born again includes the knowledge that the creation of a true 
self is identical with the creation of a true capacity for fellowship.4 1
At this point, however, Brunner suggests further that our new life 
in Christ does not mean merely an integration into the fellowship, but 
it must involve active participation in the winning of the world to 
Christ. He attempts to maintain this view in his treatment of the term 
'conversion' as expressed in the Hebrew word shub and the Greek word 
metanoia.^ It represents a call to a change of heart, a change of 
mind; but more than that, it is a total act in the genuine sense of 'the 
correspondence on the personal plane which is completed in God's self- 
communication and in the faith of man'.43 The life thus reorinented is 
further attributed to all of those who 'walk not after the flesh, but
after the Spirit' (Rom. 8:4). Such is descriptive of the truth of our
being as created by God.
Hence 'conversion' marks the end of autonomy and the
acknowledgement of one's Creator and Lord. In the experience of
conversion the Word of God becomes an inner Word in which the Holy
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Spirit renders the Christ event truth in a twofold sense: ’truth about
God and truth about myself. When that happens God becomes present in me
and I become present in God' .44 So if conversion is really to be
repentance as Jesus Christ understood it, then it must prove, according
to Brunner, its authenticity by taking the whole of humanity within its
concern, as well as by converting men from introversion to extraversion.
So he claims as follows:
We do not refer here merely to the missionary interest. A 
Christian without such an interest is a contradiction in 
terms. We refer also to active participation; enlistment in 
the band of those who wish to win the world for Christ is 
the consummation of the "change" in which conversion 
consists. This alone makes it clear to us how falsely 
negative and falsely individualistic is the traditional 
interpretation of the words "Repent and be converted". The 
Christ who calls us to be His disciples call us to this way, 
which will probably always be a way of the Cross. "Zeal for 
thine house hath eaten me up" (Psalm 69:9) - this is a word 
that must always be kept in mind when we think of repentance 
and conversion.45
In addition to the discussion of the term 'justification by faith', 
Emil Brunner now turns his attention to a treatment of another term
'sanctification' which is descriptive of the work of the Holy Spirit in 
effecting the new life in Christ. As a work of the holy God, it is the 
act of setting apart for his own purpose that which otherwise stands in 
opposition to his will. Like each of the terms treated above he sees it 
as at once a work of God and a response of man.46 in the case of 
sanctification as the work of God, too, it may be described in two 
different ways, depending upon the particular emphasis intended. So the 
term may be used to indicate the divine action in that each of the other 
terms 'justification', regeneration', and 'conversion' is included. In 
this respect the members of the ecclesia, the body of Christ, are
called, according to Brunner, simply 'the elect saints', where Paul
uses the concept 'sanctification' as equivalent for justification.47
201
From this point of view, it marks the act by which Christ through the 
Holy Spirit takes possession of the whole of one's existence, rendering 
him a saint in the New Testament meaning of that term. Hence though one 
is still far from perfect, he is nevertheless the peculiar possession of 
Christ. The Christian existence as such is the work of the Holy Spirit 
who sanctifies and thus is sanctification.^8
The term 'sanctification' is also used, in contrast to
justification, in a sense of a gradual growth or process under the
progressive influence of the Holy Spirit, however. This view of the
matter is especially compatible, according to Brunner, with the New
Testament understanding of the living God as present and active in the
world. He claims as follows:
Sanctification stands alongside of justification as a second 
thing, which is not identical with justification. And this 
is the specific difference, that sanctification, in contrast 
to justification, is not thought of as a unique event which 
as such brings into being the new creature, but refers to 
the manner in which gradually, step by step, by those 
processes of growth characteristic of all things, a sinful, 
unsanctified man grows into a sanctified man. 
Sanctification then corresponds to the gradual growth of the 
new man as it proceeds under the progressive influence of 
the Holy Spirit. Thus the action of the divine Spirit 
within the temporal process in its human, temporal aspect is 
what is meant, in contrast with justification which declares 
man righteous as a totality and at one moment.^
However, there is an apparent tension in that the Christian is the
man who is apprehended by Christ and apprehends Him in justifying faith,
who all at once and once for all is united with the Holy Spirit and 
reconciled on the one hand; and he has yet to become what he already is 
through the acquittal of justifying grace on the other. Indeed, taken 
together, these two views of the term indicate a paradoxical tension in 
the character of the Spirit's activity in human life. The first
declares that by God's justifying act one is already that which
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according to the second meaning he shall in fact become. But in this 
double sense, sanctification is a restoration of that which God 
originally created and pronounced good. So these two meanings of 
sanctification, in Brunner's view, are not essentially different in 
effect, for both have to do with bringing to God's disposal that which 
is otherwise estranged from him.^O
As already indicated, the term 'sanctification' also indicates the 
human response to the act of God. If from the divine side it means 
initially the justifying act of God, from the human side it consists 
primarily in conversion from an existence in estrangement to a new life 
in Christ. In the bestowal of grace, God also lays upon us the summons 
to obedience, which points to the ethical side of sanctification.^ 
Thus Brunner finds that there is a divine and a human side to the one 
happening, a mutuality of grace and obedience: "Man's transformation
through the Holy Spirit does not happen without the presence and co­
operation of man himself. Sanctification is indeed God's work, for no 
one can sanctify but He who is Himself the Holy One. Nevertheless His 
work of sanctification, as the transformation of the self from self- 
dependence to dependence upon God, cannot bypass the self but must 
happen through the self, by laying claim to the self. Thus 
sanctification is in fact also the task of man"52
However, he rejects the two extreme positions: on the one hand is a 
tendency toward legalistic moralism, which is unable to free itself from 
the regulation of binding rules. Such an attitude not only deprives a 
believer of his rightful liberty in Christ, but also robs him of genuine 
spontaneity of love in human relations. On the other hand is an equally 
serious misunderstanding which takes the form of quietism in its almost
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exclusive emphasis upon gift of g r a c e . 53 Therefore, Emil Brunner 
attempts to maintain the position that in Christ there is at once the 
supreme gift of grace and the unequivocal summons to obedience. One is 
indeed called first of all to a new being in Christ; but the new being 
manifests itself continually in action which is also new and 
transforming.54 Sanctification, though never complete in this world, 
points nevertheless to that true humanity where one is rightly related 
both to God and to his fellows.
In the discussion of the life of new humanity in this section we
have been concerned with Brunner’s notion of the work of Christ through
the Holy Spirit. As George S. Hendry points out, Brunner sees the work
of the Holy Spirit primarily in the representation of the historical
revelation of God in Christ, which faith thus apprehends in a relation
of mediated immediacy.55 Brunner himself puts it as follows:
Belief in the Holy Spirit means: this historical revelation
of God is the source of the inward personal presence of 
God, through which we, as individual believers, and as a 
community, participate in the life-renewing power of God, 
and indeed only in this way does the historical revelation 
become truth for us. The New Testament testimony to the 
Holy Spirit is therefore plainly directed toward Christ.
The Holy Spirit teaches us to understand Him, His truth and 
His work; through Him the Love of Christ becomes our 
portion and our possession. Indeed, through the Holy Spirit 
Christ Himself, as "Christ-for-us", becomes "Christ-in-us."
The self communication of God is not only accomplished in 
the Historical and the Objective; He seeks us, our very 
self, our heart. The self-communication of God wills our 
sanctification, the self-communication of the God who is 
love sets us within His love, and pours His love into our 
hearts. Sanctification and communion in love - this is the 
work of the Holy Spirit, the self-communication of God, 
whose nature is Holiness and Love. The Spirit who dwells 
within us is indeed the Spirit of God, and what He effects 
can therefore be nothing less than the manifestation of the 
life which is His own. To have the Holy Spirit does not 
mean possessing "something”, but "Himself”, and in Him we 
have eternal l i f e .
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For Emil Brunner, the early Christians were conscious of possessing
the pneuma, the Holy Spirit, and with this went powers of a non-rational
nature. The spirit seizes not merely the understanding, but also the
heart, and through the heart penetrates into the deep unconscious level
of the soul, and indeed even into the b o d y . Theology, which as its
name implies is directed towards what is 'logical1, is not an
appropriate instrument with which to understand this activity of the
Holy Spirit outside logic. Consequently the Holy Spirit has always been
more or less the 'stepchild of theology' and his gift of inspiration a
'bugbear' for many theologians.58 However, the Holy Spirit in the New
Testament sense is, so Brunner argues, 'the presence of God which bears
witness to, and makes effectual, the historical Christ as a living
personal presence. The operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary for
the Word about Christ to become the Word of Christ for us, and for the
Word of Christ to become the Word of God.'59 go we must speak of the
Holy Spirit when we talk of the new life based on faith and of the
ecclesia. Brunner claims as follows:
All the entities of faith are at the same time 
eschatological entities. The character of "not yet" belongs 
to the essence of faith, and therefore also to the essence 
of the Ecclesia. We are redeemed, we "are delivered from 
the power of darkness and translated into the Kingdom of his 
dear Son" (Col.1: 13), but "we wait for the adoption, to 
wit, the redemption of our body" (Rom.8: 23). We hope for 
what we do not see, for "we live by faith, not by sight" (2 
Cor.5:7). But He who thus makes the past present for us and 
directs us towards the future is the Holy Spirit. He is the 
element in which the Ecclesia lives its life, which makes 
the Christ of the past its present Lord, and which makes the 
Ecclesia the fellowship of those that wait for Him.80
Here again, Brunner utters a protest against the one-sided 
intellectualism of theology: from fear of a possible imbalance it
despises the warning of the apostle Paul and 'quenches the Spirit1. In 
this way it becomes a 'hindrance' and even 'stifles' the Holy Spirit, at
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least with regard to the fullness of its dynamic and enthusiastic 
manifestation.6*1 And indeed to talk of the Holy Spirit for Brunner is 
thus not a residuum of ancient mythical conceptions of an animistic or 
dynamistic kind, but an expression of the experience of faith itself, 
and the necessary consequence in theological reflection of the knowledge 
of sin and the bestowal of grace.62 so Brunner discusses, to a greater 
or lesser extent, the presence and power of the Holy Spirit, especially, 
in the respect of the notion of the ecclesia because he believes that 
the ecclesia is primarily not a mere institutional organisation: rather
it is 'a reality composed of personal relationships and thus it is the 
new life which originates through the Spirit of Jesus Christ among men - 
a life which can only be hinted at by such words as faith, love, hope, 
justification, regeneration, and communion in Christ, but which can 
never be expressed exhaustively.1 This ecclesia, in short, is the 
fellowship of men who have been renewed through Christ and are united 
with their Lord. In it they find a unity involving two principles which 
are entirely separated from each other: truth and fellowship.63
Accordingly, as the body of Christ, the ecclesia is neither 
organization nor institution, but persons who are members one of another 
under the headship of its living Lord. Only in the presence of Christ 
dwelling within it through his Word and his Spirit does the ecclesia 
have its being. For this reason, truth and fellowship are here 
experienced as inseparable. Brunner sees them in this context as ’one 
and the same thing.'64 Furthermore, it is a visible fellowship which 
binds men not only to Christ, but also to one another. It is that new 
humanity which is described in the New Testament as the life of 
reconciliation.65 Hence even as the purely personal fellowship that it 
is it possesses offices and uses sacraments. According to Brunner's
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claim, the ecclesia in the New Testament possesses institutions, but is 
not an institution; it has order, but is not order. The order within it 
forms 'something wholly spontaneous1, without a determining quality of 
its own, and is always merely 'provisional', produced by the necessity 
of the moment and disappearing with it. It is the messianic and 
spiritual element which prevents what is spontaneous from hardening into 
institutions and thus leading to rise of a fixed Church law.66
However, the transformation of the ecclesia into a Church very soon 
began. To the extent to which the messianic and spiritual elements 
disappeared, and the attempt was made to protect and replace what was 
disappearing, the New Testament ecclesia became, in Brunner's view, an 
institution and therefore a Church.67 As a result, none of the existing 
Churches and sects is identical with the ecclesia of the New Testament, 
but on the other hand none of the existing Churches and sects is without 
some essential element of the New Testament ecclesia. So what can be 
expected of the present institutional Churches is, according to Brunner, 
only that they assist the coming into being of the ecclesia, or at least 
do not hinder it. In other words, the institutional Churches have to 
serve as instruments of the Holy Spirit in order that through the 
preaching of the Word of God men may come to believe in Jesus Christ and 
in this way the ecclesia, in the sense of a purely personal fellowship, 
would come into being. But the present institutional Churches place 
great obstacles in the way of the achievement of this aim. Therefore, 
what Brunner suggests in order to the mission of the church is that the 
much-vaunted rediscovery of the Church must be taken place instead of a 
dangerous tendency of present-day ecclesiasticism. At the same time let 
the Church be the Church in order to overcome the false objectivism in 
the Church68 and then the reciprocal personal response in the
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relationship between God and man has to be restored.^9 Such a proposal 
for Brunner necessarily raises a question of the true nature of the 
church. Before its investigation we shall also discuss the picture of 
the New Testament ecclesia in which there is something else associated 
with his emphasis on the personal element.
2. The missionary community of faith
2.1 The Pauline conception of the ecclesia and its embodiment
(a) The concept of the Pauline ecclesia. Paul's concept of the 
ecclesia is, according to Brunner, very closely linked with his teaching 
about the work of Christ and about faith.7^ Faith for Paul means faith 
in Christ in whom God reveals Himself and descends to humanity as His 
free grace for man. The primitive Christian community confessed Jesus 
as the Christ, the Kyrios or the Son of God. The proclamation of Jesus 
as the Kyrios-Christos was developed especially by the Apostle Paul into 
the full kerygma of Christ and was of such a kind that this witness was 
approved by the other original Apostles, whose thinking was entirely 
determined by the Old Testament and contemporary Judaism.7  ^ If they did 
not agree with him in everything, it was not his proclamation of Kyrios 
Christos that roused their opposition, but his teaching about the law.72 
Then the proclamation of Kyrios Christos that Jesus was the decisive 
saving act of God was their common confession of faith.
Thus it was in this faith that they understood what God had done in 
Jesus Christ. In Him God's revelation, reconciliation, salvation, 
forgiveness of sin, promise of eternal life, fulfilment of all things in 
His own life had been accomplished. Jesus Christ was for them God's 
deed, God's word, God's revelation, God's approach, God's covenant with
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them. It was only by the grace of God that they had been called as the 
children of God in Jesus Christ who is not only God's righteousness but 
also their righteousness.7® Their faith was therefore directed not to a 
doctrine but to Jesus Himself, as in this proclamation He had taken 
possession of them as the truth and the reality of God, and as He was 
Himself present to them in faith, and bore witness to Himself as the 
living Lord.7  ^ Faith is now above all the hearing and obedient, 
trustful acceptance of the assurance of God who thereby admits men to 
His own children and only thereby makes them really His own. Paul 
characterizes faith as the 'organ' by which man grasps divine grace.7®
Brunner thus claims that Paul's concept of the ecclesia is the 
implicit consequence of both the conception of faith and the conception 
of Christ: "Ecclesiology is Christology and Christology
Ecclesiology".7® The ecclesia for Paul is the 'Body of Christ'. Paul 
describes the relationship of the ecclesia to Christ as body, bride, 
building, in Christ, with Christ.77 The decisive advance on the concept 
of the ecclesia was taken by Paul with his view of the ecclesia as Body 
of Christ. His originality of experience as Body of Christ is 
contestable and his deeper penetration into the idea of the ecclesia is 
evident.7® As F. F. Bruce points out, the relation between Paul's 
conception of the ecclesia as the Body of Christ and individual 
believers as members of that body may go back to the implication of the 
risen Lord's complaint: "Why do you persecute me?" (Act. 9:4).7^
The ecclesia as the Body of Christ has its members whose cohesive 
unity is Christ, the Lord Himself. However, the ecclesia is more than 
the sum of believers; she is a mysterious unity, as is expressed in the 
metaphor of the body which is also not a total but an organic unity of
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its individual parts. The ecclesia is thus a unity because she is in 
Christ. This unity would be the authentic organism or body, because we 
can see how something invisible makes the visible part into a unity, and 
how it is possible to say, "the whole has precedence over the parts". 
The risen Christ brings about this unity through His Spirit who operates 
with overwhelming, revolutionary, and transforming result. The 
revelation of the Spirit was the mysterious power which made the
fellpwship, consisting of many separate individuals, into a unity, a
single body. This body has essentially the differentiation of 
individual organs because there is no body without members. However, 
the body at the same time belongs to its membership.
This authentic organism thus has a living structure capable of 
functioning. As in the organism there was in the ecclesia a regulation 
of the functions assigned by the Holy Spirit to the various individual 
members who were thus equipped to perform their special services with a 
gift of the Spirit.®^ The metaphor of the organism illuminates one 
aspect of the reality, that is, the dependence of all kinds of 
ministration on the one Lord while at the same time maintaining the co­
functioning of all. The Head of a body is something different from the
ruler of a people. Both sides of the reality are expressed and must
obviously be expressed, in order to do justice at one and the same time 
to the vertical and the horizontal relationship - to bring out the 
mysterious vital fellowship on the one hand and to show that it is the
one Spirit who effects the differentiation of functions on the other.
With the expression of the ecclesia as 'Body of Christ' Paul thus knows,
according to Brunner, nothing of other kind of the ecclesia such as an
institution, a constitution and a constitutional o r d e r .
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Thus it is Christ, the Kyrios, the living and present Lord who 
binds believers together. He does this through His Spirit. The 
possession of the Spirit proves to believers that they are already 
removed out of the 'natural' state of existence and transferred into the 
'supernatural'.®® For they are in the Spirit/ that is to say, they are 
no longer in the 'flesh'. For being in the Spirit is only a form of 
manifestation of the being-in-Christ.®^ "if any man be in Christ/ he is 
a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are
become new".(2 Cor.5:17). Thus Christian existence in Christ means an 
existence in which social, racial and other barriers within the human 
family are done away with. The Holy Spirit who arms him for prayer and 
service is the same one who binds him in heart with the other 
Christians, and so he is longing for personal fellowship with others in 
faith in Christ. The same Spirit creates faith. "No man can say that 
Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost" (1 Cor. 12:3). Conversely the 
other position is also true that as a consequence of justifying faith 
"the Spirit is poured into our hearts" (Rom.5:5). Thus, Spirit and 
faith form in any case an indissoluble unity.®® Faith comes, however, 
into being through the witness about Jesus Christ, through the Word of 
reconciliation, and through the Word of the Cross, in whom a new way of 
salvation 'apart from the law' (Rom. 3:21) is opened up.
Through faith in Christ we receive the love of God as our new 
life.®® We ourselves become loving. In faith we know that God loves us 
from eternity and for eternity. It is through faith in Christ that we 
know that we are saved without our effort, out of this evil world and 
age, out of the depravity of sin and death. It is God's grace alone. 
His mercy, His boundless love, His election alone is the basis of our 
salvation by God.®7 This love of God is the Cross of Christ in which
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God's self-communication causes the man who receives it to communicate 
himself, to open his heart to other men, and to give himself to them.®® 
The Holy Spirit then binds them not only merely to God but also to each 
other. Thus the fellowship of love, brotherhood in Christ, is also the 
spiritual character of new life.
Paul finds the ecclesia in existence as something which results 
from the kerygma and from the reception of the Holy Spirit, and he 
recognizes agape as the necessary 'fruit of the Spirit',®9 for the
fellowship of Jesus lives under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, 
that is the secret of its life, of its communion and of its power. In 
this regard, Paul's ecclesiology for Brunner is also pneumatology.90 
Like faith the ecclesia at the same time comes into being as a result of 
proclamation of the gospel. The gospel for Paul is power of God for 
salvation to every one who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the 
Greek, for in it God's way of righteousness is revealed through faith
for faith, as it is written 'He who through faith is righteous shall
live' .91 Paul has thus claimed that men and women are justified in 
God's sight by faith in Christ, not by keeping the law, and that this 
justification is bestowed on them by God as a gift of grace, not as a 
reward of merit.92
This gospel is for Paul the universal need for mankind who is
affirmed to be morally bankrupt in God's sight. In this respect 
Gentiles and Jews for all the differences between them stand on one 
level. If there is to be any salvation for either Jews or Gentiles, 
then it must be based not on ethical achievement but on the grace of 
God. For this need God has made provision in Christ.93 Christ is set 
before them in the gospel as the one who by his self-sacrifice and death
212
has made full reparation for their sins. The benefits of the atonement 
thus procured may be appropriated by faith and only by faith in Christ, 
the grace of God. So if the ecclesia comes into being as the 
proclamation of the gospel, then it is the community of faith in Christ 
established and given by G o d . The ecclesia is therefore the true 
Israel, the chosen people of God, which is formed, grows and continues 
to exist through the call to salvation, wherever the call is accepted in 
obedience of faith.
The life-principle of the community is thus the risen Lord who 
presents through His Spirit. It is through the fellowship of the Spirit 
that the ecclesia is moulded as the brotherhood in Christ, the community 
of love. The Spirit is also the present gift of salvation and the 
earnest of that which is to come.95 Thus the ecclesia is at the same 
time the Messianic community96 in the twofold sense that she waits the 
coming of Christ and His glory and that as the Body of this Head she 
belongs already to Christ and His new world.97 The ecclesia is, indeed, 
the fellowship of saints in hope which is the communion of those called 
out of this world by God and set apart and renewed by the Holy Spirit 
and of the people united with one another. As the communion rejoicing 
in the here-and-now presence of Saviour, the ecclesia at the same time 
yearns for the future consummation with tense expectancy. Here the 
ecclesia is for Paul the eschatological community.98
According to Brunner both faith and the ecclesia come, however, 
into being not only as a result of the proclamation of the gospel but 
also as a result of repentance and o b e d i e n c e . 99 Thus Baptism as the 
outward sign of repentance is an integral part of the rise of the 
ecclesia. Where the Word of salvation in Christ is received in trust
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and obedience, the ecclesia happens and takes shapes by necessity. With 
this fact Baptism as an act in contrast to this inner event has no 
'independent significance'.1®® For it merely marks on the serious 
character and reality of this inner event which demands to be made 
public to be confessed on the one hand and it manifests the 
acknowledgement of its authenticity on the part of the already existing 
community or on the part of the man who has proclaimed Christ on the 
other.
Here Brunner understands with the Pauline concept of the ecclesia 
that Baptism is the 'sign' (common to all the Christian churches) of 
membership of the ecclesia.1®1 Therefore, the full sense of Baptism can 
only be realized where it is understood as a dying with Christ and 
therefore where Christ1 death as having taken place for our salvation is 
believed in.1®2 Baptism is then the event which points to the grace and 
the prevenience of Him who is the foundation of the ecclesia.1®2 It is 
a seal which to both the part of the believer and that of the preacher 
is imprinted as witness of the inner event. Beyond this there can be no 
any independent significance to the act of Baptism.1®4 However, there 
is at the same time the link between the spiritual sense and the social 
sense of the ecclesia. For in the act of Baptism happens visibly what 
already has happened invisibly through the Word and faith. The inner 
membership of the Body of Christ becomes then visible in this sign.
Therefore there is, according to Brunner, no question of Paul's 
thought that this sign itself effects something which had not previously 
been effected by the Word. Baptism is not itself a factor in salvation 
except that it makes visible an invisible event that is the visible 
reception and entry into the community. It belongs to this inner event
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and constitutes its consummation. Thus on this opinion any sacramental 
interpretation of Baptism becomes impossible because it is not thought 
of as an agent of independent significance. However, Baptism with the 
idea of sacraments which is developed and associated with the saving 
events in Christ by the later church, forms the institutional 
development of the church and then the primitive Christian community 
becomes a 'church' that Brunner indicates first and foremost a 
sacramental C h u r c h . 105 However, this does not deny that the visibility 
of the ecclesia is one of its essential marks. If we belong to Christ, 
then we belong to the ecclesia just as necessarily as the reality of 
faith depends on its expressing itself effectually in love. In this 
regard, entering into the ecclesia means belonging to Christ. Reception 
into the ecclesia is therefore the necessary final act of proclamation 
which proves its effectiveness. Thus Word, Spirit, faith, love, Baptism 
and ecclesia form, so Brunner claims, and indivisible unity.
(b) The embodiment of the Pauline ecclesia. From the 
understanding of Paul's teaching about the ecclesia Emil Brunner claims 
that the ecclesia as 'Body of Christ' is at once something which can be 
apprehended by faith and something which is visible even to the 
unbeliever as a social fact.107 The ecclesia lives in the new life 
which she has in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit, keeps alive the 
message about Him and spreads it through the whole world. For Brunner, 
the ecclesia is then the fellowship of believers in Christ; and it is 
not merely a fellowship that is believed in but also it is that which is 
experienced in manifold ways. It ought to be and is experienced in the 
mutual exchange of spiritual gifts, in mutual exhortation, in the common 
participation in divine worship and the Lord's Supper, and in the active 
love of the brethren among themselves. In consequence it is also
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experienced from community to community by visitation and letter through 
greetings and mutual aid. This fellowship not only grows out of and 
exists by faith but also in its effect is similarly seen and perceived 
with joy and gratitude as faith, hope and love.108 Indeed it is shown 
to us in the New Testament not only as an object of faith,109 as an
experienced reality working itself out visibly in practice.110 For the 
ecclesia is an objective reality corresponding to its subjective faith 
in Jesus Christ, and thus to the sphere of actual and realized 
fellowship with Christ. Therefore, the ecclesia is constituted by the 
fellowship in Christ of those who are united with each other through 
Christ and it is as real as is their zealous and brotherly love of each 
other as are the sacrifices which they make to each other in money and 
property, time and strength, security and life.111
However, the social aspect of the ecclesia, so Brunner argues, is 
not of itself an 'institutional church1 rather it is determined by its 
spiritual character as a fellowship of love in Christ. The life of the 
ecclesia is the life in the agape of God.11^ For the ecclesia as 
(the fellowship in Christ) abides in love, agape, which is the self- 
giving of God. The love of God does not inquire into the character of 
the recipient but it asks what he needs. Therefore it is basically 
independent of the conduct of the other person. It is not conditional 
but absolute. So love is the real God-likeness of man for which he has 
been created. In so far as love is in man he really resembles God and 
shows himself to be the child of God. This love is really human and 
that which is really human is thus the divine as something that is 
simply received. Through love true fellowship is realized; in love man 
is only really free and creative; and thus love is the life itself.113 
This love is, according to Brunner, life from God, with God, for God,
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and life with and for other men. It is, therefore, the most precious of 
all the gifts of the Spirit because it is itself the life of the 
Spirit.114
This central significance of love in Paul's teaching of the new 
life in Christ can be shown in various ways. Just as faith can be 
called the mode of existence of the new life, so also can love. The 
faith which saves is for Paul the 1 faith that works through love' 
(Gal.5:6).11® Love is thus mentioned together with faith and hope as 
the real heart and content of the Christian life. Love is the first 
fruit of the Spirit. Love therefore explains what it means to be in 
Christ, to be in the Spirit, to be in the faith.11® In love is realized 
the freedom from sin, to which believers have been called in Christ, in 
it the demand of the law is fulfilled, which has become possible by the 
Spirit; it is the content of the law of Christ. The law of love is thus 
the law of Christ.11  ^ Here this love constitutes for Paul the vital 
element of the Christian community.11® For it is in love that the 
ecclesia as 'the Body' of which Christ is the Head is built up and that 
its members together are rooted and grounded. For this reason love can 
be called the 'bond of perfection' and indeed in its own way it forms 
the unity of the ecclesia and enters into the service of the building up 
of the ecclesia.
So if the ecclesia is to be a 'brotherhood' and to live out of the 
consciousness of being a unique fellowship, then it must go together 
with love. Since love just as faith and hope is the mode of existence 
of the Christian community, it must reveal itself in this bond to the 
brethren in placing itself at the service of the upbuilding of the 
ecclesia. It is in this love that the ecclesia for Brunner is
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characterised as brotherhood in Christ. At the same time through this
love and fellowship in Christ the ecclesia is visible as a social
reality even to the unbeliever. This social reality is however
something different in its character. Every social reality has a
definite form and then has a definite order. For this reason the
ecclesia as a social entity has also its order. However, this order is,
so Brunner claims, not legal one, rather it is primarily spiritual one:
Every "social reality" has a definite form and therefore 
also a definite order. The remarkable and unique thing 
about the order of the ecclesia according to Pauline 
doctrine and in the Pauline communities, is that this order 
is a spiritual and therefore not legal one. Paul expressly 
says that the one Spirit gives to each member his position
and his function. Since Christ the Lord rules, there are
no rulers.119
In this regard, Maurice Goguel points out that the Christians of the 
first generation felt themselves brothers but brothers 'in Christ', that 
is to say, their brotherhood did not depend on some humanitarian 
conception but the love of God in Christ.12^
Emil Brunner does not deny that there are persons to whom an 
official duty has been allocated i.e. the episcopoi (who are mentioned 
only on one single occasion by Paul).^2  ^ However, this differentiation 
of the gifts of grace (charismata) does not create any differences in 
the sense of jurisdiction' or 'rank'. Paul knows nothing of 
Presbyterian or Episcopal Order. It was, according to Brunner, an error 
to translate the word 'diakoniai' by 'offices'.^22 For the Spirit does 
not creat offices but ministries. The Spirit pours the love of God into 
the hearts of believers and brings them increasingly into conformity 
with the character of Christ. In this respect F.F. Bruce points out 
that the central principle of the 'law of the Spirit' for Paul is the 
love of God in Christ, which is first descending vertically and 
implanted in the heart by the Spirit and then flowing out into the lives
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of others. ^ 3  Therefore, not only the believers voluntarily 'bear one 
another's burdens',124 aiso they have their responsibility of life
in Christ to others. Here the spiritual order of the ecclesia then 
comes from the power of love and the working of the Holy Spirit who is 
given by Christ and has taken possession of Christians in their wills 
and their being.125
Accordingly, the ecclesia does not originate through order nor live 
by right order, but solely in the Spirit of Christ.^ 6  she lives by the 
word, the Spirit and the love of God; and from this, as Paul claims, it 
derives and determines its order. Thus Brunner argues that Paul's 
conception of the ecclesia is different from that of the primitive 
Jerusalem community which had taken over its Presbyterian order from the 
synagogue as such. Its difference lies in the fact that it corresponds 
to the fellowship with Christ, and thus is not merely an object of faith 
but an object which, although in the last resort it can be understood 
only by faith, can be perceived by everyone. Thus faith in Christ gives 
rise to a fellow-ship in which men share their life in love, that is 
what Brunner calls the 'ecclesia'.^7
Following to Paul's basic concept of the ecclesia, Brunner thus 
claims with Hans Von Campenhausen that the Spirit is regarded as ' the 
organic principle of the Christian community'. ^ 8  There is no need then 
for any determined church order with its regulations, its demands and 
prohibitions. As a matter of principle there is for Paul no ruling 
class in the ecclesia, and even the spiritual men are not regarded as a 
spiritual 'aristocracy'.^^ The community for Paul is not regarded as a 
hierarchical and stratified organization, but as a homogeneous and 
living cosmos of free spiritual gifts which serve and supplement each
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other. Thus its members can never exalt themselves over against each 
other or harden themselves against each other. For the Spirit and love 
are sovereign, the ecclesia is already perfect in Christ and in need of 
absolutely no further organization. Even though particular concrete 
arrangements and ministries may arise within the life of the 
congregation, they do not as such establish any new system, any sacred 
law.130 Here the most striking picture of Paul’s Christian community is 
the complete lack of any legal system and the exclusion on principle of 
all formal authority within the community.1^ 1
Thus a question can be raised immediately. Is the ecclesia which 
Paul teaches possible? The answer to the question is for Brunner 
affirmative. Brunner claims that the ecclesia that Paul depicts is both 
an ideal and a reality. It is what is true and real 'in Jesus Christ' 
and thus 'in faith'.132 For it is the real fellowship of real men which 
Paul ever and again saw coming into being as a result of this kerygma 
about Christ. According to him, Paul recognizes that the local 
Christian community such as the Corinthian or Philippian is the 'Body of 
Christ1 as a work of the Holy Spirit. That is to say, it is a 
fellowship of the Spirit whose ordering is determined only by the Holy 
Spirit in as much as the Spirit allots to each his special gift and, 
corresponding to it his special service: "There is not in addition a
further 'organization', for the Body of Christ organizes itself. It is 
just for this reason that it is called the Body of Christ".133 The 
ecclesia as Body of Christ has, therefore, no legal regulations which 
are the essence of law.134 Rather it is the fellowship through the Holy 
Spirit (k olU to vtf4 TTi'eu/XQ'TejJin which its members are knit together in an 
organization which includes both equality and difference.135 For the 
fellowship of Christ lives under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit
220
which is the secret of its life, of its communion and of its power.136
So what we can say is that it is the mystery of the ecclesia as the 
fellowship of the Spirit that has an spiritual living order without 
being legally organized.13^ And the order, that is intrinsic to the 
fellowship springing from the Holy Spirit was diakonia or service as 
flowed from the true faith revealed itself in a new relationship to 
one's brother.13® However the organized hierarchy presupposing the 
office had, so Brunner claims, neither the character of brotherly 
communion nor had it a unity wherein equality was consistent with 
differentiation - a unity characterized by reciprocal subordination. 
Therefore, the only valid rule is: "Whatever you do, do it in the way it 
demands, neither perfunctorily nor flippantly but with a holy 
seriousness. Even the overseers are not simply 'officials', but like 
all the rest, they are those whom a special gift of the Spirit enables 
to lead in a particular service-whether a specific kind of appointment 
was then added to it or not. Thus there is specially urged upon them 
not an authoritative, ponderous behaviour but a serving d i s p o s i t i o n . "13 9
This charismatic order, according to Brunner, works in the ecclesia 
as the Body of Christ which is a mystical unity of visible earthly 
persons with an unseen, heavenly, and yet present Person who is their 
head and the eternal ever-present Christ.140 Thus Brunner believes that 
this is precisely the 'miracle' of the ecclesia which Paul and other 
Christian themselves regarded with ever renewed astonishment. 1 Even 
in the worldwide range of the ecclesia this miracle did happen and thus 
there is neither need of legal order nor hierachic organization.1^2 For 
instance, the community of Colosse knew itself as the same Body of 
Christ as it recognized in those other distant communities of Macedonia
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and Achaea in the One Lord, Jesus Christ, who binds them up as 'one
Body1 through His Spirit, a spirit of fellowship. According to Brunner,
Paul knows therefore nothing of the idea of the Church as an
1 institution1 . Rather it is the fellowship of Christ, the
brotherhood, whose cohensive unity is Christ, the Lord Himself, who
binds up not only its individual members but also each community of
Jesus Christ through His Spirit. So Emil Brunner put it as follows:
Although the brotherhood is composed of quite ordinary men, 
it is not ordered by the will and the law of men, but simply 
and solely by the Spirit (pneuma), His gifts of grace 
(Charismata) and His ministries (diakoniai).^44
Here Emil Brunner claims that the spiritual brotherhood of the
Pauline Christian community has to be acknowledged as the necessary
outcome of Paul's understanding of the gospel of Jesus Christ and 
therefore as the necessary norm for all time of the believing fellowship 
of Christians, who are conscious that they have their foundation in 
Jesus Christ alone.^45 However, the opinion of the Pauline community 
that was more concerned with the fellowship of Christ in faith through 
the Holy Spirit was not only misunderstood but also forgotten by the 
later church which rose out of the ecclesia as early as the second 
c e n t u r y . ^46 For instance, the church of Matthew which leaned towards 
Judaism developed an idea of the church which is no longer totally based 
on Paul's pneumatological thought but is expressed largely in terms of 
church law even though it still keeps partly the Pauline formulation of 
the e c c l e s i a . ^47 Furthermore the church of Pastoral Epistles whose 
pseudonymous letters ascribed to Paul hardly mentioned, according to 
Brunner, the work of the Holy Spirit in the sense of the reality of the 
ecclesia which is the central concept of Pauline ecclesiology. Instead 
in its place the office of the bishop is portrayed and eulogized in a 
manner unthinkable in a genuinely Pauline c o m m u n i t y . ^48 At the same
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time the formation of the canon of the New Testament has a cumulative 
effect to the f a c t . ^ 49
As a result, there is a disagreement between a Catholic doctrine 
basing itself upon the Jewish Christian and post-Pauline sources and a 
Reformed doctrine which appeals to the genuine Paul, for e x a m p l e . ^ ^0 
Here he attempts to distinguish two terras the 'ecclesia' and the 
'Church'. On Brunner's view the church has turned from the ecclesia 
into a governing institution which is an obstacle to the Christian 
community. He regards therefore the unresolved problem of the nature of 
the church comes from the fact that the connection between what the New 
Testament terms 'ecclesia* and what we call the 'church' is not clear. 
The church is no longer primarily a communion of persons, but rather an 
institution as s u c h . ^51 jn this regard, Brunner argues that the course 
of the 'Great Church' has been paralled by the history of 
'spiritualism', which has fought against all institutionalising and 
legalising, and sometimes against every concrete historical form of the 
church, appealing against all mediations and sacraments, offices, 
ordinances and institutions to the direct and personal activity of the 
Holy Spirit. This spiritualism has usually supported its polemic 
against the institutional church by painting an idealised picture of the 
primitive Christian community in order to call the former back to the 
purity of its origins. Although it may be hopeless and in fact 
impossible to seek for the New Testament concept of the ecclesia, 
however there can be, so Brunner claims, something clear at once when we 
see the theological consequences from this historical discussion of the 
relationship between the ecclesia and the church.^52
So he frequently refers to Rudolf Sohm's thesis that the nature of
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the ecclesia is incompatible with the nature of law in terms of the 
Pauline understanding of the ecclesia which arises from his
understanding of Christ and faith in Christ.155 Thus Brunner puts it as 
follows:
It is proved, by our knowledge that the Pauline 
understanding of the Ekklesia arises from his understanding 
of Christ and faith in Christ, and radically excludes the 
possibility that any element of law should be regarded as 
essential to the Ekklesia. The Ekklesia of Paul is both 
visible and invisible, but even as visible it is shaped by 
faith in the invisible Lord and, what is more, as a 
brotherhood, as a spiritual organism free from the law,
which excludes every legal element.15^
Therefore, Brunner claims that the essence of the New Testament ecclesia
is precisely the freedom and spirituality of its structure in contrast
to all legalism.155 On the basis of this argument he develops his
concept of the ecclesia from Paul's teaching of the ecclesia and his
community, which is the spiritual brotherhood in faith in Christ and
which is something unique in terms of its spiritual freedom in Christ
against all kinds of the legal institution that threatens the real
nature of the ecclesia. However, it is for Brunner an undesirable
starting point that through the ecclesiastical development of the
community of Jesus Christ whose change takes place in tiny but
continuous stages, 'the ecclesia of the New Testament', especially that
of Paul, that is the spiritual brotherhood in faith in Christ through
the Holy Spirit, was replaced by the legal institution which in actual
fact - as Catholic theories assert - 'develop' from obscure origins
which are already partly latent in the new Testament ecclesia.155
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2.2 The basic conceptions of the church
Brunner is convinced that the ecclesia of the New Testament is not a 
mere ideal but the reality in which as apostles of Jesus Christ they 
live, the reality apart from which their apostolic office and their 
witness to Jesus Christ would cease to be effective. Indeed it is the 
objective reality corresponding to their subjective faith in Jesus 
Christ. "The ecclesia is the sphere of actual and realized fellowship 
with the Christ - a fellowship which is as real as their faith and love 
and hope are real. It is constituted by the fellowship in Christ of 
those who are united with each other through Christ and it is as real as 
is their zealous and brotherly love of each other, as are the sacrifices 
which they make to each other in money and property, time and strength, 
security and life".157 So the ecclesia is a life of sharing.158 
'Sharing' means here the same as diakonia that the New Testament depicts 
as every form and manner of giving oneself and giving from one's own. 
It may mean also material sacrifice for the ecclesia. The koinonia of 
the ecclesia for Brunner is expressed through the diakonia of the
ecclesia.1
So what Brunner argues is that the false objectivism in the church 
has to be overcome, and the mutual personal response’in the relationship 
between God and man has to be restored. The New Testament provided, 
according to Brunner, principles for congregations to examine themselves 
with respect to their being genuine churches: whether they held fast to 
the Word, whether they were in obedience, whether their faith was alive, 
for example. It has also shown to us that the ecclesia is not soley a 
disordered mass impelled by the Spirit. Even as the purely personal 
fellowship that it is it possesses offices and uses sacraments. 
However, the present institutional church that turned so much toward
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doctrine, so little toward discipleship, is a chief reason for its 
weakness. A church that detaches itself from the world only in 
speaking, even if it were speaking in the purest biblical doctrine, but 
not in action and love, becomes unworthy of belief to the world. ^ 0
In Brunner's view the false objectivism has always been the real 
ecclesiastical danger within the church since its beginning. It 
attempts to define the church as 'establishment' or 'institution'. 
Hence the one-sided objective concept of the church is especially to 
blame for the church's no longer understanding itself as a missionary 
church, for instance. On the other hand, the false subjectivism 
attempts to maintain the church with dissolving tendency, which more 
seriously jeopardized the welfare of the revelation, even though as 
reaction it has often had a certain beneficial effect and even though it 
was often in the form under which biblical truth would blossom out 
against torpidity. For Brunner, objectivism leads to torpidity whereas 
subjectivism leads to dissolution. What is torpid can be awakened again 
to life; but what is dissolved is no longer in existence.
Instead Brunner attempts to intimately relate the concept of the 
church to his term 'personal correspondence'. Hence the ecclesia of the 
New Testament is primarily nothing other than a fellowship of persons 
sharing in Christ and the Holy Spirit. As the body of Christ, it is 
neither organization nor institution, but persons who are members one of 
another under the headship of its living Lord. At the same time it is a 
visible fellowship which binds men not only to Christ, but also to one 
another. In this regard, Brunner finds that there have been three 
classical definitions of the Church. They are the company of the elect, 
the body of Christ, and the communion of saints (coetus electorum,
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corpus Christi, communio sanctorum). Each of them-contains a different 
standpoint, and expresses something essential concerning the church's 
basis and nature, but no one of them is complete in itself.
(a) The company of the elect (coetus electorum). According to 
Brunner, the basis of the ecclesia lies in the eternal election. The 
creation of the world is connected with the decree of election by the 
fact that mediator of both is the Son, whom God 'loved before the 
foundation of the world'.^ 2  He is the Son-Logos, who, as the Incarnate 
One, gives us both the knowledge of election and the knowledge that the
world has been created through the son, in the Son and unto the Son.
Thus the origin, meaning, and purpose of the world are only to be 
perceived where faith in the historical revelation of the love of God, 
in the calling to Divine sonship through the Crucified, becomes the 
assurance of eternal election.163 ^he truth which concerns the creation 
is - both in point of time and of fact - subordinate to the truth which 
concerns election. In this regard, Brunner claims that man was created 
in love.
From the very outset, the Biblical idea of creation 
includes the special relation of God to man, namely, that 
God reveals Himself to man in His Word as the Lord. The God
who reveals himself is always the God whose face is turned
toward man; the theanthropos theos.^4
God's plan for the world and humanity is revealed in Christ. Here 
there is a fellowship of Christians in Christ exists. For God has 
willed from eternity that it should be so, and He did not create men as 
isolated individuals intelligible in themselves and living in their own 
strength, but as beings to whom He wills to give His own life, binding 
them to one another by this g i f t .  ^ 5  In Christ this is God's decree in 
creation and at the same time His decree of salvation. He plans to
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create men for fellowship with Him in Christ. But men have come into 
conflict with the divine destiny as their unity with the Creator. In 
consequence also their bond with one another has been destroyed. In 
fact, men do not live in love. They always live in contradiction not 
only to the will of God, but also to his own creaturely nature, in 
contradiction with himself.166 jn order to cancel out this corruption 
and to save men from the miserable destiny, God has sent us the Saviour. 
"God's plan of Creation has", Brunner says "become the plan of 
Redemption".^67 In Christ we know God's love which wants to communicate 
itself to man who has become a sinner. By this love God wills to be our 
Lord in spite of sinners. The separation between God and man can only 
come only from man. For this reason God sends us His Son. God's will 
revealed in Christ is a creative will.
So what Brunner claims here is that in Christ not only is something
given us to know but also a new fact is created, a new humanity
established. This new humanity is the ecclesia of Jesus Christ as God's
people, 'the elect people.' They are the company of the election for
fellowship with God in His Love. For this reason the fellowship of the
ecclesia with Christ and the fellowship of Christians with one another
has, for Brunner, its basis in the eternal loving will of G o d . ^68 In
this respect, the word 'election' has the same meaning of the ecclesia:
The word (in Greek) is eclectos. And the word eclectos has 
the same meaning as ecclesia. The chosen ones, the elected 
ones, the ecletoi, are forming the ecclesia. No, that's the 
wrong expression, they don't form the ecclesia, they are 
formed into the ecclesia, into the people of God, by the 
election of G o d . 169
So Brunner claims that the church (in the sense of the term 
'ecclesia') is primarily seen in contrast to any notion of a 
sociological institution.”*”^  And he puts it as follows:
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In no other way can it - as the brotherhood of Christians - 
understand its existence and nature, especially since (as 
the world must see it) it is by no means yet this new 
humanity, but only a little flock in the midst of a world in 
which the love of God counts for nothing. Its claim to be 
the new, the redeemed humanity, must therefore appear to the 
world as a grotesque piece of self-conceit. The Ekklesia 
must indeed concede the point, not only on account of its 
smallness but also on account of its own imperfection, that
this claim to be the new humanity sounds incredible. And
yet it knows tht such it is. It knows because it 
understands itself, not in terms of its visible appearance, 
but in terms of its (invisible) eternal g r o u n d . ^
Here the church for Brunner is the little flock of Christ's redeemed as
a chosen people of God and the vanguard of the kingdom of God, of the
new humanity united with God and in God. In this respect, the church is
not a sociological entity. It is a spiritual entity^7^
(b) The Body of Christ (corpus Christi). Brunner claims that the 
origin of the ecclesia is known by the fellowship through the historical 
Christ, Jesus. T h e  eternal will of God is known only in the history 
of Jesus Christ. For this reason it cannot be recognized in neither 
mystical vision nor speculative way. Actually Jesus Himself came to the 
fishers by the Galilean lake and called them out (ek-klesia) for 
fellowship with Him. Only He chose them to be His disciples and 
apostles to follow Him. He gathered around Himself a body of His own to 
whom "it is given to understand the mysteries of the kingdom of God in 
contrast to them that are without".^7^ Therefore it was not they that 
united themselves to form a people of Christ, but this same Lord who 
united them. Thus, in Brunner's opinion, the beginning of the ecclesia 
started when Jesus called them to follow Him. And on the last evening 
He established them as the new Israel under the 'New Covenant'.^7^ This 
covenant confirmed by His broken body and His blood to be shed for them. 
Therefore their membership rooted in Him was historically established in 
the making of this Covenant: "His 'Follow me' was the beginning of
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their corporate existence over against the world, first as a band of 
disciples, and later as a community bearing witness to Christ, the Risen 
One."176
After His death on the Cross and after His resurrection it was the
experience of the Holy Spirit which caused the disciple-fellowship to
think of itself as 'the body of Christ1. For, as during His earthly 
life He was its Lord and Head, so was He now also invisibly but really 
'the Head and we the members.^77 The Holy Spirit creates the living 
organism for Himself and rules them by assigning to each member his 
spiritual gift charisma and thereby his service. In fact this is a 
living experience and reality for every one in ecclesia. According to
Brunner, when Paul says in I Corinthians 12 of the living organism, he
does not teach the fact that the Christian should believe it, but rather 
he expresses it as an experience of the faith of all.^7® They thus know 
that they are the one body whose Head is Christ, and whose members they 
all are through this living experience. Therefore, they experienced as 
an indubitable reality this togetherness which bound them together in 
one ecclesia where the place of the visible Lord had been taken by the 
invisible Lord present in His representative, the Paraclete. This is an 
experience of faith only for those who through faith are in Christ.
Thus Brunner argues that what one has to believe in the ecclesia 
was an idea that never would have entered their heads. There is not 
even a single word to indicate this in the New Testament. "So we, being 
many , are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another" 
(Rom. 12:5). So where Christ is, there is the church. And the church 
is wherever Jesus Christ is, for it is the fact of His Presence among 
men which creates community in faith and love.^7^ At the same time they
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acknowledge the same reality in other congregations ekklesiai: the unity 
of the body of Christ created by the invisible Lord. The ecclesia is 
the sphere of actual and realized fellowship with the Christ. It is 
constituted by the fellowship in Christ of those who are united with 
each other through C h r i s t . B r u n n e r  thus concludes that the unity of 
the ecclesia for them was no dogma of faith, but a living experience, 
just like the nature of their own brotherhood. In their faith in Christ 
and in the experience of the Holy Spirit the social character of the 
ecclesia was thus implicit.^ Therefore, they had sure knowledge about 
the ground of their fellowship through their faith and about its reality 
through the daily experience of their bond of union. So Brunner puts it 
as follows:
Yet this spiritual event is connected with an external word, 
and this faith again leads to an outward community. For 
this reason the Church is the only true community. It is 
real and powerful, like the blood relationship, like the 
love between mother and child, but it is not, like it, 
partial and limited. It is spiritual, like the community of 
ideas, but not, like it, abstract and impersonal. It is the 
true community, because it is absolutely personal, since it 
is based upon God's personal call and man's personal answer.
It is therefore the only form of community between one 
person and another - the community of love. At the same 
time it is completely universal, knowing no barriers of race 
or class or culture. ^
(c) The communion of saints (communio sanctorum). According to 
Brunner, the meaning of the word 'communio sanctorum' refers to the 
ground of the ecclesia in the faith of individual Christians. When the 
group of disciples grew, especially after the Pentecost event, a host of 
new members were 'added' . Then it became clear to them that ecclesia 
has its ground in the faith of the individual m e m b e r s . T h r o u g h  the 
faith each member of the group acknowledges their eternal election as 
its ultimate and highest origin. The Holy Spirit, who apprehends and 
creates anew the individual when the Word of Christ is heard, makes the
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eternal decree of God a present experience.1®^ Brunner thus claims that 
the living Christ builds His body for Himself by taking possession of 
the hearts of men and 'adds them' as saints called kletoi hagioi to the 
community of disciples. In this respect the ecclesia is the community 
of the saints, of those who have been called out of the world and into 
the service of Christ.
So if fellowship with Christ who has bound each one to Himself 
through the word of reconciliation means binding the members to each 
other in Him, then faith in itself is really synonymous with 
fellowship.1®® We become capable of fellowship and willing for the
fellowship of the companionable, because faith is the reception of the
love of God. For Brunner, since God is the self-communication of God, 
He himself creates through His Spirit men who wish to communicate and 
should communicate the thing that they have received. In this regard, 
he claims that sin consists of the self that is closed to God and man
whereas faith signifies the one who becomes open for God and for his
brother. "Faith is", so Brunner claims, "communicating existence. 
Therefore it is leads of necessity through communicatio to communio".1®®
Here Brunner points out that just as faith leads to fellowship, so 
also it always received his life in Christ through faith from a 
Christian community that was there before him. Every believer has been 
added in solidarity not in solitary. Thus Brunner is convinced that the 
ecclesia is always prior to the individual believers who has received 
his faith through the communication of others.1®7 He is therefore 
already in a fellowship when he becomes a believer. And he puts it as 
follows:
Community is both the cause and the effect of this
occurrence. It is the cause: for no one becomes a believer
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save through the influence of others, who, in the very act 
of confessing their faith, pass on to him the message which 
made them believers. No one comes to the point at which he 
begins to believe in Jesus Christ apart from a message 
communicated to him by others, apart from that impressive 
chain of witness called "the Christian tradition" which 
extends from the earliest days of Christianity down to the 
present day.
The human word is never the ground of faith, but it is 
always the cause of faith.... Similarly, faith itself is 
the effective cause of community, since it is faith which 
urges one human being towards another; above all it is faith 
which impels him to join the company of those who have 
believed before him, and who are now believers.^®®
Therefore, each of these classical definitions indicates the church 
from a different perspective and expresses something essential 
concerning the church's ground and nature but no one of them is enough 
to conceptualize it. For instance, defined as the 'company of the 
elect', the transcendent aspect of the ground of the church is 
preserved. But when this definition is permitted to stand alone, it 
leads to what Brunner calls 'an abstract spiritual intellectualism' 
which interprets the idea of predestination in terms of rigidly fixed 
numbers. Defined as the 'body of Christ', the historical objective
aspect of the ground of the church is preserved. But when this 
definition stands alone, it leads to what Brunner calls 'a sacramental 
hierarchism' as has been amply demonstrated in Christian history. 
Finally, where the church is defined as the communion of saints, the
'spiritual-subjective' aspect of its ground is preserved. But when this
definition stands alone, it leads to an 'emotional and pietistic
individualism' . In this respect, Brunner claims that it is only in 
unity that these three definitions can express the reality of the church 
as ecclesia.^
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2.3 The two aspects of the church
The foregoing definitions, together with their bases, indicate the 
spiritual and theological aspect of the church. According to Brunner's 
argument, this aspect of the church is visible only to the eye of faith 
but invisible to the natural eye. This has always been clear to the
teachers of the Church and there have been no differences in their
conception. But differences began only when men reflected on the fact
that the church is always at the same time a visible and empirical
r e a l i t y .  190 jn this respect what Brunner claims is that most of them 
became the victims of a misunderstanding of the nature of the ecclesia. 
They misunderstood in the first place the word 'church'. Since the New 
Testament term 'fcKK\rj crcA' (Greek) had been translated into ecclesia 
(Latin) for almost fifteen hundred years, thus they understood the 
church as having developed in the West.191 They believed that the 
visible form of the church is something similar to what has existed as 
the church. It seems to them a structure of a social kind with a type 
of order or system of church law. Also its chief characteristic and 
function is to be a serviceable instrument for the proclamation of the 
Word of God and the administration of the Sacraments.
They understood it as the social structure and then it was for 
example, an organization serving a purpose as an external support of 
faith (externum subsidium fidei) from Calvin,192 ancj an institution 
which is to be constituted and regulated by laws. For this reason an 
attempt was made by Augustine to close the gap between this church and 
the ecclesia of the New Testament. He made it available to use the 
distinction between two terms 'ecclesia invisibilis1 that indicates the 
church of faith and the 'ecclesia visibilis', by which Augustine 
understood the Catholic universal world church of his day. This
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conception perhaps came, in Brunner's view, from Augustine's study of
Paul on the one hand and from his perception of the privileged and
national church of Roman Empire since Constantine and Theodosius on the
other.193 gut Brunner regards this double concept of the church as a
'desperate expedient' which has served more to confuse than to clarify
the issue. It is wholly foreign to the New Testament. For him, there
is only one ecclesia which is both spiritual and corporeal. Thus it was
impossible for the disciples to distinguish between the visible and the
invisible ecclesia. And he says as follows:
There is in it only the one Ekklesia, which is at the same 
spiritual and invisible (intelligible to faith alone) and 
corporeal (recognizable and visible to all). No Apostle 
would ever have agreed that this visible entity, the 
Ekklesia, was only a support of faith, let alone an external 
support. For the disciples it was wholly impossible to 
distinguish between visible and invisible E k k l e s i a .  ^ 4
Thus Brunner argues that the ecclesia of the New Testament was not able
to lie in the perception of the institutional church which has been
identified with a structure of a social type of order to be an external
support of faith. For the ecclesia, in Brunner's view, was neither a
support of faith nor an external support but the personal fellowship
with God in Christ through the Holy Spirit.
However, he is also convinced that the church which belongs to 
Christ through faith was at the same time the church which everyone 
could see. This social form of the church is a necessary consequence of 
their faith but it is not an institutional purpose to support the 
faith. 195 jj- -[s a of significance of the fellowship of God and
that of each other in Christ. For since God has communicated Himself to 
them in Christ, it follows that they must communicate themselves to each 
other. It is a communion of celebration from the knowledge of 
reconciliation between God and them, and among themselves. "The agape,
235
the love of God which was communicated to them through Christ, was now 
living and present in them and united them to one another11. ^ 96 iphe 
social character of the church is, then, the result from its spiritual 
character as an community of men through the love of Christ. This 
spiritual character itself was the structural law of this social entity.
And yet there is, in Brunner's view a difference between the 
structural law of the ecclesia, the spiritual brotherhood, and that of 
the institutional church for the administration of supernatural 
Sacraments and the promulgation of revealed doctrine.^97 According to 
him, the fundamental difference between these two entities could be 
perceived by a sociologist at the first glance, even though he does not 
more exactly know or understand the deeper foundation of this spiritual 
togetherness. Sociologically Toennies studies the distinction between 
two terms 'community' (Gemeinschaft) and 'association' 
(Gesellschaft).^8 According to this opinion, the theory of community 
starts from the assumption of perfect unity of human wills as an
original or natural condition which is preserved in spite of actual
seperation, and of which the common root is the coherence of vegetative 
life through birth and the fact that the human wills remain linked to 
each other by parental descent and by sex, or by necessity. On the 
other hand the theory of the association deals with the artificial 
construction of an aggregate of human beings by inventing a common
personality and value accepted by another one, even though they are by
themselves and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension against 
all others. In this regard, the peculiar character of the ecclesia as a 
fellowship can be possibly understood in term 'community' or 'authentic 
fellowship'.
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According to Brunner, it is also true however that the ecclesia 
cannot be wholly defined in this sociological terms. For even if it can 
have laws and institutions, the spiritual brotherhood can never regard 
these as its essence. The nature of the Christian brotherhood is 
basically different from the nature of an institution, which is called 
the 'church', and is incompatible with it. That is to say, the social 
character of the ecclesia is determined by its spiritual character and 
its faith in Christ in the sense of p i s t i s . ^ 9  This non-institutional 
character is much more evident still in the ecclesia of the New 
Testament, the people of God, whose life-element is the Holy Spirit. 
Thus if it can be defined in any sociological terms, then the ecclesia 
would have to be defined as a fellowship in the most authentic sense and 
in distinction from an association but the social character of the 
ecclesia can be understood only in the light of Christ in the last 
resort.
In fact, Brunner recognizes that the unity of these two mutually 
exclusive character, that is the spiritual on the one hand and the 
social on the other, is the paradox of the ecclesia. For this reason 
there is also a misunderstanding of the ecclesia, which can be seen as 
either the spiritual brotherhood or the social reality. For instance, 
the jurist Rudolf Sohm pays too little attention to the social character 
of the ecclesia, but only draws attention to the incompativility of the 
legal element with the ecclesia even though he tries to describe the 
ecclesia as a spiritual and social reality, ruled by the Word of Christ 
and the Holy Spirit, which has not yet developed an institutional church 
as s u c h . 200 jn contrast to Sohm, Ernst Troeltsch^OI has but little 
insight into the spiritual nature of the ecclesia and then simply 
reconed the New Testament ecclesia as belonging to the 'sect-type of the
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church1 in a way of the sociological approach.
Brunner also claims that there is another misunderstanding of the 
ecclesia of the New Testament in the more recent discussion about the 
church, especially in the New Testament studies. It is made from the 
interpretation of the term 'ecclesia' in the light of the Septuagint
'assembly' of people of God for purposes of worship or in the light of 
the secular Greek meaning of the word 'ecclesia' as a popular assembly. 
But in both cases the New Testament gives no grounds for this conclusion 
to us. It has filled both the Old Testament concept and the secular 
Greek concept of ecclesia with entirely new Christological content. It 
is not the assembly that the Apostles mean, especially that of Paul, but 
the 'klesis', the election and the call of God in Christ.^02
Accordingly, Brunner claims that the ecclesia is made visible to us 
not by a 'cult-fellowship' but by a brotherhood proclaiming Christ and 
living in mutual love even though the divine worship has its place in 
the life of the ecclesia. In this regard, the sociological description 
of the ecclesia as 'authentic fellowship' is the right one, because 
fellowship differs from association precisely in that it has its goal in 
itself and is not there to serve a further end. It is not a means but 
an end in itself, willed by God, even though this is only absolutely 
true of the ecclesia in its consummation, in the kingdom of God.^03 
Therefore the ecclesia is, according to Brunner, a throughly uncultic, 
spiritual brotherhood which lives in trusting obedience to its Lord 
Christ and in the love to the brethren which He bestows; and it knows 
itself as the body of Christ through the Holy Spirit which dwells in it. 
The whole life of the ecclesia is thus a service of God and this service
rendering of the Hebrew word Kahal which is understood as the
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of God is at the same time brotherly service to one's fellowmen. For 
Brunner, this transfer of attention, whereby the assembly plays only a 
subordinate role, brings into focus the ministry and mission of the 
ecclesia in the world.
So Brunner is convinced that it is only in the light of this 
approach that the sociological character of the ecclesia may be seen in 
true correspondence with its genuinely theological nature. In this 
regard, he once again appeals to apostle Paul who made clear to his 
congregations the nature of their fellowship, the nature of ecclesia,
with the metaphor of the body. His concept of the body is filled with a
new content, because this body which suffers and simultaneously rejoices 
along with its members is at the same time the body of Christ. Christ 
is the life of the church. Apart from Christ there would be no church. 
The church for Paul is never pictured as existing apart from Christ; it 
is always His body, drawing its nourishment and sustenance from him; it 
has no independent existence.^04 For this reason the collections which 
Paul took for 'the poor in Jerusalem' were, for example, not only a 
concern of charity, but also a concern filled with the deepest knowledge 
of Christ and genuine faith in Him.
Thus for Paul this act of love is at the same time an act of faith
in the sense that in it the grace of Christ is repeated and come alive 
in His body. The fellowship of Jesus Christ is the work and product of 
His word and Spirit. It is rooted in the historical unrepeatable fact 
of revelation, in the Word made flesh. So in the ecclesia, in its 
social reality, the self-communication of God is recognizable as the 
principle of its life. Because this love is agape, the ecclesia is for 
Brunner 'a sociological paradox.'205 For this reason the social
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character of the ecclesia lies in the fellowship of persons with God in 
Christ and at the same time signifies the world-embracing new 
humanity.^06 The ecclesia as the Christian congregation is not limited 
by national or political boundaries but universal. In order to help the 
Greeks to understand this, Paul speaks of the too when
he describes the whole Christian p e o p l e . i n  this respect, it had no 
local limits even though if forms a community locally. The Brethren in 
Corinth or Thessalonica thus participate obviously with the greatest 
interest in the lot of the brethren in Jerusalem or Asia. Here Brunner 
recognizes that the ecclesia is an ecumenical family, that is, a family 
spread over the whole around world.
Accordingly, the social character of the ecclesia is world- 
embracing and genuine brotherhood. For the same Jesus Christ who is 
present in living power in all represents in His person the new humanity 
and recapitulates the whole history of humanity in His act of salvation. 
The ecclesia of faith is, therefore, not only bound by His love, but 
also can only be understood through Christ and in Him. In this regard, 
ecclesiology for Brunner is christology. But at the same time this 
ecclesia is actualized by the Holy Spirit. He is the element in which 
the ecclesia lives its life, which makes the Christ of the past its 
present Lord, and which makes the ecclesia the fellowship of those that 
wait for Him.^08 Brunner thus concludes that the ecclesia of the New 
Testament is not only a project of faith implicit in faith in Christ, 
but also this ecclesia about which Paul gives us christological and 
pneumatological teaching is at the same time a social reality which is 
the concrete visible brotherhood. The social reality of the eccleisa 
was therefore characterized by this spirit of love, which ever and again 
drew Jews and pagans to the ecclesia and which distinguished the
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ecclesia from all thiasoi or cultic unions, and by this same love which 
was proclaimed in the apostolic preaching as the great gift of God in 
Jesus Christ.^09
2.4 The church in mission
Since Emil Brunner is convinced that the church is the community of 
Jesus Christ as a purely personal fellowship, he challenges the 
'eighteen-hundred-year old misunderstanding of the church' which 
consists of understanding the church as an institution and then simply 
identifying this institution with the ecclesia, the community in Christ 
of the New Testament. At the same time he claims that it is the first 
duty of the church to enter into action. In fact, Brunner regards the 
existing churches for the time being as indispensable from the point of 
view of the continuity of preaching and doctrine (and indeed far 
superior to every other type of organization), but "it is equally clear 
that as regards winning souls and creating live cells of Christian 
fellowship they (the churches) stand far behind other (organizations) 
and more recent formations and in the future will probably be cast into 
the shade by the latter. They have long since lost the monopoly of 
preaching Christ and still more that of creating Christian 
fellowship".210 so he regards the decisive purpose of the 
ecclesiastical transformations demanded by our age as the liquidation of 
the fatal inheritance from Constantine, and the replacing of the 
people's church of Constantine by the pre-Constantine church of those 
making confession. If the church again is a community of those who 
confess Christ, personal correspondence, despoiled by objectivism, is 
again restored. The meaning of the church as living in fellowship, 
confessing the Lord, can again become distinct.
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In Brunner's view, the church has not responded to the complexity 
of modern culture and civilization. It has failed because it has not 
attempted to explain what it means to be a Christian in the face of 
these new conditions. For him, it is not enough to merely manifest that 
the Christian believe in Jesus Christ as their only saviour, although 
that is essential, but to bring their daily lives under the control of 
Christ. For these frequent retreats and spiritual sharing and fellowship 
are the best means. Moreover, Christian believers must work out their 
lives in their families and professions in the context of the larger 
social problems of the t i m e . 212 so Brunner feels that it is impossible 
for a theologian to do his work well without having participated 
intensively in the life of those who are to be the final consumers of 
his theology, that is, Christian community, or even the communities of 
people who are distant from Christianity.213 Perhaps he has seen more 
clearly than other theologians what the significance for theology is of 
the various attempts of the church to understand the place of the 
temptations and decisions of men in their everyday life.
So this theological position links Brunner with his church 
activism. This activism is particularly important to us in the fact 
that he has consistently exhibited a lively and responsible concern 
about the practical problems of our day that the church faces. For him, 
church-in-action is precisely that church which goes into all the social 
political, scientific, and cultural situations of the modern world, 
which goes wherever man is concerned, where his responsibility is 
awakened or is being silenced, where humanity is being protested, where 
attempts are being made to bring about a better human existence. For it 
is in all these places, in the structure of modern society where modern 
man is concerned with man in the best sense of the word, that God
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somehow has already spoken to man before we appear as the proclaimers of 
the gospel. In this respect, if a theology remains in splendid
isolation, not concerning itself with its possible points of contacts
with the conditions of this world, then it can become itself one of the 
great dangers of the church. Thus, in the process of wrestling with the 
many problems of the church Brunner is convinced that the main 
difficulties lie within the church itself and not outside of it and then 
longs for the much-vaunted rediscovering of the church.
(a) The search for the renewal of the church. In the early 1930s 
Emil Brunner actively participated in the Oxford group movement. What he 
was interested in it was that the movement showed to him a hopeful sign 
of the renewal of the church today which fails to satisfy the hunger and 
thirst of people for the gospel.214 For ^  seemed to be one of the 
functions of the church. For it aims at being obedient to the
missionary command of the Lord of the church - "Go and make disciples of
all the nations, teaching them to observe whatsoever I have commanded 
you" (Matthew 28:19-20). So the church of Christ exists if and only if 
His command is carried out - whether it be done in the form of a 
'church' or of a 'm o v e m e n t '.215 At missionary stage, the 'beginning' 
church like a 'pioneer' has a character of 'movement' whereas the 
'stable' church arises. necessarily as a result of the development and 
consolidation of the already founded community of Christ; and this 
historical character of the church shows to us the 'double rhythm', that 
is to say, expanding missionary work with the mobile adaption to new 
situations and the solid institution with the steadfast tradition and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . 6 This missionary church resembles the Oxford group 
movement that marks a return to the oldest form of Christian mission. 
The New Testament shows to us, in Brunner's view, a community active in
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missionary and pastoral work and the growth of the community comes not 
only through the apostles' witness but also through the spontaneous 
activity of the individual Christians. So every Christian in the 
community is a disciple (with some reserve to the specially founded 
office of the apostles) and a missionary.217
In this regard, the Oxford group movement indicates, according to
Brunner, a new significance of the renewal of the institutional church
that fails to face the demand of the man of today.218 must be
admitted that the occasion for this new mobilisation of the world of
laymen was given by a particular staggering conviction, namely the fact
that the church today has only the slightest grasp on the world through
its officially ordained preachers. The greater part of mankind today,
and especially among the younger generation, is no longer in contact
with the preaching of the Word on Sunday by men ordained to the pastoral
office. So the church has the duty to search and try if there are other
ways to bring the gospel to those who no longer find their way within
the walls of the church. And Brunner puts it as follows:
For the missionary command does not run "Invite everyone to 
your Sunday services by the ringing of Church bells", but 
"Go forth into all the world and preach the Gospel to every 
creature". The true shepherd of whom Ezekiel speaks does 
not wait until the sheep find their way back to him, but he 
goes after them into every chasm and byway. We preachers of 
the Church have no right to say "If they do not wish to hear 
our sermon on Sunday morning, that is their affair, we have 
done all that was possible". For it is nowhere written that 
this type of proclamation of the Gospel, which has become 
traditional, is the normal or the only warranted one, when 
it is a matter of experience that the majority of men no 
longer seek for i t . 9
Then one may raise a question of how the church today can carry on 
its task properly. It is only possible if the church today for Brunner 
must first of all become that the church in which the Word of God
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becomes understandable and powerful among men who know responsibility 
for the spread of the gospel. For this task the new theological
consideration (die theologische Neubesinnung) about the Word of God in 
the Bible and about the nature and mission of the church is indeed one 
of the primary presupposition of the renewal of the church because 
without it there is no renewal of the church.220 However, it is also 
true, according to Brunner, that the new theological consideration alone 
cannot produce the renewal of the church. For it is quite clear that at 
the beginning of the church, teaching (or doctrine) and life (Lehre und 
Leben), and sermon and ecclesiastical practice (Predigt und kirchliche 
Praxis) were actually correlated. For instance, in the New Testament 
the doctrinal teaching and the practical instruction are inseparably
woven into each other as well as preaching and ministership, sacrament 
and life of community. So the church in the New Testament cannot be 
properly understood without the togetherness of knowing and doing.221 
In this regard, the renewal of the church can be necessarily considered
with the missionary task of the church, that is to say, to discover the
right point of contact.
Accordingly, the Oxford group movement indicates for Brunner, the 
church of Jesus Christ in the New Testament that has both the character 
of a 'church' and that of a 'movement'. Like a group movement it is, so 
he claims, "in the intensity of its fellowship in its spiritual life, in 
the activity of all the members of the fellowship in worship, in its
pastoral and missionary work, in the spontaneity and freedom of the rule
of the Spirit, in the emphasis laid upon spiritual growth and the
proving of faith by acts of love, in the dynamic of its expansion in the
world and its penetration of the individual l i f e " . 222 ^  ^he same time
like the 'church' it lies in its order, its offices and sacraments, its
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traditions, and the watch kept over doctrine.
However, the Oxford group movement itself cannot be, in this
respect, identified with either the 'church1 or the 'religious society'
(or sect), but it is a kind of group activity throughout all the
churches and the religious societies in building up the true church of
Jesus Christ by proclaiming the message of Jesus Christ and by obeying
Christ's command; so it has worked for the strengthening of the church
and has remained as a movement in which the early Christian enthusiasm
has again come to life. Brunner puts it as follows:
In the Group Movement, there has been set before our eyes 
once again the primitive Christian experience, that the 
Christians can be actually a salt of the earth and a light 
of the world, when they take their Christianity seriously. 
Renewal of the bond of marriage, renewal of family 
relations, of the relation of master and servant, even a
renewal of whole communities, has been set before our eyes
as an accomplished f a c t . 223
Here the Oxford group movement for Brunner is important in the fact 
that it reminds us of these criteria of the true Christian life, exactly 
as the New Testament constantly reminds us of them. The New Testament 
teaches that the Christian does not only believe that he is renewed in
Jesus Christ but also experiences this renewal and purification as a
progressive reality in such a way that others can bear witness to this 
new life as a recognisable fact. For it is true that whosoever is in 
Christ is a new creature, and must prove himself to be such by his 
fruits, the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is for Brunner the 
deepest message of the Group movement once again to impress this truth 
upon the Christian community in the full joy and the full seriousness 
with which the New Testament says it.224 jn this regard, the Oxford 
group movement indicates the necessity of renewal of the 'institutional 
church' that fails to face the missionary situation. For this reason the
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church for Brunner is a 'reforming embodiment', that is, being 
responsible for the missionary command of Christ, the Lord of the 
church. However, when the movement changed into Moral Re-Armament and 
actually lost its distinctly Christian character and origin, Brunner was 
so deeply disappointed that he left the movement.^25
(b) The search for dialogue among churches. The ecumencial 
movement^Cj has been implicit in the community of Christians that 
included both Jews and Gentiles at its beginning and in the community of 
which members professed to be one people. For they experienced the 
inner unity by a fellowship of love, a fellowship of faith, and a 
worship in their Lord of Jesus Christ. The community began, at the same 
time, to think and speak of itself as the 'ecclesia' that the name came 
to be adopted by the process - its relation to earlier Greek usage, to 
Aramaic equivalents, to Hebrew words and the rendering of them in the 
Septuagint. And with the term 'ecclesia' there is a large element of 
theological thought and interpretation about the community of 
Christians.^27
In the New Testament the term 'ecclesia' is, however, evident in a 
twofold use, that is, the term is used in the singular to indicate the 
whole fellowship of Christ's people in all its scattered parts, and at 
the same time a Christian group in one local area and correspondingly it 
is also used in the plural to indicate a number of Christian groups 
considered each in its separate existence . (But the sequence in usage 
of the terms, i.e. which came first, the whole or the part, is difficult 
for our judgment. For it is typical of the paradox of the life of the 
church in its double character as the divinely constituted 'body of 
Christ', and at the same time a human assemblage of very imperfect men
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and women.)22® So, the term 'ecclesia' is set by a double meaning that 
contains both unity and division, and in consequence there is a tension 
between them.
During the centuries of its existence, the Christian church has 
never been quite free from the peril that like persecution of Christians 
by pagans, the inner conflicts among Christians themselves varied 
greatly in intensity and severity. But the church has survived and 
grown and it has developed certain principles and methods by which its 
own inner unity might be maintained although its diversity has been 
recognised.^29 the history-making age of Reformation the unity of
the Christian church kept all the Reformers proclaiming their desire 
only for a sincere and thoroughgoing renewal (or inward reformation) of 
the church but the 'hierarchic-clerical' church of Roman Catholic 
responded to this new movement of Reformers by its outward unity and the 
combined weight of church and state. Then the crush between them was 
destructive of the unity of the Christian church. But the movement of 
the unity in the ecclesia that names the 'ecumenical movement' was never 
entirely lost even though the separation of the Church became deepened
and the outer situation of the church was changed.
But between two world wars the ecumencial movement took a different 
stage of development in its history when it brought about the ecumenical 
organization that is the World Council of C h u r c h e s . ^ 3 0  It aimed to 
fulfil and serve certain basic Christian n e e d s * . 2 3 1  ( 1) it demonstrates 
that the gospel in the name of which world wide mission was and is being
undertaken is one, even in a divided Christianity; (2) it seeks to bring
about a fellowship of the churches through mutual recognition and to 
cause them to break their tendency of the exclusivistic isolationism and
248
of the denominational particularism in the unity of the Christian 
church; (3) it lets Christians themselves everywhere act as agents of 
reconciliation in a divided world and give evidence of repentance for 
the fact that the churches had proved themselves unable to prevent two 
world wars on the soil of so-called Christian civilization; and (4) it 
organizes worldwide services of mutual assistance, interchurch aid and 
relief of suffering.
Accordingly, the ecumenical enterprise that is both the ecumenical
movement and its organization, the World Council of Churches,
represents the most important event in the history of Christianity since
the beginning of this century and it is captured in the work of leading
Christian men and theologians.232 Hence the work of Emil Brunner, fully
reflects this important event. So he has given his theological work a
character and form appropriate to the spirit of ecumencity just as he
himself has been active in the different phases of the ecumenical
movement.233 ^nd Brunner puts it as follows:
Owing to my long co-operation with the Ecumenical Movement,
I am fully aware both of the needs and the hopes of the 
World Church. Hence I have been very careful to keep as 
closely as possible to the external form of dogmatics - to 
the theological tradition common to the Church as a whole.
In the main, therefore, I have tried to follow the order of 
the Loci theologici which, from the days of Peter Lombard 
onwards, has formed the framework of Christian Dogmatics, 
and was also in all essentials adopted by that master of 
Reformed theology, Calvin. Over and over again I have 
proved that this procedure is fundamentally sound.234
Thus what mainly concerned Brunner with the ecumencial movement and 
its organization, the World Council of Churches, was to maintain the 
opportunity for an exchange of ideas and sharing of experiences in the 
ecumencial movement rather than an interest in the organizational unity 
of the m o v e m e n t . 235 r ^ g  reason for this is that the ecumenical movement
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as a movement of the unity of the church cannot be identified with the 
structural (or institutional) unity of the church, nor with the 
uniformity of service and sacrament order.236 In this regard, Brunner 
had some doubts about the organizational structure of the World Council 
of Churches. Rather, there would be, in his view, the true ecumenism, 
"where Catholics and Protestants were ready to confess that not the 
sacramental institution of the priestly church and not the theological 
preaching of Protestantism, but Jesus Christ alone and His Ekklesia, the 
fellowship of the children of God destined for the freedom of faith and 
love, is the truth that is identical with grace".237
Thus the ecumenical movement is not the unity of the church in a 
'natural' dimension, that is, an external manifestation of unity such as 
church language, canon law, administration, etc. but it is primarily, as 
Hans Kiing points out, the unity of the church in a 'spiritual' dimension 
or a true inner unity of faith and charity, namely a unity in a unifying 
Holy Spirit at work in the unanimity of the free decision of a l l . 23® g o  
if the ecumenical movement of the divided Christian churches and 
confessions seeks the visible unity of the church of Christ then it can 
be understood as the 'ecumenical' church which maintains dialogue among 
churches in order to be obedient to the missionary command of the Lord 
of the church. In fact the organization of the ecumenical movement, 
namely the World Council of Churches has contained the confluence of 
three historical streams: (1) the 'Missionary movement' of which aim has 
been made for the church to be a worldwide community; (2) the 'Life and 
Work movement' which has brought the churches together in their attempts 
to make Christianity more effective in its relation to society; and (3) 
the 'Faith and Order movement' which has explored the differences in 
basic Christian conviction that must be reconciled if the unity of the
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church as one visible body of Christ is to be attained.^39 As paui 
Hessert points out, this historical fact shows to us that the modern 
ecumenical movement began with attempts to co-ordinate missionary 
activities and student work. The concern for mission in the broad sense 
of the word has brought churches together, and communications among them 
have made it both possible and necessary fpr people of different 
traditions to function together.24®
So the ecumenical church is the spiritual unity of the church for 
its mission in one Lord, Christ.24 ^ And yet it indicates the existence 
of different church bodies and correspondingly Christian diversity.242 
In this regard, the ecumenical church seeks necessarily dialogue among 
churches to get its unity and it has, according to Brunner, 'roots of 
awordly and pragmatic kind'242, in other words, the ecumenical movement 
and in consequence the World Council of Churches as its organization 
essentially belongs to the function of the church. Accordingly, the 
ecumenical church for Brunner is possible if it is under the 
presupposition that the ecclesia must be understood as a spiritual 
brotherhood, not an institution. "If theological reflection and, above 
all, renewed serious study of the New Testament witness to Christ have 
once made this clear, then the way is open to a common understanding of 
our unity-namely our unity in Christ, without our having recourse to the 
concept of the ecclesia invisibilis (the invisible church) and then it 
can work properly with ecumenical conversations and even for ecumenical 
co-operation among churches to "have preserved for men through two 
thousand years of history the apostolic message of salvation in Jesus 
Christ."244
In this regard, the ecumenical church must share the subject of
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conversation and communal thinking - a thinking that includes both a 
sharing and a readiness to bestow and to accept criticism and therefore 
leads to rethinking with Christians everywhere and with all sorts and 
conditions of men. For this reason Emil Brunner stood continuously on 
battle against rationalism, idealism, and mysticism because of his 
assertion that all such is a monologue, namely man talking to 
himself.245 Thus he warned against 'imperialism1 even within the 
ecumenical movement since it attempted institutional centralization of 
the World Council of Churches.
(c) The search for the missionary church. In the last stage of 
his life as a theologian Emil Brunner participated actively in 
missionary affairs. He also attempted to realize his missionary concern 
that had always been central in his theology. Since his missionary 
concern had already developed during his controversy over the 'point of 
contact' with Karl Barth in his early days (see II. 1.2), Brunner's 
later missionary concern and work found its most concrete expression and 
took place in three stages:246 firstly, he developed a theoretical 
missionary problem that is to apply some of the basic Christian 
teachings to some of the problems of civilization and culture when he 
was invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures in Scotland for 1947 and 
1 9 4 8 ;247 secondly, he opened the training centre of laymen, the 
Reformierte Heimstatte, to provide an opportunity to find new ways of 
confronting the world with the gospel; and finally, he accepted an 
invitation to participate in the worldwide work of the YMCA as a 
theological adviser and worked as a missionary in Japan.
In his Gifford Lectures Brunner sought to formulate a preparatory 
exposition of the missionary theology^® that present a panoramic view
252
of the relation of Christianity to civilisation, for it is an urgent
problem not only to everyday Christian life but also to a Christian
missionary to apply some basic Christian doctrines to some problems of
civilization and he puts it as follows:
While it is necessary that Christian men and women
particularly competent in one of these fields should speak 
and write about the relation of the Christian faith to that 
particular matter, it seems to me legitimate, and even 
necessary, that alongside these monographs of specialists 
someone should at least try to give a synoptic view of the
whole (even if he has no expert knowledge of a majority of
these subjects), provided that he has given to all of them 
prolonged thought as a Christian.^49
Here Brunner directed his attention not only to the problems of the
relation between Christianity and civilization (thus his dealing with
some basic principles which underline all civilization and the more
concrete problems of the different areas of civilized life) but also to
the question of the proper understanding of the church in order to show
how a true Christian life and a true Christian church must and can be
realized.
However, he has also raised a warning against the threat of
totalitarianism of any form, especially Russian communism that hangs 
over Western civilization because it is, for him, essentially an anti­
religion without God.250 in this respect he rejects any identification 
of culture with Christian faith. So he claims that any form of
civilization or culture and the eternal kingdom of God can not be 
identified:
The Christian, then, and the fellowship of the Christians, 
are ultimately independent of all the changes - for good or 
evil - within the sphere of civilization. They stand on a 
rock which no historical changes can move. ...The Chrisitian 
church knows that no progress in the sphere of civilization 
and culture can reach that goal of history beyond history,
and that no setbacks, not even the complete destruction of
civilized life, can deflect history from that ultimate goal 
which is beyond itself. In this sense then the Christian 
faith is indeed "other-worldly" and the Church should not be
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ashamed of saying so.251
In his second stage of missionary work Emil Brunner participated 
intensively in development of the Reformierte Heimstatte in Boldern.252 
He attempted to provide a forum for a conversation between the church 
and the world, which is one of the most important prerequisites for the 
mission of the church in a secular world. This missionary work for 
Brunner provided to the church an opportunity to find new ways of 
confronting the world with the Christian message. In fact it is the 
'place of encounter' that various kind of participants meet each other 
and have a chance to speak relevantly to the thinking and feeling of 
modern man, the experiment in the field of human relations with people 
from intellectual and social groups, and to replace the monologue 
performance of lecturing theologian with the teamwork of theologians and 
laymen: "in such a way it is possible to overcome the usual monologue 
typical of our continental churches by conversation which is more 
appropriate to the essential nature of the Gospel as encounter. Boldern 
is one of the enduring fruits of my theological efforts and is 
especially close to my heart."253
Finally, Emil Brunner accepted an invitation to participate in the 
worldwide Work of the YMCA from John M o t t . 254 Since he was appointed as 
theological adviser of the YMCA in 1946, he regularly contributed 
letters in World Communique on religious questions of concern to youth 
and he provided a constant source of inspiration to them.255 Brunner 
also journeys to many Asian countries. He captivated youth, as Tracy 
Strong points out, by his honest facing of difficulties, his 
intellectual integrity, his simple but profound interpretation of the 
Christian faith, and the evidences in his own person of the fruits of
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the Spirit.25^
When he returned from his journey, Emil Brunner met with the 
Plenary at Nyborg Strand in 1950; and he emphasized to them that "we are 
now living in the age of the lay Christian, of those who preach the 
Gospel, not because they are appointed to do it, but because they feel 
an inner urge to share the best they have and they know with those who 
do not yet know or have it", and he continues to say that "the word of 
the laymen, who is not distinguished and marked off as an official 
representative of religion, carried much more weight than that of the 
professional theologian and clergymen". Furthermore, he especially
mentioned to them the necessity of having a Christian nucleus in every 
Association. In this regard, his statement made a lasting impression on 
those who heard it; and it has been frequently reproduced and quoted in 
the YMCA publications.2^
Brunner also took a missionary work to help in building up the new 
International Christian University in Tokyo, which had been founded 
after the War and also to assist in the Christian training of young 
Japanese laymen in various fields. In these latter years not only he 
experienced an important challenge to his missionary work itself, but he 
enjoyed his career as a missionary theologian and churchman because in 
this strictly missionary situation where he had to teach students who 
had no knowledge of Christian faith, it became, for Brunner, of primary
importance to find 'the point of contact' that proved to be that thing
which decided success or failure of Christian teaching.2^^ Through this 
missionary field work Emil Brunner recognized that the presentation of 
the impact which Christianity had made upon the basic problems of life
and civilization proved to be a good approach to the gospel as far as
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teaching was concerned with witness to Christ. Thus he came to realize 
the importance of the term ’the point of contact' in facing the 
missionary situation of the church.
When he acquainted with the civilization of the East and 
encountered with various kinds of people who pever met the Christian 
message, Brunner recognized that there is a new different missionary 
problems. Hence he claimed that we have to develop a new type of 
approach to the gospel for those who are not in contact with the 
Christian message under the different political and cultural conditions. 
Furthermore, he was convinced that even for European Christians it is 
needed to recognize the missionary situation that is both the widespread 
decrease of participation in Christian life - especially, during the 
last two decades in many ’Christian' countries the functions of the 
church have been either destroyed or greatly compromised through socio­
political revolution; and the decline of the active membership of the 
church that is the 'Sunday church attendance' has only barely maintained 
itself, for instance in both urban and rural community the number of 
people attending church is, according to Brunner, often only small 
percentage of the population.25^
In regard to the church in Europe Brunner claims that the church 
today has never been promised that, wherever it had opportunity to 
exercise its influence over a long period of time, it would generally 
embrace the entire people; but the statechurch membership has been
already falling off in the vital life of the church; and he claims as
follows:
The Constantinian - Theodosian identification of State 
Church and Church people which dominated the entire Middle 
Ages, the Reformation and post - Reformation period and
which began to totter only after the Enlightenment and the
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French Revolution, was possible only as a result of a 
terrific secularization of the Church, a lowering of demands 
upon the individual to certain external forms compatible 
with what could be accomplished through State c o m p u l s i o n .
Therefore, in the process of wrestling with the many problems of the
church side by side with Asian, American, and European Christians under
completely different conditions, Brunner gains a considerably clear view
of the obstacles standing in the way of the missionary church.
In Brunner's opinion the church has some reasons to make its 
decline as follows: (1) In recent centuries the church has lost
increasingly the consciousness of what the church is and what the church 
is for, and in consequence the gospel is either presented, in a lifeless 
manner that bore no witness, or handed forth as the wisdom of men, 
idealism, moralism etc. instead of the Word of God; (2) the Church has 
not become aware of the change in its situation and task because of its 
stable organization; and (3) the church has digested no better the 
tremendous social change by technical commercial revolution and complex 
modern civilization and consequently the life of the people who
constantly confront new situations and new problems; and the church has 
taken small notice of the increase and change in population and thereby 
sermon, pastorship and leadership of minister are so complicated that 
they are not enough to cover the community.2^  Therefore, the church 
today must be renewed as 'the missionary church' to maintain its 
missionary task in the face of the missionary situation.
Since Emil Brunner is convinced that the word 'Christ' is really 
effective and credible when it is accompanied by the witness of the 
church through its life, the existence of the church is the
presupposition of faith (see V.1.1). Thus the church should seek to 
create true community, a living fellowship of persons. In such a
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fellowship, everyone should feel he is valued as a person and there is 
true meeting between persons.^62 jn j^g own experience Brunner has 
found the true character of the church or the ecclesia in his own term 
more often in voluntary associations of Christians than in the 
institutional churches as such. Thus he gave much attention to the 
Group movement as well as the movement for laymen’s institutes. 
Significantly when he reached Japan he found an indigenous expression of 
Christianity, the Mukyokai, or Non-Church Movement, which embodied his 
own theories about the New Testament ecclesia.^63
Perhaps during his stay in Japan Brunner was aware of the existence
of the Mukyokai Groups. Even though the members of the Group did not
take any kind of institutional organization in terms of the Church, they
gathered to study the Bible and believed in Jesus Christ as their
Saviour. They have an important role in the spreading of the Gospel in
a particular Japanese religious and social situation. For this reason
Brunner might be able to claim that we must be open for the possibility
that Christ uses many means, outside the churches, for His purpose. In
this regard, he attempts to define the term 'ecclesia' with reference to
evangelism as follows:
Where real evangelism is being done - whether by the church 
or by Mukyokai evangelist or in whatever way - there is 
Ecclesia. And where real Ecclesia is, there is evangelism.
This is one, even the main, criterion to judge whether a 
church or any other group is Ecclesia. Why is evangelism 
this criterion? Because of the fundamental importance of 
sharing. God Himself has shared His own life with us in the 
Cross of Jesus Christ. Sharing is the very centre of the 
Gospel, the essence of Christianity. If we are in the Body 
of Christ, we also in our part, must share our life with our 
fellow men. Whether the Church is going out into the world 
sharing with those outside what it has inside - this is the 
criterion of the live church, the Ecclesia. No sharing - no 
membership in the Body of Christ.^64
One of his reasons for criticizing the institutional churches is
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their lack of missionary zeal. Brunner is convinced that the mission of 
the gospel would be better served if the true ecclesia were more 
evident: 11 it is this real spiritual fellowship which is, in itself, 
evangelistic or missionary. It is the lack of it that makes our 
evangelistic campaigns and preaching ineffective to a large degree. The 
early Church was spread in the world so quickly probably more by the 
contagion of this fellowship-life than by missionary preaching. At 
least this is what struck the pagan outsiders. 'Look how they love each 
other1 is the word of a pagan author who was otherwise known as a cynic. 
It is by real fellowship that outsiders are attracted to the Church, 
even though not yet understanding Christ, the source of this 
fellowship".265 Moreover, the most important way that a person in the 
church can lead another person to Christ is, according to Brunner, 'the 
transparency of Christ’s spirit in the character, in the life, and in 
the face of the one who presents the Christian doctrine'.266
Hence Christian theology is a product of constant and faithful 
encounter with a reality which must be apprehended anew in every age. 
God himself does not change, nor does the content of the gospel, but the 
situation in which man has his existence does change: "The Gospel of
Jesus Christ is the same in all ages. But the task of the Church, given 
by His Gospel and constituted by it, is not the same but different in 
every epoch. Every age had to rediscover Christ anew - no Christ dogma 
can give what this discovery is intended to give. The Christ dogma is 
mere intellectual substitute for the continuity of the living Church 
through the living Lord".267 The theologian, therefore, must be in 
living touch with both the changing • and the unchanging and equally 
discerning of both. Brunner regards dogmatics as something which takes 
place primarily in and for the believing community. And yet he is
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convinced that there is eristics that is concerned with the evangelical 
and missionary character of the faith. This means that theology must 
play a servant role in the church and in the world. Moreover, it means 
for Brunner that a viable theology must be in living relation to all 
that God is doing in the world. For him, the missionary task of the 
church is not an after-thought or a peripheral interest for the 
theologian but a primary responsibility: "Mission work does not arise
from any arrogance in the Christian Church; mission is its cause and its
life. The church exists by mission, just as a fire exists by burning. 
Where there is no mission, there is no Church; and where there is 
neither Church nor mission, there is no faith".268
In this regard, Emil Brunner essentially sees that theology is not
just a discussion within the church but also a declaration to the world 
of its need of salvation and a setting forth of the way in the common 
language of mankind. In his opinion, missionary theology takes the form 
of a conversation between a Christian believer and an unbeliever. The 
Christian believer enters into the questions raised by the unbeliever 
and he gives full weight to all the truth and insight the unbeliever 
already possesses. But he shows also how his knowledge, and therefore 
also his questions, ignore the very thing which brings light and true 
knowledge. The task of missionary theology may be then described as the 
fact that it removes the hindrances which lie between the gospel and the 
hearer, that is, those hindrances which are accessible to intellectual 
reflection. The gospel must be preached, and yet no calculation should 
or can properly be made as to its 'success1. That all lies in the 
wisdom and power of God. Accordingly, eristic theology for Brunner has 
no intention of making the work of the Holy Spirit superfluous. There 
is no human art that can create faith; that can be done by the Holy
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Spirit alone. But the Holy Spirit works, Brunner claims, not by some 
mystic power but by speaking. Faith arises only when one is convicted 
of the truth of the W o r d . 269 Missionary theology cannot produce faith, 
but it can and must produce the conditions which are needed for faith. 
Hence this still leaves open the question of communication which may be 
simply stated thus: Is it possible and how is it possible to
communicate the gospel to men generally? Or how can the Word of God be 
spoken to and heard by the natural man? Finally, this sort of question 
with which Brunner is mainly concerned in the term 'missionary theology1 
will be critically discussed in the next chapter.
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VI MISSIONARY THEOLOGY AND LANGUAGE
1. Communicating the Christian Message
1.1 The man of the Zeitgeist
In the foregoing chapters we undertook an analysis of various aspects of 
the term ‘missionary theology' based on the writings of Emil Brunner. 
Since he is convinced that first among new understandings in his 
thinking is that of the missionary situation of the church, it is of 
importance to note that he attempts to present the Christian Gospel 
vigorously to enable a real encounter between the church and modern man: 
"More and more I come to the view that the church nowadays speaks not 
chiefly to Christians, as it did in the Middle Ages and at the time of 
the Reformation and even a hundred years ago; it must speak primarily 
to 'heathen'. Therefore, in combating the secularism which this 20th 
century takes for granted, it must start out theologically from the 
Christian understanding of the nature of man".^
So Brunner claims that theology may not ignore anthropology, for 
inasmuch as the former would assist the preaching of the Gospel in 
effecting encounter with the sinner, it must maintain its missionary 
character. Unless the church comes with a living message which will 
confront man directly in his situation, it will actually pass by living 
man himself. A theology that does not share this existential interest 
is not worthy of our attention. For the Gospel must 'strike' man where 
he is, and then man must be persuaded of his need for the Gospel. The 
fact is that man's true need cannot be recognised until it has been 
fulfilled through the Gospel. Thus, there is for Brunner 'another task 
of theology' which is not really another task at all. He puts it as
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follows:
We are not trying to save man's "face" or his honor; here 
our concern is with the question of the preaching of the 
Gospel, religious instruction and the "cure of soul". For 
the preacher - and for the Church as a whole - to have a 
deep concern for the person to whom the preaching of the 
Church is addressed is certainly not a "secondary" matter; 
it is not a "merely educational affair", and therefore "non- 
theological", and thus a merely subordinate question, or 
even, possibly, of no interest at all. On the contrary, 
this concern for man is an integral part of the message 
itself. For the whole revelation is God's concern for man. 
For m a n ’s sake God became man; out of pity for His lost 
creature God stooped to the level of man.2
Accordingly, Brunner argues that a missionary theology is then the 
struggle of Christian faith with the Zeitgeist. 3 It must not, from the 
very beginning, put the opponent to the wall so that he cannot but be 
defeated. It must not try to improve its chances of gaining a tactical 
success by merely pretending to deal with the objections of the 
different ideological point of view. Rather, it has to affect the 
listener, to appeal to him in his very abode, and to take him seriously. 
It has to start from the spiritual situation of the opponent and to 
attack that situation at the same time. It must start from the distress 
and the danger of modern man, and show him at the same time that the 
gospel gives the rescuing answer to this question. So, although it 
needs severe dogmatics and exegesis, what really matters is the living 
and renewed understanding of the Word of God. Hence in this missionary 
theology there will be a genuinely polemical vein of discussion. As men 
of today we can only apprehend, according to Brunner, the divine Word 
through conflict with the thought of our time. We can only sustain the 
conflict if we understand the Word of God in its proper content. So 
Brunner claims that we need this missionary theology in order that the 
Word of God may be proclaimed a new messageA
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Since Brunner is convinced that missionary theology is the struggle 
of faith with the Zeitgeist, his notion of missionary theology precisely 
comes about as the following point. The conflict between faith and 
scientific criticism, or between theology and the rest of the faculties 
proves to be a pretext which has been brought about either by the 
unjustified dogmatising of traditional opinions on the part of the 
church or by sceptical distortions of the critical sciences. But real 
faith and real scientific thinking, in Brunner's view, cannot come into 
conflict. It is, therefore, the task of missionary theology to show by 
critical investigation of scientific statements what is genuine science 
in it, and what may be a hidden dogmatic presupposition which such 
science employs and by which its statements are dimmed, and so turned 
around until they become an obstacle to faith.^ In this regard, Brunner 
uses the term 'missionary theology' to refer to a defence against the 
attacks on the biblical truth of revelation or against the attacks that 
originate from the sinful 1 self-misunderstanding of reason'. The 
defence takes place dialetically in such a way that it shakes this self- 
understanding of 'autonomous' reason and at the same time claims man's 
reason. So missionary theology proves that those objections do not 
originate at all from reason itself but from a reason which is formed by 
a particular Zeitgeist, from an understanding of life and of oneself in 
rivalry with the gospel.
Thus, what Brunner claims is that missionary theology uses reason 
by examining critically the fact that this contradiction of reason does 
not concern faith at all but rather a misunderstanding of faith. It 
shows, then, that the true intentions of a critically purified reason 
have to end in faith. Therefore, it is necessary to show what is true 
and what is false in human self-understanding. It is the aim of
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missionary theology to complete this separation and to explain the true 
meaning of the Christian message by completing it.® Since his criticism 
against liberal theology that conforms to the Zeitgeist produced in the 
last century by rationalism and German idealism, Brunner regards the 
wider orientation of philosophical perspective as a progressive 
emancipation of man from all external limitation and authority. For 
him, this is an uncritical assumption of modern thought, in other words, 
man is totally independent and complete in himself by virtue of his 
powers of reason. Such is Brunner's conviction about the general 
predicament of modern man. The source of this predicament is the pride 
of reason which will not be humbled by admitting the existence of any 
authority above itself. Reason claims for itself unbridled autonomy. 
And this autonomy is equivalent to sin.”7
In short, modern philosophy's uncritical confidence in reason is 
but a variation of the fundamental and original sin of man, his 
usurpation of divine authority, or his confusion of himself with his 
Creator. Hence Brunner requires a subordination of reason because 
reason as the power of ideation spells autonomy for man. Such autonomy 
is not wrong in itself, but becomes sin only when it oversteps its 
bounds. By his reason man is to master the world in response to his 
Creator's command. Reason is, then, the means of mastery whereas faith 
is the act of submission. By ascribing the primacy to faith instead of 
to reason, Brunner subordinates the mastery to the act of submission; 
as a result, he claims that reason as the power of ideation cannot be a 
legitimate mastering of the world unless it is seen in its ethical- 
religious significance. Man must master the world in obedience to God.®
It is true that the term 'humanum' indicates for Brunner a relation
274
to God, a relation that is established by the address to God to each man 
(see II.I.2). So, whatever man's organic origins may be, the emergence 
of the human person is his individual response to God. The general 
response of men, however, is one of self-assertion, and of denial and
disobedience toward God, despite the fact that the nature of His address
is love. This means that the nature of man is that of a sinner, a 
person whose actual existence is autonomic opposition to his Creator. It 
also means that while actual relation of man to God is that of 
'contradiction1, it is still his nature to be related to God; this is
his imago dei. There is no such thing as a man apart from God, and
without some form of consciousness of God. Therefore, Brunner claims 
that all men have a knowledge of God even though it be a consciousness 
of judgement of wrath, and of separation.
The sin of man is really a personal alienation from and enmity 
against God. The attainment of spiritual enlightenment or of moral 
perfection or of inner peace cannot effect salvation because these ends 
are subjective states of the individual, whereas man's real problem is 
his relation to God. Salvation is found in reconciliation. But man 
cannot reconcile himself with God against whom he has rebelled. So God 
himself must act both to make man aware of his true conditions and to 
deliver him from the perversion of his nature and the futility of his 
efforts toward self-salvation. God acts to this end in Christ who is 
the Mediator, 'the Word made flesh'. The possibility of salvation lies 
in the fact that man can, through hearing the gospel, recognise and 
receive this Word as the real Word by which God originally addressed the 
creature and called him into existence as man, a human person. Here the 
two parties involved in the act of redemption are both fully involved in 
their proper and characteristic roles, that is, God the party of the
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first acts in grace and forgiveness, and man the party of the second 
part acts in faith and obedience. Thus, the necessity of the Mediator, 
the historical and personal appearance of Jesus Christ, and the witness 
to this saving act of God by those who have been reconciled must be 
claimed.
This claim lead us to the fundamental predicament from which man 
needs to be saved. At the same time it must contain the Christian 
missionary activity to awaken men to their sin and the realisation of 
their personal alienation from God. Strangely enough, almost the last 
thing that man can know is himself, and particularly his relation of 
personal responsibility to God. Men are always aware of their 
ignorance, their weaknesses, and their moral defects; so in religion 
they seek help from their gods to overcome these evils. However, 
according to Brunner, the basic personal relationship, in which 
responsibility to the holy and loving God constitutes the very nature of 
man's existence, comes to light only in the self-revelation of God 
through the prophets and His incarnation in Christ. The first knowledge 
of this relationship came through the law but the first effect of the 
law was to produce a consciousness of sin. The law made men aware of 
their responsibility to God but it also condemned them for their 
disobedience. This in the life of Israel prepared the way for salvation 
in Christ. But no such revelation of the personal relationship appeared 
in any other religious tradition. It is the direct manifestation of God 
in His personal presence and acts in Jesus Christ in whom men are both 
called to repentance and freely forgiven. However, this is not an 
achievement of man but the act of God. He was known as the Son of God 
by faith; this is revelation.^
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Accordingly, the saving knowledge of God which the missionary seeks 
to communicate requires both the Old Testament and the New. The work 
accomplished in Israel through its own history must be patiently done by 
the missionary to prepare the way for a full acceptance of the 
revelation in Christ, a revelation that itself is received by faith as 
indeed it was by the first disciples and by all subsequent believers. 
In Brunner's opinion, faith is the act in which the revelation or self­
communication of God is received and in which this is realised in the 
subject, man. "Faith is therefore first of all an act of knowledge; it 
is the 'light of the knowledge of the glory of God', it is awareness of 
the God who reveals Himself. ... To become aware of the revelation is 
itself revelation, and this awareness is the act of faith."^0
From this perspective of revelation Brunner is convinced that 
reason could be subservient to faith; that is to say, he would define 
place and function of reason from the perspective of faith. So he is
concerned to establish the right of revelation (or faith) and reason. 
To make the two co-equal would involve us in an impossible dualism. To 
exclude reason in the interests of faith would involve us in 
irrationalism. Yet to make faith subject to the dictates of reason 
would involve us rationalism. Therefore, Brunner argues that reason has 
its right as an endowment of the Creator, yet also its limits. The 
truth of revelation is not in opposition to any truth of reason, nor to 
any fact that has been discovered by the use of reason. Genuine truths
of faith are never in conflict with logic or with the sciences; they
conflict only with the rationalistic or positivistic metaphysics. Hence
the protest of 'intellectual honesty', which the autonomous reason 
always makes, is always suspicious. The question is not one of 
'intellectual honesty' at all, but of positivistic arrogance and self-
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will. ^ 1
The only solution Brunner has for this problem is thus a kind of 
balancing feat between the biblical revelation and reason, or ’faith’ 
and 'rational thought’, in which rational discussion goes far beyond the 
affirmations of ’faith’ though it must always be prepared to be held in 
check by these. Underlying these ideas, however, there is always the 
thought that the rather inexact, pictorial conceptions of faith can and 
should be given more adequate expression of t h e o l o g y . F o r  Brunner, to 
study theology scientifically means to place the reason at the service 
of the Word of God; this implies the usefulness of the reason for this 
service. And this at least suggests that there may be a positive 
relation between reason and r e velation.^ In this regard, the 
difference between Christian philosophy and Christian theology is 
therefore not one of principle; rather it is a mutual transition: 
"Every ’systematic theologian’ ... is philosopher and theologian in the 
one person. He is a theologian insofar as he is occupied with the 
problems that are raised directly by the message of the Bible; he is a 
philosopher insofar as he is occupied with the problems that are in the 
background of the Biblical revelation."^
Now, since Emil Brunner is convinced that missionary theology is an 
intellectual presentation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, which starts 
from the spiritual situation of the hearer, and is addressed to it, his 
argument is that missionary theology is, first of all, wholly concerned 
with the man of the Zeitgeist, such as hearer's need, his helplessness, 
his scepticism and his concrete problem. The non-believing hearer or 
the presumptive hearer, is already affected by a definite 'spirit of the 
age’; that is to say, his views of life and its problems, and of his
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own nature, are all coloured by a definite outlook which claims to rival 
the Christian view of life.^ This kind of theology takes the form of a 
conversation between a Christian believer and an unbeliever. Full 
weight must be given to the truth and insights already possessed by the 
unbeliever, but at the same time must show the lack in his knowledge. 
It aims to remove the hindrances which lie between the gospel and the 
hearer - namely, those hindrances which are accessible to intellectual 
reflection.
Thus, as Brunner argues, we need this theology in order that the 
Word of God may be proclaimed anew. It is only at the cost of the most 
intensive theological labour that the Church can again discover the Word 
which alone justifies her existence, the Word which she owes to the 
world, the Word which saves the world. In this regard, there is no 
other task for theology but this, which is now the chief task of the 
Church. But this one task has different aspects, which take on a 
varying importance according to the given historical situation.^ In a 
modern secular world which has virtually lost all knowledge of the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, theology has a different task from 
that incumbent on her in quieter times of assured 'churchliness1 . In 
her theological work the Church must seek for the point where modern man 
can be got at.
In Brunner's opinion, the task must be, therefore, accompanied with 
the fact that the Church owes it to the world to formulate its beliefs 
in a way that will not conflict with scientific knowledge. It should no 
longer mix up its belief in creation out of nothing, in the Fall, in the 
reconciling act of God in Christ, with elements of an antiquated view of 
the world which have reached us from biblical and ecclesiastical
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tradition. The mixing up of the Christian message with obsolete 
metaphysics, cosmology and chronology has long been responsible for 
their loss of trust in the Church, and for bringing them into grave 
conflicts which the Church could and should have spared them. 
Accordingly, the task of remodelling the form of its doctrine and 
preaching for the man of today, whose life frankly is no longer 
sustained by church tradition and practice, shall not be estranged from 
the outset, or revolted because he can make nothing of the old forms of 
language. ^  From the point of view that the gospel remains the same, 
but our understanding of the gospel must ever be won anew, Brunner's 
claim about the importance of missionary theology is a valuable 
suggestion. However, it must be seriously questioned whether Brunner 
can really remodel the communication of the gospel to the man of the 
Zeitgeist. We must turn now to this question and others with some 
critical examinations.
1.2 The act of communication
Since we are interested in Brunner's term 'missionary theology' or 
'eristics', we must consider whether he is effectively able to challenge 
the unbeliever to abandon his anti-Christian position and to accept the 
Christian faith. In approaching this task, Brunner's fundamental thesis
is the following two points:
1 . The biblical understanding of truth cannot be grasped by means of 
the antithesis between the 'objective' and the 'subjective' dominant 
in philosophy, but is rather falsified thereby.
2. To grasp such truth one must rise above the subject-object 
correlation. Thus, as we have seen, Brunner substitutes in its
place the category of truth as encounter (Wahrheit als Begegnung or
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often called Personjbegegnung).
The first of these two points is, however, a mistaken assumption insofar 
as the Zeitgeist is employed in theological discourse, or at least the 
counterpart of missionary theology. Perhaps Brunner *s antiphilosophical 
tendency may be found in the main sources from some philosophical
question of Kant and Kierkegaard. Brunner has generally employed the
critical philosophy of Kant in the sense of the latter's attempt to
avoid the rational speculation of idealism on the one hand and the 
empirical limitation of realism on the other.^ As a result, he 
basically acknowledges Kant's critical method by which the latter seeks 
to incorporate the best of both positions, and thereby check the 
rational by the empirical and the empirical by the rational because
percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percept are 
empty.^0 This method may provide a reliable epistemological basis for 
even a theologian. Kant himself states in the Preface to the second 
Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that he was doing away with 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.^
However, what Brunner objects to is not that Kant employs reason in 
his formulation, but that, in spite of his critical method, he does not 
employ it critically enough. In Brunner's view, Kant maintains a 
procedure up to the point of his reaffirmation of the notion of autonomy 
in the concept of the intelligible self. If moral autonomy is a fact, 
the law is our own law, and therefore our deepest self is at one with 
the law; it is itself the lawgiver, the intelligible self. On the 
other hand, if autonomy is a fact, then where there is want of 
conformity with the law, the responsibility lies in the deepest self, 
the rational self, and it alone. For reason alone is capable of
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responsible action. So in both cases the concept of the intelligible 
self is then the legislator of the good, and becomes a 'God'.^
Therefore such a criticism, so Brunner argues, cannot arrive at the 
truth of revelation. If it is truly critical, it can raise the question 
as to the possibility of some avenue of truth outside the immanental 
possibilities of human reason. Thus, Brunner's rejection of philosophy 
involves a rejection of the possibility of a knowledge of God by means 
of reason.
Of course there can be no reasonable doubt that this Kantian
epistemological dualism is at the bottom of Brunner's approach to the
problem of religious truth.^3 And he puts it as follows:
The objects of religion are at the same time the objects of 
science; faith and knowledge are identical... It was 
precisely this axiom ... which Kant so powerfully shook and 
that in a two-fold way. First, negatively, in that he 
proved the impossibility of a positive metaphysic of the 
understanding; secondly, in a positive way, in that he 
posited the knowledge of the practical reason, knowledge 
which is independent of and superior to theoretical 
knowledge. That is, he cleaves knowledge from faith. In 
method and content their pronouncements differ. Science and 
religion belong to two different spheres of consciousness.^
Since Brunner is convinced that man by reason can not overcome this
epistemological dualism, there is no theoretical, objective solution to
the idealistic-realistic antinomy. It is the merit of philosophical
criticism to show us this, but it cannot overcome antinomy. Reason has,
then, its proper sphere of competence, but as criticism has shown, it
also has its limits. Thus, this critical review of the Kantian
distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason may lead
Brunner to his antiphilosophical tendency.
Furthermore, this tendency is sharpened with Kierkegaard's claim 
that philosophy cannot apprehend the truth of existence. Kierkegaard
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argues that the proper use of the mind in the quest for truth is within 
the bounds of Christian faith. Reason, as it attempts to operate apart 
from the commitment of faith, is doomed to become fantastic and to issue 
in despair. Whereas faith begins with existence and reasons from it, 
reason transforms existence into possibility. In this opinion, the way 
of faith is the way and the only way of truth; the way of knowledge is
the way of possibility. Faith and knowledge, then, move in different
and opposite directions. For him to apprehend truth means to live in 
the truth, to exist in one's thought. But this is possible only through 
the commitment of faith. Therefore, philosophy cannot apprehend the 
truth of the self, of the world, or of God, but can only construct
various possible views of them. In this regard, many of Brunner's
theological concepts resemble Kierkegaardian terms. For instance, his 
Christology attempts to avoid liberal rejection of the real historical 
nature of the incarnation and orthodoxy's identification of the 
historical aspect with the incarnation itself in his use of 
Kierkegaard's concept of indirect communication (see IV.3.3).
However, in spite of his great indebtedness to Kierkegaard, Brunner 
fully appreciates the importance of the function of reason. For him, 
faith not only recognises the function of philosophy, but presupposes 
it. There can be no 'double truth' as a truth of reason and a truth of 
faith, but two spheres of human knowledge and experience. .For dual 
truth amounts to no truth at all.^5 "Revelation and reason possess one 
common element: they both claim truth. The genuine scientist wills, not 
that his opinion should prevail, but that truth should prevail; 
unbelievers have frequently surpassed Christians in their love of truth, 
and in their willingness to sacrifice their own interests to the truth 
they have put many a Christian to shame. But the Christian faith also
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is concerned with truth."26 It is precisely for this reason that the 
two can converse with each other, be mutually relevant, and disagree. 
Since Brunner recognises that there is only one truth, even though it 
may be apprehended and conveyed in radically different ways, the 
relationship between rationally attested truth and revealed truth is 
especially acute. If there is only one truth and if both reason and 
faith are at least relatively independent modes of apprehending truth, 
the possibility that they may conflict is by no means precluded.
According to Brunner's argument, since philosophy is however both 
possible and necessary, otherwise as Christian one neither can nor 
should cease to think, it is not reason but rationalism that makes 
Christian philosophy appear impossible.27 it is, of course, to 
Christian philosophy that he is referring here. But, in this context, 
the word 'Christian' does not appear to be necessary. It is "possible 
and necessary" for the Christian to engage in philosophy and, we might 
add, on Brunner's analysis perfectly legitimate for him to do so. To 
leave philosophy aside means to surrender one's intellect. There is 
nothing in the Christian faith that militates against the free use of 
the mind either in science or philosophy. So Brunner argues that 
Christian philosophy is the reflection of a believing Christian about 
being and about existing realities as these are disclosed in experience 
of the world. It is reflection concerning the principles of being and 
of thought about being. But it is a thinking that is freed from the 
illusory prejudice of autonomy, because it knows of its own origin in 
the Spirit and will of the Creator, and in this thought, which stems not 
from man's own resources but from God's self-communication, it 
recognises and exercises its freedom as given, and therefore as a power 
with limitations.
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Thus, Brunner not only acknowledges the legitimacy of philosophy 
but also conceives of the possibility of a Christian philosophy. 
According to him, Christian philosophy is possible because faith does 
not ignore or coerce the thinking reason, but leads it back to its 
original purpose, and sets it free. From this point of view, faith 
consists simply in this, that the illusion of the autonomous reason, 
which is the basis of all philosophical dogmatism, has been dissolved, 
and the thinking self has once more been set where it belongs, at the 
place where it is no longer that which comprehends everything, but where 
it is the subject which is itself comprehended, where therefore the 
desire to set up the absolute system has come to an end; its place is 
taken by the rightful endeavour to perceive the connection between all 
that exists for the sake of the creation. In this respect 'knowledge 
about world' provides to faith and regaining of a truly critical, and 
therefore realistic, way of thought. In Brunner's opinion, since the 
Christian philosopher alone is in a position to see man as a creature, 
as finite, not absolute reason, and as a fallen, only he can therefore 
think truly critical, and truly realistically, and only the critical 
philosopher can be a Christian.^9
However, it is important to consider in what sense Brunner regards 
the word 'philosophy' as in any sense Christian. It seems to be clear 
that he does not look upon philosophy as nothing but the expression of 
Christian theology. For he claims that neither is philosophy 'the 
handmaid of theology' as Thomas Aquinas believed, nor is theology 
dependent on 'propositions borrowed from philosophy' as Schleiermacher 
conceived. Rather, both have the same origin, but each has its 
different task of thought. Each is called to its special service. They 
both theology and philosophy stand under Christ, the one in an inner,
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and the other in an outer, circle; the one with the task of 
understanding the message of Jesus Christ in its inmost depths of 
meaning, and thus of purifying the proclamation of the Gospel and ever 
anew basing it upon the Word of revelation; the other with the task of 
making clear the truth of faith in order to throw light on the problems 
of Christians living in the world, and to help them to deal with these 
problems in a creative way.30
Now, human reason has, in Brunner's view, its proper autonomy and 
engages in the quest for knowledge in at least relative independence of 
the disclosures of faith. To understand the Bible ever so well, even 
'through the eyes of faith', is by no means to qualify as a competent 
philosopher. Philosophy is not and cannot be Christian in the sense 
that it is merely theology. Philosophical knowledge can be achieved 
only through the vigorous exercise of the intellect as it works with the 
materials of experience. So far as the form and content of 
philosophical truth is concerned, the Christian engaging in philosophy 
has absolutely no advantage over the non-Christian. He cannot, in the 
first instance, come by his truths by deriving them from revelation and, 
in the second place, he cannot defend them by appeal to faith. As 
philosopher he must justify his knowledge claims before the court of 
reason alone. Thus, there is no special Christian Philosophy in the 
sense that any special set of philosophical doctrines may be regarded as 
distinctly Christian.31 However, this is not the case that Brunner 
accepts as such. For him, what is recognised as valid in philosophy or 
science cannot be untrue for faith. That which seems to be a double 
truth, that is, the equal truth of contradictory statements, always 
proves to be either the result of drawing an inadequate distinction 
between various aspects of a question or of exceeding on one side or the
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other the rightful limits of the subject in question.
Thus, there is a very important question as to the compatibility of 
any given philosophical system with Christian revelation. Quite 
clearly, Christian theology for Brunner is not compatible with, for 
example, a kind of rationalism which challenges the Christian to prove 
that revelation and faith have a rational foundation. In a certain 
sense the assertion of faith for Brunner is not without foundation; 
indeed it rests upon a real foundation, and upon one that is very 
cogent. No one indeed should maintain, in the Christian sense of the 
word 'faith', that he believes, if he does not feel that he must 
believe, if there is no evidence for that which he believes. But this 
evidence does not belong to the sphere of rational knowledge, but to the 
knowledge of faith. It is the evidence of the fact of revelation 
itself. Insofar as the Christian faith understands it, revelation is, by 
its very nature, something that lies beyond all rational arguments; the 
argument which it certainly claims in its support does not lie in the 
sphere of rational knowledge, but in the sphere of that divine truth 
which can be attained only through divine self-communication and not 
through human research of any kind.32
So, in his explication of the Christian concept of revelation 
Brunner observes first of all that revelation must be understood as the 
act of communication. This, he claims, is fundamental to the New 
Testament understanding of revelation. In the New Testament, revelation 
is a necessary and real communication, not merely an accidental or 
causal manifestation of a truth which could be apprehended apart from 
this manifestation. It is a communication in the deepest sense of the 
word: "What that means only becomes really clear when we invert the
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sentence and say 'revelation alone is absolute communication'. 
Everything else which comes to me through communication is, so to speak, 
accidentally communication. ... But in the case of revelation the fact 
of communication is not accidental but necessary, because I cannot of 
myself know who God is, what God wills of me and for me. That he must 
tell me himself. Apart from this telling it to me himself God is to me 
the unknown, the hidden".33 Therefore, in my knowledge about that which 
has been communicated to me in revelation I remain wholly bound to the 
event of the communication and to the particularity of the revelation 
and its bearer. In the sense of revelation the act of communication is 
absolutely decisive for my knowledge about Him.
The view of revelation has, so Brunner argues, a specifically 
Christian character in the sense that in all religions revelation 
signifies, in a broad sense, something which was previously hidden and 
is now disclosed, but in the New Testament the idea of communication is 
radically transformed. For I read about an absolute mystery and an 
absolute communication. This is true since God is the one who is 
revealed. Everything else, everything that in some way or another 
belongs to the world, is in principle already known, whereas God is the 
absolutely unknown. "Through God alone can God be k n o w n . "34 I know 
about Him only when He makes Himself known. I must let Him say to me. 
This dependence upon a historical event and a historical person belongs 
to the essence of revelation. So the God of the Bible has nothing to do 
with the philosophical concept of God, because he is not thought as 
idea, but apprehended in his historical revelation of himself. The God 
whom I can think for myself is for that very reason a n  i d o l . 35
When Brunner speaks thus about absolute communication, he attempts
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to point out that revelation is an event in history. This does not mean 
that history itself reveals God as the formula of idealistic philosophy 
of history does (see IV.1.2). Rather, God reveals Himself in definite 
moments of history and above all in Jesus Christ - in His person, life, 
death, and resurrection. True communication is realised in and cannot 
be separated from the historical person of Jesus Christ. Brunner lays 
great stress on this once-for-allness of revelation. The revelation to 
which the New Testament bears witness is neither general nor repeatable 
but is absolutely unique. It is not an illustration of a truth which 
has always been known or which apart from this revelation can be known. 
The historical and personal, therefore, does not act as a symbol. 
"Symbol says nothing to me, but suggests to me what I ought of myself to 
think when I perceive it. ... Symbol awakens, but does not create my own 
knowledge. Symbol draws my attention to something which in principle I 
can say to myself. Therefore, there are many symbols for the one thing, 
and for knowledge of the thing it is a matter of indifference through 
which symbol I learn the thing indicated. Therefore the thing indicated 
is at all times detachable from the symbol, i.e. from that particular 
which drew my attention to it. The thing itself, the idea, is as
fundamentally independent of the symbol as of the person who 
communicates it."36
So Brunner claims that in the Bible, God and man are never spoken 
of in terms of an object set over against a receiving subject but always 
in terms of a reciprocally free, personal relationship between them. As 
a matter of fact, it is precisely in God's giving himself to be known 
and in this knowledge of God that the essence of the relation between 
God and man lies. Accordingly the revelation of God to men is the 
decisive element in what God does for them. For God is the God who
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approaches man just because and insofar as he knows God on the basis of 
his revelation. God is always the One who destines man for, and calls 
man to, Himself; and man is always the one so destined and called by 
God. Hence the event that is the relation between God and man hence is 
always an act of communication: likewise, the event that is the
relation between man and God is always a relation based on knowing. 
This relationship is consummated in an event in which God and man
personally meet each other. Here Brunner uses the term 'encounter' to
name this relationship between God and man. This Divine-human encounter 
is based on the self-communication of God through his Word, Jesus 
Christ.37
Since revelation is divine self-communication, the coming of God to
man, it becomes human and seeks out man where he is. This concern for
man is an essential part of the message itself. For the whole
revelation is God's concern for man. The message of the church is an
instrument of the divine message; and it has to subject itself to God's
coming to man where he is. This, therefore, is the passion of the
divine agape itself that forces us to missionary theology. It is not
some independent humanistically motivated concern, but it is the zeal
about God Himself that necessarily becomes a zeal about man. Thus, in
respect of revelation every attempt at preaching and theology which is
not concerned about this missionary task, which does not take man
seriously, is wrong from the very beginning. By reflecting about the
initiation of the divine Word we necessarily recognise this missionary
task. So Brunner puts it as follows:
The whole business of revelation is solely and unfathomably 
concerned with God's adaptation to man; the whole purpose 
of this is to lay hold of man, and to draw him once more to 
Himself, in order to set him once again within the "Kingdom 
of the Son of His love". All the activity and the message
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of the Church is set within this act of divine condescension 
toward man as the instrument of His Word, in order that the 
Church may seek man where he is, and where he is hiding from 
God, to lay hold of him and draw him out into the open to 
face reality. .. Hence our concern for man is not a 
secondary matter, alongside of the Gospel; it is the whole 
meaning of the central concern of the Church itself.^8
Therefore, since the truth of revelation aims at man, theological 
reflection on the essence and the content of the truth of revelation 
leads to a confrontation with anti-Christian ways of thinking. 
Therefore all times genuine Christian theology for Brunner always has 
been also missionary theology, or in his own phrase 'eristic theology'. 
"As a matter of fact these two tasks, apologetics and dogmatics, cannot 
be separated from each other. Every dogmatic statement is at the same 
time an apologetic-polemic statement and vice versa".39 Thus, Brunner 
claims that revelation in Jesus Christ is the personal self­
communication of God. The absoluteness of communication is inseparable 
from its personal character and also from its 'personal correspondence'. 
He directly applies this emphasis on the personal character of 
revelation to what he has said about 'truth as encounter'. What he says 
about revelation in turn determines his understanding of faith. 
Concerning the meaning of revelation and faith in the New Testament he 
has written: "Here revelation is 'truth as encounter' and faith is
knowledge as encounter". ^ 0
In Brunner's opinion, the principal task of missionary theology is 
not to set Christian faith on the platform of some previous rational 
understanding of reality, still less to prove it by reference to this, 
but rather to reflect on faith with a view to exposing the falsity of 
reason’s understanding of itself. Missionary theology thus aims to 
defend Christian faith against the misunderstanding that originate from
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man's sinful abuse of reason. For this reason, Brunner stresses the 
activity of God, God in action. Revelation is in essence God's act; 
God is in essence the Revealer. Nothing like that can be asserted about 
any man. God is the absolute Subject as such (see IV.3.4). This 
definition is, however, based on philosophical premises of which Brunner 
gives an account. As shown to us in the previous discussion (see 
III.2.1), the philosophy he refers to is the I-Thou philosophy of Buber 
(and Ebner). This absolute Subject is a subject 'for-some-end', a 
subject that communicates itself. "We cannot .grasp or describe the 
nature of radium without speaking of radio-activity. Radium is the 
radiant element - that is its very nature. Even so the nature of God is 
to shine forth in His Glory, communicating activity, personal being, 
which wills communion.
As Anders Nygren points out, in an article on Emil Brunner's 
Doctrine of God, Brunner is right in his view that we cannot think
of God's love as an ethical attribute, ^  and has a good word for 
Brunner's intention to avoid regarding God as an object. Nevertheless, 
by his philosophical definition of God as absolute Subject, Brunner has 
come to make God a 'something', an 'it', or an object. A 'Christian' 
ontology and a doctrine of being itself which Brunner intends to build 
up may be an improvement on the Greek metaphysics of old. But this does 
not prevent speculation based on the 'I and Thou' relationship making 
God an object when it uses philosophical ideas to define God's 
existence. Then, in spite of Brunner's intention, God becomes a 
'something' that can be embodied in an ontology. Thus, God as 'Subject 
per se' and 'Subject for some end' is clearly something other than the 
God of whom the Bible speaks. Brunner himself is also clearly aware 
that there is a tension between philosophical reflection and the Bible
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message, the 'revelation1 on which elsewhere he means to build. But he 
regards that tension as inevitable: "the more that reflection, exact 
definition, strictly logical argument, reasoned classification, method 
and system predominate in Christian doctrine, the more 'scientific' it 
becomes, and the further it moves from the original truth of faith from 
which it proceeds, and to which it must continually refer.
Ronald Hepburn, in the respect of the rational justification of
religious belief, attacks precisely Brunner's notion of the key term
'encounter'. Although this term certainly ensures that the language of
prayer is given priority over the language of reflection, yet we have to
ask if the strongest claims of the theology are justified: if knowledge
of God as personal can be entirely self-authenticating, or whether there
is room here for (and even likelihood of) error and illusion. Are there
no checking procedures relevant to the encounter of person with person?
Or does all 'checking' necessarily degrade persons to the status of
things? With these questions he objects, in particular, to the sense of
a conception of 'encounter' as follows:
The question which of these or other possible answers he 
will give, is of the first importance; for if the original 
direct encounter was with a being known in the last- 
mentioned way - as a holy and dreadful Presence - then one 
could not claim to have been aware directly and immediately 
of (say) God as Father of Jesus Christ. The judgement, 'I 
encountered the God revealed uniquely in the New Testament' 
would be an indirect, not a direct judgement. It would 
depend on inferences that could not themselves claim 'self- 
authentication' . We shall also have to consider the 
objection that such certainty as the Christian claims for 
his encounters with God can be had only by 'subjective' or 
'psychological' statements: statements not to the effect
that such and such exists or is the case, but that I have 
such and such sensations and feelings, and no more. And 
from statements as cautious as those one may not infer any 
equally certain statements about the world, about things or 
persons other than the speaker.44
Therefore, such a claim that all that Christians mean by 'God' can
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be exhausted by reference to certain human experiences is surely not 
secured. Statements about 'God' would then be equivalent to statements 
about human experience and it would be nonsense, by definition, to speak 
about God's existence' prior to the existence of human beings possessing 
such experiences. The definition of 'God' may well be held essentially 
to include reference to human experiences, but traditional theism will 
always insist on more than this in any acceptable definition. And yet 
the moment that a 'more' is required, we are confronted with a 
metaphysical issue concerning a being who is the independent cause or 
source of the so-called ' encounter-experiences' . In this way the logic 
of encounter subtly slips from an overt attempt at explicating the 
meaning of theological terms to a covert argument to the existence of 
God from religious experience. If encounter proves both suspiciously 
subjectivist and logically incomplete as a theory of theological 
meaningfulness, it exhibits itself equally weak as convincing evidence 
from the existence of a divine Encounterer.^5
A further difficulty within the notion of 'encounter' in its 
theological application arises over the very notion of error in 'I-Thou' 
experiences. How does one discover that he was mistaken in his 
supposition that he had been 'encountered' by the true personality of 
another? Such mistakes are always discovered by observations of a sort 
which are out of the question for theological 'encounter'. Hearing a 
snore; seeing a covert act, gesture, or facial expression; feeling a 
stab in the back - these are the means, often painful, of distinguishing 
sheer-illusion from what may conceivably be veridical extra-sensory 
perception.^6 Perhaps we may admit with Brunner that if God belongs to 
no class of objects in the world but is the creator of all objects, He 
cannot be 'discovered' at all by theological reason. For human thinking
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is inadequate to this end. However, Hepburn's argument about the 
problem of testing symbols against supposed 'encounters', I think, is 
correct, if we must ask what the real measure of 'appropriateness' of a
symbol to the experience can be. For no external evidence is ultimately
capable of arbitrating on this matter; even the Bible serves as
authority only because its words are adjudged 'appropriate' to the
experience of each generation of reader. The writers of the Bible must 
themselves have had to determine the 'appropriateness' of their words to 
the encounter-experience without an external evidence on the language of 
encounter; or, if they relied on some previous authority (earlier 
documents, oral tradition), the regression of dependence upon external 
criteria must end somewhere short of infinity.
1.3 Christ and the problem of meaning
Emil Brunner is convinced that the term 'truth as encounter' adequately 
reproduces the two decisive elements which are contained in the biblical 
understanding of truth; that it is historical and that it is personal. 
Accordingly, truth is not something which is inherently present in man 
or the world, and which man needs only to become aware of, but the 
divine truth comes to men from outside the world and happens among men 
in space and time. In his opinion, the whole question of truth hinges 
upon the fact that it is not something timeless, but something which 
comes into being, the act of God in space and time. So God's revelation 
of his truth in an historical event in space and time does not signify 
that he originates an idea which is then taken up by human thought, or 
that he creates a series of facts which man has to take into account. 
This means that he himself, his person, is the content of this event. 
The revelation of God is 'the imparting of himself1, what he speaks is 
addressed to someone, and his word is a communicating word.
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Consequently, the act of revelation and its content are identical.
The fact that God has revealed himself to man includes what he has
revealed: that he loves man and desires fellowship with him. Thus, in
the Bible the truth of God is always identical with the love of God. In
the biblical understanding of truth the fact that truth is historical
and the fact that it is personal are linked; together they define the
nature of revelation as the self-communication of God to man. So
Brunner claims that revelation is essentially God's activity in
salvation and he puts it as follows :
In the time of the Apostles, as in that of the Old Testament 
Prophets, "divine revelation" always meant the whole of the 
divine activity for the salvation of the world, the whole 
story of God's saving act, of the "acts of God" which reveal 
God's nature and His will, above all, Him in whom the 
preceding revelation gains its meaning, and who therefore is 
its fulfillment: Jesus Christ. He Himself is the
Revelation. Divine revelation is not a book or a doctrine; 
the Revelation is God Himself in His self-manifestation 
within history. Revelation is something that happens, the 
living history of God in His dealings with the human race: 
the history of revelation is the history of salvation, and 
the history of salvation is the history of revelation. Both 
are the same, seen from two angles. This is the 
understanding of revelation which the Bible itself gives
So God's saving acts, in Brunner's view, are always personal acts, 
for revelation is the personal encounter of two subjects in the 'I-Thou' 
relation. God meets man in a truth-encounter; thus revelation is not 
one-way communication, nor a monologue, but dialogue: "Revelation
actually consists in the meeting of two subjects, the divine and the 
human, the self-communication of God to man. Jesus Christ is not 
'revelation' when He is not recognised by anyone as the Christ, just as 
He is not the Redeemer if He does not redeem anyone. The Biblical 
doctrine of revelation means this transition from the divine to the 
human subject” Brunner emphasises, therefore, the point that a
296
person cannot be thought. In his view, our knowledge of a subject, a 
person, is wholly contingent upon an act of self-disclosure on the part 
of the person known. A subject which I think is not truly a subject. 
What I can discover by virtue of my own thought processes is, to the 
degree that that is possible, not a person, but an object. A personal 
subject, a real 'thou1, is all one with that mystery which only the 
subject himself can disclose. Not only is my knowledge of a subject 
dependent on the latter's self-disclosure, but it is not knowledge in 
the ordinary sense of the word at all. It is encounter. We rationally 
analyse things. We meet persons. Of course human beings are not only 
persons, but also objects in the physical world. Hence, we can acquire 
much useful knowledge about individuals through the sciences of 
physiology and psychology. But God is not an object of the world in any 
sense. He is the subject par excellence, the 'absolute subject' .^
However, as George A Schrader points out, Brunner's use of the term 
'subject' is unclear when he claims that a subject can never be known as 
an object. To regard persons as objects merely would be, in effect, to 
deny that they are subjects in and for themselves. Such an attitude is 
not only morally wrong but mistaken. The attitude has the import of 
misrepresenting the being toward which it is directed. But it might be 
equally mistaken to regard a person as in no way an object.^0 Surely 
every human subject has a body and expresses himself in and through his 
body, his actions, his words, and so forth. These are surely objective 
manifestations of the person and capable of being observed and 
described. Moreover, one of the important and difficult lessons we each 
have to learn is that our bodies and our actions are our own and that we 
are responsible for them. I am an object for others as well as for my 
self, and this constitutes one of the most fundamental problems
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confronting me. So, too, is the other an object for me. There is 
nothing wrong or mistaken in regarding oneself, others, or even God as 
an object. To do so is altogether unavoidable and necessary.
Therefore, the notion of a subject is surely a philosophical 
concept which has been assimilated by theology even as it may have been 
independently developed by theology. We need not claim that we know God 
perfectly, either on the basis of natural knowledge or revelation. But 
if we talk or think meaningfully about God at all, we must reflect on 
what we mean or can mean in referring to God as a subject. Brunner has 
surely comprehended the problem involved in the relation between the 
Christian revelation of God and the philosophical concept of God: 
"Faith does not stand in opposition to knowledge, as little as to 
ethical will. Rather, it presupposes both".51 His theological proposal 
of 'truth as encounter' heavily depends upon an I-thou philosophy (see 
III.2.3). Brunner clarified how he understood the union of faith and 
rational thinking which is the condition for dogmatic thinking as 
follows:
Thus the act of thought in dogmatics may be compared with a 
movement which arises through the activity of two 
differently directed forces, for instance, one tangential 
and the other centripetal. The purely rational element of 
thought, logic, has the tendency to go straight forward from 
each given point; but faith continually prevents this 
straightforward movement by its pull towards the Centre. So 
instead of a movement in a straight line there arises a 
circular movement around the Centre - and that is a picture 
of real theological thinking. Theological thinking is a
rational movement of thought, whose rational tendency at
every point is continually being deflected, checked, or 
disturbed by faith. Where the rational element is not 
effective there is no movement of thought, no theology; 
where rational element alone is at work, there arises a 
rational speculative theology, which leads away from the
truth of revelation. Only where faith and rationality are
rightly interlocked can we have true theology, good 
dogmatics.52
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It is the predicament of theology that it fails to deal properly 
with its very subject, the Christian faith, the more rationally it 
proceeds, and that logic and faith are played off against each other in 
the work of theology in such a way that they "check and disturb each 
other in every point". Whether or not this should be the case depends 
on how the task of theology is defined. If one defines it, as Brunner 
does, in such a way that it is not only a process of thought about that 
which is given in faith, it is at the same time believing thinking, then 
the above-mentioned predicament is inevitable.^3 in this regard, 
Brunner admits that even if there is no valid natural theology, it, in 
fact, exists; and there are a number of natural theologies. So it is 
our duty as Christians to ask what their significance is. Looking from 
the standpoint of faith, we find here a witness to the fact that man is 
created by God, and stands in a special relation to Him.
The second thing to which natural theology bears witness, in 
Brunner's view, is the fact of man's sin. For man gives back a 
perverted answer to the call of God which constitutes his humanity, and 
so the knowledge of God becomes perverted, idolatrous. He forms a wrong 
picture of the God to whom his life is now a wrong answer. Thus the 
relation of the special revelation to what man has made of the 
revelation in creation is dialectical, consisting at the same time of a 
'yes' and a 'no' and the affirmation and denial are inseparably bound up 
together. There is, consequently, no valid natural theology, no system 
of truth about God, set up on the basis of revelation in creation alone. 
The crucial claim made by Brunner in his dialectical proposal to define 
the term 'revelation' is then that although the term does not denote a 
single entity but a complex one, or there are many forms of revelation, 
it indicates the historical event: Jesus Christ (see IV.4.4). He puts
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it as follows:
The fact that "the Word became flesh" is the centre of the 
divine manifestation, towards which all the teaching and 
witness of the original witness is directed. Obviously this 
means that the "Word of God" is not that which we human 
beings mean by a "word": He Himself, Jesus Christ, is the
"Word" of God; it is therefore impossible to equate any 
human words, any "speech about - Him" with the divine self- 
communication. Jesus Christ Himself is more than all words 
about Him; the "Word" of God, the decisive self­
communication of God, is a person, a human being, the man in 
whom God himself meets us.^4
Therefore, Brunner contends that biblical truth must be radically 
separated from the philosophical search for ultimate reality. Such 
inquiry always results in some sort of impersonal Absolute, an It, which 
has nothing whatsoever to do with God revealed in Jesus Christ and 
witnessed to by the Scriptures. Ontology always obscures the personal 
category and destroys the biblical concept of truth as encounter. So 
Brunner argues that the biblical categories are final for Christian 
thought and that any effort to replace them with rationally motivated 
philosophical categories introduces the subject-object antithesis, which 
is the great falsifier. Thus God can be understood from the point of 
view of his revelation and from no other. The God of the Christian is 
by definition the God of revelation, and for this reason He can be known 
only as He makes Himself known through His own self-disclosure. In this 
respect, there is no way from man to God: the road runs only in the
opposite direction, from God to man. Human reason and historical
research cannot attain to religious truth: the only way to religious
truth is to listen in faith and obedience to God's revelation. So
theology presupposes faith: it is dogmatic proclamation and not
primarily critical philosophical work.
However, although we cannot overlook the fact that the character of
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religious faith is in important respects different from that of any
certain system of philosophical thought, the resemblances should not be
neglected. Otherwise, as Basil Mitchell points out, it is left in the
end to arbitrary human judgement to determine whether words or events
which purport to be revelatory are so or not and, if it decides they
are, how they are to be interpreted. That there are (if there are)
phenomena which appear to demand the status of revelation is, on that
view, an argument of some force for the existence of a God who might
reveal Himself in such a manner, but it is an argument which cannot
stand alone, but requires the support of reasons which are independent
of the putative revelation.55 In fact, the problem begins when Brunner
suggests that his emphasis upon the personal character of truth is
incompatible with objectivity.55 This leads to confusion and, it would
appear, self-contradiction. What he claims about the personal character
of truth is that "there is no longer a place here for the objective-
subjective antithesis. The application of this pair of concepts is
entirely meaningless. The self-revelation of God is no object, but
wholly the doing and self-giving of a subject - or, better expressed, a
Person".57 And yet he also regards this very antithesis as constitutive
of human thinking as such. Insofar as the theologian is human and
thinks, he is bound by the law of the antithesis. But this is for
Brunner most unsatisfactory. Apparently, he fears that this formal law
of thinking will somehow infect its object with abstract and impersonal
qualities. He puts it as follows:
At first it seems indeed to be a completely impossible 
undertaking to wish to withdraw oneself from between this 
pair of tongs (as it were) of the two concepts objective- 
subjective. They seem to be so necessarily linked with the 
process of thought as such that theological thinking too, it 
would seem, could not be done without them. As soon as one 
thinks at all, how can one help thinking "something", how 
help wanting to think what is objectively true? But we 
would thus concede that all thinking, including theological, 
takes place within this antithesis and is unable to proceed
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outside it. The theologian too when he thinks places the 
truth over against the false meaning: it therefore seems
quite hopeless, even meaningless, to wish to attack this 
fundamental law of thinking.
Thus, having admitted that his thinking follows the antithesis and 
that what he is trying to say cannot be comprehended in its terms, it 
would seem to follow that neither he nor we can possibly know what he is 
talking about. In part the polemic against objectivity stems from a 
misunderstanding of some of its implication. Such a misunderstanding is 
apt to arise concerning the language of faith. The reason for this is 
that the theologian is concerned with the intimate relationship of 
faith. This relationship is typically expressed in worship and in 
personal decisions. In worship, for instance, one does not speak about 
God but with God. In this context I am not trying to inform persuade, 
or direct others. In other words, one is not theorizing in the moment 
of worship. To stop and ask, "What does the term 'blessed1 mean?" would 
destroy the moment of worship. But the theologian is not necessarily 
engaged in worship when he uses highly abstract and technical language 
in this reflection about 'worship'.^ In brief, language is not that to 
which it refers. When used in any theoretical context, including 
theology, it is necessarily abstract and objective. That which is said 
is an object of thought. But it should be noted that 1 object‘ is a 
purely formal concept. There is no reason why an 'object' of thought 
may not be a 'person' or a very personal experience.
However, Brunner argues that there is a realm in which natural, 
objective knowledge is both possible and desirable. It does not, as 
such, conflict with the personal knowledge given in revelation. But one 
of the hallmarks of such objective knowledge is, in Brunner's view, that 
it "makes us masters of that which we know. The knowing subject is
302
superior to each object, because a subject is much more than an object. 
The 'I' can have something in knowledge; but the 'something' cannot 
have the 'I'. So long as the 'I' asserts itself in knowing, so long as 
it is not insane or possessed, the ' I ' remains master of the object of 
that which is known". ^ 0 That which I know in this way is for my use at 
my disposal. For this reason Brunner concludes that "the objective 
attitude toward persons is wrong". Persons, in his view, are not 
objects, but subjects; they have a claim on us to be known as 'thou'.
Furthermore, he claims that any Christian who understands his faith 
to be a gift, resting not upon his reason but upon the faithfulness of
God or 'trust', will wish to say that his faith is sure and certain.
But it would be odd to interpret this as an intellectual certainty, for 
it is precisely not upon his reason or the result of his inquiries that 
it is founded. Hence faith is, for him 'trust' and not assent of the 
intellect. In faith I believe that God is faithful to do according to 
his promises. In fact Brunner attempts to stress that we respect the 
otherness of 'thou' who is not a mere object of my thought, but a unique 
other who confronts me. God transcends my categories and theories. If 
this be so, then we cannot speak of God. For to speak of God is to use 
words whose meanings we have learned by their application to the world 
around us. We may worship him, speak with him, but we cannot, in this 
case speak of him. For instance, if such a term as 'Father' may rightly 
be used of God, then he is not completely beyond comparison. For that
term is understood only by comparison.
Thus, if Brunner is convinced that the personal self-communication 
of God is itself a person, then the term 'person' seems to be used in 
designating it as Christ. In his view, Jesus Christ is the word of God.
303
He himself is the point where the divine world breaks through into our
world. Jesus, in His person, reveals the name, the personal mystery of
God fully and finally.61 "The Incarnation takes place - not only but 
also - in order to restore the picture which has been destroyed; the 
Divine Incarnation - not only, but also, and necessarily - is the 
renewal of that which took place in the creation of man in the image of 
God. Human personal being alone is a suitable means of revealing the 
personal Being of God. The revelation of the Divine person in the God-
Man is at the same time the revelation of the originally true, personal
being of m a n . "62 Consequently, it cannot be the object of doctrine 
because it occurs in history. Truth is then Christ as person (IV.4.4). 
For Brunner nothing is more certain than this, namely, actuality and 
personal character of Christian truth. Christ is a historic personality 
only as a man.63
What is the mystery of God's person, which he discloses in Jesus
Christ? In Brunner's view, it is not it-truth, information about
something; nor it is a matter of the increase of one's knowledge.
Rather, it is the 'transformation of one's existence'.64 in thought I
master objects but in revelation I receive my master. God's self-
communication is his claim of lordship and fellowship with m a n .  65 That
God is Lord of man means either that he wills to be known and
acknowledged by man or that he is known and acknowledged by man as the
One to whom man unconditionally belongs. Hence one cannot contemplate
God Almighty, as he does the ideas. He can only obey (or disobey) God
who wills to have fellowship with his human creatures:
Since God's being as the Bible reveals it to us in no sense 
is being as such [An-sich-sein] but will to Lordship and 
will to fellowship, therefore it is essentially a related 
being - a being related to man, the creature who knows, 
acknowledges, obeys, and loves - a being related to the
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Kingdom of God. Because God is necessarily first and man 
second, the being of the creature, especially of the human 
creature, is receptive and rooted in the divine acting. 
Because God’s will is both will to Lordship and will to 
fellowship, he wills to have a creature face to face with 
himself, who in freedom gives back to him what he first 
gives to the creature. Therefore, the act in which man 
receives the being to which God has determined him is an act 
of revelation and knowledge.®®
Here the matter of man's obedient response to the address of God is 
especially interesting in a discussion of the term 'person'. We have 
seen how Brunner's concept of faith revolves about the dimension of the
personal (see IV.3.4). Personal correspondence is the opposite of
abstract, rational truth. The latter moves within the framework of the
subject-object antithesis, as Brunner calls it; that is, it is 
concerned with the knowing subject and the object known. Personal 
correspondence, on the other hand, is concerned with a relationship 
between two subjects, the Divine Thou and the human I, in face-to-face 
encounter. In this regard, man is to be understood in terms of this 
fellowship with God. As God is a 'God-who-approaches-man' (Gott-zum- 
Menschen-hin), so man is a 'man-who-comes-from-God' (Menschen-von-Gott- 
her).67 Therefore, Brunner repudiates both the rational conception of 
'person' expressed in the definition of Boethius and the legalistic 
definition of 'person' in the light of Kant's moral law. Instead he 
claims that to be person is to be in relation to someone. In the case 
of God it is a relationship 'to Himself'. God is the 'Triune God'. In 
the case of man it is a relationship to himself (or his neighbour) on 
the basis of his relationship to God.®® In this regard, his claim about 
human destiny is clearly Christocentric (or Christological). Only faith 
in Christ gives meaning to human existence. I think that this is
Brunner's strong point.
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In this way the term 'person' for Brunner can be applied to both 
'God' and 'man'; and hence it is the central category of his whole 
theology. One may ask, however, the concept of 'person' used by Brunner 
in formulating the assertions of missionary theology is sufficiently 
subjected to a criticism. For instance, if Brunner compares the meaning 
of 'person' applied to man with the meaning of 'person' applied to God, 
he sees the difference only in the removal of the human limitations with 
respect to being a person.^9 But he does not point to the qualitative 
transformation the concept of person undergoes if the limitations of 
temporal and spatial existence are removed. If this happens - and it 
certainly must happen - the term 'person' becomes symbolic, a 
consequence which cannot be prevented by the correct assertion that the 
full meaning of person can be known only on the basis of the person-to- 
person encounter between God and man. Thus if missionary theology is an 
intellectual presentation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ which starts 
from the spiritual situation of the hearer, then it seems to be 
impossible to avoid the semantic problem in theology in our time or in 
any time.^
As John Hick points out, within Christian faith there is a fixed 
basis, or a fixed starting point, for Christian belief and worship; but 
proceeding from that starting point there is a still unfinished history 
of change as the Christian way has been followed through the centuries, 
meeting new human circumstances and new intellectual climates.^ The 
permanent and unchanging element is to be found in the originating 
events from which the moving stream of Christian history has flowed. 
The word ' the Christ-event' has been indicated to refer to the complex 
of happenings constituting the life, death and resurrection of Jesus and 
the birth of the persisting community which was created by its response
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to him. It is in this event that Christian faith sees God acting self- 
revealingly for the salvation of the world. In his presence Jesus' 
disciples experienced the presence of the transcendent God and his claim 
upon human life. For them, this faith response was focused by the 
traditional Jewish idea of the anointed one - in Hebrew, Messiah; in 
Greek, Christos. Others saw him instead as an unauthorised rabbi, or a 
false prophet, or a dangerous revolutionary. ' That is to say, the 
understanding of Jesus and the way in which he is the criterion of the 
language of faith has been a subject of dispute from the first.
However, Christian faith has grown out of the small group who saw 
Jesus as the Messiah, or who were ready to see him retrospectively as 
Messiah in the light of the resurrection experience which created the 
early Christian community. The Jesus event from which Christian faith 
in all its still unfolding diversity has flowed is a faith event, and 
the New Testament documents by which that event is reflected to us 
across the centuries are documents of faith. For they were written by 
the community which had experienced Jesus raised beyond death into a 
life continuous with God's saving activity towards mankind. So the 
constant reference of the language of faith to Jesus forces it into the 
dialogue of faith with the experience of the world. Consequently, this 
all-embracing process of language cannot attain any definitive final 
resting point within history, in which the language of faith would be 
out of danger, uncontested and beyond dispute. Nor can there be any 
standpoint outside one's own participation in this process of language 
from which one can decide upon or resolve the dispute as a neutral 
arbitrator. Thus, the claim to truth can only be put forward here on 
condition that it is permanently challenged.^2
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Furthermore, since Christian faith is an ongoing movement of life 
and thought defined by its origin in the Christ-event and by its 
consciousness of that origin, it cannot be thus defined in terms of 
adherence to any fixed doctrines, for its doctrines are historically and 
culturally conditioned and have changed as the church has entered new
j
historical and cultural situations. Accordingly, it is impossible to 
predict or to limit the developments that will take place in the future 
history of this movement. In this regard, if two elements of the 
process of the language of faith do not exist as independent entities, 
which as such can be disentangled from one another, and only afterwards 
related to one another as a supplementary task, then they are only what 
they are in their relationship with each other. If the language of 
faith is the dialogue of Christian faith, i.e. the response to the 
Christ-event with the experience of the world, then to speak of the 
Christ-event is to speak the language of faith. Since the language of 
the world as such is a confused and concealed dispute about Christian 
faith, it is the concern of a theological theory of language to bring to 
light this inner polarity in the language of faith. In this way faith, 
in accordance with its nature, can remain in contact with the experience 
of the world, and the fact that it is a dialogue can provide the 
standard for the critical testing and the exercise of the language of 
faith.73 if this is so, then it is obviously legitimate to ask whether 
Brunner's term 'person' is meaningfully to direct the man of the 
Zeitgeist to Christian faith, or assist them in finding the meaning of 
the Gospel. We shall finally discuss the problem of the language of 
faith and its necessity of our doing missionary theology.
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2. Analysis of religious language
2.1 Language and 'forms of life': Wittgenstein
Theology's central problem today is not so much one within theology as 
around theology, enfolding it entirely and calling into question its 
nature and status as a whole. This issue, at once central and all- 
embracing, presents itself to the philosopher or theologian as a problem 
concerning religious language.7  ^ In this regard, many philosophers of 
religion wrote a great deal about whether religious utterances can be 
regarded as stating truths (or falsehoods), or whether such utterances 
should perhaps be thought of as expressing emotion, articulating 
optional ways of regarding the world or of affirming and commending 
attitutdes. Only utterances which are checkable (verifiable or 
falsifiable) against experience were supposed to be factually 
significant, and as it is unclear how what religious people say is 
empirically checkable, so it is inviting to attach to it a non-fact- 
stating s i g n i f i c a n c e . 75 por instance, the logical positivists judged 
all religious statements to be meaningless because they could not meet 
the verification principle of that philosophy: they held that, apart
from the assertions of logic and mathematics, only statements which can 
be verified or falsified empirically are meaningful. On the other hand 
there were those philosophers who have actually abandoned or radically 
modified the scope of the verification principle.
In order to understand what linguistic philosophy has to say about 
religious language, Frederick Ferre suggests that it is essential that 
the movement of the linguistic philosophy as a whole be brought into 
focus. He sums up the following points:7^
(1) Philosophy qua philosophy is empirically uninformative.
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(2) Linguistic significance is the primary subject matter of 
philosophy.
(3) The proper locus of meaning is the proposition or statement.
(4) The function of philosophy is to engage in analysis of the 
meaning of language.
To put it more characteristically, the early analyses of Russell, Moore,
and others showed clearly, according to Ferre, that great scope existed
for philosophy under this new understanding of its function. Ordinary
language is a subtle and sometimes misleading instrument; meanings are
elusive, often hidden or confused by the language which seems to express
logically acceptable propositions. Many systematically misleading
expressions haunt the avenues of daily speech. Grammatically perfect
sentences may conceal logical incoherence. However much linguistic
philosophers may otherwise disagree, they are one in the conviction that
there is likely to be something about unanalysed language which raises
problems which proper analysis can remove.
If analytical philosophers should be challenged as to why they 
consider such work to be worthwhile, some might reply that the 
clarification of understanding needs no further justification, that it 
is intrinsically worthwhile. Others would appeal to the fact that 
clarification of language must be of immense aid to the working 
scientist who is impatient at being trapped in avoidable linguistic 
pitfalls. Still other philosophers might answer that their work was at 
least cleansing philosophical wheat from the chaff of ages and finally 
was establishing philosophy as an important branch of learning with a 
determinate job to do and a clear method of judging its success or 
failure. There are indeed many things that cannot be said but which men 
have tried to say. In trying, they have become enmeshed in logical 
puzzles and metaphysical and theological ambiguities and vacuities. It
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is the main business of philosophy to point out what can and cannot be 
said; all philosophy is 'critique of language'. This means that 'the 
object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work 
consists essentially of elucidations'.77
As Paul M. van Buren points out, the interest of philosophy is in 
the function of language, and its method lies in the logical analysis of 
how words and statements function, both in normal and in abnormal use.7® 
Unlike logical positivists,7^ linguistic analysts are not opposed in 
principle to the use of religious language. They claim that there are a 
variety of 'language games', activities with their appropriate 
languages, so that different kinds of language are appropriate to 
different situations. For example, the language of love is not that of 
biology, nor is it the language of politics. There is no reason why one 
should look for the same sort of evidence for a biologist's statement 
concerning a certain experiment and a statement concerning love made by 
a lover. Thus, this way of doing philosophy challenges the Christian to 
think clearly, to speak simply, and to say what he means without using 
words in unusual ways unless he makes quite clear what he is doing. 
Since this philosophical interest in language seems to hold considerable 
benefits for Christians' talk of God, we will discuss its implication 
the theological discourse.
Even though it is difficult to make it clear whether there is any 
continuity between the early and the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein,®0 one Qf the possible solutions proposed by linguistic 
analysts may be represented by his later philosophical remark on 
language: 'These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are
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solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that 
in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in spite of an
urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new 
information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is 
a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language'.®^ These remarks about language that some commentators take 
as embodying the whole of Wittgenstein's later philosophy®® seemed to 
provide an alternative theory of meaning, and one which was more 
tolerant of religious language than that of the logical positivists. 
Wittgenstein argued that we must make a radical break with the idea that 
language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: 
to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or 
anything you please.®® In this regard, he maintained that 'for a large 
class of cases - though not for all - in which we' employ the word 
'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in 
the language1.®^
In the early sections of his Philosophical Investigations 
Wittgenstein often mentions the great multiplicity of the types of words 
and sentences which go to make up a natural language, and he says that 
human beings are prone to assimilate all those different types to one 
model. We human beings tend to think that language consists of words 
each of which is correlated with something in the world outside 
language. We further suppose that the correlated objects give words 
their meaning. So the red things in the world give meaning to the word 
'red', for instance. But this view of language is radically mistaken.®® 
Words and sentences are like tools in a tool box, they have different 
uses of words, for example, giving or obeying orders, reporting events, 
making up stores, guessing riddles, reporting dreams, translating,
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asking, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying.®® He calls these 
1 language-games' ®7 and says that this term ' is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or a form of life1. The concept of a 'form of life1 shows 
that one of the points which Wittgenstein is making is that language 
always occurs in a certain human context: 1 Only in the stream of thought 
and life do words have meaning'.®®
Some followers of Wittgenstein have applied the concepts of 
'language-game' or 'form of life' to religion. Norman Malcolm applied 
this concept to religion in his Memoir of Wittgenstein®^ and especially 
in his article on St. Anselm's Ontological Arguments. In the latter he 
said that he suspected that the argument could be thoroughly understood 
only by someone who had a view from the inside of that 'form of life' 
which gives rise to the idea of an infinitely great being and who 
therefore had some inclination to partake in that religious form of 
life: "in those complex systems of thought, those 'languages-games',
God has the status of a necessary being. Who can doubt about that? 
Here we must say with Wittgenstein, 'This language-game is played!'"^0 
Malcolm points out elsewhere that we can engage in the activities of 
calculating, verifying, reasoning, questioning, only if we accept many 
things without question.^ For example, we are taught the names of 
objects, and we are taught how to add and multiply. We accept what we 
are taught. To doubt at this level would mean that we were not learning 
to calculate, or to look for and fetch objects, or to carry out orders: 
"Something must be taught us as a foundation". 92 a foundation must 
underlie every use of language: "Every language-game is based on words 
and objects being recognized again. We learn with the same 
inexorability that this is a chair as that 2 x 2 = 4 " . ^ ®
313
Similarly, D.Z. Phillips criticises many philosophers of religion 
who have protested against the philosophical assertion that religious 
beliefs must be recognized as distinctive language-games. Those who 
search for the ground of religious belief claim to understand what a 
purely theological belief in the existence of God would be. But their 
accounts about what religious believers seem to be saying, in his view, 
are often at variance with what many believers say, at least when they 
are not p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . ^  For instance, a philosopher may say that
there is no God, but a believer may reply, 'You are creating and then
attacking a fiction. The god whose existence you deny is not the God I 
believe in. ' Or another philosopher may say that religion is 
meaningless, but another believer may reply, 'You say that when applied 
to God, words such as 'exists1, 'love', 'will' etc., do not mean what 
they signify in certain non-religious c o n t e x t s . T h u s ,  against the 
philosophical assumption behind the ignoring of religious testimony as 
begging the question, and the search for external reasons for believing 
in God, Phillips argues that philosophy can claim justifiably to show 
what is meaningful in religion only if it is prepared to examine 
religious concepts in the contexts from which they derive their 
meaning:
A failure to take account of the above context has led some 
philosophers to ask religious language to satisfy criteria 
of meaningfulness alien to it. They say that religion must 
be rational if it is to be intelligible. Certainly, the 
distinction between the rational and the irrational must be
central in any account one gives of meaning. But this is
not to say that there is a paradigm of rationality to which 
all modes of discourse conform. A necessary prolegomenon to 
the philosophy of religion, then, is to show the diversity 
of criteria of rationality; to show that the distinction 
between the real and the unreal does not come to the same 
thing in every context. If this were observed, one would no 
longer wish to construe God's reality as being that of an 
existent among existents, an object among objects.97
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Accordingly, to say that a god is not the same as one's own God 
involves, so Phillips claims, saying that those who believe in him are 
in a radically different religious tradition from one's own. The 
criteria of what can sensibly be said of God are to be found within the 
religious tradition. Therefore, the criteria of meaningfulness cannot 
be found outside religion, since they are given by religious discourse 
itself. Theology then can claim justifiably to show what is meaningful 
in religion only when it has an internal relation to religious 
discourse. On the other hand, Philosophy can make the same claim only 
if it is prepared to examine religious concepts in the contexts from 
which they derive their meaning. So unlike those who believe that 
theology is external to religion and seeks a rational justification of 
religious truth,^8 what Phillips claims is therefore to be the internal 
role of theology in religion. Coming to see that there is a God is not 
like coming to see that an additional being exists. Coming to see that 
there is a God involves seeing a new meaning in one's life, and being 
given a new understanding. One cannot have religion without religious 
discourse. In each case theology decides what it makes sense to say to 
God and about God. In short, theology is the grammar of religious
discourse.^9
However, John Hick points out that we must be clear about the 
implications of what is proposed. For when we are concerned with the 
language of judaic-christian faith in its natural sense, as we find it 
in the scriptures, in liturgies, in creeds and confessions, in sermons 
and in works of theology, we cannot doubt that this religious language 
has always been meant by its users to operate as cognitive discourse.1*^ 
We cannot doubt, for instance, that the great prophets of the Old 
Testament, or Jesus of Nazareth himself, or St. Paul, or Augustine,
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Aquinas or Luther, when they spoke about God, believed that they were 
referring to a real being who exists independently of ourselves and with 
whom, in the activities of worship, we may enter into personal 
relationship. Thus, from the point of view of one whose faith forms 
part of a history going back through the generations of the church's 
life to the faith of the New Testament, and behind that to the insights 
of the great Hebrew prophets, the Wittgensteinian non-cognitivist is not 
offering an objective analysis of the language of faith as living speech 
but is instead recommending a quite new use for it. For this 
Wittgensteinian non-cognitivist theory is not descriptive but radically 
revisionary. 1®1
Consequently, the principal loss of the non-cognitivist view would 
be, so Hick argues, the irreversible retreat of religious discourse 
within the borders of its own autonomous language-game, where it must 
renounce all claim to bear witness to the nature of the universe and 
must cease to interact with other departments of human knowledge. 
Religious language would become a protected discourse, no longer under 
obligation to show its compatibility with established conclusions in 
other spheres, because it would be regarded as making no claims which 
could either agree or conflict with scientific knowledge or 
philosophical reflection.1®2 On this view, whilst these considerations 
might have the psychological effect of bringing someone to abandon 
religious belief, they have no bearing upon its logical propriety. For 
religion is simply an established form of human life and language. Like 
eating and drinking, it cannot properly be characterised as either true 
or false. It is just a fact that, in the words of Wittgenstein, this 
language game is played. Religion stands on its own feet as a form of 
human life, and anyone is free to participate in it or not. It would be
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perhaps a great relief to the religious apologist not to be expected to 
defend his faith against attack.1®5
However, this particular form of life, to use Wittgenstein's phrase
again, consists in living in the world as God's world and in relation to
other people as God's children. It has political, economic and moral
consequences which constitute the Christian - ethic. It also involves
activities of worship and dispositions of mind, both intellectual and
emotional, which directly refer to the supreme Being about whom the
Christian message speaks. If there is no such Being, these activities
are misdirected and non-functional:
If one who participates in the theistic form of life is not 
convinced of the reality of a supreme Being, he is behaving 
irrationally. He is irrational in sort of way in which 
someone who talked and tried to behave as though he had 
inherited a million pounds, when he knows that in fact he 
has not, would be irrational. For to be rational is to live 
in terms of reality as one responsibly believes it to be.
And the religious form of life can only count as reasonable 
if it is based upon a sincere conviction, or at least an 
effective working presupposition, that the God whom we 
worship and seek to serve does indeed exist. There is, 
therefore, something deeply irrational about the non- 
cognitivist proposals to use the traditional language of 
religion, and to participate in the form of life of which it 
is the linguistic expression, after consciously rejecting
Dn which these depend for their
Accordingly, the final point of distinction between religion, on 
the one hand, and aesthetics and ethics, on the other, is the
Hick often calls the 'cognitive - non-cognitive issue' is one which 
centres upon the 'metaphysical surplus', namely, the reference to God. 
He acknowledges the possibility of forming a coherent understanding of 
the universe without reference to God, i.e. the sheer givenness of the
ontological claim that God exists as a real Being.1®5 The problem which
universe is accepted as the 'ultimate fact'.1®5 At this point Hick has
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applied Wittgenstein's remarks on 'seeing as'^®7 to religious belief, 
suggesting that belief in many religious doctrines may be construed as 
seeing the world or interpreting our experience in a certain way. 
According to him, the core of the concept of verification is 'the 
removal of ignorance or uncertainty concerning the truth of a 
proposition'. If anything is described as factual, where it be a 
'religious' fact or a 'more proximate' kind of fact, it must make an 
experienceable difference whether or not such facts exist. Hick claims 
that there is, in fact, a fundamental element of Christian belief which 
meets the demand for an experienceable difference and also for the 
removal of uncertainty about its truth, namely, the eschatological 
element. For him, this notion is indispensable for any conception of 
the universe which claims to be Christian. His concept of 
'eschatological verification' is, of course, intended to establish the 
cognitive meaningfulness and not the truth of religious belief. 
Nevertheless, I think that it is noticeable to see that Hick has both 
modified and gone beyond Wittgenstein's ideas. The latter employed the 
examples of the duck-rabbit and the puzzle-picture in order to draw a 
parallel between 'seeing an aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a 
word'. Whereas Hick contends that all experiencing is 'experiencing as' 
in covering such diverse cases; but he has raised many serious
p r o b l e m s .  ^ 9
Thus, in this disputation it seems to me that both Hick and the 
Wittgensteinians have at least sought to understand the language of 
religious discourse exhaustively in terms of functions which language 
may serve outside the strictly theological context; but they have 
different opinions about the question of justification. As Patrick 
Sherry points out, it is quite clear that Malcolm and Phillips are not
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merely repeating the familiar apologetical point that religion is a way 
of life and not just a body of doctrines. For they have also applied 
the notion of a 1 language-game1 to religion, attempting to establish the 
following two points:
(1) Religion is 'given' or basic, so that it need not be
justified, and indeed cannot be.
(2) Its concepts are in order as they are, for 'this language-game 
is played' .
The first of these points follows from Wittgenstein's assertion that
forms of life and language-games are simply there: 'What has to be
accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life' For 
instance, Wittgenstein says that he would like to regard having a
'comfortable certainty1 as a form of life: "But that means I want to
conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal".
As Patrick Sherry points out, Wittgenstein maintains that language- 
games like forms of life cannot and need not be justified. He argues, 
for instance, that the primitive language-game which speaks of material 
objects must simply be accepted. "What we have rather to do is to
accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the
matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are taught 
needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be 
rejected." ^ 3  such language-games are simply 'given': "You must bear
in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I 
mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or
unreasonable). It is there - like our life."^^ There comes a point 
when we must stop looking for justification and instead simply accept 
certain basic human reactions and modes of behaviour: "If I have
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exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined, to say: "This is simply what I do." ...
Could I now say: "I read off my having then meant to do such-and-such, 
as if from a map, although there is no map?" But that means nothing 
but: J am now inclined to say "I read the intention of acting thus in 
certain states of mind which I remember." Our mistake is to look for an 
explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto- 
phenomenon' . That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game 
is played'. The applications of this line of thought are varied. ^
Despite the difficulty of saying exactly what Wittgenstein meant by
a 'form of life' because of its few examples, it is possible that the
term denotes something on a smaller scale like measuring, hoping or
pitying. If this interpretation is correct, then it is incorrect to
label religion as a form of life; rather, it includes several forms of
life, for example, worshipping, hoping and forgiving. This suggestion
is, so Sherry claims, an important point, because it affects some of
Malcolm's and Phillips' arguments about the illegitimacy of trying to
justify religious beliefs:
Of course, they would still be right in maintaining the 
absurdity of asking for a justification of something like 
hoping in general. But it is perfectly sensible to ask for 
a justification of particular hopes, for instance the 
Christian's hope for forgiveness of sins and future 
resurrection. Furthermore, even a specifically religious 
practice like 'worship' is not immune to demands for 
justification: we can rightly ask whether the object of
worship actually exists and is indeed worthy of worship. In 
any case, even if religion as a whole can be described as a 
'form of life', it is incorrect to suppose that anyone ever 
does want to justify it. Apologists and missionaries are 
always concerned to justify their own particular religions, 
rather than 'religion' in general. The latter is merely as 
abstraction.^  ^
In particular, the view that criteria of intelligibility and
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rationality are to be found only within the language-game does seem to 
be in accordance with some of the things, which Wittgenstein says.^^ 
We have already seen that he thinks that one can only justify statements 
within language-games, but not the language-games themselves. The 
relationship between them is somewhat like that between a system of
measurement and the measurements themselves; and only the latter can be 
described as ' correct! or 1 incorrect' . What counts as a reason or as 
evidence, therefore, depends on the context: all testing occurs within
a system, so that it is idle to look for any general account of what 
constitute good grounds.^® Hence, Wittgenstein himself is much more 
concerned with the conditions of assertability for concepts like 'pain'
or 'material object' than with any general theory of truth. In this
regard, Phillips' claim seems to be harmless insofar as he says that 
what Wittgenstein is saying is that if the philosopher wants to give an 
account of religion, he must pay attention to what religious believers 
do and say.^^ But he goes on to say that Wittgenstein's remarks also 
mean that philosophers can only describe religious language and must not 
try to justify it; it is nonsensical to talk of religion requiring a 
foundation or justification, if we can only justify particular religious 
assertions, using criteria of meaning and truth found within
religion.^0 Thus, the task of philosophy is not 'to settle the 
question of whether a man is talking to God or not, but to ask what it 
means to affirm or deny that a man is talking to God, in other words, 
not to justify but to understand.
With respect to Phillips' accounts of the term 'language-game' 
Sherry argues, however, that it is surely doubtful whether they follow 
from the remarks of Wittgenstein which he attempts to approve.^ 1  
Wittgenstein's view here should be seen, partly at least, as an attack
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on the search for an ideal language: he asks whether the language of
every day is 'somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? 
Then how is another one to be constructed?' But he is also discussing 
the scope of philosophy and the source of its problems: part of our
failure to understand 1 is that we do not command a clear view of the use 
of our words - our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity1. 
Philosophical problems arise from the lack of understanding which would 
enable us to see connections/ and the role of philosophy is simply to 
put everything before us and to 'assemble reminders for a particular 
purpose'.122 Needless to say, Wittgenstein's thesis is about meaning 
and concepts, whereas Phillips goes on to talk about 'criteria of truth 
or falsity'.123
In this regard, what Sherry argues is that Phillips' autonomistic 
position raises the most serious objection that are concerned with 
religious truth.12  ^ For instance, how can we be sure that the standards 
of truth or validity which are accepted by our religious community are 
the right ones? Obviously Phillips will reject such an objection as 
missing the point, since the relevant criteria can only be found within 
the religious tradition and there is no independent standard by which we 
can grade different religions.125 Each one regards its own scriptures, 
traditions, etc. as the touchstone of truth. But if we define religious 
truth in terms of a particular tradition, we preclude ourselves from 
asking whether this tradition really embodies the truth. Such a 
criticism is not merely captious or academic, because religious 
communities do change their beliefs over the centuries and different 
communities often hold mutually contradictory views. Indeed in the case 
of doctrinal disputes Phillips' strategy is unsatisfactory if there 
seems to be no common standard to which the different parties can
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appeal, as Catholics and Protestants can appeal to scripture.12® So, as 
regards the question of religious truth, Sherry seems, I think, to be 
correct in saying that the issue is resolved into the ontological, 
epistemological and linguistic problems, and indeed it cannot exclude 
study of the traditional theistic arguments; of the question of the 
cognitive value of religious experience and mysticism; of the relation 
between religious and scientific beliefs; of the apparently competing 
truth-claims of different religions; of naturalistic theories of the 
nature of religion; of the problem of evil considered as a challenge to 
theistic faith; of the alleged incoherences in the concept of God and 
so o n J ^
However, Sherry also fails to recognise the Wittgensteinian view 
that it sees religious language as expressive in character and one which 
offers people possibilities of meaning for their lives. The language 
gives expression to religious ’pictures' which form the whole framework 
for the believer's life. The 'pictures' are not substitutes for 
anything more substantial than themselves.-*2® As Jaakko Hintikka points 
out, insofar as one especially instructive way of looking at 
Wittgenstein's development beyond the Tractatus is to emphasise the role 
of his insight into the need of analysing those very representational 
relationships between language and reality which were left unattended to 
both in the Tractatus and in logical semantics, the representational 
relationships between language and reality have as it were their mode of 
existence in certain rule-governed human activities. These activities 
are just what Wittgenstein calls 'language-games'. They are what, 
according to Wittgenstein, creates and sustains the representative 
relationships between language and reality.12^ If this interpretation 
is correct, then language is not something which is simply added to
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social life to facilitate communication; it is itself the embodiment of 
these possibilities. Life and language may change in such a way that 
older ways of living and expression are put under pressure and may lose 
their hold altogether: "... new types of language, new language-games, 
as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get 
f orgotten." ^ 0
In similar manner, what Wittgenstein has in mind about the role of 
language-games is that certain phenomena only 'exist', as it were, 
because our language contains their possibility. There are language- 
games played which allow us to speak of certain phenomena^! "We feel 
as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is
directed not towards phenomena but, as one might say, towards the 
possibilities of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of 
thekind of statement that we make about phenomena. ""*32 gc ^  depends 
wholly on the grammar of one or another language-game what will be 
called possible and what not; it depends on what that grammar permits. 
He writes:
If a proposition too is conceived as a picture of a possible 
state of affairs and is said to shew the possibility of the 
state of affairs, still the most that the proposition can do 
is what a painting or relief or film does: and so it can at
any rate not set forth what is not the case. So does it 
depend wholly on our grammar what will be called (logically) 
possible and what not, - i.e. what the grammar permits?
But surely that is arbitrary! - Is it arbitrary? - It is not 
every sentence - like formation that we know how to do 
something with, not every technique has an application in 
our life; and when we are tempted in philosophy to count 
some quite useless thing as a proposition, that is often 
because we have not considered its application
s u f f i c i e n t l y .
The lesson here is that all language-games consist of a plurality 
of beliefs and certainties which are independent and lend one another 
mutual support. In any natural ordinary language, then, most utterances
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must be 'true' (grounded) in terms of other accepted ’facts of nature', 
theories, propositions, assumptions, and the like. Perhaps the most 
far-reaching possibilities are those which constitute radically 
different ways of looking at phenomena or, as Wittgenstein puts it, 
create the possibilities of phenomena. As Derek L. Phillips point out, 
we may consider three types of situations about the • possibilities of 
phenomena. First, an element (proposition, theory, or whatever) is in 
no way a candidate for acceptance into the language-game because that 
which it calls into question is too firmly anchored within the language- 
game (that is, the 'new' element constitutes a virtual impossibility). 
In the second case, new elements may be introduced and older elements 
revised or replaced, either because they are not firmly entrenched 
within the language-game or because the revision (the new possibility) 
can be incorporated into the language-game as presently played. 
Finally, we have the situation where a whole new system (possibility) is 
c r e a t e d . ^34 It is true because our language-games serve to define the 
linguistic symbols involved in them and thereby guarantee them a role in 
our interactions with reality.^ 5
If this is so, then what happens to religious forms of expression 
in a period of rapid change? Changes are not necessarily inimical of 
religion, but there are strong reasons for thinking that today religion 
is becoming less and less of a possibility for people. Not only may 
people find that religion now provides only a very alien way of being 
human, but contemporary forms of language make it difficult for people 
who are religious to give expression to this in their own lives. In 
this regard, the fate of religion is unavoidably determined by what 
happens to it in the complex relations of influences and counter­
influences. Certain prevailing conceptions of philosophy of religion
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can give no account of these complexities. This is the case with 
externalism, the view that religious belief is answerable to universal 
criteria of intelligibility; and with internalism, the view that 
whatever is called religious is self-authenicating. But the facts and 
possibilities of cultural change must be taken seriously. When this 
happens, certain comforting religious pictures have to be abandoned. So 
believers cannot take comfort in the view that no matter what happens 
around them, the believer's heart is a secret place which cannot be 
affected by these events. They cannot assume that, no matter what 
cultural changes occur, religion can always accommodate them without 
loss of meaning or character.^ 6
Therefore, a theologian must not be reluctant to recognise the fact 
that language must always be understood, with the later Wittgenstein, in 
its context and it cannot be torn out of the human life and activities 
in which it is taught and used. Our ability to use our language is, in 
part, a social capacity. It depends on our interactions with others in 
community of varying interests, capacities and e x p e r t i s e . ^37 In this 
regard, theology as grammar in Wittgenstein's terms tells us how to take 
the language of faith. It discloses its sense. It is an aid to those 
who would speak and understand that language, helping them to avoid 
mistakes and misapprehensions so that they can get along with the 
language. Theology as grammar determines what can and cannot be said of 
God, and it is especially helpful where the requirements of faithful 
speech put some strain on ordinary grammar, as in Luther's remark that 
"Divinity is nothing but a grammar of the language of the Holy Ghost", 
or where apparent similarities to other sorts of language may mislead 
the hearer, or where a new context or a new challenge calls for new 
developments in the language. The 'grammar' of belief has to do with
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the totality of the religious life. It is not a theologian, for 
example, who decides we need a new theology, or in Wittgensteinian 
terms, a reformed grammar. Where there is a genuine demand for a new 
theology, it does not emerge in a vacuum from the theoretical and 
arbitrary insistence of a new theologians. A genuine demand arises from 
the totality of the religious life in its desire to say something fresh 
to God and about G o d .  ^ 8
2.2 The relation of revelation to reason and language
In the previous discussion the significance of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy and its implications for religious language, if these views 
were acceptable, would remove many of the difficulties of the 
theological dilemma and puzzlement. In the respect of language analysis, 
even though Brunner himself did not make language a special problem in 
his chief works, he insists upon the inseparable character of the 
relation of reason and l a n g u a g e .  ^ 9  According to him, so long as the 
linguistic philosopher confines himself to the empirical description of 
the actual situation of language study or the growth of language, 
neither philosophical nor theological problems will arise. But insofar 
as he regards language as the problem of man or of his relation to God, 
then he is confronted by questions that cannot be met by purely 
scientific means; the questions are mostly those in which the 
difference between a Christian and a non-Christian understanding of man 
comes out plainly. For example, the same applies to the realm of law 
and political science. Not in juridical technique, but certainly in the 
fundamental questions of the nature and obligations of law and the 
state, we must face fundamental points of view which affect our whole 
philosophy of life. The 'law of closeness of relation' or the law of 
contiguity (see IV.4.3) works itself out; the understanding of man as
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person, and of the human community as a community of persons, comes in 
sight.1
Accordingly, while Brunner insists that critical reason cannot 
attain to the knowledge of revelation, yet he also frankly concedes that 
there can be no revelation apart from reason. There is nothing, he 
claims (in his natural theology debate with Barth, see 1.1.3), to be 
feared in the thesis that man's capacity to perceive the word of 
revelation would be impossible apart from reason.^41 just how the 
reason functions in the receiving of the word is a mystery, but one 
thing is sure that "faith does not ignore or coerce the thinking 
r e a s o n " . ^42 Reason is the condition sine qua non of faith, the organ of 
r e v e l a t i o n . ^43 g o  it cannot be fenced in. Without reason we can 
neither preach nor pray. Even the word of revelation must be received 
by us as that which is thought. The understanding of the Bible 
presupposes rational activity, a knowledge of the law of grammar and 
logic: "... when man answer's God's Word of revelation, he also
accomplishes an act of thinking. Where there is speech, where there is 
an answer, there also is thought. That confession of Peter: 'Verily
Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God', is a thought which 
expresses itself as a meaningful, grammatical, logical sentence. Even 
faith is accomplished in ideas, and in connexion with ideas: God is the 
Lord, or - in the primary form - 'Thou, 0  God, art my L o r d ' " ^ 4 4
We cannot, therefore, and we ought not to dispense with rational 
categories. Brunner claims that his emphasis upon the complete 
difference between the Biblical and the rational concepts of truth in no 
way impinges upon their positive r e l a t i o n s h i p . ^4 5  He argues that we 
have distinction between the personal and the impersonal without
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separation. The Logos of revelational truth is also the Logos of 
rational truth. The unity is given to us in the idea that just as the 
world is based upon the Creator - Logos, so also our natural knowledge, 
in all its activities, ultimately presupposes the Creator - Logos. 
Even natural knowledge, which is acquired through the senses and the 
intellect, is not simply something 'profane1, insofar as it wills and 
grasps Truth, it is something sacred. In his opinion, the idea of Truth 
and the obligation to be genuine and sincere, which is fundamental in 
all serious pursuit of knowledge, points to an ultimate ground of Truth. 
The human reason, by means of which we distinguish true and false in the 
sphere of natural or scientific knowledge, is no more based upon itself 
than the world which it knows is based upon itself. Further, the reason 
and the knowledge which it acquires finds its ground and its purpose in 
the Son. The capacity of man to know is one aspect of that quality of 
'being made in the Image of God' which constitutes the nature of man. 
The God who has revealed Himself in Christ is the same God who created 
the world. Hence the question for Brunner can never be whether, but to 
what extent and in what sense, reason and revelation, faith and rational 
thinking can be combined with one a n o t h e r .  ^ 7
In Brunner's view, even though its meaning is various and complex, 
the Greek classic term 'logos' presents itself very differently, 
according as we translate it by 'meaning' or by ' r e a s o n ' . ^ 8  In a 
formal sense, the logos includes all that has unity of thought of any 
kind, whether it be the Word of God or the word of man, whether it be 
diabolical or holy, whether it be something very ordinary or something 
extremely significant. But the term 'logos' contains not only this 
formal element of unity of meaning but also the normative one, namely, 
the relation to the truth, the truly meaningful, that which is good,
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just, valid. The A S y o s  and the A o y  O V  & L S O  V <X t ~  to give
meaning, to give an account of something - demands a relation of the
single significant thing to the whole thing. At this point alone does 
that which was formerly only a formal problem in logic - whether
something in itself represents a unity of meaning - now become a 
theological problem, that is, how this particular unity of meaning
agrees with the ultimate divine meaning.
Brunner is, incidentally, concerned with a rule laid down by Bacon: 
we must be on our guard against the deceptions which lie in w o r d s . 149 
According to him when we assert, "The Word of God is 'true', God reveals 
Himself as 'the Good'", this seems to mean that we can define God, and 
His acting or speaking, by means of criteria that are already at our 
disposal. Thus, by definite norms that are known to us of the true and 
the good, God's action and His speech are measured, and then sanction is 
given to that which is found in agreement with these norms. This state 
of affairs, which from the very outset looks highly suspicious, proves 
on closer examination to be a deception produced by language. For what 
we usually call 'our' standard, 'our' norm, is in reality the truth of 
God and the norm of God. The ideas of truth and justice are, in 
reality, a reflection of His own Being; the idea of truth is simply the 
way in which God Himself, in all our mental acts, makes Himself felt as 
their hidden norm. Thus when we speak of God as 'just', 'good', 'true', 
we are not placing Him under a law outside Himself, but we are referring 
to the law of His own nature, which is the source of our ideas of truth 
and of the good.
Therefore, we may say, according to Brunner, that these ideas are 
'immanent in the human m i n d ' . ^ O  This does not mean that they are
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inborn, but it does mean that 'being human1 implies that as the mind of 
man develops, these ideas become effective as motive forces for his 
thinking and willing, and as the criteria which determine his 
judgements. In and through these ideas God works in every human being. 
This forms part of the universal revelation, which at the same time 
determines the essential structure of human existence. Without these 
ideas man is not man, and these ideas come from God. They are, however, 
purely formal ones. Even though for this very reason they are of great 
significance for our thought and will, such ide^s are not the thoughts 
of God. The ideas are 'only a final dim recollection of that which we 
ought to have known originally of God, and His living and personal 
W o r d ' . ^51 Thus, .Brunner makes distinction between two statements which 
sound exactly the same, and yet lie as far apart from one another as the 
world of the Platonic theory of ideas and the world of Biblical 
revelation. They are these: God is (the same as) the truth; and God
is the Truth. In the former, the concept of God is filled out with the 
content: truth. Thus, when we think 'God' we think no more than when 
we think 'truth'. Whereas in the latter we say that that which we call 
'truth' in abstract terms is in reality of God, the God when we know 
from revelation. For Brunner, this abstract truth is only a reflection 
of the Truth which is God, the Creator.
Accordingly, Brunner claims that the idea of truth, which is 
formal, can be filled with meaning only by the idea of God of the 
Christian revelation. That is to say, the logos of reason, which we can 
know through self-reflection on the nature of the mind and thus can know 
rationally, is only a 'representation' of the genuine divine Logos whom 
we know in Jesus Christ. This rational logos points toward Him, but it 
is not He Himself:
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The idea of truth which we as philosophers perceive when we 
take into account the nature of the mind characterizes the 
place at which, for the knowledge of faith, there stands the 
eternal Son of God, who in Jesus Christ became man. We must 
not even say that the philosophical, rational, Logos, idea 
is the idea of the divine Logos of which faith speaks is 
always the idea of a Person, the idea of the Son, in whom, 
through whom, and unto whom the world was created, in whom 
God loves the world from everlasting to everlasting, and who 
in Jesus Christ became flesh. Apart from this, His 
revelation, we do not know the Logos of God; the 
philosophical Logos idea is only its abstract substitute in
abstract t h i n k i n g .  ^ 2
In Brunner's view, rational knowledge belongs, therefore, neither 
to the action of redemption nor to that working of God in nature which 
takes place without human knowledge. The eternal Logos of God is the 
principle of the rational knowledge of truth; from Him comes the idea 
of truth, as of all true ideas. But for that very reason, because
through these ideas, in spite of the fact that they have their ground in 
Him, we cannot know Him Himself, they ought not to be connected with the 
name of Christ. Wherever anything true is perceived, the eternal Logos 
is at work; but Jesus Christ is at work where, upon the basis of His 
historical revelation, man believes in Him. He is the Head of the 
Church; He is where two or three are gathered together in His name. He 
works as the redeeming Revealer, and all that is redeeming revelation is 
ascribed to Him. But the truth-idea of philosophy does not belong here, 
important as it may be for our rational thinking. For it is merely a 
pointer to it, as it is a reflection from it. Just as a map does not
give us a real picture of a country, but rather a symbolical, 'token'
representation of the country, so the truth-idea of reason is a 'token'
representation of that Logos which in Christ became man.
So in respect of faith God, when He became man, came down to man's 
level in order that man might be able to meet Him. He has adapted His
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revelation to man, in that He clothed it in the human word of the 
Apostles.153 He chose this form of revelation because communication 
through speech is the proper way in which human communication is carried 
on. Man uses words, wherever he awakens to humanity; as humanus he 
uses language, that is, he can speak and he can understand the speech of 
others. The capacity was given to him as his own in the creation. So 
wherever the Gospel is proclaimed this capacity is presupposed (see 
II.2.2). Capacity for speech is not given to us by the message of 
Christ, but it is claimed and used for the message of Christ. In 
Brunner's view, this capacity really belongs to the lumen naturale; it 
is the primary token by which we perceive the presence and the operation 
of the natural light, or the light of reason. And yet this lumen 
naturale is not without an original relation to the divine Word, which 
in Jesus Christ became flesh. "It is not the same, but it comes from
the same source, from the Logos of God. When God created man as a
rational being, as a A o ~ f t K O $  > one w^o can understand and
use words, He created him for the reception of His Word of 
revelation". ^ 4  As ^he personal being of man is a reflection of the 
divine personal Being, imago Dei, so the human word is imago verbi 
divini. Man's capacity for speech is intended by the Creator as 
receptivity for His Word; that is its most original and direct 
meaning.^55
To be sure, since the Word of God comes to us as a human word - as
the word of an Isaiah, a Paul, or a John and it makes use of a definite
human language that is already in existence with its vocabulary and its 
grammar, Brunner insists upon the necessity of doctrine, in fact, of 
correct doctrine. Though Jesus Christ is more than all words about Him, 
yet He is not present to us, other than through definite concepts of
333
thought. "Only when a person is taught rightly about God is his heart 
rightly turned toward Him, incorrect doctrine points man in the wrong 
direction, where we cannot find Him and He cannot find u s . "156 por o n i y  
the correct doctrine can point clearly to Him who is the revelation of 
God,* and only in this clarity of statement can it itself become 
revelation, the Word of God. But when all is said and done, this 
doctrine is not revelation. It too, according to him, only points to 
revelation. Therefore, correct doctrine is, of course, doctrine that 
points to Christ. But how does one know that a given doctrine points to 
Christ?
Perhaps a possible answer to this question lies in a very 
interesting situation which we must elaborate. The fact that the 
doctrine of the Church is not the revelation itself comes out, as we 
have seen, in the New Testament witness to Christ Himself in the variety 
of the New Testament or apostolic d o c t r i n e s . 157 jQhn speaks a different 
language from Paul; Paul uses different terms from Matthew. In other 
words, this means that the 'content' is one, but in each case the 
'setting' is different. Yet even in these writers we can already 
perceive that these varieties of 'setting' are due to their intellectual 
and historical environment. We might think that this fact - namely, 
that the doctrine is conditioned by the recipient or hearer - should 
refer only to one who does not yet believe; for instance, to the way in 
which Paul the missionary says of himself that "to the Jews he is a Jew" 
and to "them that are without law" (that is, the heathen) "as without 
law", in order that he "might save s o m e " . 158
Furthermore, this problem could be more deeply understood in the 
sense of the hearer's receptivity only when we remember that faith is a
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definite experience of self-knowledge; that is, we learn to understand 
ourselves in the light of God and His revelation. For Brunner, even 
when confronted by the Word of God, man is not simply 'tabula rasa', not 
an empty page upon which God now writes His Word. Here, too, 
understanding is involved, which makes use of the 'apperceptions1 of the 
human mind. What matters is not to understand 'something, but oneself. 
Only where the Word of God or revelation leads to a new understanding of 
oneself, does it become 'one's own', in the act of believing 
understanding it is 'appropriated'. Thus the very act of faith itself 
is placed within a 'setting' in which the ideas with which man 
understands anything at all, and with which above all he understands 
himself, are not eliminated but are utilized and remoulded. So, since 
these ideas vary at different times and change, Brunner claims that 
language c h a n g e ? .  ^ 9  The most profound change takes place where we are 
dealing with man's understanding of Himself. The knowledge of faith is 
always involved in this 'setting' or missionary situation, which 
conditions our ideas, and in man's contemporary view of himself. Even 
Christian believers now use, therefore, different language from the 
believers of other days.
In similar manner, Paul Tillich points out that the 'situation' 
theology must consider is the creative interpretation of existence, an 
interpretation which is carried on in every period of history under all 
kinds of psychological and sociological conditions. The 'situation' 
certainly is not independent of these factors. However, theology deals 
with the cultural expression they have found in practice as well as in 
theology and not with these conditioning factors as such. The 
'situation' to which theology must respond is the totality of man's 
creative self-interpretation in a special p e r i o d .  ^ 0  According to him,
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every spiritual phenomenon of a period expresses its eternal content and 
one of the most important characteristics of a time has been defined 
when we have discovered which of the various aspects of culture is most 
expressive of its real meaning. Hence every period of time is self- 
sufficient in its forms, in its existential content, in its vital 
tendencies; yet it is not possible for any time to be self-sufficient. 
Because it is time, there is something within it which drives it beyond 
itself at every moment, not toward the future, which would be only a new 
time with the same impossibility of being self-sufficient, but toward 
something which is no longer time.^'l
For this reason, Tillich claims that the most profound revelations 
of existence testify to something that is not an existence. Whenever a 
period speaks most effectively and clearly of itself it speaks no longer 
of itself but of something else, of a reality which lies beneath all 
time and above all existential forms. The real 'miracle' of time and of 
every present is not only that it can transcend itself but that as a 
result of unpredictable catastrophes it must transcend itself ever and 
again. On the other hand, we may say that time lives within itself and 
its forms and because the eternal is taken up into the forms of time it 
becomes an existential form, or contemporary one. The eternal becomes 
an individual event, a present in time. That which is not time becomes 
time; that which is not an existential form becomes an existing form. 
So these two aspects of the religious situation are dynamically related 
each other like "a movement to and fro between self-transcendence and 
self-sufficiency, between the desire to be a mere vessel and to the 
desire to be the content".
Obviously, the notion of situation is applied to his theological
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method when he tells us at the outset that a theological system must 
serve two quite different needs, "the statement of the truth of 
Christian message, and an interpretation of this truth for every 
generation".  ^^ 3 Thus he is convinced that it is the unavoidable duty of 
the theologian to relate the Christian message to the cultural situation 
of his day. Since language is the basic and all-pervasive expression of 
every situation, theology cannot escape the problem of the 
1 s i t u a t i o n ' . ^ 4  He forces himself to treat symbolism and demands that 
theologians develop symbols appropriate to the contemporary scene and 
intelligible to modern man He analyses painstakingly the symbolic
and metaphorical nature of all the traditional concepts which Christian 
theologians have traditionally employed in their attempts to describe 
the God of Jesus as the Christ. Every one of these - Father, Creator, 
omnipotent, and so forth, must be taken not literally but symbolically, 
as pointing beyond their ineradicably anthropomorphic meanings to the 
mysterious Unconditioned who is God himself. They are all human 
'projections'. But they are projections on something, namely, the 
'realm of ultimate concern', that is, the Deity h i m s e l f . Thus, when 
bearing relevant witness to that which is of ultimate concern to himself 
the Christian has to consider how the Christian message should be 
interpreted with reference to this religious symbols or language.
There are, then, some striking similarities between Brunner's 
approach and that of Tillich in which they are concerned with the 
relationship between biblical truth, or revelation, and rational 
knowledge, namely, their apologetic concern. Both attempt to analyse 
the biblical truth of revelation in 'personal' terms, but they deal with 
the same problem in different context. Brunner's argument is that this 
conflict between the biblical truth of revelation and rational knowledge
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can never be resolved simply by finding the proper balance between them 
but only by abandoning this whole scheme and replacing it with an 
entirely different concept of truth centering in the personal 
correspondence between God and man as such (see III.3.4). In Brunner's 
view, the biblical truth of revelation arises in the personal knowing of 
a Subject by a subject, not in the subjective, rational knowing of an 
it. An event in which Person meets person cannot be interpreted in 
terms of a relationship between an object and a subject. However, this 
does not mean that there is no place for doctrine or that the subject- 
object antithesis can be completely discarded. On the contrary, while 
the content of the Word is a Person, nevertheless, God's Word always 
says 'something'. The personal reality cannot be encountered or known 
entirely apart from the doctrines. Doctrine forms the necessary frame­
work in which and the indispensable token by which God is personally 
known, but doctrine alone is never the reality. Doctrine is secondary 
and purely instrumental.
On the contrary, Tillich raises the question of the relationship 
between the symbols of biblical personalism and the philosophical 
inquiry for ultimate reality. He admits that on the basis of a surface 
analysis there seems to be a deep and irreconcilable conflict between 
the purely personal categories of the Bible and the impersonal 
categories employed in ontology. For example, the biblical concept of a 
personal God who is a being among other beings seems to be completely 
opposed to the ontological concept of being-itself. The biblical 
doctrine of the Logos as a particular, concrete Person, Jesus Christ, 
seems to be in direct opposition to the philosophical idea of the 
universal Logos which is present in all b e i n g . 167 The main 
antiontological bias of biblical religion is, then, "its personalism.
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According to every word of the Bible, God reveals himself as personal. 
The encounter with him and the concepts describing this encounter are 
thoroughly p e r s o n a l .  " ^ 8  In this regard, there seems to be an
unbridgeable chasm between biblical symbols and ontological concepts. 
He contends, however, that there is at the deepest level not only an 
essential unity between them but that actually each demands and depends 
upon the other. The use of biblical symbols involves the making of
philosophical, or ontological, assertions and thus raises the question 
of being with which philosophy deals. Whereas philosophy asks the 
question of the meaning of ultimate reality or the question of the 
meaning of being with which religion deals: "Philosophy necessarily asks 
the question of reality as a whole, the question of the structure of 
being. Theology necessarily asks the same question, for that which 
concerns us ultimately must belong to reality as a whole; it must 
belong to being. Otherwise we could not encounter it, and it could not 
concern u s . " 1 ^ 9
So Tillich claims that it is possible to unite what at first seemed 
to be irreconcilable. The biblical analysis of theological problems 
calls for and is supplemented by ontological concepts. "The God who is 
a being is transcended by the God who is Being itself, the ground and
abyss of every being. And the God who is a person is transcended by the
God who is the Personal - Itself, the ground and abyss of every person. 
In statements like these, religion and ontology m e e t . " ^ ®  The 
categories of biblical religion can, then, and must be united to the 
philosophical search for ultimate reality. Biblical symbols involve 
ontological assertions, and for this reason theology is inevitably 
driven to ask the question of the structure of being. Therefore, his 
argument here is that if biblical symbols are taken literally, God
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becomes a person, a being among other beings who is subject to being - 
itself and who therefore cannot become an object of ultimate concern, 
since he is not ultimate reality. What is needed, therefore, is an 
ontology which makes God really 'ultimate' by interpreting him as being 
-itself.
Thus, Tillich is convinced that theology cannot escape metaphysics. 
The theologian cannot speak without using terms which have philosophical 
meaning and significance. Even if the theologian restricts himself to 
biblical language - which is practically impossible, he does not escape 
the fact that even the biblical writers used words which have a cultural 
origin and which involve basic metaphysical doctrines. Every situation 
in which revelation is received and expressed is shaped by the personal 
and cultural backgrounds of the persons to whom the revelation comes, 
whether in biblical times or now. Thus, if the theologian cannot 
restrict himself to the biblical terminology or to the language of 
classical theology and, therefore, cannot avoid philosophical concepts, 
then I think his argument about the relational character between 
theology and philosophy, or between biblical religion and ontology in 
Tillich's terms, is correct in saying that "the ontological question of 
being creates not a conflict but a necessary basis for any theoretical 
dealing with the biblical concept of the personal God. If one starts to 
think about the meaning of biblical symbols, one is already in the midst 
of ontological problems. So he reminds us of the fact that theology
'must use the conceptual tools of its period.■'172
Nevertheless, he fails to make the content of the Christian 
revelation ultimate for ontology. His position makes too radical a 
separation between the existential and the cognitive approaches to
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reality. Revelation is robbed of its objective content and reduced to 
symbols and formals which grasp reality only fragmentarily. ^ 3  Biblical 
symbols are largely thought of as meanings and forms which give 
structure to the content provided by history and experience, but they 
are not thought to be literally true. It seems to me that in the 
Christian message, ’God’ means 'a being', not 'being-itself'. He is, of 
course, not a being 'alongside' others, but He is a being 'above 
others'. Therefore, 'existence' can be predicated of Him, though not 
the contingent finite existence of His creatures. He is a concrete 
individual, though an individual without the limits of finite 
individuals. He is not merely 'the ground of everything personal'; he 
is personal Himself. If this is the Christian view, then he does not 
take seriously enough the personal category as an ultimate ontological 
principle. The ontological significance of biblical religion is simply 
that reality as a whole supports the personal and, therefore, religious 
experience is validated. However, actually God as a personal being is 
swallowed or absorbed in being-itself, which is at best transpersonal if 
not impersonal. This does not sound like the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob, above all, the God of Jesus of Nazareth.
Thus, it must be said that the Christian message has an objective 
content in the sense that it implies that certain things are really true 
about God and his relationship to the world and to men. This content is 
essential to its very nature. The Christian message cannot be reduced 
to mere formal meanings which have no objective truth. In this regard, 
Brunner's thesis regarding the nature of biblical truth seems to be 
essentially correct in the sense that the fundamental reality of the 
faith consists not in truths about God, however important they may be in 
a secondary sense, but in the personal encounter with him in the
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revelatory experience. The Christian revelation must be understood from 
within itself. Ontology must be based not on objective philosophical 
principles which always end by making God an impersonal Absolute or an 
abstract It, but on the personal categories derived from the personal 
encounter with God and which appear in the Bible. Doctrines are, then, 
instrumental in that they provide the necessary framework in which this 
encounter takes place. However, Brunner's argument does not seem to be 
enough to give more room for a positive correlation between theology and 
philosophy with his belief in a general revelation in the creation. For 
he uses the categories of the personal and person, but he never brings 
these concepts into organic relation with a contemporary world view. He 
contends that God can be thought of in no other way than the way he 
reveals himself, and that is as the Sovereign Person, the Absolute 
Subject.
If this is so, then Brunner's polemic against objectivity stems
from a misunderstanding of some of its implications. In general we may
say that Brunner has confused language with that to which it refers.
Since he wishes to refer to very personal experiences, Brunner claims
that theoretical and abstract language is out of place. However, one
possible way of tackling these problems might be to follow up
Wittgenstein's reference to theology: "Grammar tells us what kind of
object anything is (Theology as grammar)"174 by considering the
different kinds of concepts used in doctrines and the ways in which they
have been formed. Wittgenstein's remarks on reference to theology comes
in the following context:
One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when 
one imagines anything, but how the word "imagination" is 
used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about 
words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination 
is as much about the word "imagination" as my question is.
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And I am only saying that this question is not to be decided 
- neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for 
anyone else - by pointing; nor yet by a description of any 
process. The first question also asks for a word to be 
explained; but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer. 
Essence is expressed by grammar.^7^
As shown to us in the previous discussion (see VI.2.1), the later 
Wittgenstein claims that the question of what the religious life is is 
not to be settled by ostensive definition, or by description of any 
interior goings-on, neither for the subject nor for the observer.^7  ^
The answer lies in attending to the kind of things that we are permitted 
to say about these matters, by the rules of the conversation. The kind 
of object that a thing is comes out in the kind of things that is 
appropriate to say about it. This evidently goes for 'God' as much as 
for 'imagination1. To explain what the word 'God' means we have to 
listen to what it is permissible to say about the subject: "The great 
difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were 
something one couldn't do. As if there really were an object, from 
which I derive its description, but I were unable to show it to anyone. 
- And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the 
temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the application 
of the picture g o e s . 77
It is then easy enough to say that we no longer explain these words 
in the substantive terms that turn the referents into mysterious 
objects. It is more instructive, Wittgenstein implies, to give in to 
the paradigm of designating material objects and see what confusion it 
creates for us. It stills seems that, if I have a conception of God, 
for example, I have to have something facing me from which I derive 
descriptions. But there is nothing here that we are incapable of doing. 
It is an illusion to think that we either could or could not get a
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picture of the object: there is no such object. So Wittgenstein
reminds us that we have no alternative to attending to the signs, the 
repertoire of gestures and so on that interweave our existence. We have 
no access to our own minds, non-linguistically. We have no access to 
the divine, independently of our life and language. It goes against the 
grain, so captivated are we by the metaphysical tradition, but 
Wittgenstein keeps reminding us of the obvious fact: we have nothing
else to turn to but the whole complex system of signs which is our human 
world. There are these forms of human life and thought and, since these 
forms have no independent basis outside themselves, a request for their 
justification can be met only by a careful description of the language 
in which they find expression, and of its place in our lives: !,the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."^7® 
Thus Wittgenstein's main point of using such expressions is, then, to 
draw attention to social contexts or Wittgenstein's use of term 'forms 
of life' which give language its intelligibility.
2.3 God, person and the community of the language of faith 
In the previous discussion I have attempted to show how Brunner 
inescapably extends his notion of the relationship between revelation 
and reason to language which is related to the demand for 
'contemporaneousness' in theology. In his view, language is the 
'setting' of the intellectual and historical environment. For this 
reason, he uses the categories of the personal and person in order to 
communicate the message of Christ to the man of the Zeitgeist. However, 
even though his argument about the personal encounter with God in the 
revelatory experience, namely, the Christ-event, seems to be essentially 
correct, it cannot be enough to make room for bringing his categorical 
term 'person' to reasonable minds as Brunner actually indicates. For
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him the thought of revelation may be stated simply as a personal 
revelation. Basic to his concept of the personal is the notion of the 
communication of the incommunicable (see IV.3.3). He stresses this 
point, that a person cannot be t h o u g h t . R e v e l a t i o n  is, then, the 
communication of God and His will, but through the thought there is
never a personal connection. A personal revelation is a revelation of
God who is absolute mystery.
Accordingly, to say that revelation is personal is to say that it 
is simultaneously revelation and concealment. Biblical revelation is 
the unconditionally making known of the unconditionally hidden. The 
real biblical truth of revelation is not something but God,^®® and God 
does not cease in His revelation to be the mysterious one. This is not 
to say that revelation is not a communication of truth; on the contrary 
revelation communicates the truth which is personal truth. The highest 
that we know is not the ’thing1 but the ’person'. God alone is true
person; man is person only as an image of God: he is a person by
likeness. "A personal God and a personal truth are not possible when 
our knowledge of God is the result of an interpretation of the world and 
the Ego. Personal faith and knowledge of a personal God who is Lord of 
the world can be gained only when God reveals himself personally. 8 1  
But Brunner immediately adds that revelation is not only personal in its 
conveyance of the message and in the thing that is revealed, the person; 
but it is also given to persons, to men.
The essence of revelation, then, in keeping with Brunner's 
personalistic premises (see III.3.4), is divine self-communication, in 
which the recipient necessarily becomes related to a thou. God does not 
communicate something in revelation, but Himself. Since God is person
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par excellence, i t  is a matter of 'absolute c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' . ^ 
Therefore, in my knowledge about that which has been communicated to me 
in revelation I remain wholly bound to the event of the communication, 
to the particularity of the revelation and its bearer. I must let him 
say it to me. This dependence upon a historical person belongs to the 
essence of revelation. Only the meeting between the divine 'Thou' and 
human 11 ' or the meeting where the Word of revelation is spoken and is 
met by the answer of faith, is personal. Brunner says, "we know
the person as that which makes itself known to us through speaking to 
us, through revealing himself in speech. Hence, since God Himself 
speaks to us, and in so doing manifests Himself to us, the idea of 
'person' is the only one which is appropriate to describe Him".^®^
As already shown (see III.2.3), Brunner comes to the concept of God 
as 'person' through his application of the Buberian I-Thou relationship 
even though he considerably alters it. This analysis is summed up in 
the following two points
(1) The I-thou relationship is something completely different from the 
relationship of the self to the world, from the relationship of 
thinking to its object.
(2) Every 'thou' we can know only if it reveals itself. Yet there is a 
certain possibility of recognising a human thou ourselves.
The first of these points consists in a separation of the thou from the 
world of objects, from the mere products of thinking, from the object. 
The thou is something different from the 'non-self'. The non-self is 
the world, the totality of the objects. The thou, however, is the non­
self which is a self like myself, of which I only become aware when it 
is not thought by my own efforts, or perceived as an object, but when it 
makes itself known to me as self-active, self-speaking, as '1-over-
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against-me1 . 1®® Thus in contrast to all that can be called 'it', the 
'self' (or !l') is a subject, a personality. The contrast between 
subject and object is, therefore, fundamental for the I-thou
relationship insofar as I am only concerned with the relationship of one 
subject to the other.
The second point consists in a distinction between the subject, per 
se, who is God and the relative thou, the relative subject, which is 
man. The mystery of human personality is not absolute; it is only 
relative, because it is not only 'other than I 1 but 'the same as I '.187
Thus, I have two sources for recognising a human thou, the self-
revelation of the unknown thou and my being a subject, my being a
person:
Man is in the Image of God, his personality derives from 
God's, yet just because it is from God his person is 
different from God's. God - the God known to us in His Word 
- is the unconditioned, the underived, the eternally self­
sustained person, on no side limited, and, save from 
Himself, by naught determined, absolute and, to Himself, 
absolutely transparent Spirit... He is to Himself self­
related, one knowing and willing Himself in love, the Triune 
God. Wherefore, only the Triune God is genuinely personal, 
for He is within Himself self-related, willing, knowing, 
loving Himself.1®®
Now, with God the case is different. He is the Thou, the absolute 
Subject. This has certain consequences with respect to the question how 
I can come to know about God. "Therefore I cannot myself 
unconditionally think God as this unconditioned Thou, but I can only 
know Him insofar as He Himself, by His own action, makes Himself known 
to me".1®9 Here I have only one source: God's revelation. The reason
why a divine revelation is necessary is that "God is only Subject, He is 
not also Object; He is the absolute Subject, subject in the 
unconditional, unlimited sense."190 whereas the world is an object, man
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is a subject, but a subject which is at the same time an object.1^1 God 
is subject only, never object. This concept of God as the subject, the 
unconditional subject, in Brunner's view, is not only the starting point 
for theological thinking, but its very c o n t e n t .  ^ 2  For him, the thought 
of God as the subject is immediately connected with the thought of 
revelation. Ultimately these two are but one. God, who essentially is 
the absolute subject, is also the God of the revelation. There is an 
indissoluble unity of God's essence and revelation, not only in the 
sense that God's essence is made known through the revelation, but in 
the sense that it is the essence of the God of the revelation.193
So, if this analysis is correct, then it shows to us the fact that 
Brunner may primarily use the term 'person' to indicate the revelation 
of God rather than the essence of God even though he attempts to 
maintain an indissoluble unity of God's essence and revelation. It is 
difficult, however, to say exactly what Brunner meant by the term 
'person'. For instance, he rejects the philosophical concept of God in 
its Platonic and Neoplatonic forms and the like - one which is alien to 
the Bible. On the other hand, he recognises that man can think out a 
God for himself - the history of philosophy makes this quite plain. In 
extreme cases a man can think a personal God. Theistic philosophy is 
then a genuine and extreme possibility, even though this personal God 
who has been conceived by man remains something which has been thought, 
the object of our t h o u g h t - w o r l d .  ^ 4  In this regard, insofar as Brunner 
claims that persons are not objects but subjects, they have a claim on 
us to be known as 'thou', he is, I think, guilty of confusion. For it 
becomes evident that he is unable to maintain any qualitative 
distinction between a personal God of faith, and a personal God of 
reason.
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Perhaps Brunner might claim that indeed reason cannot be excluded 
from the realm of faith. Even the word of revelation is logos, 
'meaning1, which must be received by us as "something which has been 
thought". He has not been thinking of division but of distinction. 
Faith is not apart from reason, yet it transcends reason. There would 
be no particular occasion to dispute with Brunner the fact that faith 
involves more than knowledge, if he simply meant to say thereby that it 
includes the elements of assent and trust. He argues, however, that 
faith not only goes beyond reason, but also curb's it, goes against it. 
Even though we must think in the act of faith as well as about the act 
of faith, our thought must ever return to the primal situation of 
personal encounter. There must be a constant suspension of the 
tangential tendencies of logic through holding fast to the revelational 
event (see IV.4.3). He may insist that faith has its own evidence which 
is superior to the categories of reason, and therefore the 
'contradictory1 revealed truths of the Bible are no barrier to it. 
Faith grasps the truths behind the paradoxes which it employs. If this 
is so, then, in the last analysis, not only is reason no proper 
criterion of revealed truth, but there is no criterion whatever.
The problem, however, is to find whether we can make any proper 
remarks about Brunner's use of the terms 'person', 'personal' and 
'personality'- and the like. His dissatisfaction with the emphasis on 
the false objectivism of Orthodoxy's doctrine of propositional 
revelation leaves him with Luther's dictum to the effect that the 
scriptures are 'the manger in which Christ is laid'. The concept of 
man's encounter with God necessarily implies that the person of God is 
historically and personally actualised in Jesus C h r i s t .  ^ 5  It is 
through the recognition that Jesus Christ establishes the 'point of
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contact1 between God and man that this encounter takes place (see
1.1.2). It will, therefore, be clear that Brunner's understanding of 
the terms 'person' and 'personality' consists in an application of his 
early Kierkegaardian individualism and that of his later Buberian 
communalism. As shown to us in the previous discussion (see IV.1.2), 
the early Brunner shared Kierkegaard's concept of individual and 
subjectivism together with an unshakable conviction in the absolute 
otherness of God against Hegelian immanence. However, simultaneous with 
the development of his increased appreciation for the experiential side 
of Christian piety, but affecting the fundamental structure of Brunner's 
thinking much more profoundly, was an awakened appreciation for the 
dimension of Buberian personalism (see IV.3.4). His interest in man as 
person is at the bottom of his concern to work out a 'Christian 
missionary theology' as he calls it, and a social ethic.
This suggests to us that the later Brunner's position seems to be 
precisely to oppose individualism by an emphasis on the communal nature 
of human life, even though he does not make any substantial change of 
Kierkegaard's f o r m u l a , t h a t  is, "man is an individual and as such is 
at once himself and the whole race, in such wise that the whole race has 
part in the individual, - and the individual has part in the whole 
r a c e " .  ^ 7  Accordingly, the notion of Kierkegaard's 'individual' is 
reformulated with the aid of the I-Thou framework of Buber (and Ebner). 
The 'individual' who is both himself and the race is represented as 'the 
I-Thou' relationship; as a result, in Brunner's I-Thou framework 
communalism is emphasised by definition - "I am not man at all apart 
from others. I am not 'I' apart from the 'Thou'. As I cannot be a 
human being without a relation to God, without the Divine 'Thou', so 
also I cannot be man without the human 'Thou'." ^ 8
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This emphasis on the essentially communal nature of human life 
also finds expression in Brunner's concept of personality. Personality 
is not a predicate of the I, but of the I-Thou. Personality is not 
synonymous with individuality, but rather embraces both individuality 
and humanity. Thus personality is not something individual, but it is 
real only in mutuality, in fellowship. Personality and fellowship are 
correlates, i.e. the one is not either thinkable or actual without the 
other.199
God has created man not only for communion with Himself, but 
also communion with his fellow creatures. He has created 
man, from the very outset, not only as an individual, but as 
a member of the most comprehensive human activity. 
Election, as the call out of the world to Himself, is at the 
same time that which calls human beings together, the 
\<.\y)<TL 5 is necessarily connected with the €-KK A e (TLdi. , its
c o r r e l a t e . 2 0 0
In this regard, Brunner's concept of person or personality as 
communion or communality again indicates that God's nature is the will 
to self-communication, that is to say, God wills to have fellowship with 
his human creatures.201 in Brunner's view, just as the concept of the 
revelation is included in the concept of God as the absolute subject, so 
also God's love is included in the revelation. For, as the revelation 
is God's self-communication, so also God's love is this self­
communication. Thus, he can say that "revelation as the self­
communication of God, is the act of Divine Love. As the One who
reveals, namely, as the One who reveals Himself, God is One who
loves. "202 Here Brunner's notion of revelation can be seen as the
necessity for the missionary witness of the church. As the saving 
revelation of God in Christ is a historic act, so knowledge of it 
starts from a point in time and in space. That knowledge comes through 
the witness of the disciples 'beginning at Jerusalem' and extending to
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the whole world. In this regard, the church is not only the bearer of 
the Word of Christ, but also the bearer of His Spirit and life, and in 
fact His self-representation. So Brunner uses the term 'proclaiming 
existence' which indicate the church as 'every form of historical life 
which has its origin in Jesus Christ and acknowledges in Him its 
foundation and supreme norm.203 it is this proclaiming existence of the 
church which makes known the revelation that occurred in Christ, that 
announces the revelation to come in glory, and that, while doing so, 
becomes itself faith creating revelation.
At the same time the notion of church implies that the primary 
commission of the church is not mere doctrine but proclamation. It must 
always have doctrinal content but it is itself something other than 
doctrine; it is, say, 'faith-awakening, faith-furthering and faith- 
wooing address'. For Brunner, genuine proclamation (or preaching) means 
an event entirely personal. He is therefore convinced that in every man 
there is a will and a knowledge at the side of which the proclaimer can 
place himself, where he can find his 'point of contact'. If man has not 
yet heard the Word of God, and if in him there is no knowledge about it, 
then of course discussion with him would be useless; and perhaps there 
is no point in discussing anything with him. However, as already shown 
to us, Brunner maintains that the church should enter into a genuine 
discussion with man. It should take seriously the fact that, every man 
already has something which may contribute to true insight, that he is 
capable of responding to the address of God so that the continuing 
discussion may lead to increased insight.
On the other hand, since Brunner is convinced that the origins of 
the institutional misunderstanding of the church are the same as those
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of the intellectual misunderstanding of faith, that is, they lie in the 
error of objectivist thought, he attempts to make a connection between 
the intellectual misunderstanding of faith and the institutional 
misunderstanding of the c h u r c h . ^04 In his opinion, it is precisely this 
which is the 'eighteen-hundred-years-old1 misunderstanding of the 
church. It consists of understanding the church as an institution and 
then simply identifying this institution with the ecclesia, the 
community in Christ of the New Testament. Unlike the institutional 
church, the ecclesia is brought into being only by men who are 
apprehended by the Word of God, which is Jesus Christ himself, and so 
are brought into a personal relationship to him. In other words, he 
places emphasis on the personal element in the notion of the church.
Accordingly, this relationship is vertically realized as a 
fellowship with God, and in the horizontal sense as a human fellowship, 
a brotherhood. Whereas it was later supposed that to describe what the 
church is, it was sufficient to apply to it the two objective criteria 
of 'pure doctrine' and the 'right administration of the sacraments', the 
New Testament contains a whole series of other characteristics by which 
it was possible to tell whether one belonged to the community of Christ: 
a lively faith, the endurance of suffering, zeal for service, true 
brotherly love, mutual exhortation - all characteristics which 
distinguish the church not as an institutional body, but as a personal 
fellowship. The proof of membership lies not in purity of doctrine, but 
in evidence of discipleship. In this picture which Brunner paints of 
the New Testament ecclesia, there is something else associated with his 
emphasis on the personal element, and this is a positive evaluation of 
the enthusiasm of the Spirit which prevailed in the earliest 
communities. The early Christians were conscious of possessing the
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pneuma, the Holy Spirit, and with this went powers of a non-rational 
nature. The Spirit seizes not merely the understanding, but also the 
heart. If theology, as its name implies, is directed towards what is 
'logical1, then it is not an appropriate instrument with which to 
understand this activity of the Holy Spirit which is beyond logic.20®
However, a question might be raised at this point, and a certain 
lack of clarity in Brunner's claim about the church would appear. 
Sometimes he talks as if we were not able to reach certain objective 
criteria for application of the term 'the ecclesia', but only a personal 
relationship or a kind of discipleship. It is difficult to bring this 
position into agreement with his claim that the ecclesia is 'the form of 
life in which faith itself necessarily finds expression, not a mere 
subsidiary help'.200 The believer in Jesus Christ uses the words, 
idioms and imagery of the Bible, such as freedom and world, saved by 
grace, Kingdom of God and so on. They are forms of his faith, since 
they belong to God's unique revelation to him. Following on 
Wittgenstein's remarks, to imagine a language means to imagine a form of 
life.207 Becoming acquainted with a language is not simply mastering a 
vocabulary and rules of grammar. Rather, the language of faith has a 
meaning to the believer if the language of Christian faith is the 
language of a believer, one who has been 'caught' by the Gospel; and 
therefore the language of faith has meaning when it is taken to refer to 
the Christian way of life.20® If this is so, then Brunner's claim that 
the term 'the ecclesia' is incompatible with objectivity leads to 
confusion and, it would appear, self-contradiction.
In spite of this, Brunner does not deny the fact that the Word of 
God comes to us, say as a human word - as the word of an Isaiah, a Paul,
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or a John. It makes use of a definite human language that is already in 
existence, with its vocabulary and its grammar. "The Word of God makes 
use of these languages, and thus presupposes the understanding of these 
l a n g u a g e s . " 2 ^  so what he suggests here is that the communication of 
the gospel assumes the rational capacity and nature of man. Reason is 
the prerequisite of faith. "The humanum, that which distinguishes man 
from the beasts, is necessary in order that faith may occur. The Word
of God, although it distinguishes itself as God’s Word from everything
that man knows of himself, can only be spoken to bne who has the general 
capacity of speech. This capacity for speech or power of using words, 
of speaking and being spoken to, precisely this formal personality 
(Persona quod) is the conditio sine qua non of faith, it is that also 
which is not destroyed but preserved in faith. "210 change that
takes place in the one who receives the gospel in faith requires, then, 
not a change in the rational meaning of words but a change in the man 
himself. The radical character of this change is indicated by the 
assertion that it involves the death of the 'old man1 and the birth of 
the 'new man' . But in this drastic change the same man or subject
persists. This is the continuity of reason in the discontinuity of
faith.2  ^^
So the communication of the Christian faith whether in the 
preaching of the gospel in a 'Christian' community or in the midst of a 
non-Christian people has two aspects or dimensions. There is, first, 
the intelligible use of the common language of the moral and spiritual 
life and the direct address to the rational mind. Men of all faiths can 
understand one another to a large extent in this discourse because they 
are all basically the same in formal personality. But this form of 
communication does not of itself make converts. It can only give
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theoretical knowledge about Christ. 'Accepting Christ1 or becoming a 
Christian lies in another dimension, namely, that of personal confession 
of sin and acceptance of forgiveness in and through Christ. No one can 
question the necessity or personal response and the fact that it goes 
beyond the theoretical knowledge of Christ; nor that the real point of 
effective contact for the preacher or missionary is this inner awakening 
and c o n v i c t i o n . ^ 12 Thus Brunner suggests that the relation of 
revelation and reason as one of mutual involvement yet also of tension 
and even conflict is analogous to the fact that the Christian faith is 
intimately involved with culture, yet is never to be identified with it. 
The only solution Brunner has for this problem is, therefore, a kind of 
balance between the biblical revelation and rational thought, or 'faith' 
and 'rationality' in which rational discussion goes far beyond the 
affirmations of 'faith', though it must always be prepared to be held in 
check by these. Underlying these ideas, however, there is always the 
thought that the rather inexact, pictorial conceptions of faith can and 
should be given more adequate expression by theology.^13
Following on Wittgenstein's remarks on 'forms of life' and
' language-games1, Fergus Kerr points out that it is hard to imagine how
people would awaken to the possibility of religious faith by having it
proved to them that there is something more powerful than anything in
the world. On the other hand, it is easy to think of people who have
wanted to analyse and justify their faith by securing rational grounds
for it but who then find themselves no longer able to believe in God.^^
Wittgenstein remarks on the possibility of religious faith as follows:
Life can educate one to a belief in a God. And experiences 
too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and 
other forms of sense experience which show us the 'existence 
of this being', but e.g. sufferings of various sorts. These 
neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us
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an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him.
Experiences, thoughts, - life can force this concept on us.
So perhaps it is similar to the concept of 'object'.^15
It is not that God is perceived or surmised as an object - the concept 
'object' fits into the conversation quite differently from all talk 
about any particular object. It is easy to imagine people who do most 
of what we do, but without having the concept of an object at all. That 
is to say: talking of God is like talking of an object, provided that
we remember how different the concept of an object is from the concept 
of a table or a star or a theorem. But for various reasons, connected 
with the metaphysical impulse and scientific curiosity, the concept of 
an object has forced itself irreversibly upon our culture. Analogously, 
Wittgenstein suggests, given certain experiences, sufferings, 
reflections and so on, the concept of God has forced its way into our 
forms of life.
With regard to the problem of religious language, I have already 
suggested that theologians are in a good position to understand 
Wittgenstein who himself pioneered the way from logical positivism to a 
broader and more flexible conception of language analysis (see VI.2.1). 
He remakrs: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In 
use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its 
life?"^^ The point is that isolated elements of language 'come alive1 
as they get used in wider contexts. His stress on the multiplity of 
language-games is a fundamental part of his attempts to get rid of the 
assumption that logic is prior to all experience and that it constitutes 
the a priori order to the world. Logic is found within the various 
language-games themselves. In other words, we learn to distinguish 
between sense and nonsense in different ways by actually using language 
in the varied circumstances of social life.217 For Wittgenstein, life
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and language are not two separate things. Language is not added to 
social life to facilitate communication, as though language were simply 
a means to express something apart from itself. When a form of life can 
no longer be imagined, its language can no longer be understood.
Furthermore, Wittgenstein's remarks on 'theology as grammar' may be 
of considerable theological interest, and it appears twice in his later 
literature as follows:
(a) Essence is expressed by grammar.
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as 
grammar) . 218
(b) How words are understood is not told by words alone 
(Theology).219
As Alan Keightley points out, when Wittgenstein uses the word 'essence', 
he refers to the conventions in social and linguistic activities, seen 
as a single weave, e.g. 'If you talk about essence - you are merely 
noting a convention1.220 These conventions are the bedrock, the given. 
Language-games rest on human conventions. It is human beings who are 
responsible for the conventions by which language is used. Language 
can, and in fact does, change. Wittgenstein makes this clear in the 
following statement: "This multiplicity is not something fixed, given 
once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may 
say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get 
forgotten".221 But language is always embedded in a situation, in human 
customs and institutions. It is closely interwoven with the ways we 
view the world and our activities within it.
Thus, language and life rest on conventions. While they have no 
necessity beyond what human beings do, they are not arbitrary. In
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referring to social arrangements as conventional, we must also recognise 
that they are natural. The conventions or bedrock are formed through 
the grammar of our language. It is what people do and say which forms 
their grammar, i.e. what it makes sense to say is inextricably bound-up 
with what it makes sense to do. For Wittgenstein, grammar governs the 
possibilities of intelligible experience, and hence limits what the 
world could contain. Grammar, he says, governs "the 'possibilities' of 
phenomena" by regulating "the kind of statement that we make about 
phenomena".^22 what he has in mind here is that certain phenomena only 
'exist', as it were, because our language contains their possibility. 
There are language-games played which allow us to speak of certain 
phenomena. In this regard, theology gives expression to a particular 
way of life. Words alone are empty of life. They have to be nourished 
by their use in a community. The language of religion has, or should 
have, then an active grammar. The essences have made religion what it 
is. These essences are 'expressed by grammar1 - grammar tells us 'what 
kind of object anything is'. It seems, then, reasonable to assume that 
Wittgenstein's correlation of grammar and essence implies that theology 
must be related to a living community which embodies the conventions and 
beliefs expressed by theology. Theology, as 'grammar', articulates the 
standards of intelligibility implicit in the language and activities of 
a religious traditions.
Thus the language of faith is also a language within the community 
of faith. As this community develops, it affects the language because 
the concepts of the language of faith are related to the factual 
circumstance of the community, and it may be said that a Christian 
cannot speak the language of faith in separation from the life of the 
community of faith. As already shown to us, the term 'ecclesia' in the
359
New Testament is the assembly of God called by Jesus Christ, and 
represents in this sense a unified concept. This unity, however, exists 
with an emphasis on spiritual freedom and an emphasis on established 
office, and yet this office is never an exclusive institution of faith. 
The language of faith in the New Testament is, in this respect, the 
language of faith within a concrete community. For this reason every 
time the meaning of Christ is rediscovered, a new language is born out 
of the clash of two worlds, the gospel and the present; every time this 
birth takes place, the church must wait for the judgement concerning 
this new language. Here lies a final double meaning of the Holy Spirit 
for the speech of our faith. We wait for the Spirit to challenge us to 
creativity, and we wait for the Spirit to point toward the failure. By 
accepting the freedom to create in the newness of the Spirit we put 
ourselves under the judgement of this Spirit. The language of faith is 
never ultimate, either in the past or in the present. In the final 
adoration of history, a hymn of praise will fill the spaces of heaven; 
but until then the church is driven into hearing ever again and creating 
ever again the imagery by which it can understand, communicate, and 
praise the biblical miracle of God's love for man. The church must 
always wait for the end, ready to have its language challenged and 
renewed. Christian language is the speech of the believer who is rooted 
in the gospel, who speaks to the present, and who waits for the end.^23
This last point shows that I am not claiming that the way of 
spiritual creativity in the language of faith exhausts the meaning of 
religious concepts. In preaching and theology, in life and worship, we 
receive through the Spirit the power, freedom and courage to seek 
incessantly new idioms of response and new means of verbalizing the 
gospel, new tools in our understanding of biblical faith, and new
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language by which we can speak to the world. The newness of faith leads 
to the newness to speech; and the creative power in the freedom in 
Christ must result in the creativity of Christian language.^24 
Possibilities of spiritual renewal are however expressed through 
religious language-games, hence this is one way of learning the 
’grammar1 of religious concepts. It is important to see that the 
problems have arisen within a certain way of life, and that the urge to 
answer them is a religious language, although one cannot indeed use 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy to escape from traditional theological 
problems such as the questions of ontology a n d  t r u t h . ^25
Of course, in our thinking we are often confronted with seemingly 
insoluble problems. An apparently valid argument may lead us to 
unacceptable conclusions. Sometimes we are confronted with questions 
for which there are no answers, or only absurd answers. Sometimes we 
cannot see how something that we know to be the case, can indeed be so. 
In such situations, as Wittgenstein puts it, we feel like a prisoner 
caught in his own conceptual net. It is the task of philosophy to free 
us from this kind of captivity. 'What is your aim in philosophy? - To 
shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle1.226 Wittgenstein also 
compares this captivity with an illness and philosopher's task with a 
therapy that might cure our minds. "The philosopher's treatment of a 
question is like the treatment of an illness."227 According to
Wittgenstein, the cause of the illness lies in language. The conceptual 
forms built into our language, cast a spell on us. The philosopher, 
therefore, has the task of freeing us from this enchantment: "Philosophy 
is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language."228 philosopher's task, then, is to examine concepts in
order to ascertain within what forms of life, or 'language-games', or
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categories they belong, and by this means to free us from the category 
mistakes which hold us captive.^29
Similarly, if missionary theology is itself, in a certain sense, a 
form of conceptual inquiry, namely, an inquiry concerning the basic 
concepts of the Christian faith in order to communicate the message of 
Christ, then familiarity with conceptual inquiry is not only useful but 
essential for the pursuit of this theology. The Christian faith, so far 
as Christian theology is concerned, is not an esoteric affair, remote 
from ordinary life and from other human pursuits. Hence, too, most of 
the fundamental concepts employed in expressing the Christian faith are 
ordinary everyday concepts except for a few really technical terms. In 
this regard, a missionary theology like a philosophy, is 'an activity of 
elucidation', that is to say, the activity of clarifying and analysing 
the content of our talk about God and the reflection on the fundamental 
concepts exercised in the church’s talk about God. However, this does 
not ignore or deny the fact that the language of the church is always 
threatened by two dangers: the danger of making the Word of the personal 
God subservient to the given self-understanding of man, and the danger 
of its becoming a secret language by disregarding this self- 
understanding. 230 Rather, if Brunner suggests that the notion of 
missionary theology is an intellectual presentation of the gospel of 
Christ, which starts from the spiritual situation of the hearer, and is 
addressed to it, then my argument is that it cannot, or should not, 
escape the problem of language as an essential component of our doing 
this theology since the only way the subject matter of theology unfolds 
is through the language of faith and since language is the basic and 
all-pervasive expression of every cultural and religious situation.
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VII CONCLUSION
I have suggested that in the work of Emil Brunner there is a view of the 
communication of the Christian message which could say a great deal to 
our modern missionary situation of the church. The reason for saying 
this is not just because it is ’relevant' to our contemporary missionary 
situation. Brunner's strong conviction of the necessary communication 
of the message for the man of the Zeitgeist should not be neglected in 
missionary-minded churches. He remarks: 'The Church exists by mission
just as a fire exists by burning'.1 So much theological reflection is 
permeated by the conception of the missionary task of theology and the 
church which is one essentially contained in the Christian gospel and 
necessarily connected with it. However, it is questionable whether 
Brunner has successfully achieved its missionary task in his theological 
proposal of truth as encounter. In this conclusion, the answer to this 
question should appear from the following discussion.
I want, first of all, to draw my main contention which emerges from . 
the preceding discussion. It may assist the reader to a clearer view of 
my argument that I venture to make the problem of language an essential 
component of our doing this theology. I say that one of the major 
difficulties confronting the Christian who enters into the questions 
raised by the unbeliever does not lie merely in the nature of religion 
and the confusion between religion and Christian faith. Rather, I have 
argued that the difficulty lies in the character of the language of 
faith. Many linguistic philosophy minded theologians claim that if the 
theologian is to communicate at all, he must establish some sort of 
contact points between his special senses of the words he uses and the 
ordinary senses of these words.^ He must convince us that the change of
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meaning is not so drastic as to erode the entire sense the words 
originally possessed. The search for these contact points and the 
general inquiry into meaningfulness certainly deserve to be counted as 
vital part of the missionary task since missionary theology is the 
question of how the gospel can be communicated, or it takes the form of 
a conversation between a Christian believer and an unbeliever.^
In this regard, Brunner has concerned himself with the problems 
centering around the claims of philosophy and science. This ties
indirectly with his missionary interest, for missionary theology has 
always sought to meet the criticisms of philosophy and science against 
the Christian faith. In the face of the problem of the relationship of 
theology and philosophy, he employs the Buberian I-Thou philosophy. His 
theology is, then, built around a framework that partitions reality into 
two realms, or dimensions, of existence, that is, the impersonal and the 
personal, it-truths and thou-truths. For Brunner, the biblical 
revelation cannot be properly understood either from the point of view 
of the object, as merely an outward event, or from the point of view of 
the subject as merely an inner process. Hence, Brunner seeks to 
overcome the imprisonment of theological thought in the object-subject 
dichotomy. He believes that it lies 'beyond objectivism and 
subjectivism1 . This is the concept of truth as encounter or personal 
correspondence which seems to herald the overcoming of the object- 
subject dichotomy in thought. Perhaps it seems to become his most 
important contribution to theological epistemology (see III.1.3). 
However, even though the emphasis (provided by the language of 
encounter) on the importance of personal experience for theological 
language is helpful, the notion of 'encounter' which is at the root of 
this position is beset with difficulties, and the theory of testing
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symbols against religious experience leads to what, for the theist, are 
unfortunate consequences.
In respect of the justification of religious belief, Basil Mitchell 
points out, for example, that the Buberian personalist protest owes much 
of its rhetorical force and its power as a stimulus to two dichotomies, 
which are neither of them as sharp as they are made to seem.^ They are 
(i) between talking to God, and about Him; (ii) between the personal I- 
Thou relation of encounter and the object I-it relation of scientific 
investigation. In the former case (i) he argues that when we talk to 
someone we are in a position to say something about him, to answer 
questions about his situation, character and behaviour and so on. What 
we believe about all this will affect how we address him and what we 
say. If this is so, then it is true that a man cannot talk about the 
mysteries of religion and at all understand what he is saying without a 
sense of creatureliness which is akin to humility and worship; and 
this is the beginning of an 'encounter' with God. However, emphasis on 
the personal nature of his relationship must admit its cognitive side 
too. In the latter case (ii) Mitchell rightly warns that the dichotomy 
between the relation of encounter between persons and that of objective 
scientific investigation looks deceptively clear-cut. For what 
differentiates them is precisely not one distinction but many, and to 
identify them leads us greatly to oversimplify the activities of 
scientists and to draw too sharp a line between them and other rational 
activities. Thus he rejects the protest as it stands. I think Mitchell 
is in the main right here. For if illusion is present sometime in 
'encounter', then without some objective check there is no ground 
assuring us that our experience is not always merely subjective emotion 
conjoined with personal interpretation.
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Brunner, of course, admits the power' of reason in many spheres to 
arrive at true conclusions without the assistance of faith. In abstract 
subjects, like mathematics or physics, faith has nothing to say. But it 
is, for him, possible to talk of a conception of history or of 
psychology in a sense of Christian faith. The nearer that theme comes 
to this central point, the nature of man, and his relation to God, the 
greater the divergence between the interpretation given by faith and 
that given by reason. Therefore, problems of the interpenetration of 
the two spheres, that which is of the world and knowable and that which 
is a matter of revelation because above the world can never be 
absolutely, but only approximately solved.^ There is a wide area of 
middle problems where both reason and faith must be active. Brunner 
seeks to maintain the dialogue, trusting in the help of the Holy Spirit 
to shed light upon both parties to it. Such is what Brunner calls 'the 
law of closeness of relation', or the law of contiguity (see IV.4.3), 
and man 'can only understand himself truly and realistically when he 
understands himself in the light of faith in the Creator revealed in 
Christ'.6 This principle underlies his whole missionary task which he 
seeks to do. However, when the conflict between two spheres has come 
about because of confusion on the one side and arrogance on the other, 
in the last analysis, not only is reason no proper criterion of revealed 
truth, but there is no criterion whatever. I think Brunner involves, 
then, the whole question of religious truth in subjectivism even though 
he would protest, no doubt, that the inner experience of the Spirit's 
speaking to me has an objective point of reference, the Christ of 
history and, therefore, is the opposite of mysticism.
On my view, which seems to have been that of Wittgenstein in a 
broad sense, the problem of confusion in his use of the term 'encounter'
373
lies in the fact that the problem of religious language does not play a 
significant role in Brunner's thought. Instead, we are told that we 
need to distinguish from the start between the I-Thou and the I-It 
relationship, the one a relationship of personal encounter, the other of 
objective scientific investigation. Man's relationship with God is the 
I-Thou kind. Hence, it is a fundamental error to suppose that it can be 
described in an order of language designed to express objective matters 
of fact. Rather, 'encounter' refers to the experience of those moments 
when the self finds itself so manifestly confronted by another, 
independent 'Thou' that objective reference is part of the datum. So 
what is communicated in basic theological propositions is not 
information, but events and acts. Faith is not a matter of 'believing 
that', but of 'answering' the address of God in his Word; and therefore 
it rests on a decision made in response to a personal presence.
Accordingly, in facing a question of what the real measure of 
'appropriateness' of a symbol to the experience can be, Brunner may 
reply that no external standard is ultimately capable of arbitrating on 
this matter; even the Bible serves as authority only because its words 
are adjudged 'appropriate' to the experience of each generation of 
readers. The language of encounter is, then, ultimately justifiable 
only as the occasion of religious experience. Thus, the imprecision of 
theological symbols is forgotten once the encounter from which it 
springs and to which it leads is experienced in its inexpressible 
immediateness. In this way the language of encounter, by ruling out any 
such objective check, has effectively blocked any means of 
distinguishing between 'genuine' encounter with God and the illusory 
products of supercharged emotions. However, this sort of alleged 
incompatibility of objective language and Christian faith, I think,
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seems to be defective by excluding language which takes the form of a 
conversation between a Christian believer and an unbeliever. For I am 
convinced that all thinking and speaking is essentially objective, since 
it is indeed always thinking and speaking 'about something'. Thinking 
leads to assertions 'about something', and speech communicates these 
assertions in that it articulates them. As a result, even the speaking 
and thinking of theology is necessarily objective.^
Following Wittgenstein I have, therefore, argued that the question 
about the existence of something about which nothing can be said in any 
language turns out to be a spurious one. If someone invents a rule and 
tries to follow it, then he has no independent checks on whether or not 
he is following the rule correctly (and without the notions of correct 
and incorrect, there are no rules). So the possibility that a given 
symbol can convey a meaning rests upon the possibility of discriminating 
certain aspects of experience which are common to the public, or the 
Society, which understands and uses the symbol. Otherwise, there would 
be no criterion for the correct and incorrect usage of symbol. For 
instance, an expression (sound, gesture, etc.) becomes a linguistic 
symbol only when it communicates. To communicate it must be abstract in 
the sense that it refers to aspects of experience common to those who 
understand the language. It must be, then, objective in the sense that 
there must be some social criterion for correct and incorrect 
application. Thus, my argument is that if Brunner desires in his 
concept of personal encounter that we respect the 'otherness of the 
other', that is to say, He is not a mere object of my thought, but 
unique other who confronts me, then, it seems to me that an attitude of 
objectivity may sometimes rescue us from ignoring or distorting the 
otherness of the other. I grant that the most precious thing in my
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relation to an other is something immediately and uniquely present in 
the encounter. Yet it is unfortunately all too common for me to 
misconstrue what is given in that immediate relationship.
Furthermore, since Brunner claims that man's relationship with God 
is of the I-Thou kind, namely a relationship of personal encounter, he 
stresses this point, that a person cannot be thought. 'God and the 
medium of conceptuality are mutually exclusive. God is personal and 
discloses Himself only in the medium of personality, hence in a personal 
way, not through being thought, but through actual address, summons, 
command.'® But if we cannot think the personal, if God and the medium 
of conceptuality are mutually exclusive, then we can actually neither 
talk to God, nor talk about God. Perhaps in a usual manner Brunner 
makes much of the difference between the way in which we know an object 
and the way in which we know a person. Our knowledge of objects
involves only our own cognitive processes. But our knowledge of a
subject, a person, is wholly contingent upon an act of self-disclosure 
on the part of the person known. So he refers to the person to person 
encounter between human beings as analogous to the person to person
encounter between God and man. In a genuine encounter, object and
subject are taken into some third thing in which they cease to be more
object or more subject.
However, one can speak of 'cognitive encounter' with many
realities that have no personal character but which are not mere things
either. Life in all its dimensions cannot be grasped without an
encounter of the knowing and the known beyond the subject-object scheme. 
If this is so, then a question may arise whether the person to person 
encounter is the only valid analogy to the Divine-human encounter and
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whether, therefore, in the description of the way of knowing God, the 
personalistic categories should be used exclusively. Insofar as Brunner 
compares the meaning of ’person' applied to man with the meaning of 
’person’ applied to God, he sees the difference only in the removal of 
the human limitations with respect to being a person. But in this 
instance the language itself is a vital part of the concrete 
relationship itself, and it is necessarily abstract and objective. That 
which is said is an object of thought. Hence the theologian uses highly 
abstract and technical language, even when he writes about worship. If 
he objects to the abstraction and objectivity of such language, he would 
do well to lay down his pen.
Nevertheless, the crucial claim made by Brunner is that- what is 
true of revelation from God's side is also true of its acceptance on 
man's part. His faith and knowledge are also a personal event 
throughout. Revelation as the sovereign self-communication of God finds 
its counterpart in faith as the free self-giving of man. Thus faith is 
seen to be not knowledge of an object, but an act of trust: man is now
ready to receive his life from the hand of God and to exercise his 
responsibility in such a way that he responds to the word of God. In 
other words, revelation for Brunner is His lordship over man and His 
fellowship with him. God reveals himself first as the Lord and secondly 
as the One who wills to have fellowship with man. It follows, then, 
that faith must be thought of in personal terms. Even though all 
theological effort is directed toward truth, it is a truth which is not 
theoretically discerned, but only grasped 'in faith', that is to say, in 
an event which transforms the individual and integrates him into a 
fellowship, i.e., the ecclesia. Therefore, Brunner draws knowledge and 
fellowship into a unity: to know God means to be one with him.
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Probably a crucially distinguishing characteristic of the 
theological personalism of Brunner’s missionary theology is its 
employment of and relation to the concept of the ecclesia. In Brunner's 
view, it is the essential function of the ecclesia to bear witness to
the revelation in Christ in which God manifested his own nature to be
communicating love. It exists for the sake of this witness. The 
ecclesia is primarily nothing else than the organ and bearer of the 
Gospel by its preaching and pastoral works. So the principal thesis 
which Brunner advances, which forms his starting point and to which he 
constantly returns, is that the ecclesia, the community in Christ of the 
New Testament, is a purely personal fellowship, with nothing in the 
nature of an institution and, therefore, not yet a Church. As a result, 
Brunner attacks the Church which is something impersonal, an
institution, and something which exists above individual men in the same 
way as the state. He tends to identify the Church, the institutional 
Church, with the It-world or the impersonal sphere, while the ecclesia 
is the community of personal relations of an I-Thou kind. In this way he 
attempts to make a connection between the intellectual misunderstanding 
of faith and the institutional misunderstanding of the Church.
However, in biblical language, in becoming a Christian, the
Christian becomes a member of the Church. The difficulty is that people 
do not speak biblical language. In ordinary use, including the use of 
Christians, the word 'Church' refers to something objective: we go to
church; the church is at such and such an address; there are clergy 
and people in it and so on. As Van Buren points out, the linguistic 
difficulty arising from the difference between the biblical, or the 
theological, and ordinary uses of the word is nothing, however, compared 
to the theological problem of holding together biblical assertions
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concerning the ecclesia and descriptions of the sociological unit to 
which the biblical statements are supposed to apply.^ What appears 
sociologically to be ,an odd sort of group is often spoken of theologically 
as the 'Body of Christ'. This is not merely a description. Rather, it 
is a reference to the historical perspective which the members 
presumably have in common, and it suggests the harmony that would exist 
between people who shared this perspective. In this regard, a man 
becomes a Christian in the context of this community of believers, 
directly or indirectly, rather than in his own purely personal 
relationship. So, even though it indeed takes risks such as being 
depersonalised and collectivised, the faith of the community of Christ 
can continue and can make itself felt in the world only if it is willing 
to embody itself in worldly institutions. For this reason, I think the 
Church which is actually a sociological and theological reality has not 
only the inner life of its members but also its communal activities and 
institutions. Hence, the Church cannot remain alive without expressions 
of faith and the personal participation in them.
My argument about Brunner's notion of the Church is, I should 
emphasise on this point, that the Church is not merely the community of 
the persons-encounter; rather, it is the community of the forms of life 
in which the faith of Christ itself necessarily finds expressions. The 
community of Christ uses the words and speeches, such as the Kingdom of 
God, God the Father, saved by grace, righteousness, apostles and so on. 
They are forms of life of faith, since they belong to God's unique 
revelation to us. These words and speeches are translated, which means 
that they are given another frame of life and of thought. Otherwise, we 
may be involved in an abandonment of the gospel, for the gospel is about 
the Word made flesh. Every statement of the gospel in words is
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conditioned by the culture of which these words are a part, and every 
style of life that claims to embody the truth of the gospel is a 
culturally conditioned style of life. In this regard, even though the 
gospel calls into question all cultures, including the one in which it 
was originally embodied, there can never be culture-free gospel.^ jn 
any event, the language of the community of Christ enters into a 
concrete language which has already been molded. This necessarily means 
that the language of the community must, therefore, remain in dialogue 
with the language spoken elsewhere. This is demonstrated most clearly 
in the specific expressions of the language of faith.
This last point shows that the Church needs theology as grammar and 
syntax of Christian speech. This means that to talk about God is to use 
words and speeches whose meanings we have learned by their application 
to the world around us. We have no access to the divine, independently 
of our life and language. Hence talking about God has to be reflection 
on how the word 'God' is used in our life and language. Since God's 
Word does not bring God into language in isolation, language is the 
manifold echo to the question of God. So the event of the Word of God 
is necessarily bound up with the entire life of language. For if the 
Word of God brings the whole of our reality into language anew, then the 
reality which is already in language is necessarily addressed anew. 
This touches the root of the vexatious linguistic problem in the Word of 
God. The happening of the Word of God has created a linguistic 
tradition of its own, to be seen not only in many forms in the Bible, 
but also in great variety and indeed disharmony in the history of the 
Church.^ For this reason, theology, in practice, has always included a 
great deal of critical reflection on what people are inclined to say 
about God. Perhaps theology, like every other human occupation, is
subject to the limitations and errors of human understanding. But it is 
not only the humanness of theology which constitutes the uniqueness of 
its challenge in every age, but the challenge of the age itself.
Thus, in the foregoing discussion, I have wanted, at the same time, 
to suggest that in the face of the missionary situation a consideration 
of the way in which religious language attempts to understand and 
explain possibilities of spiritual renewal would be the most profitable 
way of carrying out missionary theology if Brunner claims that the 
missionary theology aims at interpreting the Gospel in such a way that
people of today can feel themselves addressed thereby in their
particular conditions. As Wittgenstein says in a somewhat different
context, it is 'Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out new 
facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do 
not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something 
that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense 
not to understand.'^ Now the things which we are seeking to understand 
are the forms of the church's life in which men may find spiritual
renewal. People still want to hear the Gospel, but it must be presented 
as relevant to life as it is seen to be lived.
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